Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:14-07969 (JLL) (JAD)
01-12-2016
TELEBRANDS CORP., Plaintiff, v. MOPNADO, Defendant.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICITION, TO TRANSFER FOR IMPROPER VENUE, OR TO TRANSFER FOR CONVENIENCE JOSEPH A. DICKSON, U.S.M.J.
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Mopnado's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, to transfer for improper venue, or to transfer for convenience. (ECF No. 15). The Honorable Jose L. Linares, U.S.D.J., referred Defendant's motion to this Court for a Report and Recommendation. The Court conducted oral argument on Defendant's motion on September 11, 2015 and then ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing after engaging in limited jurisdictional discovery. Upon consideration of the parties' arguments and submissions, and for the reasons stated below, it is the recommendation of this Court that Defendant's motion be DENIED in its entirety.
Defendant notes that A-Thread Apparel, LLC is the true defendant in this matter, and that it "operates under the fictitious business name 'Mopnado.'" (See Def. Br. at 1, ECF No. 15-1; Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 3, ECF No. 26-1 at 111). For the purposes of clarity, the Court will simply refer to A-Thread Apparel, LLC / Mopnado as "Defendant" or "Mopnado."
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Telebrands Corp., commenced this action against Defendant on December 22, 2014 in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. (Compl., ECF No. 1). Plaintiff's claims arise under United States Patent Laws (35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.), United States Trademark and Unfair Competition Laws (15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.), and the statutory and common law of the State of New Jersey.
Plaintiff has "market[ed] and [sold] mop products under the trademarks HURRICANE®, SPIN MOP™, and/or TWIN MOP™ (collectively, 'the HURRICANE Products')" since at least 2012. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-8, ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has sole rights to U.S. Patent No. 8,291,544 (titled "Mop with the Function of Dewatering the Yarns by Twisting in a Single Direction via an Up-and-Down Linear Motion") (hereinafter "'544 patent"); U.S. Patent No. 8,132,287 (titled "Cleaning Device with Cleaning Means and a Frame Body") (hereinafter "'287 patent"); and U.S Trademark Application Serial No. 86/223,494 "for the mark SPIN MOP for mops, and all common law rights appurtenant thereto ('the SPIN MOP Trademark')." (Id. ¶¶ 9-12).
Plaintiff contends that "[a]s a result of its long and substantially exclusive use, substantial sales and extensive advertising and promotional activities . . . , the SPIN MOP Trademark has become well-known and widely recognized as indicating the source or origin of [Plaintiff's] product." (Id. ¶ 16).
Plaintiff claims that Defendant's product is a direct competitor of Plaintiff's products, is sold in the same markets (i.e., it is available, through the internet, throughout the United States), and that Defendant's "MOPNADO product infringes at least one claim of each of the '544 patent and the '287 patent." (Id. ¶¶ 18-21). Plaintiff claims (1) an infringement of the '544 patent; (2) an infringement of the '287 patent; (3) trademark infringement under § 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, for infringement of Trademark Registration No. 3,838,929; (4) violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (5) common law trademark infringement and unfair competition; and (6) unfair competition under N.J.S.A. 56:4-1 et seq. (Id. at 4-12).
On February 2, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, to transfer this matter to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of improper venue or for convenience purposes. (See generally Def.'s Motion, ECF No. 15). Defendant argued that it is not subject to either general or specific personal jurisdiction in this District. (Def.'s Br.at 5-6, ECF No. 15-1). Defendant asserted that it lacks sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey because it is a limited liability company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. (Id. at 6). Defendant contends that it "does not actively solicit any business in New Jersey[,] . . . does not and has never attended trade shows in New Jersey[,] . . . does not advertise its products in New Jersey[,] . . . [and] is in no sense at home in New Jersey." (Id.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Defendant further contended that "the overwhelming majority of [its] sales [are] done through Amazon" and because Defendant "has not sold any product to a retailer or customer in New Jersey, there is no basis for specific jurisdiction in New Jersey." (Id. at 12). Lastly, Defendant argued that there is no basis to find specific jurisdiction under either "a stream of commerce theory or through a theory that Mopnado sells into New Jersey via its website." (Id. at 13).
Defendant similarly asserted that New Jersey is not a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because New Jersey does not have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, and Defendant therefore does not "reside" in New Jersey for the purposes of establishing venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (c)(2). (Id. at 11) ("Since New Jersey does not have personal jurisdiction over Mopnado, Mopnado is not a resident of New Jersey."). Defendant also argued, in the alternative, that the case should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California because the case could have initially been brought there and such a transfer would be "for the convenience of witnesses and in the interest of justice." (Def.'s Br., ECF No. 15-1 at 17).
Plaintiff filed an opposition brief on March 2, 2015. (Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 19). In that submission, Plaintiff contended that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendant because Defendant's "interactive website and . . . false advertising claims" are purposefully directed at New Jersey, Defendant purposefully availed itself of doing business in New Jersey through Defendant's website, and that subjecting Defendant to the Court's jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Id. at 12, 18). Plaintiff also argued that venue is proper in the District of New Jersey because Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in this District. (Id. at 21). With regard to Defendant's alternative request for a "convenience" transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, Plaintiff asserts that its choice of forum is entitled to significant deference, and that Defendant failed to "establish that the balance of interests of justice strongly weighs towards transfer." (Id. at 21) (citing Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971)).
