Opinion
No. 05-10-01129-CV
02-13-2012
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant v. TAYLOR COLBY HUDSON, Appellee
Affirm in part; Reverse and Remand in part; Opinion Filed February 13, 2012.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Hunt County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC1000263
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Murphy, and Myers
Opinion By Justice Lang
Appellant Texas Department of Public Safety appeals the trial court's order that affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part an administrative law judge's (ALJ) administrative decision that sustained the Department's suspension of appellee Taylor Hudson's driver's license pursuant to chapter 724 of the Transportation Code. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.035(a) (West 2011) (the Department has authority to suspend the driver's license of a person who refuses request of a peace officer to submit to the taking of a specimen). Specifically, the trial court's order affirmed Hudson's suspension, but reversed the two-year suspension, reducing it to 180 days.
In a single issue, the Department contends:
The trial court held there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Hudson's license should be suspended for two years. The Department, not the ALJ, determines the length of a suspension if the ALJ authorizes a suspension. Did the trial court err in impliedly holding the length of the suspension is an issue to be decided at the administrative hearing?
For the reasons set out below, we decide this issue, in part, in the Department's favor. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Further, because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to rule 47.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 27, 2009, a police officer stopped Hudson for speeding and arrested him based on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Hudson was transported to the Hunt County jail, where he refused the officer's request for a breath specimen. As a result, his driver's license was suspended. Hudson requested an administrative hearing on the license suspension, and on June 4, 2010, an ALJ conducted a telephonic hearing where both the Department and Hudson were present. On June 8, 2010, the ALJ rendered findings of fact and conclusions of law, sustaining the Department's license suspension. However, the fifth finding of fact specified: "[Hudson] has had one alcohol-related or drug-related enforcement contact as defined by Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.001(3) during the ten years preceding the date of [Hudson's] arrest." The ALJ's conclusions of law included: "[Hudson's] driver's license is subject to a suspension for two years pursuant to Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.035" and the "order" stated, in part, "the Department is authorized to suspend the Defendant's driving privileges for the period indicated above."
Hudson appealed the suspension of his driver's license to the county court at law, requesting that the trial court "reverse the findings of the [ALJ] and order [the Department] to rescind the suspension of [Hudson's] driver's license." Hudson asserted in his petition "the [ALJ's] findings, inferences, and decisions are in violation of the statute and rules," "are not reasonably supported by substantial evidence," "are arbitrary and capricious, and are characterized by an abuse of . . . discretion," and "[t]here is no evidence to support the enhanced suspension of Defendant's driver[']s license." The Department responded by filing a general denial and specific denials, asserting in part, "that, the findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions of the administrative law judge do not exceed statutory authority" and "that, the findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions of the administrative law judge are reasonably supported by substantial evidence."
The trial court affirmed the Department's suspension of Hudson's driver's license, but found that there was no evidence that "[Hudson] has had one alcohol-related or drug-related enforcement contact . . . during the ten years preceding the date of [Hudson's] arrest," which would support the ALJ's "enhancement" of the license suspension from 180 days to two years. Accordingly, the court "modified" the ALJ's decision to read that "[Hudson's] driver's license is subject to a suspension for 180 days."
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
"If a person is arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was operating a motor vehicle in a public place . . . while intoxicated . . . , the person is deemed to have consented . . . to submit to the taking of one or more specimens of the person's breath or blood . . . ." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.011(a). If a license holder refuses the request of a peace officer to submit to the taking of a specimen, the person's license is suspended by the Department. Id. § 724.035(a). The length of the suspension is set by statute. "The period of suspension or denial is two years if the person's driving record shows one or more alcohol-related or drug-related enforcement contacts, as defined by Section 524.001(3), during the 10 years preceding the date of the person's arrest." Id. § 724.035(b). If a license holder's driving record does not show one or more alcohol- or drug-related enforcement contacts during the 10 years preceding the date of arrest, the period of suspension is 180 days. See id. § 724.035(a)-(b).
A person whose driver's license is suspended by the Department may request an administrative hearing before an ALJ. Id. § 724.041(a), (d). The issues to be determined by an ALJ at a hearing are limited to the following:
(1) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person;Id. § 724.042. To sustain a license suspension, an ALJ must find that the Department proved each of the four elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 724.043(a); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Jackson, 76 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
(2) probable cause existed to believe that the person was:
(A) operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; or(3) the person was placed under arrest by the officer and was requested to submit to the taking of a specimen; and
(B) operating a watercraft powered with an engine having a manufacturer's rating of 50 horsepower or above while intoxicated;
(4) the person refused to submit to the taking of a specimen on request of the officer.
