Opinion
23A-CR-461
08-23-2023
Sage John-Cole Thomas, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT James D. Crum Coots Henke & Wheeler, P.C. Carmel, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable Michael A. Casati, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D01-2009-F3-5642
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
James D. Crum
Coots Henke & Wheeler, P.C.
Carmel, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Kathy Bradley
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
RILEY, JUDGE.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[¶1] Appellant-Defendant, Sage John-Cole Thomas (Thomas), appeals his convictions for criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon, a Level 3 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a); intimidation with a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony, I.C. § 35-45-2-l(a)(4); pointing a firearm, a Level 6 felony, I.C. 35-47-4-3(b); intimidation, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4); criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-2(a); and carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-47-2-1.
[¶2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶3] Thomas presents this court with two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
(1) Whether the State rebutted Thomas' claims of defense of property and self-defense; and
(2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Thomas' conviction for criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶4] On September 13, 2020, between noon and 2:00 p.m., James Manis (Manis) contacted Thomas through Snapchat to arrange for the purchase of a subwoofer Thomas had advertised for sale. Thomas and Manis met at a McDonald's in Westfield, Indiana, where they negotiated a price of $200 for the speaker. After checking the speaker to ensure it worked, Manis paid the agreed upon price and both Manis and Thomas left the McDonald's parking lot. When Manis returned home, he hooked up the speaker to hear the audio. Because the speaker "crackled and popped," Manis did not believe the speaker was working properly and he reached out to Thomas to ask for a refund. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 35). Thomas initially declined, but at some point, he agreed to refund the money. They decided to meet at the same McDonald's later that evening.
A subwoofer is an audio amplifier or speaker for a car.
[¶5] Manis arrived alone at McDonald's, while Thomas, who had been drinking, was accompanied by his friend, Lowees Hadad (Hadad). Manis, a registered gun permit holder, was wearing a gun in a holster on his front waistband. Thomas, who did not have a permit to carry a gun, carried a handgun in the back waistband of his pants. Manis and Thomas exited their respective vehicles, and Manis handed the speaker to Thomas. Thomas took the speaker, placed it in the backseat of his car, entered his car, and started to drive off without returning the $200 to Manis. When Manis realized Thomas was leaving with the speaker, he went around to the driver's side of the vehicle and retrieved the speaker from the backseat through the vehicle's open window.
[¶6] As Manis was returning to his vehicle with the speaker, Thomas approached him from behind and placed him in a headlock. After walking in a circle, with Manis still in a headlock, Thomas took Manis to the ground. At some point while they were on the ground, Manis' gun fell out of its holster. Hadad, who had exited Thomas' vehicle, picked up the gun and placed it in Manis' car. Thomas pulled his own gun out of his waistband, pointed it at Manis' head, and asked Manis, "do you want to die over a $200 sub?" (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 4041). Once Manis and Thomas hit the ground, Manis no longer had control over the speaker, which had fallen to the ground.
[¶7] Manis struggled to push the gun away from his head. Thomas' right hand was on the firearm in "classic shooter position." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 96). Manis had both "hands on the slide." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 96). Thomas released Manis' head, and "put his other hand on the firearm." (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 96-97). While Manis was trying to push the gun away from himself, it discharged. At the point of discharge, the gun was in Thomas' hand. Once the gun discharged, the altercation ended; Manis took Thomas' gun, got in his truck, locked the door, and called 911.
[¶8] When law enforcement arrived at the scene, Thomas, Manis, and Hadad were placed in custody and transported to the police station. Manis informed the officers that he had paid Thomas two one-hundred-dollar bills for the speaker. When Thomas was searched, no money was found on him, nor did the officers find the money in Thomas' car. Other than some change on the floor, no significant amount of money was found in Thomas' truck.
[¶9] On September 15, 2020, the State filed an Information, charging Thomas with Level 3 felony criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon; Level 5 felony intimidation with a deadly weapon; Level 6 felony pointing a firearm; Level 6 felony intimidation; Level 6 felony criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon; Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license; and Class B misdemeanor battery. On January 9 through January 11, 2023, a jury trial was conducted. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all charges. On February 16, 2023, the trial court sentenced Thomas to twelve years for criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon; three years for intimidation with a deadly weapon; two years for pointing a firearm; two years for intimidation; two years for criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon, 180 days for carrying a handgun without a license, and 180 days for battery, with all sentences to be served concurrently.
[¶10] Thomas now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Self-Defense
[¶11] Thomas contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim that he was entitled to use deadly force in the defense of his property. The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367, 376 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), trans. denied. When analyzing a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Id. "It is the factfinder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction." Id. The evidence does not have to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and it is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn to support the conviction. Id.
[¶12] Self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301 (Ind. 2020). A claim of defense of property is analogous to the defense of self-defense. Hanic v. State, 406 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980). A person is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly force, against another "if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to immediately prevent or terminate the other person's trespass on or criminal interference with property lawfully in the person's possession[.]" I.C. § 35-41-3-2(e). A defendant must show that his use of force was reasonable "in light of the urgency of the situation." Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697, 702 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). The State must disprove at least one element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Nantz v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001), trans. denied. The State may refute a claim of self-defense by direct rebuttal or by relying on the evidence presented in its case-in-chief. Mariscal v. State, 687 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), reh'g denied, trans. denied. It is the factfinder's decision to determine whether a claim of self-defense has been disproved. Nantz, 740 N.E.2d at 1280. "A conviction in spite of a claim of self- defense will be reversed only if no reasonable person could say that the claim was negated by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt." Pointer v. State, 585 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992).
