Opinion
CV166064929S
06-09-2016
The Metropolitan District v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities
Filed June 10, 2016
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (#104)
Jane S. Scholl, J.
Introduction
In this action the plaintiff, The Metropolitan District (" MDC"), seeks a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the defendant, the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (" CHRO"). The essence of the plaintiff's claims is that CHRO is not following its statutory and regulatory procedures by not timely reviewing complaints and assuming jurisdiction over complaints where it has none. The plaintiff claims that, as a result, CHRO has engaged in improper rulemaking and denied the MDC due process. The MDC seeks a declaratory judgment that CHRO has engaged in improper rulemaking and violated the procedural and substantive due process rights of the MDC; that General Statutes § 46a-71 does not apply to the MDC and CHRO does not have jurisdiction over complaints filed by independent contractors against the MDC. The MDC also seeks an order of mandamus requiring CHRO to review all of its files regarding complaints of discrimination practices since 2011 and whether it had jurisdiction over the complaints and properly reviewed them. The MDC seeks to enjoin CHRO from holding a factfinding conference in a certain case and a judgment permanently enjoining CHRO from engaging in improper rule-making.
CHRO has moved to dismiss the action because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. CHRO claims that the MDC has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under General Statutes § 4-175 and § 52-29; that its Section 1983 claim is barred to the extent it seeks injunctive relief; the MDC lacks standing to seek mandamus; and the MDC fails to meet the requirements for injunctive relief.
Discussion
The MDC, in its complaint, details a long history of the case activities of CHRO, involving all complaints filed with CHRO from 2009 to 2015. The MDC claims that the statistics it cites reveals that CHRO is not timely reviewing complaints to determine if they have merit as required by statute. The MDC also complains about the handling by CHRO of several complaints against it alleging that CHRO did not review the complaints to determine whether CHRO has jurisdiction of the claims or the complainants or whether they were timely filed. The MDC complains that CHRO routinely processes complaints by independent contractors and which are brought more than 180 days after the act or omission complained of. The MDC also claims that CHRO does not conduct merit assessment reviews as required by statute. In its brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss the MDC recites a detailed history of CHRO's handling of certain complaints against the MDC in a manner it claims indicates that the agency made no effort to comply with its statutory and regulatory obligations.
General Statutes § 46a-83(b), effective October 1, 2015, provides: " Not later than sixty days after the date of the filing of the respondent's answer, the executive director or the executive director's designee shall conduct a case assessment review to determine whether the complaint should be retained for further processing or dismissed because (1) it fails to state a claim for relief or is frivolous on its face, (2) the respondent is exempt from the provisions of this chapter, or (3) there is no reasonable possibility that investigating the complaint will result in a finding of reasonable cause. The case assessment review shall include the complaint, the respondent's answer and the responses to the commission's requests for information, and the complainant's comments, if any, to the respondent's answer and information responses. The executive director or the executive director's designee shall send notice of any action taken pursuant to the case assessment review in accordance with section 46a-86a. For any complaint dismissed pursuant to this subsection, the executive director or the executive director's designee shall issue a release of jurisdiction allowing the complainant to bring a civil action under section 46a-100. This subsection and subsection (e) of this section shall not apply to any complaint alleging a violation of section 46a-64c or 46a-81e. The executive director shall report the results of the case assessment reviews made pursuant to this subsection to the commission quarterly during each year."
" Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [plaintiff's] claim . . . Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum . . . In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed . . . We have recognized that a party aggrieved by a decision of an administrative agency may be excused from exhaustion of administrative remedies if: recourse to the administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate . . . or injunctive relief from an agency decision is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Levine v. Town of Sterling, 300 Conn. 521, 528, 16 A.3d 664 (2011).
" The exhaustion doctrine reflects the legislative intent that . . . issues be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief, and to give the reviewing court the benefit of the local board's judgment." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simko v. Ervin, 234 Conn. 498, 504, 661 A.2d 1018 (1995). " [The doctrine] serves dual functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stepney, LLC v. Town of Fairfield, 263 Conn. 558, 564-65, 821 A.2d 725 (2003). Therefore, if " a party has a statutory right to appeal from a decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issues which the appeal was designed to test." (Citations omitted.) Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 598, 409 A.2d 1029 (1979).
