Opinion
5-22-0174
05-11-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AARON P. ANGLIN, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion County. No. 18-DT-79 Honorable Charles D. Mockbee IV, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BOIE PRESIDING JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: We remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct the necessary preliminary examination as to the factual basis of the defendant's allegations against his appointed counsel.
¶ 2 On August 12, 2021, after a stipulated bench trial, the defendant, Aaron P. Anglin, was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 11-501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2018)). The defendant was sentenced on February 17, 2022, to 24 months of probation, restitution, and a fine.
¶ 3 The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and now challenges his conviction and sentence. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in not conducting an inquiry under People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (1984), and its progeny, regarding the defendant's pro se posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct the necessary preliminary examination as to the factual basis of the defendant's allegations against his appointed counsel.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 11-501(a)(2) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2018)), on August 12, 2021, following a stipulated bench trial. After the trial court orally announced its finding of guilty, defense counsel indicated that he would be filing a posttrial motion. The trial court then began discussing a date for a posttrial motion hearing. During that discussion, the following dialog occurred:
"THE COURT: August 27th at 2:30.
[DEFENDANT]: So what is this, sentencing?
THE COURT: It is a hearing date for your attorney to file a motion for new trial, he's indicated.
[DEFENDANT]: I'm just gonna hire me a new attorney because
THE COURT: Sir, sit down for a second.
[DFENDANT]: Hire me a new attorney, you'll not doing your work right.
THE COURT: Hold on just a second.
[DEFENDANT]: They got paperwork and everything.
THE COURT: Anything else [defense counsel]?
[DEFENDANT]: Saying I didn't do nothing.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Judge.
THE COURT: Anything else [the State]?
[THE STATE]: No, Judge.
THE COURT: Sir, as soon as you have your notice you're free to leave. Thank you.
[DEFENDANT]: I'm gonna go get an attorney right now cause you all just screwed me. They got paperwork and everything saying who did it and you all still didn't, ain't throw out my case. That was-Les Fisher wasn't even here and you'll threw out his case.(Case is adjourned)"
¶ 6 On August 13, 2021, the defendant filed a posttrial motion for a new trial that alleged that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict. The defendant's motion for a new trial was prepared by his trial counsel. The defendant, however, was represented by a different attorney from the public defender's office at the hearing on the defendant's posttrial motion on August 27, 2021. The trial court denied the defendant's posttrial motion and set the matter for sentencing on September 22, 2021. The defendant indicated to the trial court that he desired to hire private counsel for sentencing. Thereafter, the defendant made several motions to continue the sentencing hearing, stating that personal matters had delayed his ability to hire private counsel, which were granted by the trial court.
¶ 7 On February 17, 2022, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. The defendant was represented by the same counsel who represented the defendant at the hearing on the defendant's posttrial motion. The trial court noted that there had been several continuances based on the defendant's indication that he had wanted to hire private counsel, but there was no further discussion within the report of proceedings regarding the obtainment of private counsel. The defendant was sentenced to 24 months of probation, restitution, and a fine. Thereafter, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 9 On appeal, the defendant argues that his statements, at the conclusion of his bench trial, indicated that he was expressing, inter alia, dissatisfaction with his trial counsel's performance. As such, the defendant alleges that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an inquiry under People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (1984), into the factual matters underlying the defendant's claim.
¶ 10 Our supreme court has developed, through Krankel and its progeny, a procedural framework for the resolution of pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Murray, 2017 IL App (3d) 150586, ¶ 21. The procedural framework requires the trial court to make a preliminary inquiry into a pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and, if the claim shows a possible neglect of the case, appoint new counsel to pursue the claim at a full hearing. Id. It has consistently been held that the goal of any Krankel proceeding is to facilitate the trial court's full consideration of a defendant's pro se claim, thereby potentially limiting issues on appeal and creating the necessary record for any claims raised on appeal. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 13.
