Opinion
Case No. 3:22-cv-00342-LCB
2023-05-02
Katherine TERRY and the Shoals Doula Group, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. RCHP-FLORENCE, LLC, Defendant.
Erin Ann Blalock, Erin Blalock, Attorney at Law, Florence, AL, for Plaintiffs. Clyde O. Westbrook, III, J. Patrick Strubel, Watkins & Eager, PLLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.
Erin Ann Blalock, Erin Blalock, Attorney at Law, Florence, AL, for Plaintiffs. Clyde O. Westbrook, III, J. Patrick Strubel, Watkins & Eager, PLLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant. OPINION & ORDER LILES C. BURKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Katherine Terry, who does business as The Shoals Doula Group, LLC, brings this action against RCHP-Florence, LLC, which does business as North Alabama Medical Center ("NAMC"). (Doc. 21.) Terry has been a labor doula since 2013, and since then, she has accompanied many clients during their childbirth experiences at NAMC. (Doc. 21 at 2.) In April 2021, however, NAMC sent Terry a letter stating she was no longer permitted to serve as a doula to her clients at NAMC. (Doc. 21 at 2.) Terry now brings claims against NAMC for tortious interference with contractual or business relations and defamation. (Doc. 21 at 2-6.)
NAMC moves to dismiss Terry's claims for tortious interference and slander per se under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 23.) For the reasons below, the Court finds that Terry's allegations, accepted as true, state a prima facie claim for tortious interference but not slander per se. The Court thus DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART NAMC's motion. (Doc. 23.)
I. BACKGROUND
The Court pulls the following facts from Terry's Amended Complaint and the attachments thereto. (Doc. 21.)
Terry has worked as a labor doula since 2013. (Doc. 21 at 2.) A doula is a "birth companion" who accompanies a woman during her pregnancy and labor, providing "emotional support, physical comfort, and communication with members of [the woman's] birth team to ensure that [she] has the information [she] need[s] to make informed decisions as they arise during pregnancy and labor." (Doc. 21-2 at 1-2.)
Terry operates her business through The Shoals Doula Group, LLC. (Doc. 21 at 2.) She is self-employed, so she is not an employee, vendor, or independent contractor of any hospital, including NAMC. (Doc. 21 at 2.) Expectant parents hire Terry for her services, and their relationship is governed by a client contract. (Doc. 21 at 2.) The contract is silent as to birth location, and Terry's clients are free to choose where they give birth. (Doc. 21 at 3 and Doc. 21-2 at 1-3.) The location they choose does not benefit economically from Terry's contracts. (Doc. 21 at 3.) Terry does not pay the location to act as a doula for her clients, nor does the location pay Terry for her services. (Doc. 21 at 3.)
Many of Terry's previous clients gave birth at NAMC, so she was present at the hospital during their childbirth experiences, fulfilling her doula responsibilities. (Doc. 21 at 2.) According to NAMC's visitor policy, effective March 5, 2021, in its Women's Center, two visitors are allowed at a time to be with a patient, and "[i]f a doula is being utilized, the doula . . . count[s] as a visitor." (Doc. 21-1 at 1.)
On April 29, 2021, Mona Hanan, the director of women's and children's services at NAMC, sent a letter to Terry on NAMC's behalf, informing Terry that she was "no longer permitted to render professional services as a doula at NAMC 'due to violation of hospital policy.' " (Doc. 21 at 2.) The policy Hanan referenced, however, was an employee policy, so it did not apply to Terry. (Doc. 21 at 2.) On the date Terry received the letter, she had nine clients who had planned to deliver at NAMC. (Doc. 21 at 2.) NAMC's employees, including Hanan, Russell Pigg, and the nursing staff, were aware of Terry's contracts with those clients. (Doc. 21 at 3.) Because of her ban, Terry was unable to perform her job as doula for those nine clients. (Doc. 21 at 4.) As a result of NAMC's actions, Terry suffered financial losses, damage to her professional reputation, and emotional distress. (Doc. 21 at 4-5.)
