Opinion
Case No. 6:19-cv-784-Orl-31LRH
2021-02-11
Cindy THAYER, Plaintiff, v. RANDY MARION CHEVROLET BUICK CADILLAC, LLC, Defendant.
Hannah Victoria Dantzler-Fleming, Keith R. Mitnik, Joseph Thomas Dunn, Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Orlando, FL, Brian James Lee, Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff. Joseph T. Kissane, Jennifer Lee Watson, Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant.
Hannah Victoria Dantzler-Fleming, Keith R. Mitnik, Joseph Thomas Dunn, Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Orlando, FL, Brian James Lee, Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff.
Joseph T. Kissane, Jennifer Lee Watson, Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant.
ORDER
GREGORY A. PRESNELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court without oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) and Plaintiff's two Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (Docs. 53, 57). In ruling on this motion, the Court has also considered the parties’ briefs in opposition (Docs. 46, 56, 62) and Defendant's reply in support of its motion (Doc. 47).
I. Background
Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC ("Randy Marion") is an automobile dealership based in North Carolina. As the name implies, it sells and leases vehicles. Randy Marion also operates a service department. As a part of that service, Randy Marion allows individuals who bring in their car for service to use a Randy Marion-owned vehicle while the individual's car is being serviced.
On September 4, 2015, Samuel Pope ("Pope") dropped a vehicle off at Randy Marion for service. That vehicle belonged to his wife, Rebeca Lowthorp ("Lowthorp"). Randy Marion gave Pope another vehicle—a loaner vehicle—to use while his wife's vehicle was being serviced. The parties disagree over whether a rental agreement was signed. About a week later, Pope was driving the loaner vehicle on Interstate 4 when he collided with Plaintiff Cindy Thayer's ("Thayer") vehicle. Thayer now sues Randy Marion for damages from that collision under a theory of vicarious liability. II. Legal Standard
Courts may grant summary judgment "[w]hen the only question a court must decide is a question of law." Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley , 635 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011). A party is entitled to summary judgment when the party can show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Which facts are material depends on the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. , 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). A court "must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Hinson v. Clinch Cty., Ga. Bd. of Educ. , 231 F.3d 821, 826–27 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ).
III. Analysis
Randy Marion moves for summary judgment on its fourteenth affirmative defense. That affirmative defense asserts that "the Graves Amended [sic] applies to Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick, Cadillac, LLC's vehicle." Doc. 26 at 5. Thayer responds that material issues of disputed fact exist as to whether the Graves Amendment applies here.
The Graves Amendment provides that:
An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—
(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).
49 U.S.C. § 30106(a). This statute preempts vicarious liability under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. , 540 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th Cir. 2008) ; Vargas v. Enter. Leasing Co. , 60 So. 3d 1037, 1041-43 (Fla. 2011). If the Graves Amendment applies, Randy Marion is not liable for any damages stemming from this accident.
For the Graves Amendment to apply, a defendant must show (i) that it was "engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles;" (ii) that there was "no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the" defendant; and (iii) that the defendant rented the vehicle to the plaintiff. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) ; see also Stratton v. Wallace , No. 11-CV-74, 2014 WL 3809479, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2014) ; Collins v. Auto Partners V. LLC , 276 So. 3d 817, 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Thayer argues that three facts are in dispute and therefore preclude summary judgment. First, Thayer claims that "[i]t is disputed whether Defendant owned the Vehicle." Doc. 46 at 2. Second, Thayer disputes whether Randy Marion was "engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles." Id. at 3. And third, Thayer contests whether the vehicle in question was a rental vehicle. Id. at 2. i. Vehicle Ownership
Thayer also claims that "[i]t is disputed whether Lowthorp executed the Agreement." Id. However, Thayer does not explain how this fact is material, especially because "the Graves Amendment simply does not require a written rental agreement." See Collins , 276 So. 3d at 822.
Thayer first argues that Randy Marion has not offered sufficient evidence that it owned the vehicle in question. She claims that Randy Marion only "cites to paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's Complaint which alleges that the Vehicle operated by the tortfeasor was owned by Defendant at the time of the subject collision" to support Randy Marion's ownership. Doc. 46 at 7. Thayer also claims that because Randy Marion denied that allegation in its answer, "the parties’ pleadings ... clearly demonstrate a conflict as to whether the [v]ehicle was owned by" Randy Marion. Doc. 46 at 7.
