Opinion
No. FA 00-0436771S
May 2, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON POSTJUDGMENT MOTIONS FOR CONTEMPT (#'s 140, 145, 147, 151) AND MODIFICATION (#158)
The pending motions for contempt and for modification of alimony present the questions of whether the defendant's discharge in bankruptcy released him from obligations he assumed in the separation agreement incorporated into the judgment dissolving his marriage from the plaintiff and in a subsequent postjudgment agreement and, if so, whether to modify alimony. The court finds that, under federal law in effect when the defendant filed for bankruptcy, that obligation is a debt in the nature of alimony, support or maintenance and thus nondischargeable in bankruptcy. The court finds further that the defendant reasonably believed that it had been discharged in bankruptcy. Accordingly, the court grants the motion for contempt for the defendant's nonpayment of that debt before but not after he filed for bankruptcy and for his nonpayment of other support obligations. The court directs the clerk to schedule a hearing to determine an updated arrearage finding, order payment on the arrearage, and consider counsel fees. In view of this conclusion, the court defers decision on the motion for modification of alimony.
The defendant filed for bankruptcy on October 11, 2005. Although recent revisions to the bankruptcy code have changed the language of the exemption to dischargeability for debts owed to former spouses, those provisions of the new law apply only to cases filed on or after October 17, 2005, 180 days after the new act's enactment. See § 1501 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-8, Stat. 119 Stat. 23 (2005). The applicable text of 11 U.S.C § 523(a) in effect when the defendant filed his petition is thus controlling for this proceeding, and it provided in pertinent part: "A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . (5) to a . . . former spouse . . . for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse . . . in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that — (A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise . . . or (B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support . . ."
I. HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
The marriage of the parties was dissolved by the Superior Court on November 16, 2001, after an uncontested hearing. As part of the judgment of dissolution, the court (Domnarski, J.) incorporated the terms of a written stipulation signed by both parties in which the husband assumed responsibility, in a portion of the agreement captioned "Real Property," to pay for the monthly cost of second and third mortgages on the marital home, which was awarded to the wife. The agreement further provided, in an article captioned "Alimony," that he would pay alimony to the wife of one dollar per year "for the sole purpose of insuring that payment is made on the second and third mortgage[s]." On March 24, 2004, the court (Abery-Wetstone, J.) approved a postjudgment agreement between the parties authorizing the plaintiff to refinance the marital home and pay off the balance remaining on the second and third mortgages. That agreement further provided that
Pursuant to the dissolution of marriage dated November 16, 2001 the defendant is responsible for paying the 2nd mortgage and 3rd mortgage. The balance due on the 2nd mortgage is approximately $44,636.87 and the balance of the 3rd mortgage is approximately $14,843.11. The defendant, commencing May 1, 2004, shall be responsible for making monthly payments directly to the Plaintiff. Said monthly payments shall be in the amount of $484 per month for a term of 240 months or 20 years.
The plaintiff brought the first of the pending contempt motions, # 141, in December 2004, claiming that the defendant was delinquent in paying for the loan and on child support. In January 2005 the parties entered into an agreement, accepted by this court and approved as an order, that he owed a child support arrearage of $3,650 plus a $50 marshal's fee; that, upon his obtaining employment he would "commence making the $500 monthly payment to Ms. Taylor for their joint loan debt to Countywide; and that he would provide a copy of a life insurance policy." (The dissolution judgment had ordered him to "maintain existing life insurance policy for the benefit of the minor children.")
The plaintiff thereafter filed the motion for contempt #145 on March 19, 2005, alleging "nonpayment of child support, loan, no life insurance policy given." The parties appeared before this court on April 7, 2005, at which time they agreed that "there is currently an arrearage of $5,000 due on the loan," and that defendant would "pay the Plaintiff an additional $50 per week towards said arrearage." On April 25, 2005, plaintiff filed another motion for contempt (#147) alleging nonpayment of child support. On May 16, the defendant agreed, and the court so ordered, to pay $500 "towards the Countrywide Loan" by Friday, May 20 and the court ordered a wage execution for payment of child support. On September 29, 2005, plaintiff filed yet another motion for contempt, #151, alleging that the defendant "owes $7,000 for court ordered loan, $3,590 toward various child support obligations," and that he had not yet provided a copy of the life insurance policy. On November 10, the court appointed counsel to represent the defendant. That same day, he filed an affidavit attesting to his filing of a bankruptcy petition the previous month on October 11, 2005. On November 14, 2005, the plaintiff then filed the pending motion to modify alimony (#158) requesting "that the court order the defendant to make alimony payments in the amount of $494 per month for a period of 20 years."
