Opinion
No. 4-583 / 03-2107.
September 9, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Glenn E. Pille, Judge.
Tracy Taylor appeals the denial of her claim for workers' compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.
Mark Hedberg, of Hedberg, Owens, Hedberg Walsh, Des Moines, for appellant.
Jennifer Clendenin, of Ahlers Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Tracy Taylorinjured her left hand while working for Maytag Company. She seeks further judicial review of a workers' compensation decision denying her claim for permanent partial disability benefits. She contends 1) the agency should have given greater weight to the opinion of one physician over another and 2) the agency erroneously relied on medical guidelines to determine functional loss, to the exclusion of other evidence. Both issues go to the ultimate question before the agency — whether Taylor's injury entitled her to permanent partial disability benefits.
I. Standards of Review
The standards for judicial review of agency action are set forth in the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) (2001). Taylor does not cite particular subsections of this provision but argues generally that our review is for "an error of law" or for "substantial evidence." Maytag urges that the two relevant subsections are Iowa Code sections 17A.19(10)(c) and (f). The first authorizes relief from agency action if the action is "[b]ased upon an erroneous interpretation of a provision of law whose interpretation has not clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c) (emphasis added). The second authorizes relief if the agency action is "[b]ased upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f).
The key question under both of these provisions is whether the case involves a "determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." The deputy commissioner framed the issue before it as "whether the injury is the cause of permanent disability and the nature and extent thereof." Under our workers' compensation statutes this question is to be decided by the commissioner. See Iowa Code §§ 85.21(1) (authorizing workers' compensation commissioner to order payment of benefits due); 85.34 (authorizing compensation for permanent disabilities); 86.17(1) (authorizing commissioner to preside over contested case proceedings brought under workers' compensation chapter). It is also clear this question is a determination of fact. Catalfo v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 213 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1973) (holding claimant's right to recover permanent partial disability benefits "remains a question of fact to be resolved on the present record by the commissioner or deputy pursuant to Code § 86.34."). Therefore, Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(c), which applies only if the agency's interpretation of a particular law has not clearly been vested in the agency, is not germane.
Taylor does not argue that the agency decision is "[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable interpretation of a provision of law whose interpretation has clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(1).
Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(f), however, is applicable. Having concluded entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits is a "determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency," we will overturn the agency's determination only if it "is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f).
II. Entitlement to Permanent Partial Disability Benefits
A. Medical Opinions.
Taylor's first challenge to the agency's decision is based on dueling medical opinions. Taylor was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in her left hand and wrist. An orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Jeffrey Rodgers, performed surgery. Several months later, in response to a request from Maytag, he opined, "Based on the AMA [American Medical Association] Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition, she has no measurable sensory deficits or wrist range of motion deficits, and consequently has 0% permanent partial impairment."
Taylor then retained Dr. Justin Ban, a certified independent medical examiner. Following an examination and review of past medical records, Dr. Ban assigned her a ten percent permanent impairment rating to the upper extremity.
Maytag's counsel sought another medical opinion. After reviewing the records of Dr. Rodgers and Dr. Ban, Dr. Donna Bahle opined that the American Medical Association guidelines "would provide a 0% impairment for range of motion loss."
The deputy workers' compensation commissioner, whose decision was affirmed on intra-agency appeal, focused only on the opinions of Drs. Rodgers and Ban. He gave more weight to Dr. Rodgers' opinion "first, because he was the treating physician of claimant and second, the values for both sensation and range of motion are not found to be sufficient to establish measurable impairment."
Substantial evidence supports the deputy commissioner's finding that Taylor suffered no permanent disability. It is undisputed that Dr. Rodgers was Taylor's treating physician. We recognize that this status does not render his opinion weightier as a matter of law than that of an independent medical examiner. See Gilleland v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 524 N.W.2d 404, 408 (Iowa 1994). Here, the deputy commissioner relied on more. After summarizing the medical evidence, he pointed out that Dr. Rodgers administered sensory testing on three occasions and "no measurable range of motion deficit was noted." He also cited Taylor's report to Dr. Rodgers of complete relief of her paresthesia. Contrary to Taylor's assertion, these fact findings are supported by the record and are "sufficiently certain to enable a reviewing court to ascertain with reasonable certainty the factual basis on which the administrative officer or body acted." Catalfo, 213 N.W.2d at 509. B. Reliance on American Medical Association Guidelines.
Paresthesia is an "abnormal sensation, such as burning, pricking, tickling, or tingling. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1316 (27th ed. 2000).
The Iowa supreme court has since stated that an agency's decision is sufficient if it is possible to "work backward" from the agency's written decision and "deduce" what must have been the agency's legal conclusions and findings. See, e.g., IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 634 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Ward v. Iowa Dep't. of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Iowa 1981)); Bridgestone/Firestone v. Accordino, 561 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Ward); Norland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Iowa 1987) (quoting Ward). In Ward, the court noted that the agency entirely failed to set forth findings of fact and separate conclusions of law. The court characterized this omission as "disappointing" in light of the agency's statutory obligation to do so. Ward, 304 N.W.2d at 238; seealso Iowa Code § 17A.16(1). Although the court elected to overlook the omission, it did so only in that particular case and it declined to suggest "any willingness to continue the practice." Ward, 304 N.W.2d at 239. In this case, the agency issued detailed findings of fact and reasoned conclusions of law, complying with Catalfo (which pre-dated the enactment of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act), as well as with Iowa Code § 17A.16(1).
Taylor next contends the American Medical Association Guidelines cited by Dr. Rodgers as well as the other physicians "are not, as a matter of law, necessarily entitled to greater weight than other evidence." She maintains the deputy commissioner relied on these guidelines to the exclusion of other record evidence. The deputy's findings, cited above, belie this assertion. Cf. Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Iowa 1998) (rejecting equal protection challenge to guides).
III. Disposition
We affirm the district court order affirming the agency's denial of permanent partial disability benefits.