Defendant filed a Memorandum in Further Support of its Motion to Dismiss on March 9, 2015. (Def. Reply, ECF No. 20). Defendant argued that its website "is not interactive where it would be subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey," (Id. at 4) and that "a passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise personal jurisdiction." (Id. at 6 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.Pa. 1997))). Defendant contended that, even assuming that its website may be considered interactive, it did not purposefully avail itself of doing business in New Jersey. (Id. at 7). Lastly, Defendant asserted that New Jersey is not a proper venue for this case because "any alleged acts took place in California" and because Plaintiff's argument that New Jersey would be a more convenient for the parties is unpersuasive. (Id. at 9-10).
The Court conducted oral argument on September 11, 2015 and, noting that the motion record was deficient in several respects concerning the nature and extent of Defendant's connections with New Jersey (particularly the means by which Defendant's products reached the State and Defendant's relationship with Amazon.com), the Court Ordered the parties to engage in limited jurisdictional discovery. (ECF No. 23). The Court also Ordered the parties to file supplemental submissions addressing the impact, if any, of the information they uncovered during the jurisdictional discovery period. (Id.).
On October 6, 2015, Jin Chon, a principal of Defendant, submitted a declaration intended to "correct a statement made in [her] declaration dated February 2, 2015 [in support of Defendant's motion to dismiss]." (ECF No. 25 at 2). Specifically, though Ms. Chon had previously represented that "Mopnado has never directly sold or shipped anything to New Jersey", she discovered, after researching Defendant's sales records, that Defendant "had sold 1 Mopnado product as of February 2, 2015 that [Defendant] shipped directly to NJ in December 2013." (Id. at 3). In its supplemental brief, Plaintiff argued that Defendant has actually sold three Mopnado products directly into New Jersey via its website, (ECF No. 26 at 2-3), and that Defendant has also sold "at least 626 units of the infringing product to customers in New Jersey via its listing on Amazon.com." (Id. at 3). Plaintiff contended that, based on those contacts, the District of New Jersey may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. (See generally ECF No. 26). In its supplemental response, Defendant argued that, in light of its small number of direct sales and its lack of control over where the product it sells via Amazon.com is ultimately sold and shipped, it still cannot be said to have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in New Jersey. (ECF No. 28 at 5-9). Defendant also argued, for the first time, that venue in the District of New Jersey would not be appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). (Id. at 9-10).
II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
a. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)
"It has long been the rule that a valid judgment . . . may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (citations omitted). The burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction over the defendant is placed on the plaintiff. Penguin Grp. (USA), Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (quoted in Envirocare Techs., LLC v. Simanovsky, No. 11-CV-3458(JS)(ETB), 2012 WL 2001443, *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012)).
Here, Defendant moves to dismiss for a "lack of personal jurisdiction" pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. District Courts must employ the law of the Federal Circuit when ruling on personal jurisdiction issues in patent infringement cases. See Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Once a defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, as Defendant did here, "the burden falls upon the plaintiff to come forward with sufficient facts to establish that jurisdiction is proper." Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat. Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Carteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992)). Where, as here, the "court's determination of personal jurisdiction is based on affidavits and other written materials, and no jurisdictional hearing is conducted, the plaintiff usually bears only a prima facie burden." Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., No. 2014-1807, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11536 (Fed. Cir. July 6, 2015) (citing Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
"The plaintiff meets this burden and presents a prima facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by 'establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.'" Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1223 (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1987). Once the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, "the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, which must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
i. The Legal Boundaries of Personal Jurisdiction
"A personal jurisdiction determination for an out-of-state defendant is a two step inquiry: 'whether a forum state's long-arm statute permits service of process and whether assertion of personal jurisdiction violates due process.'" Grober v. Mako Prods., 686 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). "A federal court sitting in New Jersey has jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided under New Jersey state law." Miller Yacht Sales, Inc., 384 F.3d at 96. "New Jersey's long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction coextensive with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution." Id. (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(c)). A district court sitting in New Jersey may therefore exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [New Jersey] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., Inc., 766 F.2d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
"Minimum contacts can be analyzed in the context of general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction." Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 334 (3d Cir. 2009). General jurisdiction results from, among other things, "systematic and continuous" contact between a non-resident defendant and the forum state. Spuglio v. Cabaret Lounge, 344 F. App'x 724, 725 (3d Cir. 2009); Grober 686 F.3d at 1346. "Specific jurisdiction over a defendant exists when that defendant has 'purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.'" Miller Yacht Sales, Inc., 384 F.3d at 96 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)); accord Grober 686 F.3d at 1346.
Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. (Pl. Br. at 7-14, ECF No. 19). Plaintiff does not argue that a court sitting in New Jersey may exercise general personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff. (Id.). Indeed, as the record reflects that Defendant is an entity organized under Delaware law, maintains its principal (and only) office in California, and does not have any property, employees, bank accounts, telephone listings or other lasting ties to New Jersey, (Decl. of Jin Chon ¶ 16, ECF No. 15-2), the Court finds that Defendant could not be considered "at home" in this State and is thus not subject to general personal jurisdiction here. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (clarifying that the test for general personal jurisdiction over non-resident entity is "whether that corporation's 'affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.'") (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)). The Court will therefore focus its inquiry on whether Defendant's alleged contacts with New Jersey are sufficient to justify an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.
ii. Specific Jurisdiction Analysis
"Specific jurisdiction is proper only when the 'cause of action arises out of [the] defendant's forum-related activities, such that the defendant 'should reasonably anticipate being haled into court' in that forum.'" Abel v. Kirbaran, 296 Fed. Appx. 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001)). The United States Courts of Appeals for both the Third Circuit and the Federal Circuit use the same three-part inquiry when analyzing "if a defendant has minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due process" in this context. HS Real Co., LLC v. Sher, 527 Fed. Appx. 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2013). See O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007); accord Grober 686 F.3d at 1346.
"First, the defendant must have 'purposefully directed [its] activities' at the forum." O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). "Second, the litigation must 'arise out of or relate to' at least one of those activities." Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Grimes v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1559 (3d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations omitted). Third, "if the prior two requirements are met, a court may consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise 'comport[s] with 'fair play and substantial justice.''" O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476); accord Grober 686 F.3d at 1346 (In describing the appropriate specific jurisdiction analysis, the Federal Circuit wrote: "When analyzing specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a court considers whether: '(1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum state, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant's activities with the forum state, and (3) assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.'"). The Court notes that a specific jurisdiction analysis is claim-specific. Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Such a determination is claim specific because a conclusion that the District Court has personal jurisdiction over one of the defendants as to a particular claim asserted by Remick does not necessarily mean that it has personal jurisdiction over that same defendant as to Remick's other claims.").
Here, Plaintiff has identified the same conduct for each of its claims: (1) Defendant's alleged operation of a website, accessible to New Jersey visitors, that contains information on the infringing products, provides visitors with a link to a third-party site that sells those products, and, at some point, permitted New Jersey residents to purchase the infringing products directly; and (2) Defendant's alleged sale of the infringing product to New Jersey residents via the third-party website Amazon.com. (See generally Pl. Br., ECF No. 19; Pl. Supp. Br., ECF No. 26). The Court's analysis will therefore analyze whether Defendant's alleged conduct is sufficient to subject it to specific personal jurisdiction in this State with regard to Plaintiff's various causes of action. The Court notes that, as the parties have conducted a single jurisdictional analysis with regard to all of Plaintiffs' claims (i.e., they did not engage in a claim-by-claim analysis), the Court will likewise analyze those claims collectively.
A. Defendant's Website-based Contacts
The framework laid out in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), is instructive when determining whether a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis of that defendant's internet presence and related contacts. Indeed, both parties cite the Zippo case for this proposition. (Compare Def. Br., ECF No. 15, at 9-10 with Pl. Br., ECF No. 19, at 9-10). The issue before the court in Zippo was "whether a Web site could provide sufficient contacts for specific personal jurisdiction." Foreign Candy Co., Inc. v. Tropical Paradise, Inc., 950 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1026 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (citing Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.2d 704, 710-11 (8th Cir. 2003)). The Zippo court held that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1124. To illustrate that principle, the Zippo court outlined a "sliding scale" approach to be used in analyzing the propriety of personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.Id. (citations omitted).
Having considered all of the information submitted in connection with Defendant's motion, including the parties' supplemental filings, the Court finds that, for the purposes of this case, Defendant's website is such that, at times, it "clearly does business over the internet." Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. The Court notes that this finding is based largely on information, disclosed to the Court for the first time after the parties engaged in jurisdictional discovery, demonstrating that Defendant actually sold the infringing product directly to consumers through the mopnado.com website.
