Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-2110, SECTION "K" (5)
December 20, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the plaintiff, Keenan Temple's objections to the magistrate's Report and Recommendation granting the Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment, brought by the remaining defendants, Louisiana Department of Corrections Secretary Richard Stalder ("Secretary Stalder"), Washington Correctional Institute ("W.C.I.") Warden Ed C. Day ("Warden Day"), and Louisiana Parole Board Chairman Ronald Bonvillian ("Chairman Bonvillian"). Having considered the magistrate's report, the parties' pleadings and memoranda, together with the relevant law, the Court finds no merit in Temple's objections and adopts the findings of the magistrate's Report and Recommendation.
BACKGROUND
In this civil rights action, plaintiff, Keenan Temple, contends that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by keeping him incarcerated until June 29, 1999, 606 days after his anticipated release date of October 22, 1997. This matter is before the Court pursuant Temple's objections to the Report and Recommendation granting summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, Louisiana Department of Corrections Secretary, Richard Stalder, Washington Correctional Institute Warden, Ed C. Day, and Louisiana Parole Board Chairman, Ronald Bonvillian. The Court dismissed Clara Wells with prejudice as a party defendant on July 3, 2002. ( See Rec. Doc. #39). Secretary Stalder and Warden Day contend that their claims should be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Chairman Bonvillian contends, and Temple concedes, that he is absolutely immune from liability.
STANDARD FOR REVIEWING A MAGISTRATE'S RECOMMENDATION
Magistrate judges are empowered by statute to preside over pretrial matters on appointment by a district judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(A), a district court evaluating a magistrate judge's recommendation is permitted to adopt those portions of the recommendation to which no specific objection is made, as long as those sections are not clearly erroneous. Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). Where a party makes a "specific written objection" within "[ten] days after being served with a copy of the [magistrate judge's] recommended disposition," the district court is required to make a de novo determination regarding those parts of the report. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). Because Temple timely filed objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, this Court is required to undertake a de novo review of the motions underlying Magistrate Judge Chasez's Report. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322. "[M]ere allegations or denials" will not defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Rather, the non-movant must come forward with "specific facts" that establish an issue for trial. Id. When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must avoid a "trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts" are tasks for the trier-of-fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. To that end, the Court must resolve disputes over material facts in the non-movant's favor. "The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, with evidence competent under Rule 56, is to be believed." Leonard v. Dixie Well Service Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1987).
UNDISPUTED FACTS
On September 6, 1983, Temple was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to serve ten years in prison. On March 25, 1989, Temple was released on parole in connection with his September 1983 manslaughter conviction. According to Temple, his parole for his September 1983 offense was to end on March 27, 1993. (Pl. Obj. to Mag. Judge's Rpt. Recom. p. 2). On March 9, 1992, Temple was arrested and charged with felony theft, under L.A. R.S. 14:67, and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, under L.A. R.S. 14:95.1. (Pl. Ct. Ordered Bench Mem. Ex. C). Following his arrest, he was released on bond. In July of 1992, Temple was shot and paralyzed from the waist down. He remained in the hospital until November 1992.
On March 17, 1993, the Louisiana Department of Corrections Parole Board ("Parole Board") issued a warrant for the arrest of Temple for violation of parole based on his arrest on charges in March 1992. On July 15, 1993, the Parole Board held a preliminary hearing for the alleged parole violations. On August 18, 1993, the Parole Board released Temple on bond pending the adjudication of his March 1992 charges.
On May 30, 1996, Temple plead guilty to the March 1992 charges of felony theft and being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to two three-year sentences to be served concurrently. On July 18, 1996, Chairman Bonvillian issued a letter to Temple advising him that his parole had been revoked. On October 30, 1996, Temple was transferred to W.C.I. W.C.I. officials provided Temple with his "full term date," which they calculated to be April 24, 2003. This date was ascertained by adding the prison time Temple incurred as a result of the revocation of his parole, to the two three-year concurrent sentences he received as a result of his 1992 felony theft and possession of a firearm by a felon convictions.
