Opinion
1-21-0280
12-16-2022
THE COUNTY OF COOK, THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, and THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LABOR COUNCIL, and INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 700, Defendants-Appellees.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 20 CH 02332 Honorable Alison C. Conlon, Judge presiding.
JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Connors and Justice Delort concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
JUSTICE MITCHELL
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not err in dismissing several Cook County public employers' complaint in favor of arbitration where the issues involved interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreements' terms, which are subject to arbitration pursuant to the agreements and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.
¶ 2 Plaintiffs Cook County, the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, and the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County appeal from an order dismissing their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment on two labor law questions: (1) whether plaintiffs and the Forest Preserve District of Cook County are the same employer; and (2) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the effect of an interest arbitration award entered against the Forest Preserve District. The overarching question presented in this appeal is: Did the circuit court err in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint because the complaint raised matters subject to mandatory arbitration under the parties' collective bargaining agreements and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act?For the following reasons, we affirm.
While plaintiffs present four issues for appeal, each speaks to this single question.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 Plaintiffs are public employers which have entered into collective bargaining agreements with defendants Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (FOP) and International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 700 (Local 700): one agreement between Cook County and the FOP, two agreements between Cook County and Local 700, one agreement between the Clerk and Local 700, and one agreement between the Office of the Chief Judge and Local 700. ¶ 5 Each of the five collective bargaining agreements contains a "Me-Too" provision that requires the employer to give defendants' union members increases or more favorable treatment to match any increases or more favorable treatment given to any other union. For example, a "Me-Too" term in the collective bargaining agreement between Cook County and the FOP reads:
"If the Employer *** enters into an agreement with any other union *** that contains across-the-board wage increases greater than those set forth in this Agreement, or agrees to a lower rate of employee contribution to health insurance ***, then upon demand by the Union, those wage increases or health insurance changes will be applied to members of this bargaining unit."The "Me-Too" provisions in the other collective bargaining agreements contain substantially similar language entitling defendants' members to the same increased benefits as given to members of other bargaining units. Those provisions use the terms "Employer," "Cook County," or "County" to refer to the employer.
¶ 6 In June 2019, a labor arbitrator ruled in favor of the FOP and entered an award in a labor dispute between the Forest Preserve District of Cook County and the FOP. The arbitration award provided for an amendment of the collective bargaining agreement between those parties, increasing disability benefits, wages, and health insurance benefits.
¶ 7 Subsequently, defendants FOP and Local 700 filed grievances against plaintiffs, alleging that, pursuant to the "Me-Too" provisions in the collective bargaining agreements, defendants' union members are entitled to the same wage and benefits increases. Plaintiffs filed their complaint for declaratory judgment and for stay of arbitration in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs timely appealed. Ill. S.Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303(a) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 8 ANALYSIS
¶ 9 Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in dismissing their complaint because it set forth questions of law over which the circuit court should have exercised jurisdiction. Specifically, the complaint sought declarations that (1) plaintiffs and the Forest Preserve District are separate employers for labor relations purposes; and (2) the effect of the Forest Preserve District interest arbitration award is not substantively arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreements. Plaintiffs contend that these are questions of law that a labor arbitrator does not have authority to decide under the parties' collective bargaining agreements. A circuit court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Goldwater v. Greenberg, 2017 IL App (1st) 163003, ¶ 13. ¶ 10 The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act governs collective bargaining agreements between public employers and labor organizations. 5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2018); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2014 IL App (1st) 122526, ¶ 21. Section 8 of the Act requires that all grievance disputes concerning "the administration or interpretation of the agreement" be resolved by final and binding arbitration, unless there is a joint agreement of the employer and union to the contrary. 5 ILCS 315/8 (West 2018); American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. State of Illinois, 124 Ill.2d 246, 254 (1988). Simply put, in the context of public employee labor disputes, all disputes are presumed arbitrable unless expressly agreed otherwise. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council v. Town of Cicero, 301 Ill.App.3d 323, 334 (1998).
¶ 11 The five collective bargaining agreements each provide for a grievance resolution procedure, uniformly defining a "grievance" as a difference or dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of the terms of the agreements. The agreements also circumscribe an arbitrator's scope of authority to the "express relevant language" of the agreements:
"His/her decision must be based solely upon his interpretation of the meaning or application of the express relevant language of the Agreement." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 12 Plaintiffs contend that the complaint merely raised "threshold legal issues" that the parties have not consented to arbitrate and that these issues cannot be decided solely upon the arbitrator's interpretation or application of the "express relevant language" of the agreements. Because the collective bargaining agreements require that an arbitrator base his decision upon the express language of the agreement terms, we again look to the language of the "Me-Too" provisions at issue:
"If the Employer *** enters into an agreement with any other union *** that contains across-the-board wage increases greater than those set forth in this Agreement, or agrees to a lower rate of employee contribution to health insurance ***, then upon demand by the Union, those wage increases or health insurance changes will be applied to members of this bargaining unit."