But simple reliance on the pleadings is insufficient because Randy Marion submitted evidence that proves it owned the vehicle in question. In its reply, Randy Marion points to a request for admission that reads: "Admit that the vehicle owned by [Randy Marion] which was involved in this crash was a courtesy loaner vehicle." Doc. 47-1 at 3. Randy Marion responded by "[a]dmit[ting] to the extent that it was a loaner vehicle but was under user agreement with Rebecca Lowthorp." Id. Randy Marion's ownership of the vehicle is therefore "conclusively established unless the court permits a party to withdraw or amend the admission," which the Court has not done. Bell v. Mallin , No. 8:17-cv-2001, 2018 WL 3067845, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) ). Randy Marion's corporate representative also testified that Randy Marion "owned [the car] in 2015." Doc. 46-5 at 40:7–14. Thayer has not pointed to any evidence that would put ownership in dispute, so there is no disputed issue of fact with regard to Randy Marion's ownership of the loaner vehicle. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (requiring a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion to "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat" it).
ii. Randy Marion's Business
Next, Thayer contends that Randy Marion failed "to provide sufficient evidence to determine as a matter of law that [it] is a business in the business of vehicle leasing or renting." Doc. 46 at 8. In its motion and reply, Randy Marion points to testimony from its corporate representative, Ben Goins ("Goins"), to support its argument that Randy Marion "is an automobile dealership engaged in the business of leasing vehicles among other things." Doc. 39 at 2. When asked whether Randy Marion "rent[s] and lease[s] motor vehicles," Goins responded, "yes." Doc. 46-5 at 70:6–8; see also id. at 67:20–22 (testifying that in addition to selling new cars, Randy Marion leases new cars). The testimony that Thayer points to—where Goins stated that Randy Marion "is just in the automobile business"—does not contradict this testimony and does not present a legitimate dispute over this issue of fact. Doc. 46-5 at 14:20–17:1.
Thayer also argues that Randy Marion "fail[ed] to provide any evidence by a person with firsthand knowledge definitively establishing [its] participation in the business of renting vehicles." Doc. 46 at 8. But Goins is a corporate representative. "When a Rule 30(b)(6) witness speaks, the witness speaks on behalf of the corporation," rendering Goins's testimony that of Randy Marion. Vipre Sys. LLC v. NITV LLC , No. 06-cv-1631, 2007 WL 3202439, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2007).
iii. The Vehicle
Finally, Thayer contends that Randy Marion's shifting labels assigned to the vehicle foreclose summary judgment. See Doc. 46 at 13. They do not. True, Randy Marion has interchangeably referred to the vehicle as a "loaner" or a "rental." Compare Doc. 46-3 at ¶ 14 (calling the vehicle a "loaner") with Doc. 46-5 at 35:5–36:11 (referring to the vehicle as a "rental"). But the term used to describe the vehicle is not dispositive. To assign materiality to this changing label "would be to ignore the plain facts and to elevate form over substance." Tyler v. Tomlinson , 414 F.2d 844, 850 (5th Cir. 1969). Instead, the Court must focus on the actual relationship between Lowthorp and Randy Marion. There is no dispute that (i) the vehicle involved in the accident was provided as a temporary replacement vehicle while Lowthorp's vehicle was being serviced; (ii) she was entitled to use that vehicle during her car's servicing; and (iii) a customer has to leave his or her vehicle for service at Randy Marion in order to receive a loaner vehicle. These undisputed facts explain the contours of the relationship between Lowthorp and Randy Marion.
With these facts in mind, the question becomes one of statutory interpretation: Whether this relationship triggers the Graves Amendment. See Birnholz v. 44 Wall St. Fund, Inc. , 880 F.2d 335, 341 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989) ("the interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the court to decide"). The parties point to two cases that have addressed this topic. Thayer cites to Zizersky v. Life Quality Motor Sales, Inc. , 21 Misc.3d 871, 866 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings Cnty. 2008) where a New York state trial court held that the Graves Amendment did not apply to a courtesy loaner vehicle given to a client while the client's car was being serviced. Conversely, Randy Marion cites to Collins v. Auto Partners V. LLC , 276 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), a factually analogous Florida case that comes out the other way. But Zizersky does not bind this Court and is based on New York law, and Collins has little analysis about why the car—which "the employee ... was provided ... while his [vehicle] was being serviced"—qualified under the Graves Amendment. The Court must therefore undertake its own statutory analysis.