¶ 11 To initiate a preliminary Krankel inquiry, a defendant simply needs to bring the claim to the trial court's attention. Id. ¶ 11. The defendant does not have to file a written motion but can simply send a note or letter to the trial court or raise the issue orally. Id.; People v. Bates, 2019 IL 124143, ¶ 15. The trial court should examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation with the purpose of determining what further action, if any, is warranted on a defendant's claim. People v. Moore, 207 Ill.2d 68, 77-78 (2003). The trial court may deny the pro se posttrial allegations of ineffective representation, without the appointment of new counsel and without holding further proceedings, if the court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy. Id. at 78. If the defendant's allegations show possible neglect of the case, however, new counsel should be appointed to represent the defendant at a hearing on the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. Where it is not clear what concern a defendant is attempting to raise, the trial court should conduct a "minimal inquiry" to determine the nature of the defendant's complaint. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 15.
¶ 12 We note that not every posttrial complaint made by a defendant warrants a Krankel inquiry. For example, in People v. Taylor, 237 Ill.2d 68 (2010), our supreme court noted that "there [was] nothing in defendant's statement specifically informing the court that defendant is complaining about his attorney's performance." Id. at 77. The Taylor court also stated that "because of the rambling nature of defendant's statement, it is amenable to more than one interpretation." Id. As such, the Taylor court found that the defendant's statement did not warrant a Krankel inquiry. Id.
¶ 13 Our standard of review of an alleged Krankel error depends upon what action, if any, the trial court undertook. If the trial court took no action, or expressed no opinion on the merits, then our review is de novo. People v. McLaurin, 2012 IL App (1st) 102943, ¶ 41. De novo review means that this court performs the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. Id. If the trial court reached a determination on the merits of the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this court will only reverse if the trial court's action was manifestly erroneous. Id. In this matter, the trial court took no action regarding the defendant's posttrial allegations and, as such, our review is de novo.
¶ 14 The State argues that the defendant's posttrial statements were insufficient to trigger a Krankel inquiry. According to the State's argument, the defendant's posttrial complaints indicated that the defendant was upset with how the trial court weighed the evidence against him in finding him guilty, and was not a complaint regarding what his attorney did or failed to do. The State argues that nowhere in the defendant's comments does the defendant refer to his attorney. As such, the State argues that no preliminary Krankel inquiry was necessary, and that this court should deny the defendant's request to remand this matter back to the trial court for a Krankel inquiry.
¶ 15 We disagree. A defendant's statement may be either implicit or explicit, but must still provide a clear basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Taylor, 237 Ill.2d at 77. Here, the defendant stated that, "I'm just gonna hire me a new attorney because you'll not doing your work right." Although the remainder of the defendant's statements could be interpreted as indicating a dissatisfaction with the entire proceedings, the foregoing statement indicates an implied complaint with his trial counsel's representation to the extent that the defendant desired to hire new counsel.
¶ 16 The defendant also stated that "[t]hey got paperwork and everything saying who did it." According to the State's argument, this statement was an indication that the defendant did not understand the effect of the recantation of an affidavit that he had provided to his attorney, and the trial court's decision to find the recantation more credible than that of the original affidavit. We find this argument to be speculative since the trial court never inquired into what paperwork the defendant was referencing. In fact, the record of proceedings indicates that the trial court interrupted the defendant while the defendant was attempting to speak, asked the parties if there was anything further, and then adjourned while never acknowledging that the defendant was speaking or allowing the defendant to complete his statement. If the trial court had conducted a minimal inquiry regarding the "paperwork" or the reason the defendant was going to "hire me a new attorney," there would be an adequate record on appeal to support, or contradict, the State's argument.
¶ 17 The defendant's claims may have been without merit, or as the State alleges, may not have directly related to the defendant's trial counsel; however, one of his statements did implicitly relate to his trial counsel's performance. As such, the trial court should have conducted at least some minimal inquiry to determine what the defendant was complaining about to ensure that an adequate record was made of the defendant's claims.
¶ 18 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to conduct the necessary preliminary examination as to the factual basis of the defendant's allegations against his appointed trial counsel. We therefore remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct the necessary preliminary examination as to the factual basis of the defendant's allegations.
¶ 19 We emphasize that we are not remanding for a full evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel, but rather, we remand the cause for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct the required preliminary investigation. If the trial court determines that the claim of ineffectiveness is spurious or pertains only to trial strategy, the trial court may then deny the claim and leave standing the defendant's conviction and sentence. Moore, 207 Ill.2d at 81. If the trial court finds that the defendant did not, in fact, receive effective assistance of counsel, then it shall order a new trial. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d at 189.
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter to the trial court of Vermilion County for proceedings consistent with this decision.
¶ 22 Remanded with directions.