" The plaintiff's preference for a particular remedy does not determine the adequacy of an administrative remedy . . . an administrative remedy, in order to be 'adequate, ' need not comport with the plaintiffs' opinion of what a perfect remedy would be . . . The plaintiff may not choose its administrative remedy through the framing of its own complaint. If that were possible, the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine would be thwarted." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Savoy Laundry, Inc. v. Stratford, 32 Conn.App. 636, 642, 630 A.2d 159, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 931, 632 A.2d 704 (1993).
In Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 211 Conn. 129, 557 A.2d 925 (1989), the dispositive issue was " whether an employer charged with age discrimination may seek injunctive relief to avoid responding to interrogatories propounded by the administrative agency authorized to investigate such complaints." Id., 130. The plaintiff claimed that the complainant was a municipal employee who was not covered by the age discrimination statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the action stating: " As a general matter, this court has repeatedly required litigants to exhaust their administrative remedies before a judicial challenge to administrative actions will be entertained . . . In particular, we have recognized the delay and disruption in the administrative process that would result from judicial interference with statutorily authorized administrative investigations intended to determine whether there is a factual basis for the initiation of formal proceedings . . . [T]he issue that the plaintiff seeks to raise is its eligibility for a statutory exemption. [T]he CHRO investigation may not be forestalled at this point in the proceeding simply because [an issue of statutory construction] may later be raised if the outcome of the investigatory process is adverse to the [plaintiff] . . . The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear this complaint, and hence properly granted the CHRO's motion to dismiss." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 131-3. This matter is clearly within the dictates of Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities . Here the plaintiff claims that CHRO does not have jurisdiction over the claims of an independent contractor or claims it argues are untimely or without merit. Just as in Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities this court has no jurisdiction over these issues because of the plaintiff's failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available through the agency proceedings and the appellate process available after them.
" An administrative agency, generally, must determine in the first instance whether it has the authority to act in a particular circumstance before a Superior Court may review the jurisdiction of the agency. See General Statutes § 4-183. A claim that an administrative agency has acted beyond its statutory authority or jurisdiction properly may be the subject of an administrative appeal . . . Where there is in place a mechanism for adequate judicial review, such as that contained in § 4-183, [i]t is [the] general rule that an administrative agency may and must determine whether it has jurisdiction in a particular situation. When a particular statute authorizes an administrative agency to act in a particular situation it necessarily confers upon such agency authority to determine whether the situation is such as to authorize the agency to act that is, to determine the coverage of the statute and this question need not, and in fact cannot, be initially decided by a court . . . This general rule is in accord with our frequently stated observation that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test . . . We note that the general rule set forth in Greater Bridgeport Transit District is limited by its prefatory clause to situations [w]here there is in place a mechanism for adequate judicial review . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sastrom v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 105 Conn.App. 477, 481-82, 938 A.2d 1233 (2008). In Sastrom the court found that the plaintiff had no judicial mechanism to challenge the defendant's determination of its own jurisdiction, therefore he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies and the court had subject matter jurisdiction over his declaratory judgment action regarding the issue of the defendant agency's jurisdiction over him.
Here the MDC has adequate administrative remedies. The MDC has available to it the ability to request a declaratory ruling from CHRO as to the issues it raises, for example, the jurisdiction of CHRO over independent contractors. General Statutes § 4-176(a) states: " Any person may petition an agency, or an agency may on its own motion initiate a proceeding, for a declaratory ruling as to the validity of any regulation, or the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency." General Statutes § 4-175 provides: " (a) If a provision of the general statutes, a regulation or a final decision, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff and if an agency (1) does not take an action required by subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (e) of section 4-176, within sixty days of the filing of a petition for a declaratory ruling, (2) decides not to issue a declaratory ruling under subdivision (4) or (5) of subsection (e) of said section 4-176, or (3) is deemed to have decided not to issue a declaratory ruling under subsection (i) of said section 4-176, the petitioner may seek in the Superior Court a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the regulation in question or the applicability of the provision of the general statutes, the regulation or the final decision in question to specified circumstances. The agency shall be made a party to the action."
