Opinion
Civil Action No. SA-99-CA-0228 HG.
February 1, 2000.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO: Honorable H.F. Garcia United States District Judge
The matter before me is defendant's motion for summary judgment filed on October 22, 1999. I have jurisdiction to enter this Memorandum and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the District Court's Order referring all pretrial matters in this proceeding to me for disposition by order or to aid in their disposition by recommendation where my authority as a Magistrate Judge is statutorily constrained.
Docket no. 12.
Docket no 2.
I. Jurisdiction
The Court has federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 1343.II. Statement of Facts
On October 1, 1996, plaintiff applied for a warehouse position with defendant, Quinney
Electric, Inc. He was hired on the same day. His duties as a warehouse employee included retrieving different parts and supplies from bins to be packed, marked and loaded in the truck for delivery to various job sites. The warehouse workforce consisted of a supervisor and two employees, including plaintiff. At some time thereafter, the other employee left his employment and only plaintiff and his supervisor remained.
See Docket no. 12, Exhibit H Exhibit A, at 29.
Id .
Id . at Exhibit A, 29:4-17.
Id . at Exhibit A, at 30.
At the time of plaintiff's hire, there was an employee performing the duties of the truck driver position. The truck driver was responsible for loading the parts gathered by plaintiff on the truck, delivering them to job sites, and helping to unload them. The truck driver employee was not supervised by the same individual as plaintiff and he was not part of the warehouse workforce. Although plaintiff's warehouse duties did not include driving the truck to make deliveries to job sites, defendant asked him to "fill in" whenever the truck driver did not come to work. Eventually the truck driver ended up leaving his employment with defendant. At this time and for a period of approximately two months, plaintiff began making deliveries to various job sites until a permanent replacement for the position could be hired.
Id . at Exhibit A, 31-32.
Id . at Exhibit A, 31.
Id . at Exhibit A, 32:1-25.
Id . at Exhibit A, 40:15-18.
Shortly after plaintiff began making deliveries, defendant received complaints about his performance from other employees of the company. Even plaintiff himself complained about the procedures he had to follow in making the deliveries. For example, plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition that one of defendant's on site supervisors complained to plaintiff's supervisor that during one of the deliveries, plaintiff refused to help other employees unload the truck. Despite plaintiff's denial of the incident, he argues the company nevertheless believed the supervisor over him because the supervisor was "white." Plaintiff also complained about the company's expectations of him when making the deliveries. For instance, he complained to defendant's management about the way he was "treated" when he was sent to deliver materials to a job site where the foreman could not initially be located. According to plaintiff's deposition testimony, defendant instructed him to look for the foreman at a large work site in order to complete the delivery of the work materials to the employees. Plaintiff became upset at the instruction, particularly because he was also expected to make other deliveries on that day. When he returned to the warehouse, plaintiff went to his supervisor's office and threatened to quit his job if he was to be "treated" in this manner again.
Id . at Exhibit A, 46-48.
Id . at Exhibit A, 46. There is no evidence on record, however, that plaintiff was disciplined because of the complaint made by the on site supervisor.
Id . at Exhibit A, 50-53.
Based on the complaints received by other employees and plaintiff's threats of quitting his job, defendant immediately began the process of hiring and training another employee to fill the truck driver vacancy so that plaintiff could fully return to the warehouse position. An individual (Hispanic) applied for the position and was hired as a full-time driver on December 18, 1996. Plaintiff returned to his warehouse position and also assisted in training the new employee.
Id . at Exhibit A, 56-57; and Exhibit B.
Id . at Exhibit I.
Soon thereafter, the company experienced a slow down in work and an increase in overhead costs which resulted in the need to reduce its workforce. As part of defendant's reduction in force ("RIF") plan to cut company costs, plaintiff's warehouse position was targeted for elimination. Consequently, plaintiff was laid off on January 23, 1997. When he was informed that he was being terminated as part of a RIF plan, plaintiff did not object (or complain) about the reason given. In addition to plaintiff, three other employees (all Hispanics) were also laid off. Defendant gave plaintiff a referral letter indicating that he was a good employee, but that he was laid off as part of the company's attempt to lower overhead expenses. During the RIF phase, defendant retained the truck driver/delivery employee, as well as the warehouse supervisor because it was still in need of their services.
Id . at Exhibit B.
Id . at Exhibit A, 35.
Plaintiff states in his response that out of a workforce of 70 employees, he was the only Black employee. Docket no. 14 at 2.
Id . at Exhibits B G.
Id . at Exhibit B, 2.
On May 21, 1997, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Employment Equal Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that defendant discharged him from employment because of his race (Black). On December 16, 1998, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights ("right to sue" letter). Plaintiff timely filed this lawsuit in federal court on March 17, 1999.
During the course of his deposition, plaintiff clarified the allegations made in his federal complaint and stated that he was not claiming discrimination in the assignment of extra work tasks or that the terms and conditions of his employment were discriminatory, but only that he believed he was terminated because of his race. Id . at Exhibit A, 69-75.