During the spring and summer of 2021, several NAMC employees made false statements about Terry to members of the public. (Doc. 21 at 5-6.) Those statements included the following:
1. Terry broke too many rules to practice at NAMC;(Doc. 21 at 5-6.) Such statements were made orally or in writing, and the speakers knew the statements were false or said them "with reckless disregard for the truth and with actual malice." (Doc. 21 at 6.) The statements damaged Terry's professional reputation, and she was subjected to "disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt" from her "friends, acquaintances, clients, and the public." (Doc. 21 at 6.) Accordingly, Terry's business slowed, and she suffered additional "emotional distress, anxiety, depression, and humiliation." (Doc. 21 at 7.)
2. Terry was incompetent in her profession;
3. Terry lied to her clients about being banned from NAMC;
4. Terry cared more about earning money than her clients;
5. Terry was dishonest;
6. Terry should not be able to practice as a doula in Alabama; and
7. Terry's violation of the hospital's policy was "pretty serious."
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the general standard for pleading civil claims in federal court. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 708 (11th Cir. 2010). The Rule requires that a complaint contains "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not demand "detailed factual allegations," but it does require something beyond "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move to dismiss a complaint that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, accepted as true, to assert a facially plausible claim for relief. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). A claim is facially plausible when it raises " 'a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' of the defendant's liability." Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Allegations "merely consistent" with a defendant's liability are insufficient to push "claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the district court accepts a complaint's factual assertions as true and construes those assertions in the light most favorable to the pleader. Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Tortious Interference
Under Alabama law, the elements of tortious interference with a contract or business relationship are: "(1) the existence of a protectible business relationship; (2) of which the defendant knew; (3) to which the defendant was a stranger; (4) with which the defendant intentionally interfered; and (5) damage." White Sands Grp., LLC v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So.3d 5, 14 (Ala. 2009).
The parties do not dispute that Alabama law applies to this litigation. (Doc. 23 at 5 and Doc. 24 at 5.)
NAMC argues that it was not a stranger to Terry's contracts with her clients. (Doc. 23 at 5.) NAMC advances three arguments in support of its contention: (1) it has control over who can attend births at the hospital; (2) it was an essential entity in the relationship between Terry and her clients planning to deliver at NAMC; and (3) NAMC, Terry, and Terry's clients were parties to an interwoven set of contracts to provide expectant mothers birthing services. (Doc. 23 at 8-10.)
Thus, in this case, the only element in dispute is the third element: whether NAMC was a stranger to Terry's contracts with her clients. Before addressing that dispute, the Court notes that Terry's Amended Complaint pleads facts which, accepted as true, are sufficient to support a finding of the other elements for tortious interference. When NAMC banned Terry, she reportedly had contracts with nine clients who had planned to give birth at NAMC. (Doc. 21 at 2.) Terry alleges that NAMC, through its employees, knew about those contracts. (Doc. 21 at 3.) Terry claims that NAMC intentionally interfered with those contracts when one of its employees wrote a letter to Terry, banning her from the hospital and "making it impossible" for her to perform under the contracts. (Doc. 21 at 4.) And, because of her ban, Terry alleges that she suffered monetary losses in the amount of $6,000, along with damage to her professional reputation and emotional distress. (Doc. 21 at 4-5.)
Under Alabama law, a defendant who is found liable for tortious interference is subject to liability for "(1) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the . . . relation; (2) consequential losses for which the interference is a legal cause; . . . (3) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation if either is reasonably to be expected to result from the interference;" and (4) punitive damages. White Sands, 32 So.3d at 17 (citing KW Plastics v. United States Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1268 (M.D. Ala. 2001) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A cmt. a (1979)).