[¶13] Here, Thomas' defense of property claim falls short on the lawful property interest prong of the statute. At the time Thomas used force against Manis by placing Manis in a headlock, he had no property interest in the speaker. Although Manis attempted to return the speaker to Thomas and get his money refunded, Thomas accepted the car speaker but failed to reimburse Manis his $200. As such, when Manis retrieved the speaker from Thomas' vehicle, the speaker was still Manis' property.
[¶14] Even if we were to assume that Manis had been refunded the money for the speaker, and Thomas had a property interest in the device, Thomas was not entitled to use deadly force, defined as "force that creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury," when acting in defense of his property. I.C. § 35-31.5-285. Where a defendant claims he is acting in defense of property other than a dwelling, curtilage, or an occupied motor vehicle, and not in defense of himself or a third party, the use of deadly force, as here, is prohibited. Nantz, 740 N.E.2d 1281 (defendant who pointed a loaded gun at the victim's head to protect a property interest in a bulldozer, and was not protecting himself or a third party, was not entitled to use deadly force under the statute).
[¶15] Thomas now attempts to get around this mandate by claiming that he believed he was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2(c), Thomas would be "justified in using reasonable force against" Manis to protect himself from what he "reasonably believe[d] to be the imminent use of unlawful force." Thomas would be "justified in using deadly force; and [would not] have a duty to retreat; if [Thomas] reasonably believe[d] that that force [wa]s necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to [himself][.]" I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). In support of the argument that he believed himself to be in danger to incur serious bodily injury, Thomas references the fact that Manis was carrying a gun and that Manis had stated that he was going to bring "this group [with] guns." (Appellant's Br. p. 7). Hadad testified that he was invited along by Thomas because Thomas had been advised that Manis and his group would have guns. However, Thomas' argument is weakened by the fact that Manis arrived alone at the McDonald's parking lot. Moreover, when interviewed by law enforcement immediately after the altercation, Thomas stated that his gun was the only gun that he was aware of at the time of the incident. Accordingly, as pointed out by the State, Thomas could not feel threatened by Manis carrying a gun when he did not know Manis was carrying one.
[¶16] Manis was legally allowed to carry the gun and never removed the weapon from its holster. During the altercation, the gun fell to the ground and was removed by Hadad, who placed it in Manis' car. There is no evidence Manis brought the gun to threaten Thomas, nor is there evidence Manis ever threatened Thomas with it. See Birdsong v. State, 685 N.E.2d 42, 45-46 (Ind. 1997) (even though victim entered the defendant's apartment with a gun, the use of deadly force was not reasonable where the victim was carrying the gun by the barrel, and it fell out of his hand when he entered the apartment).
[¶17] In sum, there is no evidence that Thomas' belief that he was in danger of great bodily injury was reasonable when Manis showed up alone, Thomas was unaware of the weapon Manis was carrying, Thomas instigated the confrontation when Manis attempted to walk away with the speaker that was rightfully his, and Thomas approached Manis from behind and placed Manis in a headlock. Moore v. State, 181 N.E.3d 442, 446 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (evidence that defendant participated willingly in violence was sufficient to defeat a claim of self-defense). Thus, Manis was never a threat to Thomas, Thomas was not rightfully in possession of the speaker, and the State sufficiently rebutted Thomas' claims of self-defense.
II. Criminal Recklessness
[¶18] Next, Thomas contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction for criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon. Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well-settled. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Clemons v. State, 987 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.
[¶19] To convict Thomas of criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally perform[ed] an act, while armed with a deadly weapon, that create[d] a substantial risk of bodily injury." I.C. § 35-42-2-2(a), (b)(1)(A). Thomas claims that although Manis and Hadad both testified that Manis and Thomas were holding the weapon, "[n]either witness testified who pulled the trigger, or how the gun discharged." (Appellant's Br. p. 8).
[¶20] The State presented evidence at trial reflecting that during the altercation over the speaker, Thomas pulled his gun out of his waistband and pointed it at Manis' head. Manis struggled to push the gun away from his head. Thomas' right hand was on the firearm in "classic shooter position." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 96). Manis had both "hands on the slide." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 96). Thomas released Manis' head, and "put his other hand on the firearm." (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 96-97). While Manis was trying to push the gun away from himself, it discharged. At the point of discharge, the gun was in Thomas' hand. As Thomas' right hand was in shooter position and the gun remained in Thomas' hand after the discharge, the jury could reasonably infer that Thomas pulled the trigger to discharge the gun. See Al-Saud v. State, 658 N.E.2d 907, 910 (Ind. 1995) (the State presented sufficient evidence to show criminal recklessness when the defendant brandished a gun in a congested area during a dispute, even if the gun was unloaded). Thomas' argument to the contrary merely amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we decline to do. See Clemons, 987 N.E.2d at 95. Therefore, we affirm Thomas' conviction for criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon.
CONCLUSION
[¶21] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Thomas' claims of defense of property and self-defense, and that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Thomas' conviction for criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon.
[¶22] Affirmed.
[¶23] Bradford, J. and Weissmann, J. concur.