¶ 13 Here, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that plaintiffs and the Forest Preserve District are separate employers for labor law purposes. In the complaint, plaintiffs set forth their position that each plaintiff is a separate employer from the Forest Preserve District such that the "Me-Too" provisions in the parties' collective bargaining agreements are not triggered by the Forest Preserve District arbitration award. Thus, in seeking such declaratory judgment, plaintiffs are essentially asking the court to interpret the terms "Employer" or "County" in the "Me-Too" provisions as excluding the Forest Preserve District.
¶ 14 In light of this, the circuit court rephrased the question presented as "whether the Me Too provisions require the Plaintiffs to increase wages and benefits under the CBAs." A determination of whether the Forest Preserve District is "Employer" or the "County" under the collective bargaining agreements necessitates those terms' interpretation, which is the central, if not the only, issue in the underlying "Me-Too" grievance. Plainly, an arbitrator's decision as to whether the Forest Preserve District arbitration award would trigger the "Me-Too" provisions would necessarily be based on his interpretation of "Employer" or "County," the express terms of the provisions.
¶ 15 Likewise, the second issue regarding the arbitrability of the effect of the Forest Preserve District interest arbitration award involves the application of the "Me-Too" provisions-the underlying question concerning whether the Forest Preserve District interest arbitration award would trigger those provisions. As defined in the agreements, a dispute with respect to if and how the agreement's terms would apply is a grievance that must be arbitrated, absent an express agreement to the contrary. See 5 ILCS 315/8 (West 2018).
¶ 16 Plaintiffs contend that the circuit court may still decide the issues if the questions are entirely legal. However, the issues raised in plaintiffs' complaint fall squarely within the scope of authority prescribed to an arbitrator by plain terms of the agreements, and there is no express agreement of the parties not to arbitrate these issues. They are "grievances" that must be arbitrated pursuant to the parties' express agreement and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, and a party may not use a declaratory judgment action to circumvent mandatory arbitration (see Rock Island County Sheriff v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2025, 339 Ill.App.3d 295, 298 (2003)).
The issue involved in this grievance may not be entirely legal because an arbitrator would hear testimony, assess witness credibility, and consider evidence of past practices of the parties in making his determination. Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court improperly referenced the evidence of past practices in ruling on a motion to dismiss, in violation of the "four corners" rule, but the circuit court only opined that an arbitrator would likely consider that external evidence as part of his determination.
¶ 17 Plaintiffs contend that a declaratory judgment action vests the circuit court with jurisdiction to decide an exclusively legal question even in the face of an arbitration provision. The authority on which plaintiffs rely has no application in this context. See Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of Support Staff, Security/Policeman s Benevolent & Protective Ass'n Unit No. 114, 2013 IL 114853, ¶¶ 37-38 (a constitutional challenge to a statute); Office of Lake County State's Attorney v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 200 Ill.App.3d 151, 156 (1990) (a challenge to an administrative agency's assertion of jurisdiction on the ground that it is not authorized by statute). The Declaratory Judgment Act "merely affords a new, additional, and cumulative procedural method for the judicial determination of the parties' rights." Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill.2d 363, 373. Here, the parties agreed to have their dispute settled by an arbitrator, not through judicial determination.
¶ 18 Plaintiffs maintain that having these issues decided by an arbitrator would require the arbitrator to improperly consider and interpret things other than the express language of the agreements. But that is contrary to the plain terms of the collective bargaining agreements: an arbitrator's decision is to be based solely on his interpretation or application of the express relevant language of the agreements. In interpreting and applying the collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator "may of course look for guidance from many sources," and his award is legitimate if it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); AFSCME, 124 Ill.2d at 254-55. ¶ 19 Indeed, an arbitration award will be overturned as not drawing its essence from the collective bargaining agreement if it is based on "a body of thought, feeling, policy, or law outside of the collective bargaining agreement." Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, 2017 IL App (1st) 161499, ¶ 20 (an arbitrator may not change or alter the terms of the collective bargaining agreement); see also Griggsville-Perry Community Unit School District No. 4 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 20 (an arbitrator may not impose his own personal views of right and wrong on an employment dispute). However, an arbitration has not even taken place, so it is premature to suggest that the arbitrator's decision is improper. Because an arbitrator may look to various sources for interpretive guidance, plaintiffs' argument to the contrary is simply unavailing.
¶ 20 Plaintiffs raise a number of other claims of error, but none of them compel a different conclusion. First, plaintiffs argue that the Labor Board's certifications conclusively establish that the Forest Preserve District and plaintiffs are distinct employers as a matter of law. Regardless of the evidentiary strength, the certifications would be among the evidence an arbitrator could consider in reaching a decision. Second, plaintiffs maintain that the circuit court improperly relied on management (or employer) rights provisions in concluding that the collective bargaining agreements expressly allow an arbitrator to consider external law. As discussed above, an arbitrator may look for guidance from many sources in interpreting and applying collective bargaining agreements.
¶ 21 Accordingly, the issues raised in plaintiffs' complaint must be arbitrated, and the circuit court did not err in dismissing the complaint.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 24 Affirmed.