Opinion
2012-02-7
Louis A. TERMINELLO, et al., respondents-appellants, v. VILLAGE OF PIERMONT, etc., appellant-respondent, et al., defendants.
Rutherford & Christie, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Lewis R. Silverman of counsel), for appellant-respondent. Feerick Lynch MacCartney PLLC, South Nyack, N.Y. (Mary E. Marzolla of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
Rutherford & Christie, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Lewis R. Silverman of counsel), for appellant-respondent. Feerick Lynch MacCartney PLLC, South Nyack, N.Y. (Mary E. Marzolla of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SHERI S. ROMAN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, in effect, for a judgment declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7 (2005) of the Village of Piermont, is unconstitutional, the defendant Village of Piermont appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Weiner, J.), entered September 30, 2010, as denied its converted motion for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7 (2005) of the Village of Piermont, is not unconstitutional, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal, as limited by their notice of appeal and brief, from so much of the same order as denied that branch of their cross motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, on the issue of liability.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, the converted motion of the defendant Village of Piermont for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7 (2005) of the Village of Piermont, is not unconstitutional is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7 (2005) of the Village of Piermont, is not unconstitutional; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant Village of Piermont.
On November 22, 2005, the Village of Piermont adopted Local Law No. 7 (2005) of the Village of Piermont (hereinafter Local Law No. 7), “to adopt the provisions of Real Property Tax Law, Section 1903 concerning Homestead base proportions.” On the same date, the Village adopted revaluation figures following a complete reassessment of real property within the Village. The plaintiffs are residential condominium owners and homeowner's associations within the Village who allege, among other things, that their tax assessments increased disproportionately to other similarly situated properties after the Village's adoption of Local Law No. 7 and the 2005 revaluation figures, and that such disparate treatment is unconstitutional.
The Village established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with regard to the plaintiffs' allegations that their federal and state constitutional rights to equal protection were violated by the Village's adoption of Local Law No. 7 and the homestead provisions of the Real Property Tax Law. Legislative enactments and local laws are presumptively valid ( see Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 40, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876, 209 N.E.2d 539; Korotun v. Incorporated Vil. of Bayville, 26 A.D.3d 311, 312–313, 809 N.Y.S.2d 533). This presumption is especially strong in the area of taxation, where special deference is given to legislative policy choices ( see 41 Kew Gardens Rd. Assoc. v. Tyburski, 70 N.Y.2d 325, 333, 520 N.Y.S.2d 544, 514 N.E.2d 1114).
Furthermore, where, as here, the challenged legislation does not involve a suspect class or interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, the scope of judicial review is limited to whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective ( see Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724, 475 N.E.2d 95; Tilles Inv. Co. v. Gulotta, 288 A.D.2d 303, 304, 733 N.Y.S.2d 438). As the rational basis standard of review is especially deferential in the area of tax law, equal protection does not prevent the Legislature from treating one class of individuals or entities differently unless the difference is palpably arbitrary or amounts to invidious discrimination ( see Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20, 25, 489 N.Y.S.2d 455, 478 N.E.2d 971; Tilles Inv. Co. v. Gulotta, 288 A.D.2d at 305, 733 N.Y.S.2d 438). Thus, a classification must be upheld if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification ( see Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v. Wing, 94 N.Y.2d 284, 290, 704 N.Y.S.2d 897, 726 N.E.2d 449, cert. denied 530 U.S. 1276, 120 S.Ct. 2744, 147 L.Ed.2d 1008).
Real Property Tax Law § 1901(13)(a) defines the “Homestead class” to include condominiums, but not any condominium which “previously was on an assessment roll as a dwelling unit in other than condominium form of ownership” (RPTL 1901[13][a][2] ). The Village established, prima facie, that this provision bears a rational relationship to a valid state interest. Prohibiting retroactive application of the law is a valid state interest ( see Matter of 470 Newport Assoc. v. Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 211 A.D.2d 322, 326, 627 N.Y.S.2d 1020). Furthermore, the classification of properties as homestead or non-homestead, and the imposition of different tax rates on each, is reasonable ( see Foss v. City of Rochester, 65 N.Y.2d 247, 257, 491 N.Y.S.2d 128, 480 N.E.2d 717).
In response to the Village's showing, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the application of the law to their properties violates their federal or state constitutional rights to equal protection ( see Matter of Chasalow v. Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 202 A.D.2d 499, 501, 609 N.Y.S.2d 27; Matter of Towne House Vil. Condominium v. Assessor of Town of Islip, 200 A.D.2d 749, 607 N.Y.S.2d 87; cf. Foss v. City of Rochester, 65 N.Y.2d at 260, 491 N.Y.S.2d 128, 480 N.E.2d 717; Verga v. Town of Clarkstown, 137 A.D.2d 809, 525 N.Y.S.2d 272). Accordingly, the Village was entitled to summary judgment with respect to so much of the complaint, insofar as asserted against it, as alleged equal protection violations.
Contrary to the Village's contention, the plaintiffs did not abandon their remaining theories of liability, which were argued both before the Supreme Court and on this appeal. Nevertheless, the Village established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the plaintiffs' allegations of federal and state due process violations ( see A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44, 54 S.Ct. 599, 78 L.Ed. 1109; Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 211), and their allegation that the Village retaliated against them for exercising their federal and state free speech rights to file tax grievances ( see Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 102). In response, the plaintiffs offered only conclusory allegations which failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Further, the plaintiffs' allegation of a conspiracy to violate their equal protection and due process rights ( see 42 USC § 1985[3]; Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049), must also fail.
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the Village's converted motion for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7, is not unconstitutional.
Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7, is not unconstitutional ( see Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 334, 229 N.Y.S.2d 380, 183 N.E.2d 670, appeal dismissed 371 U.S. 74, 83 S.Ct. 177, 9 L.Ed.2d 163, cert. denied 371 U.S. 901, 83 S.Ct. 205, 9 L.Ed.2d 164).