Based on the parties' initial submissions (i.e., everything filed prior to the point that the Court Ordered the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery), it appeared that Defendant's website was, at all relevant times, almost entirely passive in nature. Plaintiff's own descriptions of the website, along with the screen shots Plaintiffs submitted in opposition to Defendant's motion, indicated that much of the website's content was dedicated to providing information regarding the allegedly infringing products. (Compl., ¶¶21-26, Exs. D - E, ECF No. 1; Decl. of Bala Iyer, ¶ 5, Exs. 1-2, ECF No. 19-3). It further appeared that the only truly "interactive" portions of the website were a feature through which visitors could sign up for a newsletter, as well as a link labeled "Contact Us" that would, ostensibly, enable visitors to communicate with Defendant. (Def. Rep. Br. at 3, ECF No. 20; Compl., Ex. E at 3, ECF No. 1-6). Indeed, Defendant itself suggested as much. (Def. Reply Br. at 3, ECF No. 20 ("The only portion of mopnado.com that is beyond the provider of information, is the ability to sign up for a mopnado.com newsletter-[sic] in order to get more information.") (emphasis in original)). Though Plaintiff repeatedly argued that Defendant sold the infringing product on its website, (Pl. Br., at 5, 6,10, ECF No. 19), Defendant represented, in no uncertain terms, that this was not true, and that it was actually impossible for customers to purchase products via the mopnado.com website. (See, e.g., Def. Reply Br. at 1, ECF No. 20 ("[A]ny allegations that any sales with customers in the forum state are via www.mopnado.com are false."); id. ("Defendant's website, www.mopnado.com is incapable of conducting any direct sales."); id. at 3 ("Even though the website contains links that are titled 'store' and 'shopping cart', interested customers are unable to purchase any products through mopnado.com or operate the 'shopping cart' feature. Customers who attempt to purchase products through mopnado.com are directed to amazon.com.") (emphasis in original)). The information Defendant produced in discovery, however, confirms that Defendant did sell certain products, including the allegedly infringing product at issue, directly to New Jersey consumers through its website. (See Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 2, ECF No. 26-1 at 103) (sales records marked as "Mop-00150" denoting sales of the "Mopnado Walkable Deluxe Spin Mop" on December 18, 2013, August 5, 2015 and September 9, 2015, one sale of "Replacement Mop Heads (Qty 2)" on December 28, 2013, and one sale of a "Twist Lock" on August 15, 2015. Defendant's records indicate that both the "Billing Province" and "Shipping Province" for each of those sales was "NJ."); Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 5, ECF No. 26-1 at 169 (letter from Defendant's counsel indicating that that the document marked as "Mop 00150" reflects "sales from Mopnado.com"). The Court notes that Defendant made two of those sales (including one sale of the allegedly infringing product) prior to the date Plaintiff commenced this action. Defendant made the other three sales after expressly representing to the Court that such direct sales were impossible. (Compare Def. Reply Br. ECF No. 20 (filed on March 9, 2015) with Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 2, ECF No. 26-1 at 103 (reflecting sales to New Jersey based customers on August 5, 2015, August 15, 2015 and September 9, 2015). The Court finds that, at least with regard to its direct sales, Defendant has, through its website, made such contacts with New Jersey sufficient to constitute purposeful availment." Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1124.
The Court further finds that Plaintiff's claims in this case "'arise out of or relate to'" Defendant's website-based sales. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (internal citations omitted). Indeed, in its Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant "markets and sells the MOPNADO product throughout the United States, including the State of New Jersey, on the Internet at the URL www.mopnado.com . . . which provides a link that consumers click to purchase the MOPNADO product," (Compl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 1), and those alleged acts serve as the basis for Plaintiff's patent, trademark, and common law claims. (Id. ¶¶ 35-73). Before analyzing whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the Court will examine whether Defendant's sales of the allegedly infringing product to New Jersey residents through Amazon.com are also sufficient to constitute purposeful availment capable of supporting a finding of specific jurisdiction.
Read liberally, this allegation could refer to a "link" that permits consumers to purchase the product directly on Defendant's website (i.e., a link to a specific product page on the website) or, alternatively, a link that directs consumers to Defendant's presence on third-party websites such as Amazon.com. In any case, when addressing these website-based sales, Defendant argues only that its contacts do not rise to the level of purposeful availment. (Def. Supp. Br., at 5-9, ECF No. 28). It does not address whether Plaintiff claims "arise out of or relate to" those sales. (Id.).
The Court notes that Defendant only sold one infringing product via its website prior to the time that Defendant commenced this action. (Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 2, ECF No. 26-1 at 103).
B. Defendant's Sales Through Amazon
Though the Court has found that Defendant's website-based contacts are sufficient to constitute purposeful availment, and that Plaintiff's claims arise out of those contacts, the Court will nevertheless briefly examine the legal impact of Defendant's sales of the allegedly infringing product to New Jersey residents through its presence on Amazon.com. The record reflects that, when Defendant's website is not set up to accommodate direct sales, and visitors click the "Store" link on that website, they are brought to a "Products" page featuring links to subpages containing information on various "Mopnado" products. (See Decl. of Bala Iyer, ECF No. 19-3, ¶ 5, Ex. 1). After clicking on the link for one of those products, visitors are then brought to a page containing more detailed information on that specific product, as well as a link stating "Buy Now at Amazon.com." (Id. at Ex. 2). By clicking the "Buy Now" link, visitors are "re-directed to a storefront on Amazon.com where [they can] purchase the Mopnado product." (Id. ¶ 6, Ex. 3). The Amazon.com storefront indicates that the products are "sold" by "Marlow's Mercantile" and "Fulfilled by Amazon.com." (Id. at Ex. 3). During the jurisdictional discovery period, Defendant disclosed that "Marlow's Mercantile" is not a standalone business entity but, rather, "just the name that [Defendant] uses for its Amazon storefront." (Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 1, ECF No. 26-1 at 23, 26).
The record, as bolstered through jurisdictional discovery, indicates that the "fulfilled by Amazon.com" relationship works as follows. First, Defendant created a "listing" for the allegedly infringing product, providing Amazon with photos and information regarding that product. (Id. at 52-53). Defendant also set the price for the product. (Id. at 53-54). Per its agreement with Amazon, and per Amazon's instructions, Defendant periodically ships specific quantities of the products to certain of Amazon's "fulfilment centers." (Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 3, ECF No. 26-1 at 112). When consumers find the Mopnado product on Amazon.com (or are driven to the "Marlow's Mercantile" storefront via links on defendant's website, www.mopnado.com) and purchase the product, Amazon collects payment for those purchases and ships the product from its various fulfilment centers to the customers. (Id.). Amazon will then, on a bi-weekly basis, remit to Defendant the money it collected for sales of the product, minus Amazon's "commission and fulfilment handling fees." (Id.). The record reflects that, through this arrangement, Defendant sold and shipped 626 units of the allegedly infringing product to customers located in New Jersey. (Id. at 114-15).