The 22nd Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany, did not provide a calculation of the time Temple was to serve. (Pl. Ct. Ordered Bench Mem. Ex. H). However, Temple was to serve the remainder of his 1983 conviction, which was 4 years and 2 days, and the two three-year concurrent sentences he received as a result of his March 1992 convictions. This gives a total of 7 years and two days. Judge Duczer held that the March 1992 convictions were "to be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence." (Pl. Ct. Ordered Bench Mem. Ex. H).
On March 19, 1997, Temple filed an administrative grievance, disagreeing with prison officials' calculation of his release date. In his grievance, Temple argued that no prison time should be added to his concurrently-running three-year sentences because he had not violated his parole, but rather, had "completed his sentence on the manslaughter conviction." Temple reasoned that his "full term date" in connection with the September 1983 ten-year manslaughter sentence from which he was paroled in 1989, "expired on March 27, 1993, and no procedure was initiated by the Department of Corrections to revoke his parole prior to its expiration date." Essentially, Temple argued that since the Department of Corrections did not hold a preliminary hearing to revoke his parole before the parole expired, he had satisfied his sentence and his parole could no longer be revoked. Although no formal hearing was conducted before his parole date had expired, Temple was detained in connection with the new offense, and the Parole Board issued letter dated July 18, 1996, notifying Temple of his revocation, and issued a warrant for his arrest. ( See Commissioner's Recommendation).
W.C.I. officials rejected Temple's argument that the time limit for the Department of Corrections to revoke his parole had expired. It determined that Temple had, in fact, violated his parole because he had committed felonies while on parole and, for this reason, was required to serve, in addition to his March 1992 three-year sentences, the time remaining on his September 1983 ten-year manslaughter sentence. In the "first step response" to Temple's administrative grievance, Clara Wells informed Temple: "You committed your new felony convictions while under [parole] supervision." (Clara Wells, First Step Response, Mar. 31, 1997). Wells also informed Temple that his sentence was to run concurrently in accordance with L.A. C. Cr. P. Art. 883 since his sentencing judge was silent as to how to run his sentence with his parole violation. Similarly, in the "second step response," Warden Day explained: "[Y]ou were released under parole supervision . . . on March 25, 1989. You committed new felonies . . . in March 1992, while still under parole supervision. . . . [Y]our time has been properly calculated." (Ed Day, Second Step Response, Apr. 4, 1997). Finally, at the third step, a representative of Secretary Stalder responded: "You were released by GT/PS [Good Time/Parole Supervision] on 3-25-90, and subsequently chose to violate the conditions of that release well before the expiration of your sentence. . . . Your relief is hereby denied." (Third Step Response, Jun. 17, 1997).
Temple appealed his denial of administrative relief and, on June 30, 1997, filed a petition for judicial review with the 19th Judicial District Court for the State of Louisiana. In this judicial proceeding, Temple essentially set forth the same argument presented in his administrative grievance proceeding. Commissioner Bergeron ordered the Department of Corrections to set aside the parole revocation of July 18, 1996 and recalculate Temple's time in accordance with his recommendations. The Court found that "the state, by waiting in excess of three years from the date of a warrant for parole revocation, has permitted the parole period to expire and lost its claim to authority to revoke." (Pl. Ct. Ordered Bench Mem. Ex. J). On June 29, 1999, Temple was released from custody.
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Magistrate Judge Chasez issued a Report and Recommendation on September 5, 2002, which recommended that defendants be granted summary judgment. Specifically, the Report recommends that defendants Secretary Stalder and Warden Day be granted summary judgment and Temple's claims against them be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Report also recommends that defendant Chairman Bonvillian be granted summary judgment and Temple's claims against them be dismissed because he is entitled to absolute immunity. Temple objects to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. He argues that: (1) the Magistrate Judge gave no consideration to his procedural due process right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, (2) the Magistrate Judge erred in failing to follow Nelson v. Stalder, 135 F. Supp.2d 745 (E.D.La. 2001), (3) the Magistrate Judge erred in omitting significant facts from her factual findings, (4) the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the defendants were reasonable in calculating his release date, (5) the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that defendants' conduct was reasonable in review of Temple's complaint, (6) the Magistrate Judge erred in failing to give appropriate consideration to the recommendation of the Commissioner and the 19th Judicial District Court in Louisiana, (7) the Magistrate Judge erred in interpreting L.A. R.S. 15:574:10 and in imputing consideration of this statute, and (9) the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. (Pl. Objections to Magis. Jud.'s Rpt. Recom.)
