Opinion
Civil No. 3:03-CV-1236-H
February 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed December 10, 2003; Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed January 7, 2004; and Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed January 16, 2004. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is DENIED.
I. Background
On June 4, 2003, Plaintiff Alta Mae Teames brought the instant action against Officer Henry; Officer Clark; and the City of Lancaster, Texas, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The action arises out of events that occurred on June 28, 2002. On that day, Officer Henry, in his capacity as a police officer for the City of Lancaster, effected a traffic stop inside the Dallas city limits and immediately in front of Plaintiff's home. During the traffic stop, Officer Henry's police car completely blocked the driveway to Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff's husband, who was eighty-four years of age at the time, approached Officer Henry and asked Officer Henry to move the police car so that he could use his driveway. Officer Henry refused. Plaintiff's husband then got into his own truck and slowly rolled it towards the police car, attempting to show Officer Henry that the driveway needed to be used. In response, Officer Henry pulled out his weapon, radioed for back up, and ultimately engaged in a physical struggle with Plaintiff's husband.
For purposes of this motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court will describe the background of the case in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Brittan Communications Intern. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 313 F.3d 899, 904 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.") (internal quotations omitted).
At this point, Plaintiff, who was seventy-nine years of age at the time, exited the home using a "walker." She stood on the front porch and pleaded with Officer Henry not to hurt her husband. When Officer Clark-who was supervised by Officer Henry at the Lancaster Police Department-arrived at the scene, he forcibly and without provocation pushed Plaintiff off of the porch, causing four fractures in Plaintiff's right leg and hip. Plaintiff was not interfering with any police officer or police action at the time.
The instant action ensued. Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants do not move for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiff's state law assault and battery claim against Officers Clark and Henry; therefore, the Court addresses only the federal claims in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
II. Legal Standards
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion is appropriate if material facts are not in dispute and questions of law are all that remain. See Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing 5 A WRIGHT MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 1367 at 510). In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, a court "must look only to the pleadings and accept all allegations in them as true." St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Convalescent Serv., Inc., 193 F.3d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). "[T]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief." Brittan Communications Intern. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 313 F.3d 899, 904 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Rule 12(b)(6) decisions appropriately guide the application of Rule 12(c) because the standards for deciding motions under both rules are the same."). "Thus, the court should not dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999).
III. Analysis
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff's pleadings are insufficient to establish that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional deprivation; (2) Plaintiff's pleadings are insufficient to establish that any constitutional deprivation was caused by a policy, practice, or custom of the City of Lancaster; and (3) Plaintiff's pleadings are insufficient to overcome the individual defendants' defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that: (1) Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a constitutional deprivation under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments; and (2) Plaintiff's pleadings comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. Constitutional Deprivation
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's pleadings are insufficient to establish that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights. Specifically, Defendants contend that because Plaintiff was not searched, detained, or arrested, Plaintiff cannot claim a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore, Defendants contend that Plaintiff "invokes the Fourteenth Amendment only as a necessary component of her Fourth Amendment claim and not in support of a separate violation of her constitutional rights." (D.s' Br. at 6.) For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a violation of her constitutional rights.
It is well established that an individual has a constitutional right to be free from a law enforcement officer's use of excessive force. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 452 (5th Cir. 1998); Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1997); Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1115-16 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1993). It is equally well established that this constitutional right protects bystanders, not just prisoners, arrestees, or detainees. See Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 902 (5th Cir. 1998); Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1996); Stroik v. Ponseti, 35 F.3d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1994); Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1986). A bystander's right to be free from a law enforcement officer's use of excessive force springs from the unreasonable seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment or from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (1989) ("[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard, rather than under a `substantive due process' approach."); Petta, 143 F.3d at 911 n. 25 ("[W]here a plaintiff's excessive force claim, whether he be a prisoner, arrestee, detainee, or an innocent bystander of tender years, falls outside of the protections of the Bill of Rights, that plaintiff may still seek redress under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 ("Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims.").
For purposes of triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment, a "seizure" occurs when an "officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a person." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19n. 16 (1968). See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (referring to a seizure as "a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied"). Thus, a "seizure" is not limited to instances where an officer arrests or detains an individual; it also includes other restraints by an officer on an individual's liberty. See Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 433 n. 6; Stroik, 35 F.3d at 157-58.
In the instant case, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that she suffered a seizure for purposes of triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment. As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Clark intentionally used physical force against Plaintiff, sufficient to push Plaintiff off of her front porch and to fracture her leg and hip in four places. As pled, this amounts to "a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97. At the minimum, Plaintiff alleges facts, which, if proved, would support a conclusion that Officer Clark physically restrained Plaintiff with more force and for a longer time than the seizure in Ikerd. See Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 433 n. 6 (concluding that a seizure occurred when a deputy grabbed the arm of a child during the arrest of the child's father). At the most, Plaintiff alleges facts, which, if proved, would support a conclusion that Officer Clark physically incapacitated Plaintiff with force that could have been deadly when applied against a seventy-nine-year-old lady who needs a "walker." See Stroik, 35 F.3d at 157-58 (recognizing that a seizure occurs when deadly force is used). Thus, Plaintiff alleges all of the earmarks of a classic seizure: a police officer who intentionally uses physical force against an individual in such a manner as to terminate the individual's freedom of movement. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97. Accordingly, having concluded that Plaintiff's right to be free from the use of excessive force springs from the Fourth Amendment, the Court must next determine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a cause of action for excessive force against each Defendant under the standards applicable to the Fourth Amendment.