Docket no. 1.
III. Issues Presented
1. Whether Taylor can establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under Title VII?
2. Whether Quinney Electric's proffered reason for a RIF, including the elimination of Taylor's warehouse position, was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of race?
IV. Summary Judgment Standard
The applicable standard in deciding a motion for summary judgment is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Mere allegations of a factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 requires that there be no genuine issue of material fact. In an employment discrimination case, the Court focuses on whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Therefore, summary judgment is proper if, under governing laws, there is only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict; if reasonable finders of fact could resolve a factual issue in favor of either party, summary judgment should not be granted.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
See LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc ., 86 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. at 248; Thomas v. LTV Corp ., 39 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id .; Wise v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co ., 58 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1995).
Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249.
The movant on a summary judgment motion, in this case Quinney Electric, bears the initial burden of providing the court with a legal basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it alleges demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion, in this case Taylor, to present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. The Court will look at the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion drawing all inferences most favorable to that party. Thus, summary judgment motions permit the Court to resolve lawsuits without the necessity of trials if there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp ., 477 U.S. at 323.
Anderson , 477 U.S. at 257.
Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Carner , 997 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1993). In this case, the nonmovant, Taylor (even as a pro se plaintiff), bears the burden of proof at trial with respect to his Title VII claims. Taylor cannot discharge this burden by referring to mere allegations or denials in his pleadings; rather he must refer to evidentiary documents already in the record and set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp ., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a nonmovant cannot discharge her burden with doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence).
See Fields v. City of South Houston, Texas , 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir. 1991).
V. Analysis and Conclusions of Law
A. Burden-Shifting AnalysisThe well-established framework of proof in an employment discrimination case requires that a plaintiff carry the initial burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff does so, a rebuttable presumption arises that the employer unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff. The burden then shifts to the defendant to present evidence that the plaintiff was treated in a certain way for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the presumption disappears, and the plaintiff must prove that the reason articulated by the employer was a mere pretext for discrimination. For purposes of proving pretext, it is not enough to show that the stated reason was false; plaintiff must show both that the stated reason was false and that discrimination was the actual reason for the adverse employment action. The plaintiff ultimately retains the burden of persuading the fact-finder of intentional discrimination. B. Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union , 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 252-253 (1981).
Patterson , 491 U.S. at 187; Burdine , 450 U.S. at 254.
Id .
Id .; Burdine , 450 U.S. at 256.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 516-17 (1993).
Id .
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The evidentiary framework for Title VII claims was established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position that he held; (3) he was discharged; and (4) after being discharged, his employer replaced him with a person who is not a member of the protected class. In RIF cases such as this one, where the employer discharges the plaintiff and does not plan to replace him, the Fifth Circuit has held that the fourth element is, "more appropriately, that after [the] discharge others who were not members of the protected class remained in similar positions."
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Id . at 801-03. The elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case necessarily vary according to the facts of the case and the nature of the claim. Id . at 802, n. 13; St. Mary's Honor Center , 509 U.S. at 506.
Even though defendant attempts to distinguish between the terms "discharge" (or "termination") and "lay-off" the Court believes there is no relevant legal distinction between these terms and thus, they are used interchangeable throughout this memorandum.
See Vaughn v. Edel , 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id . See Meinecke v. H R Block of Houston , 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995) (summary judgment in RIF case affirmed).
It is undisputed that plaintiff has established elements one to three of his prima facie case: he is a member of a protected class (Black); he was qualified for the position he held as a warehouse employee, and he was discharged from employment. Defendant disputes, however, plaintiff's ability to meet element four of his prima facie case — namely, that employees, not members of plaintiff's protected class, remained in similar positions. The Court will thus limit its analysis to plaintiff's last element of his prima facie case and it will refer to the relevant factual allegations as set forth above in the Statement of Facts.
Based on the summary judgment evidence on record, the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to establish that he was terminated from employment because of his race. As discussed more fully below, defendant laid off plaintiff as a result of a RIF plan necessitated by business reasons. The evidence shows that even though plaintiff performed the duties of a truck driver/delivery position, first on an as needed basis and then on an interim basis, he always remained a warehouse employee during the course of his three and a half months employment with defendant. Besides plaintiff and his supervisor, there were no other warehouse employees at the time of his lay off. The truck driver/delivery position was separate and apart from the warehouse position plaintiff performed in that both positions had different work duties and were supervised by different individuals. In addition, the record shows that other employees and even plaintiff had complained about the truck driver/delivery functions while he was performing the job on an interim basis. After receiving the complaints, defendant immediately began the process of hiring and training a full time new truck driver/delivery employee so that plaintiff could return to his warehouse duties. Even though plaintiff spent some of his time training the employee, he was able to fully return to his warehouse job.
Docket no. 12, Exhibit A, at 30.
Id . at Exhibit A, 31-32.