ANALYSIS
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that any civil action for damages for alleged civil rights violations that attacks the validity of a state court conviction or confinement, which has not been reversed, expunged, invalidated or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, is not cognizable under Section 1983.
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. at 486-87. "In addition to convictions and sentences, Heck applies to proceedings which call into question the fact or duration of parole." Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 851 (1995); see also Cotton v. Texas Dep't Criminal Justice, 35 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994) (parole proceeding) (unpublished). The instant action is, therefore, the type of case to which the Heck Court refers since Temple's Section 1983 claims question the legality of his incarceration resulting from his parole revocation, and there exists a state court judgment that invalidates the calculation of Temple's sentence.
However, before the Court undertakes the Heck analysis to determine damages for the allegedly unconstitutional conviction, it will first consider the applicability of the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity. Absolute immunity renders a defendant immune not just from liability, but also from suit. Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 76 (5th Cir. 1995); Hulsey v. Owens, 63 F.3d 354, 355 (5th Cir. 1995); Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994). Courts employ a "functional" test to determine whether officials are entitled to absolute immunity and look to the "nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988); Hulsey, 63 F.3d at 356. As far as Chairman Bonvillian is concerned, the Fifth Circuit has held that parole board members are absolutely immune when performing adjudicative, decision-making functions as opposed to administrative functions for which they are entitled to only qualified immunity. Hulsey v. Owens, 63 F.3d at 356; cf. Walter v. Torres, 917 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1990). Chairman Bonvillian contends, and Temple concedes, that he is absolutely immune from liability. Temple's claims against Chairman Bonvillian are, therefore, dismissed under the doctrine of absolute immunity.
To the extent that Temple sues Secretary Stalder and Warden Day in their official capacities, the law in the Fifth Circuit is clear that the Department of Corrections is immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Loya v. Texas Department of Corrections, 878 F.2d 860, 861 (5th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Bonvillian, 1997 WL 162155, *3 (E.D.La.). To the extent Temple sues Secretary Stalder and Warden Day in their personal capacities, Temple fails to overcome their defense of qualified immunity. Once a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test to overcome this defense. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). First, the court must determine "whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation at all under current law." Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)). The court must look at currently applicable constitutional standards to determine whether a constitutional violation exists. See Id. Secondly, if the plaintiff has articulated a constitutional violation, then the judge "determines whether the defendant's actions were 'objectively reasonable' with reference to "clearly established law' at the time of the conduct in question." Id. at 899-900. If the plaintiff fails to meet both steps, then the defendants prevail with their qualified immunity defense.
In this case, the plaintiff satisfies the first prong because he claims the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right against deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Essentially, the plaintiff is alleging that he was wrongly imprisoned without a proper hearing and in violation of his liberty interest in not being incarcerated arbitrarily. This grievance is a constitutional violation under current law—it violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the second prong, the Court finds that the plaintiff fails to satisfy this step because the defendants' actions were "objectively reasonable" with reference to "clearly established law" at the time of the conduct in question. At the time Temple's parole was revoked, there was no clearly established federal law which suggested that delaying a parole revocation hearing until after an individual's parole had expired was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Temple does not advance any authority or federal precedent to support his contention that failure to commence a preliminary hearing on the issue of parole revocation is unreasonable in light of clearly established law, or otherwise a violation of a constitutional right.
Temple relies on the case of Nelson v. Stalder, 135 F. Supp.2d 745 (E.D.La. 2001) for his argument that Secretary Stalder and Warden Day did not undertake any meaningful review of his case. However, Nelson is no longer good law because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed it. See Nelson v. Stalder, 31 Fed.Appx. 836, 2002 WL 243382 (5th Cir. (La.)).
Consequently, the Court finds that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields Secretary Stalder and Warden Day from liability because Temple has not proven that the defendants acted unreasonably in light of "clearly established law" at the time of the conduct in question.
CONCLUSION
Temple has not defeated the Plaintiffs' defense of absolute and qualified immunity. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of the defendants, is HEREBY GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Temple's § 1983 claims against Secretary Bonvillian, Warden Day and Secretary Stalder are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.