The exhaustion doctrine requires not only that a party avail himself of any remedies before the administrative agency but that a party who has a statutory right to appeal from a decision of an administrative agency, cannot, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issues which the appeal was designed to test. " General Statutes § 4-183(a) provides the proper avenue for reviewing an agency's actions . . . Not only does that statute provide a right of appeal from a final agency decision by an aggrieved party, but it also includes an immediate right to appeal from an adverse preliminary ruling if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. Moreover, the statutory framework includes a means of staying an agency decision pending appeal. General Statutes § 4-183(c). Thus, a potentially aggrieved party is well protected by statute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; footnote omitted.) Pet v. Department of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346, 352, 542 A.2d 672 (1988).
Pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-94a a respondent before CHRO who is aggrieved by a final order may appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. That statute provides, in part: " (a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section . . . (b) A person may appeal a preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling to the Superior Court if (1) it appears likely that the person will otherwise qualify under this chapter to appeal from the final agency action or ruling and (2) postponement of the appeal would result in an inadequate remedy . . ."
Our Supreme Court has reiterated that " [w]here there is in place a mechanism for adequate judicial review, such as that contained in [General Statutes] § 4-183, it is the general rule that an administrative agency may and must determine whether it has jurisdiction in a particular situation. When a particular statute authorizes an administrative agency to act in a particular situation it necessarily confers upon such agency authority to determine whether the situation is such as to authorize the agency to act--that is, to determine the coverage of the statute--and this question need not, and in fact cannot, be initially decided by a court . . . Stated in another way, [i]t is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter . . . Exhaustion is required even in cases where the agency's jurisdiction is challenged . . . The doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions . . . The doctrine of exhaustion furthers the salutary goals of relieving the courts of the burden of deciding questions entrusted to an agency . . . in advance of possible judicial review . . . More importantly, a favorable outcome will render review by the court unnecessary. As the United States Supreme Court has noted: A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene . . . Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that [e]ven a claim that an administrative agency has exceeded its statutory authority or jurisdiction may be the subject of an administrative appeal . . . The provisions of § 4-183(b) recognize that exhaustion is required as a prerequisite to the Superior Court's jurisdiction absent exceptional circumstances . . . The [exhaustion] doctrine is applied in a number of different situations and is, like most judicial doctrines, subject to numerous exceptions. Application of the doctrine to specific cases requires an understanding of its purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved . . . While our courts have also acknowledged that there are exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, we have recognized such exceptions only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Department of Public Health, 48 Conn.App. 102, 110-13, 710 A.2d 176 (1998).
" Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to [the legislature's] delegation of authority to coordinate branches of [g]overnment, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that [the legislature] has charged them to administer . . . Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 213, 105 A.3d 210 (2014).
It is clear to the court that all the issues raised by the MDC can be litigated and resolved in the context of the CHRO proceedings, and, if the MDC is unsuccessful, can be appealed to the court or be the subject of a petition for a declaratory ruling to CHRO. The MDC has, in fact, utilized the provisions of General Statutes § 4-183 to seek judicial review of interlocutory decisions of CHRO. For example, in the Dixon and Smith cases cited in paragraph 8 of its complaint, the MDC filed interlocutory appeals from CHRO's reasonable cause finding. See, MDC v. CHRO, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV14024208; MDC v. CHRO, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV146024368.
The plaintiff claims that it comes under the exceptions to the exhaustion rule. The plaintiff cites Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 461 A.2d 938 (1983). However that case is inapplicable because that was an action by the Commissioner of Consumer Protection to enforce an investigative demand issued to attorneys suspected of engaging in deceptive trade practices pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The defendant moved to dismiss the action claiming that it was not covered by the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. Therefore the court was required to address the issue of the jurisdiction of the agency in that context.
Aaron v. Conservation Commission of Town of Redding, 178 Conn. 173, 179-80, 422 A.2d 290 (1979), also cited by the MDC for the principle that it is not required to exhaust administrative remedies, is likewise inapplicable. There the Court noted that: " In the present case there is some question as to whether the plaintiff's claims could properly be litigated by way of appeal because of the rule that a party who seeks some advantage under a statute or ordinance, such as a permit or a variance, is precluded from subsequently attacking the validity of the statute or ordinance." (Citations omitted.) Here there is no dispute that the MDC could challenge an adverse CHRO decision by way of appeal.
The MDC argues that it should not be required to participate in and defend claims where CHRO does not have jurisdiction. " It is no answer for the plaintiff, in refusing to avail himself of that administrative remedy, to claim that to do so may prove more costly and less convenient than going directly to Superior Court . . . Without a clear showing of irreparable injury . . . failure to exhaust administrative remedies serves as a bar to judicial intervention into the agency process . . . the expense and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of living under government." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Department of Public Health, 48 Conn.App. 102, 114, 710 A.2d 176 (1998).
The plaintiff claims that exhaustion is not required where relief from the agency is inadequate or futile. " Futility is more than a mere allegation that the board might not grant the relief requested . . . [W]e have held that the failure to exhaust an administrative remedy is permissible only when the administrative remedy would be useless ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn.App. 769, 773, 647 A.2d 751 (1994). The MDC has not demonstrated that is the case here.
The plaintiff argues that the available relief pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 is not as broad as the relief it seeks here, that is, a declaratory judgment that CHRO engaged in improper rulemaking and violated the MDC's procedural and substantive due process rights. Yet General Statutes § 4-183 clearly provides for relief for such claims. Where substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the agency's decision is " (1) [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; [or] (4) affected by other error of law" the court may sustain the appeal, and where a particular agency action is required by law, render a judgment that modifies the agency decision, orders the particular agency action, or orders the agency to take such action as may be necessary to effect the particular action.
Lastly, the " broad statutory grant[] of jurisdiction [of General Statute] § 52-29 [is] not intended to circumvent the well established principles of exhaustion." River Bend Associates, Inc. v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 262 Conn. 84, 106, 809 A.2d 492 (2002). " A declaratory judgment action is not, however, a procedural panacea for use on all occasions, but, rather, is limited to solving justiciable controversies . . . Invoking § 52-29 does not create jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 813, 967 A.2d 1 (2009).
Similarly, the MDC cannot pursue its claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief. " Exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . is not required before bringing a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . Thus, a failure by the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies would not dispose of an otherwise valid § 1983 claim . . . When the claim is for injunctive relief, however . . . the fundamental requirement of inadequacy of an available legal remedy in order to obtain injunctive relief remains in full force." Flanagan v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 54 Conn.App. 89, 94-95, 733 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 250 Conn. 925, 738 A.2d 656 (1999). The MDC has adequate legal remedies, consequently, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.
Conclusion
" To permit judicial review, either by injunction or by declaratory judgment, of every procedural, preliminary and interlocutory order or ruling by which a person may consider himself aggrieved, would afford opportunity for constant delays in the course of administrative proceedings and would render orderly administrative procedure impossible. Moreover, it would result in bringing to the court such an avalanche of trivial procedural questions as largely to monopolize their time and energies." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Department of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346, 367-68, 542 A.2d 672 (1988). Here the MDC is unhappy with how CHRO is doing its job, calling it on occasion a " rogue" agency. It is not the providence of this court to oversee the operations of CHRO to the extent the MDC suggests in its complaint. Nor should the MDC be allowed to bypass the administrative and judicial processes available to it for review of the actions of CHRO of which it complains, by a direct attack upon CHRO as it attempts here. The MDC has adequate administrative remedies in which to voice its concerns to CHRO, and, if unsuccessful, to this court, which it has failed to exhaust.
The Motion to Dismiss is granted.