Id . at Exhibit A, 46-53.
Id . at Exhibit B.
There is simply no evidence in the record which would support plaintiff's assertion that defendant hired the truck driver/delivery employee to replace him because plaintiff did not perform that position on a full-time basis. Significantly, plaintiff's warehouse position was eliminated as part of the RIF plan and no other warehouse employee remained in a similar position as plaintiff. In other words, no one replaced plaintiff in his warehouse position. Moreover, when he was informed that he was being laid off as part of a RIF plan, plaintiff did not object to (or complain about) the reason given. The evidence shows that defendant only retained the warehouse supervisor and the truck driver employee because it was still in need of their services. Under these facts, plaintiff cannot show that other employees, not members of his protected class, remained in similar positions after he was discharged. The Court further notes that throughout his deposition testimony, plaintiff was not able to point to any competent evidence which would support his claim of discrimination other than his own "beliefs," "feelings" or "speculations." Plaintiff's subjective beliefs, however, are insufficient as a matter of law, to show that defendant's legitimate, business reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Id .
Docket no. 12, Exhibit A, at 35.
Docket no. 12, at 12 and Exhibit B.
Docket no. 12, Exhibit A, at 68-76.
See Grizzle v. The Travelers Health Network, Inc ., 14 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff's own self-serving generalized testimony stating her subjective belief that discrimination occurred held insufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor); Patton v. United Parcel Serv. Inc ., 910 F. Supp. 1250, 1263 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (plaintiff may not rely on her own subjective beliefs because subjective beliefs, even if genuine, cannot serve as the basis for judicial relief in a discrimination claim).
Therefore, because plaintiff has failed to prove the fourth element of his prima facie case of intentional discrimination, the Court recommends that summary judgment be granted to defendant on plaintiff's claim.
C. Defendant's Proffered Reason Was Not Pretextual
Even though the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to establish his prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII, the Court will nevertheless discuss defendant's proffered reason for the RIF or downsizing of the company.
According to the sworn testimony of the company's president, Quinney Electric began experiencing financial difficulties and a slow-down in work. Defendant's precarious financial situation necessitated a RIF to minimize the company's overhead costs. The decision was made to lay off plaintiff, as well as three other employees. Plaintiff was notified he was being laid off due to a RIF plan, was eligible for rehire, and was given a referral letter indicating same. Plaintiff's warehouse position was eliminated and was never filled. The warehouse supervisor and the truck driver/delivery employee remained in their positions as the company was still in need of their services.
Docket no. 12, Exhibit B, 1-2.
Id . at 2.
Id .
Id .
Id . and docket no. 12, at 10.
Because defendant has articulated a legitimate business reason for the reduction on force or downsizing of its company, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to prove that defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Significantly, defendant is not required to prove the absence of a discriminatory motive. Rather, plaintiff has "the ultimate burden of proving the critical element of discriminatory motive." Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant's proffered reason for its RIF was a pretext for racial discrimination. In his deposition he stated that he was not aware that other employees were laid off until after the filing of his lawsuit. Besides his "beliefs" and "speculations," plaintiff was not able to point to any competent evidence showing that defendant's reason for his lay off was pretextual and that the underlying reason for his lay off was his race?
See La Pierre , 86 F.3d at 449 (reorganization of business functions, which included plaintiff's demotion and reassignment of plaintiff's managerial responsibilities to a member of a non-protected class, considered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason).
Messer v. Meno , 936 F. Supp. 1280, 1294 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (citing St. Mary's Honor Center , 509 U.S. at 515-17), cert. denied , 119 S.Ct. 794 (1999).
Messer , 936 F. Supp. at 1294 (citing Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253-56).
Id . (citing Ray v. Tandem Computers Inc ., 63 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Docket no. 12, Exhibit A at 76:14-25 77:1-16.
For example, plaintiff testified that he believed that what prompted his termination, was an altercation he had with one of the company's stockholders who was also an employee of the company. Plaintiff, however, is unable to corroborate this allegation with competent evidence. Id . at Exhibit A, 57:13-25-58:1-25; and docket no. 14.
Consequently, because plaintiff cannot establish his prima facie case for intentional discrimination based on his race or prove that defendant's legitimate reason for its RIF plan was a pretext and that discrimination really motivated defendant, the Court recommends that defendant's summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII claims be granted.
VI. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, I recommend that defendant's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to entitle him to relief such that there is no genuine issue of material fact under the applicable legal standards.
Docket no. 12.
VII. Instructions For Service And Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation on each and every party either (1) by certified mail, return receipt requested, or (2) by facsimile if authorization to do so is on file with the Clerk. According to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b), any party who desires to object to this report must serve and file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation within 10 days after being served with a copy unless this time period is modified by the District Court. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of the Court, and serve the objections on all other parties and the Magistrate Judge. A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court. Additionally, any failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this Report and Recommendation within 10 days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996).
SIGNED this 1st day of February, 2000.