Opinion
No. AB-421.
April 1, 1982.
Appeal from the Deputy Commissioner.
John S. Smith of Marlow, Shofi, Ortmayer, Smith, Connell Valerius, Tampa, for appellants.
H. Guy Smith, Lakeland, for appellee.
The employer/carrier (E/C) challenge a workers' compensation order, contending that the Deputy Commissioner (deputy) erred by awarding compensation to claimant's husband for nursing services. We agree and reverse.
In 1968 claimant sustained a compensable injury. A claim was subsequently filed to compensate claimant's husband for various services he performed for claimant. The deputy concluded that claimant's husband performed nursing care type services which she needed. Accordingly, the deputy awarded the husband compensation for three hours per day at the minimum wage prevailing at the time the services were performed.
There is no competent substantial evidence that claimant's disability, i.e. the nature of her compensable injury and process of recovery, required the services in question as a matter of medical need under the standards of § 440.13, Fla. Stat., for the ten-year period in question and continuing. Accordingly, it was error for the deputy to award compensation for nursing services to claimant's husband.
RESERVED.
WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
MILLS, J., dissents.
I dissent. I would affirm. The deputy's award of compensation to the claimant's husband for nursing services provided his wife is supported by competent substantial medical and lay testimony.
Because of an industrially related injury, claimant is and will be permanently and totally disabled and unable to wash her hair, put her hair in rollers, shave her legs and underarms, take a shower, wash parts of her body, dress herself, and rub out knots and spasms that frequently occur in her injured shoulder and arm. Also, when claimant's left arm is manipulated or exerted, she has forearm jerking, clawing of the hand, and hopping of the hand, which require restraining by the husband. Her husband performs these tasks during his time off from his work.
There is no doubt that the services rendered claimant by her husband are of a kind not ordinarily performed by a husband for his wife and that the services are palliative nursing services. I cannot believe that any husband or wife would consider these services to be merely housekeeping services ordinarily performed by a husband.