"A person whose driver's license suspension is sustained [by an ALJ] may appeal" the ALJ's decision to a county court at law. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.041(a)-(b). "[C]ourts review administrative license suspension decisions under the substantial evidence standard." Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999); see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.047 ("Chapter 524 governs an appeal from an action of the department, following an administrative hearing under this chapter, in suspending or denying the issuance of a license."); id. § 524.043 (establishing rules for appeal but not defining scope of review); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174 (establishing the substantial evidence standard as the scope of review for an administrative license suspension decision).
Under the substantial evidence standard, there is a presumption that substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions. City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. 1994). The issue for the reviewing court is not whether the ALJ's decision was correct, but rather whether there is some reasonable basis in the record for the administrative decision. Id. If there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the ALJ's findings, the reviewing court must affirm the decision. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. The findings and conclusions of the agency are presumed valid. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Stacy, 954 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ). Courts must affirm administrative findings in contested cases if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support them. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131; Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d at 792-93. See generally Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174. Any evidentiary ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the administrative order with a finding of substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision. See Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d at 792; Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tex. 1984).
While a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the ALJ on the weight of the evidence questions committed to the ALJ's discretion, the reviewing court:
(2) shall reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:Id. (quoting Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174(2) (emphasis added)). "Thus, to reverse an [ALJ's] decision, the reviewing court must conclude (1) that the [ALJ's] decision was erroneous for one of the reasons enumerated in subsections (A) through (F), and (2) that substantial rights of the appellant have thereby been prejudiced." Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cantu, 944 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ); see also Raesner v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 982 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
(A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
(B) in excess of the agency's statutory authority;
(C) made through unlawful procedure;
(D) affected by other error of law;
(E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole; or
(F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
A trial court's order reversing an ALJ's decision is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 109 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.). We review questions of law without affording any deference to the trial court's finding. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cuellar, 58 S.W.3d 781, 784 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
The Department's issue on appeal is couched, at least in part, in terms of whether the trial court "impliedly" held the length of the suspension is a matter to be decided in an administrative hearing. However, the trial court's order takes direct action. It does not imply. In our review, we address the specific arguments made by the Department as to the trial court's error on the record, if any.
The Department asserts several reasons the trial court's order is in error, including the ALJ's authority arises under § 724.042 of the Texas Transportation Code and that statute gives the ALJ no authority to determine the length of the suspension, and the trial court had no jurisdiction to render judgment by modifying the ALJ's administrative decision as to the length of the suspension. Further, the Department contends we should reverse the trial court's order, "and reform the administrative order of June 8, 2010, sustaining the Department's suspension of Hudson's driver's license to show the Department shall, pursuant to statutorily granted authority, issue a suspension period based on section 724.035 of the Transportation Code."
In a license suspension hearing before an ALJ, there are four issues listed in § 724.042 to be addressed by the administrative judge. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042. The ALJ's authority is restricted to determining those issues. Id.; see Church v. State, 942 S.W.2d 139, 139 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ ref'd).An ALJ exceeds its authority by deciding issues that are outside the issues listed in §724.042. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Hirschman, 169 S.W.3d 331, 337-38 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.) (concluding that a "fact" finding by an ALJ regarding issue not specified in § 724.042 was "beyond her authority"); Church, 942 S.W.2d at 139-40. Texas Transportation Code § 724.042 "neither requires nor empowers the ALJ to decide" evidence concerning the license holder's record of alcohol- or drug-related enforcement contacts during the 10 years preceding the date of arrest nor to make conclusions of law regarding the length of the suspension. See Hirschman, 169 S.W.3d at 337-38. "To reverse an [ALJ's] decision, the reviewing court must conclude (1) that the [ALJ's] decision was erroneous for one of the reasons enumerated in subsections (A) through (F), and (2) that substantial rights of the appellant have thereby been prejudiced." Cantu, 944 S.W.2d at 495 (interpreting Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174).