Whether a defendant is a stranger to a contract or business relationship is decided as a matter of law. Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Invs. Life Ins. Co., 875 So.2d 1143, 1154 (Ala. 2003). Being a stranger to a contract is critical because "a party to a contract cannot, as a matter of law, be liable for tortious interference with a contract." Lolley v. Howell, 504 So.2d 253, 255 (Ala. 1987). But just because one is not a party to a contract does not render him a stranger. BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Cellulink, Inc., 814 So.2d 203, 212 (Ala. 2001) (citation omitted). If a defendant has "any beneficial or economic interest in, or control over" the contract or business relationship, then he is a party in interest and cannot be considered a stranger. Waddell, 875 So.2d at 1154. The Supreme Court of Alabama "adopt[ed] the term 'participant' to describe an individual or entity who is not a party, but who is essential, to the allegedly injured relationship and who cannot be described as a stranger." Id. at 1157. The Court went on to establish that one cannot tortiously interfere with a business relationship "so long as one is a participant in a business relationship arising from interwoven contractual arrangements that include the contract." Id.
The Court acknowledges that both Terry and NAMC reference a four-part test for determining whether a defendant is a stranger to a contract or business relationship. The test, used by Georgia courts, states the following: "a defendant is not a 'stranger' to a contract or business relationship when: (1) the defendant is an essential entity to the purported injured relations; (2) the allegedly injured relations are inextricably a part of or dependent upon the defendant's contractual or business relations; (3) the defendant would benefit economically from the alleged injured relations; or (4) both the defendant and the plaintiff are parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of contracts or relations." Waddell, 875 So.2d at 1156 (citing Britt Paulk Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Vandroff Ins. Agency, Inc., et al., 952 F. Supp. 1575, 1584 (N.D. Ga. 1996)). While the Supreme Court of Alabama cited that test during its discussion of Georgia's law on tortious interference, it did not adopt that test verbatim. See Waddell, 875 So.2d at 1157 (creating the "participant" rule after its discussion on how Georgia courts determine whether a defendant qualifies as a stranger); see also Walter Energy, Inc. v. Audley Cap. Advisors LLP, 176 So.3d 821, 830 (Ala. 2015) (giving an overview of Waddell and noting that the Supreme Court of Alabama "summarized its analysis of the stranger requirement" by adopting the "participant" rule). Even though the Eleventh Circuit applied Georgia's four-part test in MAC EAST, LLC v. Shoney's, 535 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2008), in a later Eleventh Circuit case, Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1302 (11th Cir. 2010), the Eleventh Circuit applied the "participant" rule. The Court thus opts to apply the "participant" rule, but it notes that even if it had applied Georgia's four-part test, its ultimate finding would have been the same.
At this stage of litigation, the Court does not find that NAMC was a participant in Terry's contracts with her clients; on the contrary, the Court concludes that, in the context of the third element of tortious interference, NAMC qualifies as a stranger. Terry reports that she is not an "employee, vendor, or independent contractor of NAMC." (Doc. 21 at 2.) It is undisputed that NAMC was not a party to the contracts, and Terry's client contract is silent as to the birth location. (Doc. 21-2 at 1-3.) Terry alleges that NAMC had no economic interest in Terry's contracts with her clients, an allegation which is further supported by NAMC's relevant visitor policy, which states that a doula is considered a patient's "visitor." (Doc. 21 at 3 and Doc. 21-1 at 1.)
The Court disagrees with each of NAMC's arguments, and it will address them in turn. The logic behind NAMC's first argument is skewed. NAMC claims that the Amended Complaint demonstrates that NAMC controls who can attend births at the hospital. (Doc. 23 at 8.) NAMC further claims that the fact it was able to ban Terry from the premises proves that NAMC had control over Terry's contracts with her clients. (Doc. 23 at 8-9.) Firstly, the Court cannot reasonably infer from the Amended Complaint that NAMC has complete control over who attends childbirths at the hospital. NAMC's visitor policy that was allegedly effective at the time NAMC banned Terry simply quantifies the number of visitors allowed to be with a patient; beyond the rule that a visitor must be at least twelve years old, the policy does not include any other rules or restrictions on who may be a visitor. (Doc. 21-1 at 1-2.) Rather, it states "If a doula is being utilized, the doula will count as a visitor." (Doc. 21-1 at 1.) Based on that phrasing, the Court finds that NAMC cannot control whether a patient brings a doula as one of her visitors during her childbirth experience.