1. Officer Clark
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Clark used excessive force against her in violation of her constitutional rights. For cases alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, "[a] plaintiff must prove injury suffered as a result of force that was objectively unreasonable." Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 2003). In the instant case, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment as to Officer Clark. As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Clark intentionally used physical force against Plaintiff, sufficient to push Plaintiff off of her front porch and to fracture her leg and hip in four places. Plaintiff further alleges that Officer Clark did so despite being outside of his jurisdiction and despite Plaintiff's age, use of a "walker," and non-interference in the altercation between Officer Henry and her husband. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts, which, if proved, would support a conclusion that Officer Clark used excessive force in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff has also pled facts sufficient to overcome Officer Clark's defense of qualified immunity. As discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts, which, if proved, would "show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right," namely a bystander's right to be free from an officer's use of excessive force. Mace, 333 F.3d at 623 (internal quotations omitted). See Petta, 143 F.3d at 902; Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 433 n. 6; Stroik, 35 F.3d at 157-58; Coon, 780 F.2d at 1160-61. That constitutional right was clearly established in June 2002 when Officer Clark allegedly used excessive force in the instant case. In addition, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts, which, if proved, would establish that "it would [have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Mace, 333 F.3d at 624 (internal quotations omitted). The Court recognizes that the inquiry for reasonableness on the merits of the excessive force claim and the inquiry for reasonableness on the merits of the qualified immunity defense are distinct. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204-05 (2001) (recognizing that an officer who uses an unreasonable amount of force, reasonably believing that the law permits that amount of force, would still be entitled to qualified immunity). Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts, which, if proved, would allow her to prevail on her claim of excessive force and to overcome Officer Clark's defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as to Officer Clark.
2. Officer Henry
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Henry is liable for Officer Clark's use of excessive force due to Officer Henry's status as Officer Clark's supervisor. In order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff "must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged." Anderson v. Pasadena Ind. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999). In the instant case, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts, which, if proved, would support a conclusion that Officer Henry initiated and fueled a series of events that directly led to Officer Clark's use of excessive force against Plaintiff. Plaintiff has also sufficiently pled facts, which, if proved, would support a conclusion that Officer Henry, as a police officer and as a supervisor, could have prevented the events from escalating into Officer Clark's use of excessive force against Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts that Officer Henry either caused the constitutional violation or was personally involved in the constitutional violation. See Anderson, 184 F.3d at 443. Finally, for the reasons discussed above for Officer Clark, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to overcome Officer Henry's defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as to Officer Henry.
3. City of Lancaster
Plaintiff alleges that the City of Lancaster is liable for Officer Clark's use of excessive force because a policy or custom of the City of Lancaster caused Officer Clark to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Specifically, according to Plaintiff, the City of Lancaster had a policy or custom of inadequately training and monitoring its police officers, and of inadequately investigating citizen complaints against police officers, such that the City of Lancaster failed to discourage police officers from violating constitutional rights. In order to prevail on her claim, Plaintiff must establish that a "policy or custom" of the City of Lancaster was the "moving force" behind the alleged use of excessive force. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). The Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a policy or custom of the City of Lancaster that could have been the "moving force" behind the alleged use of excessive force. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as to the City of Lancaster.
B. Rule 7(a) Reply
Finally, Defendants move the Court to require Plaintiff to state her factual allegations with more particularity pursuant to Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.s' Br. at 10.) Pursuant to Rule 7(a), "the court may, in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity." Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433-34 (5th Cir. 1995). Such a reply "must be tailored to the assertion of qualified immunity and fairly engage its allegations." Id. at 1433. The court may require a Rule 7(a) reply on its own motion or on the motion of the official asserting the defense. See id. The court's discretion to deny a motion for a Rule 7(a) reply is narrow "when greater detail might assist [in analyzing the merits of a defense of qualified immunity]." See id. at 1434.
In the instant case, the Court concludes that a Rule 7(a) reply would not assist either the Court or the Parties at this stage in the litigaton. First, as discussed above, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts, which, if proved, would overcome the qualified immunity defenses of Officers Clark and Henry. Second, the Parties have already engaged in six months of discovery, with three of those months limited to issues bearing on the defense of qualified immunity. See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434 (indicating that a Rule 7(a) reply is appropriate at the "threshold pleading stage," during which stage the Court may also order that discovery be limited to qualified immunity). Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings includes a very detailed affidavit from a witness to the events at issue in this case. Although the Court did not-and must not-consider the affidavit in reaching its decision on Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the affidavit nonetheless provides Defendants with greater detail on issues regarding the defense of qualified immunity. For all of the above reasons, Defendants' motion for a Rule 7(a) reply is DENIED.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. In addition, Defendants' motion for a Rule 7(a) reply is DENIED. This case shall proceed on the deadlines established by the Court's Scheduling Order, entered August 8, 2003, and discovery shall no longer be limited to issues bearing on the defense of qualified immunity.
SO ORDERED.