The parties appeared with counsel for hearing on the pending motions on February 3, 2006. Both parties testified that day, as did the defendant's current wife, Erin Scarano. After the conclusion of evidence both parties submitted briefs on whether the defendant's subsequent discharge in bankruptcy had released him from the obligations to pay for the Countrywide loan or prevented an increase in alimony. The court heard oral argument from counsel on March 16, 2005, and the matter is now ready for decision.
At the hearing before this court, the defendant testified that he had listed his debt to the plaintiff pursuant to the April 2004 agreement and court order with the bankruptcy court and been discharged on that debt. The plaintiff did not challenge that testimony, which the court finds proven (except as to discharge, which is the issue under consideration here). The defendant has not filed with his court a claim for statutory exemption because of the bankruptcy or sought an injunction preventing collection on the allegedly discharged debt but does object to a finding of contempt on the grounds that he is no longer subject to this obligation by virtue of its discharge in bankruptcy.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
As the Appellate Court noted in Lewis v. Lewis, 35 Conn.App. 622, 626-27, 644 A.2d 273 (1994), the defendant's discharge in bankruptcy does not automatically resolve the question of whether he still owes this debt to the plaintiff, which depends on "the nature of that obligation regardless of whether or not the bankruptcy court has been asked to pass upon the issue . . . The question of dischargeability . . . may be determined by the state courts in connection with proceedings to enforce the obligation." Id. "Thus, a debt could be in the nature of support under § 523(a)(5) even though it would not legally qualify as alimony or support under state law." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) Balvich v. Balvich ( In re Balvich), CT Page 8035 135 B.R. 323, 333 (Bankr.N.D.Ind. 1991). "By determining dischargeability with reference to federal bankruptcy law, we ensure uniformity of treatment of debtors who are similarly situated." In re Seibert, 914 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir. 1990).
The only substantive inquiry required in assessing the dischargeability of the defendant's obligations is whether his agreement, at the time of the parties' dissolution, to pay the second and third mortgages or his later agreement to pay plaintiff the monthly sum of $494 was in the "nature of alimony, maintenance or support" and hence nondischargeable under the bankruptcy code. "Under bankruptcy law, the intent of the parties at the time a separation agreement is executed determines whether a payment pursuant to the agreement is alimony, support or maintenance within the meaning of section 523(a)(5)." In re Brody, 3 F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1993). "A debt to a former spouse is `in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support' to the extent that it is intended, and in fact functions, to provide support to the former spouse." Cook v. Bieluch ( In re Bieluch), 219 B.R. 14, 20 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1998) "[I]nitial recourse must be made to the language of the divorce decree . . . If the intention and effect of the award is not clear from the decree itself, then the Bankruptcy Court may look beyond the four corners of the decree . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "All evidence, direct or circumstantial, which tends to illuminate the parties' subjective intent is relevant." In re Brody, supra, 3 F.3d 38.
As the Appellate Court recent decision in Larson v. Larson, 89 Conn.App. 57, 872 A.2d 912 (2005), shows, in determining whether a debt is "owed to" a former spouse, a court looks to the substance of the parties' agreement.