Secondly, NAMC interprets Alabama law—that a defendant cannot be a stranger if it has "control over" the contract or business relationship—too literally. Waddell, 875 So.2d at 1154. The tort is called tortious interference. The premise of the tort is that the defendant acts in a way that hinders or impedes the plaintiff's business or contractual relationships. Such action requires an exercise of influence or control.
What is relevant is not whether the defendant exercised control over the plaintiff's contract or business relationship but whether the defendant had a delineated right to do so. See BellSouth, 814 So.2d at 214 (holding that BellSouth was not a stranger because it had the "legal right to terminate Cellulink's relationship with Wal-Mart directly" due to its own "rights and duties" arising out of the relevant contracts between the three parties) (emphasis in original); see also Bill FitzGibbons, LLC v. REV Birmingham, Inc., 2014 WL 1923813, at *11 (N.D. Ala. May 2, 2014); Peacock v. Merrill, 2005 WL 2739138, at *1-2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2005); Huntsville Golf Dev., Inc. v. Est. of Brindley, 2015 WL 5693608, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2015).
Additionally, the Court has not found a case where the Supreme Court of Alabama applied the law the way NAMC does in its motion. Said differently, the Supreme Court of Alabama has never held that a defendant was not a stranger solely because the defendant exercised control over the plaintiff's contracts or business relationships. Rather, in cases where the court held that a defendant was not a stranger, the holding rested on the following findings: the defendant was a party to the contract; see, e.g., Bama Budweiser of Montgomery, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 611 So.2d 238, 247 (Ala. 1992); Fitzpatrick v. Hoehn, 262 So.3d 613, 627 (Ala. 2018); the defendant had an economic interest in the contract; see, e.g., Walter, 176 So.3d at 829-30; the parties contracted in reliance on some duty to be performed by the defendant; see, e.g., Ex parte Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., 773 So.2d 475, 480 (Ala. 2000); the defendant was an agent of a party to the contract; see, e.g., Parsons v. Aaron, 849 So.2d 932, 947 (Ala. 2002); or the defendant and plaintiff were parties to an interwoven set of contracts; see, e.g., Tom's Foods, Inc. v. Carn, 896 So.2d 443, 455 (Ala. 2004); Waddell, 875 So.2d at 1159.
Based on the allegations in Terry's Amended Complaint, the Court cannot say that NAMC had a delineated right to control Terry's contracts with her clients. (Doc. 23 at 8.) Terry's client contract does not have a birth-location provision, and Terry does not allege any facts to suggest that a separate contract or agreement existed between Terry, her clients, and NAMC. In other words, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Terry and/or her clients granted NAMC a right to exercise control over their contracts, so NAMC was thus not a party in interest to those contracts. Furthermore, the Court has already established that NAMC was not a party to Terry's contracts with her clients and that NAMC had no economic interest in those contracts. And the Amended Complaint contains no allegations to suggest either that Terry and her clients contracted in reliance on NAMC performing a duty, that NAMC was an agent of Terry's or her clients, or that the entities were parties to an interwoven set of contracts.
This point is discussed more in depth in a later paragraph.
Turning to NAMC's second argument, the Court does not agree that NAMC was an essential entity in Terry's contracts with her clients. (Doc. 23 at 9.) Terry defines a doula as a "birth companion." (Doc. 21-2 at 1.) Her job is to "provide emotional support, physical comfort, and communication" during the client's childbirth experience. (Doc. 21-2 at 1.) Put differently, she does not help deliver her client's child. And Terry's client contract explicitly establishes that Terry works only for the client. (Doc. 21-2 at 1.) Thus, based on the language of the contract, the birth location has no effect on Terry's ability to fulfill her duties as a doula to her clients. If Terry's client suddenly decides to give birth somewhere besides NAMC, that does not change Terry's performance obligation under the contract. In fact, many pregnant women choose not to give birth at hospitals. Moreover, NAMC and Terry provide Terry's clients separate and distinct services during their childbirth experiences: NAMC provides medical services while Terry provides emotional support. (Doc. 21-2 at 1.) Though both services occur simultaneously, neither service relies on the other, so neither service is essential to the other.
