Opinion
24A-MH-2242
10-23-2024
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of G.D., Appellant-Respondent v. St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc. d/b/a St. Vincent Stress Center, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Christopher Kunz Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Andrew B. Howk Ryan A. McDonald Kathryn M. Daggett Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable David J. Certo, Judge The Honorable Phyllis J. Garrison, Judge Pro Tempore Trial Court Cause No. 49D08-2409-MH-40367
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Christopher Kunz Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Andrew B. Howk Ryan A. McDonald Kathryn M. Daggett Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] The trial court granted a petition for the involuntary, temporary commitment of G.D. to the St. Vincent Stress Center ("Stress Center"). In this expedited appeal, G.D. claims: (1) insufficient evidence supports the trial court's findings that G.D. is gravely disabled; and (2) G.D.'s commitment to the Stress Center is inappropriate. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
On July 16, 2024, our Supreme Court issued an order establishing the Marion County Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project, in which the briefing schedule for these time-sensitive appeals has been altered to allow us to review temporary commitments in a time frame such that we can still provide meaningful relief to appellants.
Issues
[¶2] G.D. presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:
I. Whether sufficient evidence supports the trial court's finding that G.D. is gravely disabled as a result of his mental illness.
II. Whether G.D.'s commitment to the Stress Center is appropriate.
Facts
[¶3] At the time of his temporary commitment, G.D. was sixty-one years old and had been married to his wife, K.D., who is a retired nurse, for thirty-eight years. G.D. worked in the computer field for various large companies. In 1991, G.D. was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and, for over thirty years, was compliant with his medication. Specifically, G.D. had been prescribed lithium to manage his illness. In 2023, however, G.D. had a reaction to the lithium, which caused liver damage and made him ill. Thereafter, G.D. stopped taking lithium, but no other medication has managed to control his bipolar symptoms. The illness caused by the reaction to the lithium resulted in G.D. becoming unemployed. But G.D. had two pensions and, with his Social Security benefits, was able to retire.
[¶4] In August 2024, K.D. became worried because G.D. was not sleeping, spending too much money, and driving recklessly-all symptoms of a manic episode. He was also seeing things and talking to people who were not there. Accordingly, on August 8, 2024, K.D. took G.D. to the Stress Center. G.D. refused, however, to go inside. Instead, he walked into oncoming traffic on 86th Street. The police were called and took G.D. to the Stress Center, where he remained until August 26, 2024. No commitment was sought at that time.
[¶5] After leaving the Stress Center, G.D. began to live with his son instead of his wife. K.D. found it difficult to speak with G.D., who became defensive and "defiant." Tr. Vol. II p. 7. G.D. also bought a new $62,000 car and planned to take a trip to Florida. G.D. planned to charge his vehicle at other's homes and churches along the way and camp in parking lots. The car was ultimately repossessed, as G.D. could not afford the $20,000 payment the dealership demanded. In Florida, G.D. planned to visit his aunt to help her fund his plan for a Disney-affiliated theme park based on the science-fiction television series "Stargate SG-1." Id. at 39. G.D. believed that his theme park could house the homeless and help ease vehicular and airport traffic. He planned to start small, with a restaurant in Indiana, then hopefully expand to Florida. G.D. also believed that technology was "evil," and threw away his phone, smart watch, and laptop due to his beliefs that they were tracking him.
[¶6] On September 4, 2024, G.D. was found sitting on a stranger's front porch, watching traffic; he claimed he had "found paradise." Id. at 26. The police were called and took G.D. back to the Stress Center. At the Stress Center, G.D. exhibited symptoms of bipolar disorder, including irritability, mood swings, auditory hallucinations, and delusional thinking. Dr. Erika Cornett, who treated G.D. during both of his stays at the Stress Center, testified that G.D.'s symptoms-unorganized thoughts, sleep disturbances, excessive spending, and impulsive behaviors-were all indicative of a manic episode.