In making such a determination, courts have typically considered whether an obligation "was intended either (1) to address the unequal earning capacities of the parties — suggesting a nondischargeable `support' purpose, or (2) to allocate the marital assets — suggesting a dischargeable property division." Id., 20. Courts have suggested various factors to consider in making this determination. See Lewis v. Lewis, supra, 35 Conn.App. 627-28 ("Courts have a list of factors to examine in determining whether a particular transaction constitutes a nondischargeable duty such as alimony, maintenance or support, or whether it is a property settlement and therefore, dischargeable . . . The following factors are taken into account: (1) whether the obligation terminates on the death or remarriage of the debtor's spouse; (2) whether the payments appear to balance disparate income; (3) whether the payments are made to a third party or the ex-spouse; (4) whether the obligation terminates at the end of a specified event (i.e., children are out of school, debt is satisfied, etc.); and (5) what was the intent of the parties"); In re Bieluch, supra, 219 B.R. 20 ("Among the factors traditionally utilized by courts in divining the actual nature of an obligation imposed in a divorce decree are the following: (1) the label given the obligation in the decree, (2) the form and placement of the obligation in the decree, (3) whether the obligation terminates on death, remarriage, etc., (4) the economic disparity between the parties, (5) the length of the marriage, (6) the presence of minor children, (7) whether a traditional support award would have been adequate in the absence of the obligation in question, (8) the age, employability, and educational level of the parties, and (9) the financial resources, actual or potential, of each spouse"). No one of these factors is controlling. Thus, the label given an obligation, though "persuasive evidence of intent . . . is not dispositive; the court must look to the substance, and not merely the form, of the payments." Stebbins v. Stebbins, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FA-96-0154797 (May 11, 2000) (Harrigan, J.) ( 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 175).
This court does not consider the present question on a blank slate, moreover, as several Connecticut courts have addressed similar situations in both Reed v. Reed, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. FA 92-0292283 (December 12, 1995) (Bassick, J.), and Peabody v. Peabody, Judicial District of New London, Docket No. 504914 (July 10, 1995) (Teller, J.), courts held that a spouse's agreement to pay for a mortgage on marital property occupied by the former spouse and secured, as here, by an order of nominal alimony for debt indemnification purposes was in the nature of support and thus nondischargeable. A length annotation on "Debts for alimony, maintenance, and support as exceptions to bankruptcy discharge, under § 523(a)(5) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978," contained in 69 ALR Fed 403, shows that courts throughout the country have frequently addressed similar issues, and their decisions vary depending on the specific factual situations presented to the court. This court's reading of that annotation and its discussion of the myriad cases in sections 8 and 9 of the annotation dealing with debt for payments due on mortgage loan or "debt to spouse for specific amount payable in lump sum or installments" does not show courts to be particularly consistent, which is perhaps understandable in light of the complexity of the question. As Connecticut courts have repeatedly pointed out, property and support orders are inextricably intertwined. Similar statutory factors govern the award of both, parties often treat them interchangeably, and appellate courts overturning such orders ordinarily order new trials in recognition that "a judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other . . ." Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 354, 880 A.2d 872 (2005). The most this court can glean from previous cases addressing the issues presented here is that, ultimately, each court decision is highly factually specific and that the lists of factors contained in Lewis and Bieluch aptly summarize relevant considerations.
III. DISCUSSION
When the parties' marriage was dissolved, they owned three parcels of real property, the defendant had a dry-cleaning business with his brother, and they held various deferred compensation accounts. The plaintiff wife was awarded the marital home, the husband was awarded property at 94 Clinton Avenue in New Haven, and they agreed to sell a third parcel at 189 Bassett Street, which the husband's financial affidavit valued as having equity of $18,000, and to use the proceeds to pay marital debt. The total non-mortgage debt listed on the two parties' financial affidavits was slightly less than the equity in the Bassett Street property. The husband's financial affidavit valued the parcel awarded to him as having no equity, while the wife's financial affidavit did the same for the parcel awarded to her. His financial affidavit valued the property awarded to the wife as having equity of $32,000 and the wife's valued the property awarded to the husband as worth $29,000. The separation agreement divided marital debt, the parties' pensions, and the husband's interest in a personal injury action equally, 50% to each party. Based on the parties' financial affidavits, there was little other property of much value. Neither party's affidavit placed a value on the defendant's ownership interest in the dry cleaners. The husband's financial affidavit did not list him as receiving any income from that business. His affidavit specified his occupation as "buffer/polisher," his only place of employment as "Sargent Assa Abloy," and his only source of income as coming from his principal employment. At the hearing before this court, Mr. Taylor testifed that at the time of the dissolution he had been a machine operator at Sargent; but he also testified, in contradiction of his financial affidavit at the time of the dissolution, that his only income at the time of the divorce had come from the dry cleaner establishment, for which the financial affidavit had not listed any income. He testified before this court that sometime between the dissolution and the April 2005 agreement he sold the business to pay its bills and netted no profit.
The question remains, however, how to characterize the husband's agreement to pay the second and third mortgages on the marital home in the approximate amount of $60,000. Certain aspects of that obligation do support its characterization obligation as a property settlement. The provision that the defendant pay off the second and third mortgages was contained, for example, in a section of the agreement captioned "Real Property," and the mortgages were for debt owed on real property. Still, the positioning of the obligation in that section of the separation agreement is not very persuasive here as to whether it was, or was not, in the nature of support. The mortgage payment obligation was not specifically labeled as a property distribution. The portion of the separation agreement captioned alimony, moreover, specifically provided that the husband would pay alimony to the wife of one dollar per year for the "purpose of insuring that payment is made on the second and third mortgage[s]."
The defendant's brief argues that "the contempt motion is not for violation of the original divorce decree, but for violation of the March 24, 2004, agreement. That agreement transformed the nature of the obligation and changed the method for its payment." Def's Mem. of Law Opposing Contempt Motion, at 4. The defendant's brief thus focuses its analysis on the situation of the parties at the time of the 2004 agreement. Although the 2004 agreement did change the method of payment, the court does not agree that this Agreement "transformed the nature of the obligation," for purposes of deciding the present matter. The defendant had not been making his payments on the second and third mortgages, which both became delinquent. The plaintiff began receiving phone calls from the creditors owed these mortgages and reasonably decided that she needed to pay off these debts to protect her right to live in the marital home and her credit. The purpose of the 2004 Agreement was to let her do so and for the defendant now to pay her instead of the mortgagees. The terms of the 2004 Agreement did not relieve the defendant of his obligation under the dissolution judgment to pay off the second and third mortgages; but, in view of his failure to comply with the obligation, permitted the plaintiff to refinance and pay off those mortgages, thereby preventing further damage to her credit and possible loss of the home through foreclosure, and redirected his payments to her. The 2004 Agreement was obviously intended to implement the intent of the original Separation Agreement and thereby effectuate the original judgment; and this court's decision must begin, in deciding whether the defendant's obligation has been discharged, by considering whether the mortgage obligation in the original separation agreement was in the nature of support.
If the parties had intended that obligation to be a property settlement, then either they did not intend a 50-50 property division, or one would have to infer that the dry cleaners had net worth of approximately the same amount as the $60,000 indebtedness on the second and third mortgages, for the value of the other property assigned to each party was relatively equal. But the court finds no credible evidence to support that latter conclusion. The husband's testimony before this court that his cleaners provided his only income at the time of the divorce is contradicted by his financial affidavit at the time of the dissolution showing income only from his principal place of employment, which he listed as Sargent, which he confirmed before this court to be where he was then working. The court instead believes his financial affidavit which showed that he was receiving no income from the dry cleaners. Since he gained no net profit from the subsequent sale of the dry cleaners, testimony which the court does find credible, there is no credible basis for the court to find any positive value for the worth of the dry cleaners at the time of the dissolution. It was producing no income to him at the time of the dissolution, he claimed no value for it in his sworn financial affidavit, and when he later sold his share he gained no profit. Were the court to characterize his agreement to pay off the second and third mortgages as a property division, the court would thus have to conclude that the parties had not intended a 50-50 property division, a conclusion not supported by any other evidence and in fact contradicted by that evidence. After considering all the evidence, the court finds that the intent of the parties at the time of their dissolution was to divide their property equally.
The parties intended, in their separation agreement, for Ms. Taylor to continue living in the marital home after the divorce with their two children. At the time of the divorce, the wife's financial affidavit showed weekly income of $568 gross and $425 net; the husband's showed $721.89 gross and $509.16 net. The plaintiffs net weekly income of $425, plus the court-ordered child support of $150 per week, was not enough to meet her weekly expenses for herself and the parties' two children, which her financial affidavit listed as $742.50 per week. Even with child support, she was thus short almost $170 per week toward being able to meet weekly expenses for herself and the children. Although the evidence does not show the exact amount due weekly on the second and third mortgages, the husband's obligation to make those payments had the effect of partially balancing out the parties' disparate incomes.
Pendente lite support orders show that the parties recognized that the plaintiff would need more than the $150 in child support to meet her needs and those of their two children and continue living in the family home: Less than two months before the dissolution, the parties, represented by counsel, agreed that the defendant would pay the plaintiff weekly support of $250 per week; a month later, they agreed to continue that order and also agreed that the plaintiff would have exclusive use of the marital home. The defendant's promise and obligation to pay for the second and third mortgages were thus obviously intended to help the plaintiff continue living in the family home with the children.
As the court recognized in Lewis v. Lewis, supra, 35 Conn.App. 630, payment toward necessities of life such as shelter supports a finding that an obligation was intended to be in the nature of support, rather than an unscrambling of property claims. See also Larson v. Larson, 89 Conn.App. 57, 68, 872 A.2d 912 (2005) ("It cannot be disputed that part of `support' is ensuring that both the debtor's former spouse and his children have a home in which to live"); Chudy v. Cooper ( In re Cooper), 263 B.R. 164 (Bankr.D.Conn. 2001) (noting that "a significant part of the duty that is owed by a debtor to his or her former family is the provision of an adequate place to live" and that a debtor's obligation to pay the utilities, mortgage, and taxes, for the marital residence occupied by the ex-spouse "was intended to replace that support obligation"); In re Mizen, 72 B.R. 251 (Bankr.D.Ohio 1987) ("In the present case the second mortgage assists in providing shelter to the Debtor's former wife and his two minor children . . . [P]roviding a home for the Debtor's minor children is certainly a support obligation . . . [A] significant part of the duty that is owed by a debtor to his or her former family is the provision of an adequate place to live . . . The Debtor's obligation to pay the second mortgage appears to provide assistance to the Debtor's former family in keeping and maintaining their residence . . . For the above reasons, primarily the fact that the Plaintiff and the children are living in the house in question, the second mortgage payments are properly characterized as support, and are therefore nondischargeable"); In re Henry, 5 B.R. 342 (Bankr.D.Fla. 1980); (citing Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir. 1961), that "the obligation to maintain and support a family includes the obligation to keep a roof over their heads. It is obvious that that is what the bankrupt undertook to do when he agreed to keep up the installment payments on the trust deed upon the home in which his divorced wife and children were to live").
The Lewis case suggests that payments to third parties may support a finding that an obligation is a property settlement, whereas payments directly to an ex-spouse suggest the payments to be in the nature of support. The original divorce decree here provided that the husband would pay the second and third mortgages to the mortgagees, but any inference that such a payment to third parties suggests property orders is significantly undermined here by the fact that the parties later decided that he would make direct payments to the plaintiff of $494, which represented the monthly amount necessary to refinance the second and third mortgages. Moreover, the dissolution judgment tied the defendant's obligation to pay the second and third mortgages to alimony by including the provision that alimony could be modified if he failed to meet that obligation. Thus, unlike the husband, the wife here did not waive alimony; she simply deferred her right to claim alimony of more than a dollar per year so long as her ex-husband complied with his mortgage payment obligation. The episodic nature of that obligation also earmarked it as a support. Just as periodic payments to an ex-spouse for a specific time characterize many alimony orders, defendant here would make periodic payments for a specific length of time (under the dissolution judgment, that required to pay off the second and third mortgages; under the April 2004 agreement, for twenty years) to provide a basic necessity to his ex-wife and children.
From all of this evidence, the court concludes that the defendant's obligation to pay the second and third mortgages was intended by the parties to be in the nature of support and maintenance, rather than a property distribution, and, as long as the defendant complied with this obligation, had that effect. Moreover, the court notes, in consideration of the factors relevant to awards of alimony and the financial affidavits filed by the parties at the time of the dissolution, the defendant's assumption of that obligation was "not so excessive that it is manifestly unreasonable under traditional concepts of support." Long v. Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1110 (6th Cir. 1983). As the Appellate Court recently noted in Larson v. Larson, supra, 65, the meaning of the term "in the nature of support" is to be broadly and liberally construed. Although wanting to give debtors a "`fresh start' in life . . . unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt," Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934), Congress did not intend for bankruptcy to deprive their spouses or children of necessary support or to make them a charge upon the community. Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186, 189 (9th Cir. 1956). Although there are certainly arguments that can be made here that the defendant's obligation to pay the second and third mortgages was a property settlement, the court finds, on the balance of evidence, that the more likely and better supported conclusion is that the parties intended this obligation to be in the nature of support for the wife and children. The subsequent modification to that agreement, pursuant to which the wife refinanced the marital home and paid off those two mortgages in order to preserve the home for herself and the children and the defendant agreed to pay her the monthly amount of she owed for the refinancing of those mortgages, was also intended as such.
The evidence shows that the defendant has not paid on the $494 per month obligation since April 7, 2005. He has not offered credible evidence of inability to make any payment whatsoever toward this obligation. The court thus finds him in contempt for his not making those payments through the date of his filing for bankruptcy. The court finds that he was advised by his bankruptcy attorney that this obligation would be discharged by the filing of the bankruptcy and that relying upon such advice was, on the facts of this case, reasonable; and the court's contempt finding regarding the loan repayment obligation therefore does not apply to the period after the bankruptcy filing. "It is within the sound discretion of the court to deny a claim for contempt when there is an adequate factual basis to explain the failure to honor the court's order." Marcil v. Marcil, 4 Conn.App. 403, 405, 494 A.2d 620 (1985).
IV. OTHER CONTEMPT CLAIMS
At hearing on February 3, 2006, the plaintiff established that the defendant then owed her $1,200 in back child support payments, which represented an arrearage of eight weekly payments of $150, ten months of payments toward the $494 per month loan repayment obligation, and $230 in unreimbursed medical expenses that she had presented to the defendant. The evidence showed that between May 5, 2004, a date on which plaintiff claims defendant was paid current in child support, and February 1, 2006, the defendant had paid her the total amount of $12,800. Child support alone for that time period would have amounted to $13,500. An additional $8,892 was due on the monthly loan obligation during that period. The defendant did not quarrel at the hearing with the amount which plaintiff said he had paid; but, disputing any liability toward the loan after the bankruptcy filing and asserting that any past indebtedness toward that loan had been discharged, he claimed he was current, or close to current, in child support. Even if the court had adopted the defendant's position, the defendant's proven child support arrearage would have been sufficient to support a finding of contempt.
At trial the parties disagreed on how to credit the various payments the defendant made during this period. That issue would be significant here had the court agreed with his position that the bankruptcy discharged the loan obligation, but, since the court has found otherwise, it is not necessary to allocate particular payments toward specific obligations. Instead, the evidence shows that the defendant owed, as of February 1, 2006, an arrearage of $9,832 toward his support obligations (child support, debt repayment in the nature of support, and unreimbursed medical expenses).
V. COUNSEL FEES
As the prevailing party in this contempt motion, the plaintiff is entitled to seek an award of counsel fees pursuant to § 46b-87 of the General Statutes. "The award of attorneys fees in contempt proceedings is within the discretion of the trial court." Tatro v. Tatro, 24 Conn.App. 180, 189, 587 A.2d 154 (1991). In Champagne v. Champagne, 43 Conn.App. 844, 685 A.2d 1153 (1996), the court upheld the trial court's refusal to award counsel fees for successfully defending against a motion for contempt because "the defendant raised a valid issue in his motion." Id., 850. In exercising its discretion here, the court declines to award counsel fees to the plaintiff regarding the defendant's failure to make the loan repayments in view of the complexity of that issue. The court will, however, consider an award of counsel fees to plaintiff for her successful pursuit of her claims for contempt on the arrearage in child support and unreimbursed medical expenses and orders plaintiff to submit an attorneys fee affidavit before the next court hearing itemizing services and expenses on those issues. The defendant may contest the reasonableness of any counsel fee award at that hearing.