Defendant contends that, because consumers purchased the product through the Amazon.com platform (i.e., Amazon collected the money from the New Jersey residents and then shipped the product to those residents), Defendant itself cannot be said to have made any contacts with the New Jersey customers in question (i.e., no purposeful availment). (Def. Supp. Br. at 7-8, ECF No. 28). Defendant goes as far as to suggest that "Amazon . . . is the effective seller of the product," (id. at 8), and that Defendant's role in the process is simply that of a business that placed an advertisement available to consumers throughout the country. (Id. at 8-9).
This Court rejects Defendant's legal interpretation of its Amazon-based sales, as it ignores the reality of the situation. First, Defendant is not just "advertising" its product on Amazon. It is selling it pursuant to a detailed agreement with that entity. (See Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 4, ECF No. 26-1 at 118-166). Second, despite Defendant's efforts to cast itself as a bystander in that process, powerless to stop Amazon from selling the allegedly infringing product throughout the country, Jin Chon, a member of Defendant, has testified that the benefit of utilizing Amazon's platform is the opportunity to reach Amazon's audience, which, Ms. Chon agreed, is likely the largest online marketplace in the United States. (See Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 1, ECF No. 26-1 at 44). In short, Defendant is intentionally using Amazon's vast, established infrastructure to sell and ship its products to consumers nationwide, and is paying Amazon for the privilege, in the form of commissions and handling fees. Indeed, Defendant has admitted that it currently relies on Amazon as its exclusive means of selling the Mopnado product. (Id. at 22-23) (testifying that Defendant only sells its products "online", and specifying that, right now, Defendant's Mopnado product is "only sold on Amazon."). When consumers in various states purchase Defendant's product, it is not mere happenstance, as Defendant would appear to suggest. Rather, those sales mark the success of Defendant's business plan.
In Envirocare, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78088 at *12-17, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York examined whether a defendant's sales through Amazon.com (specifically the sort of "fulfilled by Amazon" relationship at issue here) and eBay.com might serve as a proper basis for personal jurisdiction The Court reasoned, in pertinent part:
Defendants in the present case . . . marketed and sold their products exclusively through Amazon and eBay, and, as of October 2011, entered into at least 46,000 separate transactions with individual buyers across the country. They used eBay and Amazon to expand their market "literally to the world" and "avail[ed] themselves of the benefits of this greatly expanded marketplace." As one court stated:
["]It should, in the context of these commercial relationships, be no great surprise to sellers--and certainly no unfair burden to them--if, when a commercial transaction formed over and through the internet does not meet a buyer's expectations, they might be called upon to respond in a legal forum in the buyer's home state. Sellers cannot expect to avail themselves of the benefits of the internet-created world market that they purposefully exploit and profit from without accepting the concomitant legal responsibilities that such an expanded market may bring with it.["]Id. at *12-13 (quoting Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2006)). The Envirocare court found that the defendant's sales to New York residents through Amazon, id. at *2-3, were sufficient to constitute purposeful availment with regard to that jurisdiction. Id. at *14-15. This Court finds the reasoning in Envirocare persuasive. As described above, Defendant has intentionally created a business model whereby it now sells the allegedly infringing Mopnado product exclusively through its storefront on Amazon.com, thereby taking advantage of Amazon's national presence, and has sold at least 626 units of that product to New Jersey residents pursuant to that arrangement. The Court finds that, through those sales, Defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in New Jersey. Moreover, for the reasons articulated in Section II(a)(II)(A) above with regard to Defendant's direct sales to New Jersey residents, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims "arise out of or relate to" Defendant's Amazon-based sales.
C. The Exercise of Specific Jurisdiction Comports With Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Having determined that it would otherwise be appropriate to exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court must confirm that doing so would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. "In addressing this question, a court may consider 'the burden On the defendant, the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.'" Gourmet Video, Inc. v. Alpha Blue Archives, Inc., 08-2158 (MLC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87645, *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2008) (quoting Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. N.J. 2004)). At its heart, the Court's inquiry is focused on whether it is "reasonable to require the defendant to defend the suit in the forum state." Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel, 49 F. Supp. 2d 743, 746 (D.N.J. 1999). Moreover, where, as here, a defendant has engaged in forum activities, the "'minimum requirements inherent in the concept of fair play and substantial justice'" will only serve as a basis for defeating jurisdiction in "'rare cases.'" Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987)).
While neither party has addressed this issue directly, the Court finds that the District Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant would satisfy the "fair play and substantial justice" requirement. Plaintiff alleges that, by selling the Mopnado product to New Jersey residents over the internet, Defendant violated Plaintiff's statutory and common law rights. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1). Information disclosed during the jurisdictional discovery process has revealed that Defendant did, in fact, sell a combined total of more than six hundred units of the allegedly infringing Mopnado product to New Jersey residents via Defendant's own website, (see Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 2, ECF No. 26-1 at 103 (records reflecting direct sales of three Mopnado products to New Jersey consumers), and through Defendant's arrangement with Amazon. (See Decl. of Elana B. Araj, Ex. 3, ECF No. 26-1 at 114-15 (Defendant's interrogatory response indicating that Defendant sold 626 units of the Mopnado product through its relationship with Amazon). New Jersey has a legitimate interest in this matter, given the nature of certain of Plaintiff's claims (i.e., Plaintiff's claim for unfair competition under New Jersey statutory law) and the fact that Plaintiff is both incorporated and headquartered in that State. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1). Similarly, Plaintiff has an obvious interest in obtaining an efficient resolution of its claims, an interest that would not be served by either dismissing its claims or transferring this case to another district. Neither party has discussed the governmental interest in ''furthering fundamental substantive social policies." Gourmet Video, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87645 at *8. While the Court is cognizant of the burdens that Defendant, a California-based entity, would face when litigating in New Jersey, the Court finds that this burden is not sufficient to outweigh the competing, pro-jurisdictional factors, especially considering that Defendant has sold the allegedly infringing product to hundreds of New Jersey residents. See id. at *18-19; see also Decker, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 746 (noting that, where a party has engaged in jurisdictional activities, the concepts of fair play and substantial justice will only serve as a basis for defeating jurisdiction in "rare cases"). Moreover, the Court recognizes that any such burden may be reduced through efficient case management. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that it is imminently "reasonable to require the defendant to defend the suit in [New Jersey]." Id.
As the Court has found that Defendant's contacts with New Jersey are sufficient to constitute purposeful availment, that Plaintiff's claims arise out of those contacts, and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the Court further finds that the District Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant with regard to the claims at issue. The Court, therefore, respectfully recommends that the District Court deny the portion of Defendant's motion seeking dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
b. Venue is Proper in this District Under 28 U .S.C. § 1391
Defendant argues that New Jersey is not a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). (Def. Br. at 11, ECF No. 15-1). That statute provides:
A civil action may be brought in -
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;Defendant focuses on § 1391(b)(1), arguing that, because it does not "reside" in New Jersey, venue would not be appropriate in this District. More specifically, Defendant notes that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), "an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question." Therefore, Defendant, a limited liability company, is deemed to "reside," for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. Defendant argues that "[s]ince New Jersey does not have personal jurisdiction over [Defendant], [Defendant] is not a resident of New Jersey . . . Thus, venue is not proper in New Jersey, but would be in the Central District of California . . .." (Def. Br. at 11, ECF No. 15-1). As set forth above, this Court finds that Defendant is, in fact, subject to personal jurisdiction in this District. Defendant's venue challenge must, therefore, necessarily fail.
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
The Court notes that, in its response to Plaintiff's supplemental brief (i.e., the briefing that the Court requested regarding the impact of information disclosed during jurisdictional discovery), Defendant argued, for the first time, that the Court should also apply the patent-specific venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). (Def. Supp. Br. at 9, ECF No. 29). Indeed, Defendant acknowledges that "[t]he parties have not previously addressed [the impact of that statute]." (Id.). The Court finds that, by failing to raise this venue argument previously, thereby effectually depriving Plaintiff of the opportunity to prepare a substantive response, Defendant has effectively waived it.
This Court respectfully recommends that the District Court deny the portion of Defendant's motion challenging the propriety of venue in this District.
c. Defendant's Application to Transfer This Matter to the United States District Court for the Central District of California Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
In the alternative to outright dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) or 12(b)(3), Defendant requests that the Court transfer this matter to the United States District Court for the Central District of California in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Def. Br. at 11-15, ECF No. 15-1). That statute provides, in pertinent part, that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." The purpose of § 1404(a) is to "prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The decision of whether to transfer a case is committed to the trial court's sound discretion. Cadapult Graphic Sys. v. Tektronix, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 560, 564 (D.N.J. 2000); Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. RAM Lodging, LLC, No. 09-2275, 2010 WL 1540926, at *2 (D.N.J. April 14, 2010). The Court notes that Defendant retains the burden of establishing that transfer is appropriate. In re Amendt, 169 F. App'x 93, 96 (3d Cir. 2006).
In determining whether to transfer a matter pursuant to § 1404(a), and based on the plain language of that statute, a court must consider: (1) the convenience of the parties, (2) the convenience of the witnesses, and (3) the interests of justice. Rappoport v. Steven Spielberg, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 481, 497 (D.N.J. 1998). In addition to these statutory factors, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established a list of public and private interests that a court should examine when deciding whether to transfer an action:
The private interests have included: plaintiff's forum preference as manifested in the original choice; the defendant's preference; whether the claim arose elsewhere; the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; the convenience of the witnesses—but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and the location of books and records (similarly limited to the extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum).Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1995).
The public interests have included: the enforceability of the judgment; practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting from court congestion; the local interest in deciding local controversies at home; the public policies of the fora; and the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases.
The Court must, therefore, engage in a two part analysis in evaluating any motion to transfer venue pursuant to § 1404(a). As a threshold matter, the Court must decide whether the transferee district has proper jurisdiction and venue, such that the case could have been brought in the transferee district in the first instance. Lawrence v. Xerox Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 442, 450 (D.N.J. 1999). The Court must then conduct an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness" regarding which forum is most appropriate to consider the case. Id.
