Opinion
Docket No. 1:06 CV 0875.
July 11, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by pro se Plaintiff, Carnell Taylor, ("Plaintiff"). [Rec. Doc. 1]. Plaintiff was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis on June 15, 2006. [Rec. Doc. 7]. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Winn Correctional Center in Winnfield, Louisiana.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff asserts that on March 1, 2006 he noticed on his inmate balance sheet fifteen dollars had been taken from his account without his permission. He alleges someone "forged my name, and thumb-print" in violation of his due process and equal protection rights. [Doc. 1 pg. 5] Plaintiff seeks an injunctive and declaratory judgment [Doc. 1 pg. 6] Plaintiff also asks for $5,000 dollars in compensatory damages and seeks a transfer closer to his home where so his mother can come and see him.
LAW AND ANALYSIS 1. Frivolity Review
When a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the court is obliged to evaluate the complaint and dismiss it without service of process, if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915A; 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) (2). Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990).
A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a civil rights suit as frivolous based on the complaint alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).
District courts must construe in forma pauperis complaints liberally, particularly in the context of dismissals under § 1915(e) (2) (B), but are given broad discretion in determining when such complaints are frivolous. Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint may not be dismissed under § 1915(d) (2) (B) "simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely." Jolly v. Klein, 923 F.Supp. 931, 942-43 (S.D.Tex. 1996).
A civil rights plaintiff must support his claim(s) with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, a district court is bound by the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint and is "not free to speculate that the plaintiff 'might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint." Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d at 97.
Plaintiff's original twelve page hand-written complaint specifically details his theories of liability with respect to each named defendant. The thoroughness of the complaints convinces the court that plaintiff has pled his best case and need not be afforded any further opportunity to amend.
Accepting all of plaintiff's allegations as true, the court concludes, for the reasons stated hereinafter, that he has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted and accordingly, recommends dismissal of the complaint as frivolous.
2. Parratt/Hudson Doctrine
Section 1983 proscribes conduct by any person who, under the color of state law, acts to deprive another person of any right privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, an initial inquiry in a lawsuit filed under § 1983 is whether plaintiff has alleged that his constitutional rights have been violated. If no constitutional violation has been alleged, there is no cognizable claim under § 1983.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV. However, the jurisprudence makes it abundantly clear that a prisoner's claim for random deprivation of personal property is not cognizable under § 1983.
In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544, 107 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), a prisoner claimed that prison officials had negligently deprived him of his personal property without due process of law. The Supreme Court held that the prisoner was "deprived" of his property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court ruled that the State's post-deprivation tort remedy provided all the process that was due. Id., 451 U.S. at 536-37, 101 S.Ct. at 1913.
The Due Process Clause does not embrace tort law concepts. Id. Although a prisoner may be afforded a remedy under state tort law for deprivation of property, the Fourteenth Amendment does not afford the prisoner a remedy. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335, 106 S.Ct. at 667. Even in instances where intentional deprivation occurs, as is the case herein, where an adequate state post-deprivation remedy is available, the Due Process Clause is not implicated. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 1995); Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 1994). This principle (known as the Parratt/Hudson doctrine) rests on the premise that because the state is unable to predict random and unauthorized conduct, pre-deprivation remedies are unfeasible. Davis, 70 F.3d at 375, citing, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128-32, 110 S.Ct. 975, 985-86, 1098 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (distinguishing between random unauthorized conduct and a deprivation which results from predictable conduct authorized by a State).
In this case, plaintiff's allegations, accepted as true for purposes of this evaluation, demonstrate an unauthorized deprivation occurred when cash was taken from his inmate account. If adequate state law remedies are available, no further due process is required under the Constitution.
Louisiana law provides plaintiff the opportunity to seek redress for either the negligence of prison officials or an intentional tort committed by employees of the prison facility. See, La. Civil Code, Article 2315. This provision of state law which is the general tort provision of Louisiana's Civil Code provides all the process that is required, and thus, the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated. Charbonnet v. Lee, 951 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205, 112 S.Ct. 2994, 120 L.Ed.2d 871 (1992).
A liberal construction of plaintiff's complaint fails to support a constitutional violation; plaintiff's claim is clearly barred by the Parratt/Hudson doctrine.
3. Transfer
Prisoners have no constitutional right to incarceration in a particular institution. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983); Meachum, 427 U.S. 224. A prisoner's liberty interests are sufficiently extinguished by his or her conviction that a state may generally confine or transfer him or her to any of its institutions, to prisons in another state or to federal prisons, without offending the Constitution. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225) (intrastate prison transfer does not implicate Due Process Clause), and Olim, 461 U.S. at 244-48 (interstate prison transfer does not implicate Due Process Clause)); see also Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1991) (no due process rights implicated in transfer from state to federal prison). A non-consensual transfer is not per se violative of either due process or equal protection rights, Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991); Stinson v. Nelson, 525 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1975), and no due process protections such as notice or a hearing need be afforded before a prisoner is transferred, even if the transfer is for disciplinary reasons or to a considerably less favorable institution, Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976); Johnson, 948 F.2d at 519; see also Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1989) (transfer from work release center back to prison does not implicate due process nor equal protection rights). Thus, plaintiff cannot state a constitutional claim regarding her transfer.
Insofar as plaintiff orders the court to provide him with a declaratory or injunctive judgment, his relief sought is totally unrelated to the facts alleged in his claim. Thus, plaintiff's claim is not a cognizable claim under § 1983 since plaintiff has failed to show that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. Therefore, the court concludes that plaintiff's claim is frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (i) and (ii).
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's civil rights complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (i) and (ii).
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (C) and Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have ten (10) business days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the clerk of court. A party may respond to another party's objections within ten (10) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual finding and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within ten (10) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglas v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).