Opinion
C.A. No. 97C-12-009.
Submitted: May 5, 2000.
Decided: June 9, 2000.
Upon Defendants Lynette Donoway and Charles Willoughby's Motion for Summary Judgment. Denied.
William D. Fletcher, Jr. and Donna L. Harris of Schmittinger and Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Stephen F. Dryden of Robinson Grayson, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants Lynette Donoway and Charles Willoughby.
Rodney Don Sweet, Seaford, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant Stephen C. Glenn. Ronald E. Hastings, Jacksonville, Florida, pro se.
ORDER
1. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. From the submissions of the parties, it appears that:
Plaintiff, Linda Sue Thomas, has brought suit as a result of a slip-and-fall that occurred on March 7, 1996 at the residence of Defendants, Lynette Donoway and Charles Willoughby. The Defendants' residence was a mobile home located on Lot 37, Pineridge Trailer Park in Seaford, Delaware. The Plaintiff was lawfully on the Defendants' premises delivering clothing for Lynette Donoway. On the night before the accident, Plaintiff had made arrangements with Ms. Donoway's mother to bring over several outfits for her daughter to wear to her father's funeral. The Plaintiff did not have any ownership interest in the clothing. Upon exiting the mobile home after delivering the clothing, Linda Mitchell, another resident of the trailer, said something that caused Ms. Thomas to turn around. Upon doing so, she slipped on the steps of the trailer and fell, injuring herself.
2. Defendants assert as an affirmative defense that 25 Del. C. § 1501, the Delaware Guest Statute, bars Plaintiffs claim because Plaintiff was a friend of Ms. Donoway and was merely assisting her by providing several potential outfits for her to wear at her father's funeral. The Defendants further contend that since the clothing was returned to Plaintiff, no cause of action can lie. In addition, Defendants argue that there is no claim in Plaintiffs Complaint alleging willful or wanton misconduct by the Defendants which would bring her claim outside the purview of the Guest Statute. Plaintiff, on the other hand, submits that the Guest Statute is inapplicable because Defendants were receiving a benefit as a result of Plaintiffs presence on the premises.
3. Superior Court Rule 56(c) provides that judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and-that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The burden is on the moving party to show, with reasonable certainty, that no genuine issue of material fact exists and judgment as a matter of law is permitted. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Further, if the record indicates that a material fact is disputed, or if further inquiry into the facts is necessary, summary judgment is not appropriate.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56.
See Celotex Corp. v. Cattret, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Martin v. Nealis Motors, Inc., Del. Supr., 247 A.2d 831 (1968).
Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahi, Del. Supr., 706 A.2d 526, 530 (1998); McCall v. Villa Pizza, Inc., Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 912 (1994).
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Ebersole v. Lowengrub, Del. Supr., 180 A.2d 467 (1962).
4. 25 Del. C. § 1501 states:
No person who enters onto private residential or farm premises owned or occupied by another person, either as a guest without payment or as a trespasser, shall have a cause of action against the owner or occupier of such premises for any injuries or damages sustained by such person while on the premises unless such accident was intentional on the part of the owner or occupier or was caused by the wilful or wanton disregard of the rights of the others.
The legislative intent of this section was to protect a landowner from suits by guests based on simple acts of negligence.
Stratford Apts., Inc. v. Fleming, Del. Supr., 305 A.2d 624, 626 (1973).
A "guest" is one who is present by invitation, express or implied, without economic or business benefit to the host. However, when a person confers some economic or other benefit of value on the owner of the premises, they are usually not considered a guest without payment. Payment is considered to have been made to the occupier if the presence of the guest, or business invitee, confers a benefit upon the occupier, whether the benefit is in the form of a cash payment or otherwise.
Facciolo v. Facciolo Const. Co., Del. Supr., 317 A.2d 27, 28 (1974).
Whitney v. Brann, D. Del., 394 F. Supp. 1, 8 (1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 966 (3d Cir.), cert. den'd, 426 U.S. 922 (19 ).
Hoksch v. Stratford Apts., Inc., Del. Super., 283 A.2d 687, 688 (1971).
5. The Delaware Supreme Court recently pronounced in an unpublished order that the Guest Premises Statute was not applicable to a security guard at a mobile home park who was delivering a message to a resident. In doing so, the Court found that to prevail the plaintiff must demonstrate that the occupier of the land "received and expected [a] benefit of value from [the security guard's] presence. The benefit may not be de minimus, but it need not be financial." The Court stated in its holding:
See Smith v. Henderson, Del. Supr., No. 329, 1998 (Aug. 10, 1999) (ORDER).
Id. at 1.
The record establishes that Gary was attempting to deliver a message, while on duty as a security guard, and that this was a service provided to all of the community residents. We are satisfied that this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], raises an issue of material fact for the jury to decide.
Id.
Id.
6. Likewise, this Court must deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment because there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Defendants received a benefit from the presence of Plaintiff on the property at the time of the accident. The Plaintiff was on the Defendants' property in order to deliver clothing for the Defendant to wear at her father's funeral. Although this is not an economic benefit to Defendants; this is clearly something of value. This would be a different case if Plaintiff was merely stopping by Defendants' trailer to pay her condolences about the loss of her father. However, that is not the case before the Court. In the case at bar, the Defendant's mother had prearranged the visit by Plaintiff to come onto Defendants' premises in order to deliver clothing that Defendant would then wear at her father's funeral. There is no question that this was a benefit to the Defendants. This benefit was at the request of the mother of Defendant Donoway and accepted by Defendant Donoway. Consequently, since Defendants received a benefit as a result of Plaintiffs presence on their property, the Guest Statute is inapplicable to the instant matter. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied .
Since the parties have fully briefed the issues before the Court, the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the original Reply Memorandum of Law because it was untimely is moot and the Court did not consider that Motion in coming to its present determination.
IT IS SO ORDERED.