Defendant contends that venue would be appropriate in the Central District of California. (Def. Br. at 12, ECF No. 15-1). The Court will assume for the purposes of this motion only, and without deciding, that venue and jurisdiction would be appropriate in that District. Defendant's application nevertheless fails the second part of the transfer analysis, which requires the Court to balance the public and private interests that the Court of Appeals articulated in Jumara.
The Court notes that Plaintiff "does not contest that it could have sued [Defendant] in the Central District of California. (Pl. Br. at 16, n.8, ECF No. 19).
i. Private Interest Factors
With regard to the "private interest" factors relevant to a 1404(a) analysis, the Third Circuit has directed courts to consider "plaintiff's forum preference as manifested in the original choice; the defendant's preference; whether the claim arose elsewhere; the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; the convenience of the witnesses -- but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and the location of books and records (similarly limited to the extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum)." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. The Court will address each of these factors in turn.
A. The Parties' Choice of Fora / Where the Claims Arose
Within the Third Circuit, a plaintiff's choice of forum is a "paramount concern" in deciding a motion to transfer venue. Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970). When a plaintiff chooses its home forum, that choice is "entitled to greater deference." Sandvik, Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 724 F. Supp. 303, 307 (D.N.J. 1989). Here, Plaintiff is both incorporated and headquarted in New Jersey, and has thus elected to litigate in its home forum. (Compl., ¶ 1, ECF No. 1). The Court acknowledges, however, that "when the central facts of a lawsuit occur outside of the chosen forum, plaintiff's choice of forum is accorded less weight." NCR Credit Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d at 321; Melone v. Boeing Co., No. 07-cv-1192 (DMC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25367, *5-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008) ("Deference to the plaintiff's selected forum is also diminished 'where the central facts of a lawsuit occur outside the chosen forum' or the plaintiff's choice of forum 'has little connection with the operative facts of the lawsuit.'") (quoting In re Consolidated Parlodel Litig., 22 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (D.N.J. 1998)). Defendant argues that "since the operative facts in the present case, including the Defendant's shipping and warehousing of product, took place outside of New Jersey, Plaintiff's choice [of forum] is accorded less weight." (Def. Br. at 13-14, ECF No. 15-1). Defendant's argument ignores the fact that, while the products at issue may have originated elsewhere, each was sold and shipped to consumers within New Jersey. See Master Cutlery, Inc. v. Panther Trading Co., No. 12-4493 (JLL), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178639, *9-10 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2012) ("'The locus of the alleged culpable conduct determines the place where the claim arose.' Intellectual property infringement occurs, among other places, where any allegedly infringing articles are sold") (internal citations omitted). The Court finds that the "central facts" of this lawsuit occurred both in New Jersey and elsewhere, and that those facts are not so disconnected from New Jersey that the Court should reduce the level of deference afforded to Plaintiff's choice of forum.
Moreover, while the Court acknowledges that Defendant would prefer to litigate in the Central District of California, Defendant is the moving party here, and thus bears the burden of persuasion regarding its motion to transfer. Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 756 (3d Cir. 1973). To overcome the presumption in favor of Plaintiff's choice of forum, Defendant must show that the balance of conveniences weighs "strongly in favor" of transfer to a more convenient forum. Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25. As set forth in connection with the Court's discussion of the other Jumara factors, below, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to carry that burden.
B. The Relative Convenience of the Parties
This factor requires the Court to examine "the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Defendant contends that "Plaintiff is a far larger company than Defendant and could much easier handle litigating a lawsuit outside of the state." (Def. Br. at 14, ECF No. 15-1). Defendant's basis for that argument, however, is its representative, Jin Chon's, "good faith belief that Telebrands is a far larger company than Mopnado." (Decl. of Jin Chon ¶ 23, ECF No. 15-2). In short, Defendant, which bears the burden of establishing that a transfer would be appropriate, has not offered anything beyond Ms. Chon's vague, unsupported speculation regarding the relative financial condition of the parties. The Court therefore finds that this factor is neutral to the transfer analysis.
C. The Convenience of the Witnesses and Location of Documents
Defendant argues that "a transfer to California would be more convenient for Defendants' material witnesses . . . [as] all of Defendant's witnesses reside in California and China." (Def. Br. at 14, ECF No. 15-1). The question of which fora might be more convenient for each parties' witnesses, however, is not the appropriate consideration. Rather, the Court of Appeals has clarified that courts should consider witness convenience in the context of a 1404(a) motion "only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. As Defendant does not contend that its witnesses would be unavailable for trial in New Jersey, it has failed to establish that this factor favors transfer.
Similarly, while Defendant argues that its records are located in California, and that transporting those documents to New Jersey would be "difficult," (Def. Br. at 14, ECF No. 15-1), the location of a party's documents is only relevant to a transfer analysis "to the extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. As Defendant does not suggest that its documents would somehow be unavailable for production in New Jersey, it has not established that this factor favors transfer.
ii. Public Interest Factors
In addition to the "private interest" considerations discussed above, the Court of Appeals has directed courts to take certain "public interest" factors into account when adjudicating amotion to transfer, including: "the enforceability of the judgment; practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting from court congestion; the local interest in deciding local controversies at home, the public policies of the fora, and the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80.