We start with the statute's plain text. See Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. , 541 U.S. 246, 252, 124 S.Ct. 1756, 158 L.Ed.2d 529 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Graves Amendment precludes liability against "[a]n owner of a motor vehicle" that is "rent[ed] or lease[d] to a person" where that liability stems from "being the owner of the vehicle." 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a). The plain meaning of "rental" is a transaction that involves payment of consideration for the use of something. Rent, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defined as "[c]onsideration paid ... for the use or occupancy of property"); Cascella v. Canaveral Port Auth. , 827 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (adopting Black's Law Dictionary for "rent"). This definition means that a transaction qualifies as a "rental" under the Graves Amendment when, in exchange for use of a vehicle, a party provides some form of consideration. It is, in essence, defined by contract law. Here, the key question is whether Lowthorp's use of the loaner vehicle was supported by some form of consideration. If it was, the vehicle qualifies as a rental and the Graves Amendment applies. And the undisputed facts show that Lowthorp's use of the loaner vehicle was supported by consideration. When Pope took Lowthorp's car in for servicing, Randy Marion accepted the car for servicing and allowed Lowthorp to use a car owned by Randy Marion while the car was being serviced. Importantly, Randy Marion testified that it would not allow her to use the loaner vehicle unless she allowed Randy Marion to service her own vehicle. See Doc. 46-5 at 68:20-24. And Thayer has offered no evidence that Randy Marion would have allowed Lowthorp to use that loaner vehicle if her car were not being serviced. Lowthorp surrendered her car to Randy Marion and agreed to pay the cost of repairs. In exchange, she received the use of a loaner vehicle. This is sufficient consideration to bring Randy Marion within the scope of the Graves Amendment.
While the statutory text is clear here and the Court need not wade into the Graves Amendment's legislative history, that journey would further reinforce this conclusion. Representative Sam Graves stated that the purpose behind his amendment was to address situations where vicarious liability is imposed on "companies and their affiliates simply because they own a vehicle involved in an accident." 151 Cong. Rec. H1034-01, H1200 (2005). That purpose aligns with the Court's interpretation of the statute: It precludes Randy Marion's liability that would stem solely "because [it] own[s] a vehicle involved in an accident."
Thayer's argument that the vehicle at issue was provided "for free" does not change this outcome. See Doc. 46 at 11 (arguing that "the Graves Amendment does not apply to cars given to someone to drive for free"); see also id. at 3 ("The Agreement produced by Defendant is notably silent as to any consideration paid by Lowthorp in exchange for use of the Vehicle"). In making this argument, Thayer relies on Zizersky , which concluded that under New York law "[i]n the context of lease agreements, rent is the amount paid for use and occupation of land or other property." 866 N.Y.S.2d at 507. That decision seemingly implies that without an additional monetary cost, there is no rental. But nothing in the Amendment's text constrains "rental" to the narrow definition Thayer advances and Zizersky adopts. This definition of "rental" would unduly restrict the consideration that could underlie a rental without any textual or common law basis. Under black letter contract law, consideration "need not be money or anything having monetary value, but may consist of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee." Fla. Power Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n , 487 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. 1986). There is no legal basis to restrict the Graves Amendment in this way.
Even if a rental required monetary consideration, Randy Marion testified that it "mak[es] some money when somebody gets a vehicle." Doc. 46-5 at 68:10-12.
Randy Marion has established that no material issues of disputed fact preclude application of the Graves Amendment here, and judgment in its favor is therefore proper. Wright v. Southland Corp. , 187 F.3d 1287, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999) ("An affirmative defense is generally a defense that, if established, requires judgment for the defendant even if the plaintiff can prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence").
The Court does not need to consider Randy Marion's second request: Whether Florida Statute § 324.021(9)(c)(3)(a) immunizes Randy Marion as a provider of temporary replacement vehicles. See Doc. 39 at 5-6. That request is mooted by this ruling in Randy Marion's favor. Similarly, Thayer's two motions for summary judgment are mooted by this judgment.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 53) and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Defendant's Seatbelt Affirmative Defense (Doc. 57) are DENIED AS MOOT .
3. All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT . The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for Defendant and close the file.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on February 11, 2021.