Opinion
Nos. 243, 252.
March 6, 1933.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
Separate suits by the United States of America against the steamship Habana, her engines, boilers, and furniture, claimed by the Compania Trasatlantica, and against the steamship Cristobal Colon, her engines, boilers, and furniture, claimed by the Compania Trasatlantica. From separate decrees sustaining exceptions to the libels, the libelant in each case appeals.
Decrees affirmed.
The suits were brought to recover penalties under section 10 of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended by section 27 of the Immigration Act of 1924 (8 USCA § 146), because of the failure of the masters of the vessels to prevent the landing of certain aliens after an order to detain them on board had been served, and without any time or place for their landing having been designated by the immigration officers. The particular aliens were through passengers bound from Havana, Cuba, to ports in Spain, and escaped from the vessels while they were at the port of New York where they touched en route to Spain.
George Z. Medalie, U.S. Atty., and George B. Schoonmaker, Asst. U.S. Atty., both of New York City, of counsel), for the United States.
Hunt, Hill Betts, of New York City (John W. Crandall, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before L. HAND, SWAN, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
These cases are ruled by Taylor v. United States, 207 U.S. 120, 28 S. Ct. 53, 52 L. Ed. 130, and Dollar S.S. Line v. Elting, 51 F.2d 1035 (C.C.A. 2). The section, as it was before the Supreme Court in the first case, was, in substance, the same, and it was there held that "bringing to" the United States meant bringing aliens there with intent to leave them. That section, 18 of the Act of 1903 (32 Stat. 1217), has since been re-enacted twice, in 1917 and 1924. The language was changed, but the phrase, "bringing to," was retained; the change was in the addition of the clause, "or providing a means for an alien to come to," and was made necessary because entry by "bridges and toll roads" was also included. Probably the whole clause is to be read distributively; but, if not, and if the clause, "providing a means for an alien to come to," also includes vessels, there is still no reason to assume that it enlarges the class of persons included. Rather the situation falls within those decisions which hold that, when a statute has been re-enacted, it incorporates existing interpretations. United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337, 28 S. Ct. 532, 52 L. Ed. 821; Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U.S. 18, 38 S. Ct. 7, 62 L. Ed. 123; Louisville Cement Co. v. Int. Com. Com., 246 U.S. 638, 644, 38 S. Ct. 408, 62 L. Ed. 914; Heald v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 20, 23, 41 S. Ct. 42, 65 L. Ed. 106.
The Nanking, 290 F. 769 (C.C.A. 9), is not to be taken as a decision to the contrary. It is true that the facts were the same, but the point was not taken, and the decision cannot be considered a ruling. While the result is that a shipowner touching in the United States is not responsible even for a negligent failure to restrain passengers who escape, this is involved in the authoritative interpretation. There is no a priori ground for a distinction between passengers and sailors; indeed, there is more reason for allowing passengers to go ashore. They are normally less subject to restraints.
Decrees affirmed.