Opinion
Civ. No. 03-1529(SRC)
January 9, 2004
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion by defendant United States of America to dismiss plaintiff Vincent Gerard Tecchio's Second Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.
Plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss also included a cross-motion for summary judgment. In light of the dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff's summary judgment motion is moot.
I. BACKGROUND
On or about April 7, 2003, plaintiff filed a verified complaint alleging that certain Internal Revenue Service employees violated multiple statutes, regulations and various sections of the Internal Revenue Manual. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on or about June 6, 2003. Subsequently, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on June 10, 2003. The Court granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice, and plaintiff was afforded until October 14, 2003 to submit an amended pleading. On that date, plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint. The instant motion to dismiss was filed on October 30, 2003.
II. DISCUSSION
In its motion, defendant asserts, among other things, that the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars plaintiff's suit against any of the named defendants. In opposition, plaintiff argues that his action is not one seeking to enjoin either the assessment or collection of taxes and thus the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable. Having reviewed the submission of the parties, the Court is satisfied that plaintiff's action is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
The Anti-Injunction Act provides that except under certain enumeration circumstances, "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person[.]" 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). Courts will apply the prohibition stated in section 7421(a) broadly to further the purposes of the Act. See Commonwealth Dev. Ass'n v. U.S., 365 F. Supp. 792, 794 (M.D. Pa. 1973),aff'd, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974). Thus, section 7421(a)'s prohibition applies "not only to the assessment and collection of the tax itself, but also to activities intended to, or which may culminate in, the assessment or collection of taxes." Hill v. Mosby, 896 F. Supp. 1004, 1005 (D. Idaho 1995) (citing Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1282 (5th Cir. 1982)). (Emphasis added).
Here, plaintiff's request for relief does not clearly seek to enjoin the collection of taxes. Rather, plaintiff states in his opposition papers that
this action is against INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE employees who entered data and created computer records and who then created substitute forms based upon the said computer records[.] . . . Then the said defendants, named and unnamed INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE employees, based upon the above said computer records and computer generated forms made demands for monies in excess of those authorized by a legislative grant of authority and/or in excess of those authorized by a valid lawful and properly executed delegation order of authority. See Pl. Br. at 8 (emphasis added).
When the allegations made in plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and other submissions are read as a whole, however, it is clear that the relief sought would necessitate this Court enjoin certain activities "intended to, or which would culminate in, assessment or collection of taxes, something barred by the Anti-Injunction Act[.]" Doyle v. Rubin, et al., 973 F. Supp. 935, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1997). Accordingly, plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted and the Court therefore will grant defendant's motion to dismiss.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant United States of America's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is granted. Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied as moot.