A. Enforceability of Judgments
Defendant contends that "a judgment would be easier to enforce in California than New Jersey," as given Defendant's California residence. (Def. Br. at 15, ECF No. 15-1). This Court disagrees, as a judgment rendered in either this District or the Central District of California could easily be registered in another district. This factor is therefore neutral to the transfer analysis.
B. Practical Considerations Regarding Trial
"[P]ractical considerations are relevant and warrant transfer if they could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive. One practical consideration that supports transfer is efficiency." Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank One, N.A., No. 03-1882 (SDW), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137119, * (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2012). In line with that principle, "[t]he Supreme Court has held that allowing lawsuits with similar issues to proceed simultaneously in different districts 'leads to wastefulness of time, energy and money that [section] 1404(a) was designed to prevent.'" COA Network, Inc. v. J2 Global Communs., Inc., No. 09-6505 (WJM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60116, *13-14 (D.N.J. June 17, 2010) (quoting Cont'l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960)); Platinum Ptnrs. Value Arbitrage Fund, L.P. v. TD Bank, N.A., No. 10-6457 (ES), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84689, *20-21 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2011) ("Transfer is often meant as a time saving device, for the parties and for the Court. Thus, the transfer of a civil action to another district where similar cases are already pending 'serves not only private interests but also the interests of justice.'") (internal citations omitted). The Court notes that this factor will weigh in favor of transfer as long as the cases are sufficiently similar, and that the legal claims and issues involved need not be identical. See Platinum Ptnrs. Value Arbitrage Fund, L.P., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84689 at *21-23 (finding that, where cases already pending in the Southern District of Florida "related generally" to a case pending in this District, but were not so similar that they would necessarily be consolidated upon transfer, that similarity still weighed in favor of transfer).
As Plaintiff notes, Civil Action No. 14-7199, Telebrands Corp. v. Beach Sales & Engineering LLC, et al., is currently pending before the Hon. Jose L. Linares, who is also presiding over this matter. (Pl. Br. at 20, ECF No. 19). Both this case and Civil Action No. 14-7199 involve, among other things, Plaintiff's claim that the defendant has infringed upon U.S Patent No. 8,132,287. (Compare Compl., ECF No. 1, with Compl. in Civil Action No. 14-7199, ECF No. 1). Nothing in the records indicates that the Central District of California is also considering the '287 patent at this time. The Court therefore finds that, against this backdrop, transfer would actually promote inefficiency, create the danger of inconsistent outcomes, and run counter to the public interest.
At the time Plaintiff submitted its opposition brief, another case involving the '287 patent was also pending before Judge Linares: Civil Action No. 14-6566. That Court has since administratively terminated that action in light of a related, ongoing bankruptcy stay. (ECF No. 39 in Civil Action No. 14-7969). --------
Defendant argues that the "practical considerations" factor actually weighs in favor of transfer, because "all of Defendants' [sic] material witnesses are in California and China." (Def. Br. at 15, ECF No. 15-1). This Court disagrees. Even ignoring the obvious neutralizing interest (i.e., as Plaintiff's material witnesses are located in New Jersey, one party's witnesses will have to travel across the country in any event), (Pl. Br. at 18-19, ECF No. 19), the waste of judicial resources inherent in having two federal courts presiding over litigation involving alleged infringement of the same patent would outweigh any such efficiencies. The Court therefore finds that this factor weighs against transfer.
C. Local Interests of the Fora
Defendant argues that this factor supports its transfer application, contending that, because the allegedly infringing product was, at one time, located in California and shipped from that State, "it is far more appropriate to have California citizens deciding factual issues regarding alleged acts that originated and took place in California." (Def. Br. at 14-15, ECF No. 15-1). Defendant's argument ignores the fact it allegedly sold the infringing product to hundreds of New Jersey residents and allegedly violated the intellectual property rights held by a New Jersey resident. The Court finds that this factor is, at most, neutral to the transfer analysis.
D. Relative Administrative Difficulty / Judge's Familiarity With State Law / Public Policies of the Fora
Neither party has addressed the remaining public interest factors: (1) the comparative administrative difficulty of proceeding in the proposed fora; (2) whether a judge in either fora is more familiar with the applicable law; and (3) the public policies of the fora. The Court will, therefore, not consider these factors in its transfer analysis.
iii. The Jumara Factors Weigh Against Transfer
Defendant has established that only a single Jumara factor - Defendant's own forum preference - actually favors transfer. The Court has found that every other factor Defendant addressed either weighed against transfer or remained essentially neutral to the Court's analysis. As noted above, in order to overcome the presumption in favor of Plaintiff's choice of forum, Defendant was required to demonstrate that the balance of conveniences weighs "strongly in favor" of transfer to California. Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25. It has not done so. The District Court should therefore deny Defendant's motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court respectfully recommends that the District Court deny Defendant's motion in its entirety.
/s/_________
JOSEPH A. DICKSON, U.S.M.J. cc: Honorable Jose L. Linares, U.S.D.J.