[¶7] At the Stress Center, G.D.'s hallucinations became uncontrollable and, as he put it himself, he "blew a gasket." Id. at 21. G.D. became aggressive with the staff, cornered one of the clinicians, and began to bang his fists on the nurses' station. To calm him, staff placed him in seclusion. When this did not calm him, he was restrained to the bed. G.D. was unable to sleep due to his auditory hallucinations. Although compliant with his medication, G.D.'s symptoms had not yet subsided, and he still did not understand why he needed to take his medication.
[¶8] On the same day G.D. was brought to the Stress Center for the second time- September 4, 2024-Dr. Cornett filed an application for G.D.'s temporary commitment. The trial court found probable cause to detain G.D. that same day. The trial court held a hearing on the matter on September 12, 2024, at which Dr. Cornett testified that G.D. was gravely disabled due to his bipolar disorder. Id. at 19. The next day, the trial court entered an order finding that G.D. was gravely disabled and authorizing G.D.'s temporary commitment for a period not to exceed ninety days. This expedited appeal then ensued.
The record does not indicate whether a guardianship of G.D has been established.
Discussion and Decision
[¶9] In Indiana, an adult person may be civilly committed either voluntarily or involuntarily. Commitment of T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015). In this case, the Stress Center sought an involuntary temporary commitment of G.D. for a period not to exceed ninety days. See Ind. Code §§ 12-26-6-1 through -11.
[¶10] Our Supreme Court has held that "[t]he purpose of civil commitment proceedings is dual: to protect the public and to ensure the rights of the person whose liberty is at stake." Commitment of T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 273. "The liberty interest at stake in a civil commitment proceeding goes beyond a loss of one's physical freedom, and, given the serious stigma and adverse social consequences that accompany such physical confinement, a proceeding for an involuntary civil commitment is subject to due process requirements." Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809 (1979)). "To satisfy the requirements of due process, the facts justifying an involuntary commitment must be shown 'by clear and convincing evidence . . . [which] not only communicates the relative importance our legal system attaches to a decision ordering an involuntary commitment, but . . . also has the function of reducing the chance of inappropriate commitments.'" Id. (quoting Commitment of J.B. v. Midtown Mental Health Ctr., 581 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991), trans. denied).
[¶11] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a civil commitment, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting it, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility. Id. We will affirm if clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's judgment. Id. Clear and convincing evidence requires proof that the existence of a fact is "highly probable." In re Commitment of C.N., 116 N.E.3d 544, 547 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019).
[¶12] A petitioner for a temporary commitment must prove by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) an individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled; and
(2) detention or commitment of that individual is appropriate.
Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e). The trial court here did not find that G.D. was dangerous, only that he was gravely disabled. G.D. does not deny that he has a mental illness. G.D. challenges only the trial court's findings that he is gravely disabled and that his commitment was appropriate.
I. Gravely Disabled
[¶13] We first address whether the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that G.D. is gravely disabled. "Gravely disabled" is defined by statute to mean:
a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because the individual:
(1) is unable to provide for that individual's food, clothing, shelter, or other essential human needs; or
(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of that individual's judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual's inability to function independently.
Ind. Code § 12-7-2-96. Although this is a close case, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial court's conclusion.
[¶14] G.D.'s outlandish plans for the Stargate-themed park demonstrate the gravity of G.D.'s mental illness. It is reasonable to infer from G.D.'s testimony that he believes that he will be able to teleport people between his parks-hence his belief that the parks will reduce, as opposed to, increase vehicular and air traffic. More concerning is that G.D. has displayed a lack of awareness of the dangers of his plan to travel to Florida and charge his car at strangers' homes. G.D. testified that he likes to enter people's homes via the back door.
Obviously, his plans regarding strangers' homes on his road trip could be perilous and present a danger to himself and others.
[¶15] G.D. also experienced auditory hallucinations and spoke to imaginary people. And despite spending his career in the technology field, G.D. threw away not only his phone and smartwatch, but also his wallet and car keys-all because he thought they were "evil" and could track him. Tr. Vol. II p. 8. G.D.'s failure to sleep regularly resulted in him becoming irritable. G.D. also became aggressive toward staff members of the Stress Center, cornered a staff member, and banged his fists at the nurses station. Despite attempts to calm G.D. by less-restrictive means, he eventually had to be physically restrained with leather straps.