In his petition, Hudson asserted that the ALJ's findings are in violation of §§ 524 and 724 of the Texas Transportation Code, that the findings are not reasonably supported by substantial evidence, that the findings are arbitrary and capricious, and that there is no evidence to support the enhanced suspension of his license. At the hearing on the merits before the trial court, Hudson argued specifically, in part, that there was no evidence to support the ALJ's fifth finding of fact as to prior enforcement contacts under § 524.001(3). Therefore, he contended, it was error for the ALJ to conclude that Hudson's license is subject to suspension for two years because of that prior enforcement contact. Finally, upon inquiry by the trial judge, Hudson's counsel candidly acknowledged there was substantial evidence to support the findings as to the four statutory issues that the ALJ was authorized to address. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042. The Department, like Hudson, agreed there was no evidence in the record before the ALJ of any prior enforcement contacts. Also, the Department argued the ALJ did not have the authority to address prior enforcement contacts and the length of suspension.
After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court remarked he could either strike the ALJ's fifth finding of fact or find that there was no evidence to support that finding. Counsel for the Department agreed those were viable options, stating, "Well, you can. And it would still not prevent the Court from affirming what the ALJ did, finding affirmatively that the Defendant had the - that we had proved the basis for suspension." The record before us shows there was no evidence before the ALJ as to Hudson's prior "alcohol-related or drug-related enforcement contacts as defined by Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.001(3) during the ten years preceding the date of the Defendant's arrest."
The trial court, in its order rendered after the hearing, correctly concludes the ALJ's decision should be affirmed as to the four issues that the ALJ had jurisdiction to decide under § 724.042, thereby affirming the Department's suspension of Hudson's driver's license. However, we cannot affirm the part of the order that states: "However, as to the period of suspension, said Administrative Decision is ORDERED modified to read 'Defendant's driver[']s license is subject to a suspension for 180 days pursuant to Texas Transportation Code Ann. § 724.035(a)(1).'"
A finding by a reviewing court that an administrative decision is erroneous under § 2001.174(2)(A)-(F) is not, by itself, sufficient to modify an ALJ's decision. Upon finding one of the errors enumerated in § 2001.174(2)(A)-(F) as well as that appellant's "substantial rights" have been prejudiced due to that error, the reviewing court shall only "reverse or remand" the case to the ALJ. There is no provision in § 2001.174(2) for a reviewing court to render a different judgment from the ALJ's decision or to modify an order of the ALJ. See City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 109 S.W.3d at 137-38.
The trial court's order presents several questions of law that we review de novo. Id. at 135. First, we conclude the trial court's finding there was "no evidence" to support the ALJ's findings as to the length of the suspension is not a statutory ground for a conclusion there is error in an administrative decision. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 2001.174(2). Rather, the trial court must determine whether the record shows "substantial evidence" supports the findings of the ALJ. See id. § 2001.174(2)(B); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. 2006); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Varme, 262 S.W3d 34, 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Second, the order of the trial court determining there is error in the administrative decision is silent as to whether or not Hudson's "substantial rights" were "prejudiced" by an error in the ALJ's administrative decision. See Varme, 262 S.W.3d at 41. A finding, if supported by the record, that Hudson's "substantial rights" have been "prejudiced" by an error identified in § 2001.174(2)(A)-(F) is required before the ALJ's decision can be reversed or remanded. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 2001.174(2)(A)-(F); Raesner, 982 S.W.2d at 132; Cantu, 944 S.W.2d at 495. Third, we conclude the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when its order "modified" the ALJ's decision. A court applying the substantial evidence standard of review may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. As noted above, the reviewing court may only reverse or remand to the ALJ as authorized by § 2001.174(2). City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 109 S.W.3d at 137-38.
IV. CONCLUSION
We decide the Department's issue in its favor in part and deny it in part. We affirm, in part, the trial court's order affirming the ALJ's conclusion that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's rulings on the issues set out in Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042. We reverse the rest of the trial court's order for reasons stated above, where it states "However, as to the period of suspension, said Administrative Decision is ORDERED modified to read "Defendant's driver[']s license is subject to a suspension for 180 days pursuant to Texas Transportation Code Ann. § 724.035(a)(1). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED the Department is authorized to suspend or deny the Defendant's driving privileges for the period of 180 days." We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Department also asserts for the first time on appeal that the Department, not the ALJ, has sole authority to determine the suspension period under § 724.035 of the Texas Transportation Code. However, because this argument was not raised at the trial court below, we do not reach it on appeal. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Suarez, No. 03-10-00856-CV, 2011 WL 3796183, at *5 n.3 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE
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