NAMC also argues that it was essential because Terry could only fulfill her duties because NAMC had given her "permission" to do so. (Doc. 23 at 10.) But revisiting the phrasing in NAMC's visitor policy, NAMC categorizes a doula as a visitor of an expectant woman. (Doc. 21-1 at 1.) That categorization does not give rise to the inference that NAMC gave Terry any sort of express "permission" to serve as a doula for her clients choosing to give birth at NAMC.
Lastly, regarding NAMC's third argument, the Court does not agree that NAMC, Terry, and her clients were parties to an interwoven set of contracts to provide expectant women birthing services. (Doc. 23 at 10.) While Terry alleges that she and her clients have contractual relationships, Terry's Amended Complaint contains no allegation, nor can this Court make a reasonable inference from the factual allegations contained therein, that Terry's clients were in contractual relationships with NAMC. Without an allegation supporting the existence of another contract, the Court cannot find that NAMC and Terry had contractual duties or responsibilities that were inextricably intertwined.
That aside, the Court emphasizes that its analysis of Terry's tortious interference claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is not meant to imply that NAMC's ban of Terry was unjustified. And nothing in this Order precludes the Court from finding, during a later stage of litigation, that NAMC was not a stranger to Terry's contracts with her clients. Indeed, at the summary-judgment stage, NAMC's arguments may be more compelling. But at this point, the Court's role is to determine whether Terry, in her Amended Complaint, pleads a prima facie claim for tortious interference. Under that scope, the Court concludes that she has.
B. Slander Per Se
In her Amended Complaint, Terry states that NAMC employees made several false statements about her and her livelihood. (Doc. 21 at 6.) Those statements include variations of the following:
1. Terry broke too many rules to practice at NAMC;
2. Terry was incompetent in her profession;(Doc. 21 at 5.) Specifically, in her claim for defamation, she alleges that, because of those statements, NAMC is liable for slander per se. (Doc. 21 at 7.)
3. Terry lied to her clients about being banned from NAMC;
4. Terry cared more about earning money than her clients;
5. Terry was dishonest;
6. Terry should not be able to practice as a doula in Alabama; and
7. Terry's violation of the hospital's policy was "pretty serious."
"To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was at least negligent . . . in publishing a false and defamatory statement to another concerning the plaintiff, . . . which is either actionable without having to prove special harm (actionable per se) or actionable upon allegations and proof of special harm (actionable per quod)." Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So.2d 1085, 1091 (Ala. 1988) (internal citations omitted). Oral defamation is referred to as slander. Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 16 (Ala. 2003). In order to recover for slander per se, the oral statements must impute the subject to an "indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude." Id. at 17.
Here, none of the statements that Terry alleges involve the "commission of an indictable criminal offense involving infamy or moral turpitude," and the Court is unpersuaded by Terry's argument stating otherwise. In her brief, she cites Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "malpractice," which is "[a]n instance of negligence or incompetence on the part of a professional." (Doc. 24 at 12.) Relying on that definition, Terry contends that the statements made by the NAMC employees accuse her of incompetence, so they also accuse her of malpractice. But Terry does not claim that "malpractice" is an indictable offense, let alone one involving infamy or moral turpitude, and this Court is not aware of any Alabama statute that says differently. As such, Terry does not "assert a facially plausible claim" for slander per se, so dismissal of that claim is warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, NAMC's motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. (Doc. 23.) The Court denies the motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Terry's tortious interference claim and grants the motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Terry's slander per se claim.
DONE and ORDERED May 2, 2023.