[¶16] We also cannot ignore that, when first brought to the Stress Center, G.D. refused to enter and instead walked into traffic on 86th Street. And, before he was taken to the Stress Center for the second time, G.D. was found on the front porch of a stranger's home in the early hours of the morning, watching the traffic. He later told Dr. Cornett that he had "found paradise" there. Id. at 26. G.D. still does not understand why he needs to take medication, which evidences the gravity of his mental illness.
[¶17] From all of this evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the Stress Center had demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that G.D. was gravely disabled, i.e., he was in a condition in which he, as a result of his mental illness, was and is in danger of coming to harm because he "has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of [his] judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in [his] inability to function independently." I.C. § 12-7-2-96.
[¶18] We find this case to be distinguishable from Commitment of T.K., which G.D. cites in support of his argument. In that case, our Supreme Court concluded:
The most favorable testimony to the trial court's decision is that T.K. was aggressive, loud, talked in a coarse manner that was inappropriate, and proactively sought to shame someone by placing flyers on people's windshields. While we certainly do not condone such behavior and would like to see cooperation between T.K. and medical professionals, the evidence put forth by the Department does not clearly and convincingly support the proposition that T.K. is gravely disabled. T.K. made no physical outbursts, destroyed no property, did not put himself or others in actual danger with idiosyncratic behavior, and was not at risk of suffering a lack of food, clothing, or shelter. Instead, at best, the evidence suggests that T.K.'s loud, boisterous, and rude public behavior harmed his reputation and made others not want to be around him. That is not sufficient evidence to support a civil commitment on grounds of grave disability.Id. at 277.
[¶19] Here, G.D. apparently had housing with his son and had a means of income through his pensions. But his behavior, unlike that of T.K., included walking into traffic, spending money wildly, becoming so aggressive that he needed to be physically restrained, and entering the porch of a total stranger in the middle of the night. G.D.'s plans to drive to Florida and charge his car at strangers' homes could be dangerous and shows a lack of insight regarding his behavior.
[¶20] All of this supports a finding that G.D. is gravely disabled as that term is defined by statute. See B.A. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 134, 142 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (holding that sufficient evidence supported trial court's conclusion that patient was gravely disabled where there was testimony that, if released from a supervised setting, patient would be unable to function independently and would be in danger of coming to harm because of her impaired ability to make rational and reasoned decisions and because of her behavior of acting aggressively toward others).
II. Appropriateness of the Commitment
[¶21] G.D. also argues that his commitment to the Stress Center is inappropriate. We disagree. "The determination of whether an involuntary commitment is appropriate is fact-sensitive." R.P. v. Optional Behav. MHS, 26 N.E.3d 1032, 1037 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015). The trial court could reasonably conclude from all of the evidence that G.D. would not do well in a less-restrictive environment and that he needs additional treatment in the Stress Center.
[¶22] G.D. acted aggressively while at the Stress Center, and Dr. Cornett testified that, the longer a patient remains in a manic state, the more difficult it becomes to stabilize the patient. G.D. had not been on effective medication for approximately one year, and the medications he was currently being given at the Stress Center had not yet been effective in controlling G.D.'s symptoms. Thus, Dr. Cornett testified that G.D.'s temporary commitment was in his best interests and was appropriate. This is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that G.D.'s commitment is appropriate. See B.A., 219 N.E.3d at 142 (holding that sufficient evidence supported trial court's finding that patient's commitment was appropriate where psychiatrist testified patient would not do well in a less-restrictive setting and instead needed continued hospitalization, patient displayed aggressive behavior while hospitalized, and, although patient showed some improvement, her delusional beliefs still remained).
Conclusion
[¶23] Sufficient evidence supports the trial court's conclusions that G.D. is gravely disabled and that his temporary commitment is appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶24] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J. concur.