Opinion
C.A. No. 01A-06-007 HDR
Submitted: January 3, 2002
Decided: March 27, 2002
Upon Appeal from a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
David H. Williams, Esq. and Jennifer L. Brierley, Esq., of Morris, James, Hitchens Williams LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant the Board of Education of the Capital School District.
Joseph J. Longobardi, III, Esq., Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee Bruce L. Johns.
ORDER
This 27th day of March, 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of counsel and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) The Board of Education of the Capital School District ("District"), has appealed the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("Board") which reversed the decision of the Appeals Referee ("Referee") and granted unemployment benefits to Bruce L. Johns ("Claimant"). Because the Board did not consider several issues raised by the evidence, reversal and remand is required.
(2) Claimant was employed by the District as a custodian from September 1, 1990 until his discharge on November 14, 2000. In June of 2000 the Claimant's ability to perform his job became an issue when he said he had a bad back. His doctor provided a one page note that he had permanent restrictions and could not lift over twenty pounds. The District sought additional information to determine if his disability could be accommodated. Claimant provided some additional information but not all which the District sought. Ultimately, Claimant was discharged after the District found that 1) he was unable to perform all of the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation, 2) he engaged in repetitive acts of insubordination by failing to acknowledge in writing receipt of documents and by failing to provide or release medical information from his doctor on his limitations, and 3) he engaged in insubordinate and belligerent conduct during a meeting held on October 17, 2000. After considering the testimony of several school administrators who were present at the meeting, the District found that Claimant placed his hand in front of a school official's face by a "forceful movement in her direction."
(3) The Claims Deputy found that Claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because he was terminated for just cause and because he displayed wilful and wanton misconduct. Claimant appealed and the Appeals Referee affirmed. The Appeals Referee focused on the October 17, 2000 meeting and found just cause for termination. Claimant appealed and the Board reversed after finding Claimant's testimony about the October 17, 2000 meeting to be credible and that Claimant was not insubordinate at that meeting. Claimant was the only witness to testify before the Board and said he was ten feet away from the school official when he raised his hand.
(4) The District argues on appeal to this Court that the Referee and the Board committed legal error when they failed to determine whether Claimant was eligible to receive benefits under 19 Del. C. § 3334 before deciding whether Claimant was disqualified under 19 Del. C. § 3315. The District further argues that the Board erred as a matter of law when it determined that Claimant was discharged without just cause. Last, the District asserts that the Board's decision must be reversed because it failed to address all of the legal issues raised by the evidence before it. Claimant replies that subordinate findings and conclusions may be inferred and that the Board's finding that Claimant was discharged without just cause is supported by substantial evidence.
(5) On an appeal from a decision of the Board, this Court must determine if substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Board's decision and if the decision is free from legal error. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. If there is substantial evidence and no mistake in law, the Board's decision will be affirmed. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine credibility, or make its own factual findings.
19 Del. C. § 3323(a); Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308, 309 (Del. 1975).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 54 (Del. 1965).
(6) There is a two-tier test which the Board must employ in determining whether Claimant is entitled to unemployment benefits. First, it must determine if the Claimant is eligible and second, it must determine if the Claimant is disqualified. In this case it is undisputed that Claimant was subject to a permanent restriction from his doctor that he could not lift more than twenty pounds. To be eligible for benefits the Board must find that Claimant is "able to work and is available to work and is actively seeking work. . . ." Because there were no adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law on this pivotal issue, the decision of the Board must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
19 Del. C. § 3314, 3315; or United Propane v. Sowers-Vescovi, 2000 WL 305504 (Del.Super. 2000); McManus v. Christina Service Co., 1997 WL 127953, Silverman, J. (Del.Super. 1997); Division of Unemployment Ins. v. Unemployment Ins. Bd., 1990 WL 58214, Ridgely, J. (Del.Super. 1990).
United Propane, supra; McManus, supra; Division of Unemployment Ins., supra, op. cit. fn. 3.
(7) Nor are the findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate to support the decision that Claimant was discharged without just cause. The Board addressed only one incident of alleged insubordination. Unresolved by the Board were the allegations that there were a series of insubordinate acts which culminated in the termination. These included Claimant's alleged failure to attend meetings, wilful refusal to sign receipts for documents and various other allegations of insubordinate conduct. Accordingly, this case must be remanded for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Konstantopoulos v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1991 WL 53452 (Del.Super. 1991).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision.