Opinion
No. 1D21-1489
06-14-2023
Lisette Lee TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Victor D. Holder, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Darcy O. Townsend, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Victor D. Holder, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Darcy O. Townsend, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Bilbrey, J.
Lisette Lee Taylor appeals her conviction and sentence for aggravated manslaughter by culpable negligence of her infant daughter in violation of section 782.07(3), Florida Statutes (2017). We affirm on all issues and write to discuss the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal (JOA).
Appellate review of a denial of JOA is de novo, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Lanier v. State , 264 So. 3d 402, 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). To allow a case to go to the jury, the State's evidence must be sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to find each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Pagan v. State , 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002) ; see also Reed v. State , 350 So. 3d 836, 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was that Appellant gave birth to a daughter on October 11, 2017, and tested positive for methamphetamine or amphetamine while hospitalized following the birth. There was no evidence that the baby was born with any drugs in her system. Testimony established that the day after Appellant and the baby returned home from the hospital, a DCF investigator visited. During that visit, Appellant tested negative for any drugs. The DCF investigator did not find that conditions in the home required removal of the baby, and the investigator concluded that Appellant had adequate food, shelter, and clothing to provide for the baby. The DCF investigator instructed Appellant not to share the bed with the baby and warned her of the other unsafe sleep conditions she needed to avoid (soft bedding, fluffy blankets, pillows) that could interfere with the baby's breathing. A friend of Appellant's also cautioned Appellant not to sleep with the baby in her bed.
On October 30, 2017, the baby died, and Appellant reported the death to the police. A few hours after Appellant discovered her baby had died, Appellant was interviewed by police investigators. Appellant explained that on Saturday October 28th, she took her then seventeen-day-old baby to a friend's home where Appellant ingested meth. Appellant explained that she and the baby spent the night at the friend's home because Appellant had no transportation of her own. Another friend gave Appellant and the baby a ride home on Sunday October 29th. Appellant admitted to using meth again on that Sunday afternoon at her home. The meth caused Appellant to stay awake all of Sunday night, while the baby slept from midnight to 5:30 a.m. Appellant told investigators that she and the baby were awake from 5:30 a.m. until 8:30 a.m. on Monday October 30th. Appellant fed and changed the then nineteen-day-old infant during this time. Because the house was unheated and the weather was cold, Appellant dressed the baby in two layers of clothing. There was testimony that she also wrapped the baby in a baby blanket for warmth.
Appellant told investigators that she and the baby fell asleep about 8:30 a.m. on October 30th. While Appellant denied having the baby in her bed, another witness who resided at the home testified that she observed Appellant and the baby sleeping together in the bed three times during that day. This witness testified that she heard the baby crying about 10 a.m., and she went into the bedroom to wake Appellant. Appellant woke up, said, "Okay," and went back to sleep. The same witness testified that she entered the bedroom twice more during that day, at about noon to deliver a package and at some time between 2 and 4 p.m. Appellant woke up both times but did not get out of bed. This witness observed the baby beside Appellant in the bed each time, apparently sleeping.
When Appellant awoke at around 6:40 p.m. on October 30th, she realized that the baby had not awakened to be fed all day. Appellant tried to wake the baby but quickly realized the baby had died. At 7 p.m. she called 911, and law enforcement officers arrived to begin their investigation. In the bedroom, investigators found two items of drug paraphernalia later shown to contain meth. The room was also cluttered with a jumble of baby-related equipment such as formula, diapers, baby wipes, a basinet still in its box, a tilted baby rocker/seat, and bedding.
A search warrant was secured for Appellant's blood and urine, and samples were collected on October 31st. At trial, the State's toxicology expert testified that she had tested the samples and confirmed that Appellant tested positive for meth. The toxicology expert explained that Appellant's levels were pretty high, that she was likely impaired, and that it was dangerous for her to be caring for an infant. The expert also explained the ordinary effects of meth, including an initial stimulant effect and a leveling off, followed by profound exhaustion or "crash" lasting several hours.
The medical examiner testified at trial that he could not determine the baby's exact cause of death, but his expert opinion was that the baby died because of "an unsafe sleep." He defined "unsafe sleep" as any of these conditions: being face-down; in heavy bedding; exposed to second-hand smoke; in a tilted rocker; on a fluffy mattress; or co-sleeping with a sibling, parent, or dog. The medical examiner could not specify which type of unsafe sleep occurred here, and he could not determine a time of death. The medical examiner testified that the baby exhibited no disease, genetic defect, injury, or other physical condition that might have killed her. The examination of the baby's body caused the medical examiner to conclude that the baby was face-down at some point before she died. He explained that very young infants are unable to lift their heads if bedding, pillows, or another's body blocks their breathing.
After the State rested, the defense moved for JOA based on the insufficiency of the State's evidence of culpable negligence to allow a reasonable jury to find this element beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense argued that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Appellant's actions were so grossly and egregiously negligent that they constituted culpable negligence. And even if the State provided enough evidence to create a jury question on the level of Appellant's negligence, the defense argued that the State's evidence was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant's culpable negligence was the cause of the baby's death.
The trial court carefully analyzed the motion and found that if the State established only that Appellant slept with the baby in her bed, with no evidence of impairment from meth use, JOA on the element of culpable negligence would be appropriate. See, e.g ., State v. Morrison , 470 Md. 86, 117–18, 233 A.3d 136, 155 (2020) ("[c]o-sleeping is not an inherently dangerous activity" without "evidence of any degree of impairment"). The trial court's denial of JOA was based on Appellant's admitted "timing of the meth use," the testimony of the State's toxicologist about the usual effects of meth, and the likelihood of Appellant's "impaired ability to take care of her child due to the use of meth." The trial court thus allowed the jury to determine whether Appellant's use of meth while being the sole caregiver of the nineteen-day-old infant, combined with sharing a bed with the infant, was sufficiently egregious conduct to constitute culpable negligence. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7.
The court in Morrison used "co-sleeping" to mean sleeping in the same bed as another. Some authorities define co-sleeping similarly. See Co-sleeping, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/co-sleeping (last visited June 1, 2023). Here, "bed-sharing" is used instead to avoid any confusion. See Bed-sharing, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bed-sharing (last visited June 1, 2023).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged, and the court denied the defense motion for new trial. Appellant was then sentenced to 23 years in prison. This appeal of the judgment and sentence follows.
Section 782.07(3), Florida Statutes (2018), provides, "A person who causes the death of any person under the age of 18 by culpable negligence under s. 827.03(2)(b) commits aggravated manslaughter of a child, a felony of the first degree ...." The elements of aggravated manslaughter of a child by culpable negligence under section 782.07(3) therefore are: 1) the defendant caused; 2) the death of a person under the age of eighteen; 3) by culpable negligence under section 827.03(2)(b). Culpable negligence is not defined in section 827.03(2)(b) but is defined in various cases as discussed below.
Although culpable negligence is not defined by statute, case law describes the severity and nature of the acts required to attribute knowledge of the consequences to the actor. In Kish v. State , 145 So. 3d 225, 227–228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), we cited a standard jury instruction defining culpable negligence in explaining:
For negligence to be called culpable negligence, it must be gross and flagrant. The negligence must be committed with an utter disregard for the safety of others. Culpable negligence is consciously doing an act or following a course of conduct that the defendant must have known, or reasonably should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
See also Ibeagwa v. State , 141 So. 3d 246, 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (defining culpable negligence similarly based on a standard jury instruction).
"Culpable negligence must be determined upon the facts and the totality of the circumstances in each particular case." Id . (citing Behn v. State , 621 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) ). "We have explained that in child neglect cases, a caregiver's ‘degree of care, neglect, indifference, or callous disregard is measured against societal norms and expectations under the circumstances.’ " Lanier , 264 So. 3d at 406 (quoting Ramos v. State , 89 So. 3d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ). Sharing the bed with an infant without additional proof of wrongdoing may be insufficient to amount to culpable negligence. See Morrison , 470 Md. at 117–18, 233 A.3d at 155. But here, there was evidence that due to Appellant's impairment from meth, she showed an inability to care for the baby, neglect of the baby, or indifference to the baby's safety to aggravate the negligence from sharing the bed. This was sufficient to allow the issue of her culpable negligence to go to the jury.
Appellant cites Medina v. State , 226 So. 3d 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), where the court reversed a conviction for child neglect by culpable negligence causing great bodily harm. Medina allowed a four-year-old child to descend stairs alone after Medina purportedly used marijuana. The second district found that Medina's actions were negligent but did not rise to the level of culpable negligence since his actions did not create a dangerous situation or contribute to child's serious, permanent injuries. Id . at 1027. "Ideally, a sole caretaker of a child should be in the full possession of his or her faculties while caring for the child." Id . at 1026. But a caretaker "may be under the influence to a limited extent without the caretaker's conduct rising to the level of culpable negligence if the caretaker's slightly altered state does not negatively affect the caretaker's duty to supervise and care for the child, create a dangerous situation, or contribute to the child's injuries." Id . The court also noted that a caretaker's failure to supervise a child does not establish culpable negligence per se. Id .
Although the offense here is aggravated manslaughter by culpable negligence in violation of section 782.07, Florida Statutes, and not child neglect by culpable negligence ( section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes ), or culpable negligence standing alone ( section 784.05, Florida Statutes ), the term "culpable negligence" as defined in case law is consistent as an element of all three crimes.
The holding in Medina is distinguishable since here the jury had evidence that Appellant was more than just slightly impaired, that it was dangerous for her to be caring for a newborn while crashing from meth use, and that she knew it was dangerous to sleep in the same bed as the baby. As the trial court found, bed-sharing alone likely would not have been culpable negligence. This is because there was no evidence that Appellant was warned that bed-sharing with the baby was extremely risky and likely to result in serious injury or death. And no evidence was offered that bed-sharing was so risky that a reasonable person would know that it was likely to cause death or great bodily harm to an infant. But the bed-sharing with a newborn combined with the effects of Appellant's meth use was enough to raise a jury question on culpable negligence. The State's evidence was sufficient to show that Appellant acted with "gross and flagrant ... utter disregard for the safety of" the baby or that she followed "a course of conduct that [she] must have known, or reasonably should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily harm." Kish , 145 So. 3d at 227–28.
The case is more akin to Cornell v. State , 159 Fla. 687, 32 So. 2d 610 (1947), than it is to Medina . In Cornell , the infant's grandmother challenged her conviction for manslaughter by culpable negligence. There, the evidence at trial showed that while "in a highly drunken state" the grandmother shared the bed with her infant grandchild causing the infant to suffocate. Id . at 612. "Under these circumstances, the jury was warranted in finding that the death of the child was due to gross and flagrant neglect, on the part of Emily Cornell, amounting to culpable negligence within the definition given by our cases." Id .
Along with establishing a prima facie case that Appellant's actions qualified as culpable negligence, to avoid JOA the State also had to present evidence that the culpable negligence caused the baby's death. "To prove manslaughter by culpable negligence, the State must prove (1) the fact of the death and (2) a causative link between the death and the culpable negligence of the defendant." Ramos , 89 So. 3d 1119 n.1 ; see also Tyus v. State , 845 So. 2d 318, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The State "must prove that the defendant's conduct was the legal or proximate cause of the harm at issue." Id. (citing Eversley v. State , 748 So. 2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1999) ).
This element was clearly established by the testimony. According to the medical examiner, "unsafe sleep" was the cause of the baby's death. "Unsafe sleep" was defined to include bed-sharing with an infant, which Appellant did according to the testimony at trial. "Expert medical testimony as to the likelihood or probability of a causal connection between the defendant's act and the victim's death is generally sufficient to establish causation." Id . So the evidence of causation was enough to survive the motion for JOA.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed: 1) Appellant used meth while caring for her baby who was less than three weeks old; 2) Appellant fell into a deep sleep as an after-effect of the meth use the following morning; 3) because Appellant was still impaired from the meth use, it was dangerous for her to care for an infant; 4) bed-sharing with an infant is unsafe sleep; 5) Appellant had been warned of the danger of bed-sharing; 6) nonetheless, Appellant slept in the same bed with the baby while crashing from the meth use; and 7) the unsafe sleep caused the baby's death. The evidence presented at trial was therefore enough to survive the motion for JOA and allow the jury to determine whether Appellant was guilty of aggravated manslaughter by culpable negligence. As a result, we affirm her conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED .
M.K. Thomas and Long, JJ., concur.