Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0791-D
July 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPTNION AND ORDER
Defendants Dallas Division FBI, Euless City Manager, Maple Avenue Economic Development Corporation of Dallas — Fair Oaks L.L.C. ("Maple Avenue"), Anterra Management Corporation ("Anterra"), and Dallas Police Substation move to dismiss this prose civil rights action for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. For the reasons set out below, the court grants the motions, enters an injunction to prevent plaintiff Christopher F. Taylor ("Taylor") from filing any future lawsuit against any party in any court without first obtaining leave of this court, and admonishes Taylor that continued disregard of this court's orders and the injunction entered today will result in referral of this matter to the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas to consider prosecuting him for criminal contempt of court.
In view of this decision, Maple Avenue and Anterra's May 17, 2002 motion to strike plaintiffs attempted motion for summary judgment and to stay further filings until resolution of motion to dismiss is denied as moot.
I
Taylor brought a pro se action against his former employer, Paper Tubes and Sales ("PTS"), alleging race discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and civil rights violations. Taylor v. Paper Tubes and Sales, Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-1277-P (Solis, J.). Judge Solis granted PTS' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Subsequent to dismissal of the case, Taylor has filed eight lawsuits in this court. In the first, he accused PTS of engaging in a pattern of perjury and harassment against him, in conspiracy with AAMCO Transmission, Lanes Automotive, Euless City Manager, PTS attorney Cheryl Smith, Esquire ("Smith"), PRIDE, USA, Dallas Police Substation, Manpower Temporary Agency, Fair Oaks Apartments, their attorneys, and the Fort Worth City manager. Taylor alleged that he reported various drug offenses to the police, to no avail. He asserted that, in retaliation, he was evicted following a "mock trial." Judge Lindsay dismissed the case as frivolous. See Taylor v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-0670-L (Lindsay, J.).
Taylor then filed suit against Judge Solis and the Dallas Division of the FBI alleging that Judge Solis purposely ignored the criminal behavior of PTS and that the FBI was aware of these crimes and allowed them to continue. He alleged that Judge Solis, the FBI, and PTS had conspired to deny his appeal of the judge's ruling. Judge Lindsay dismissed the case as frivolous. Taylor v. Judge Solis, et al., Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1308-L (Lindsay, J.).
Taylor then filed a third suit, this time against the Clerk of the Court for the Northern District of Texas and Judge Lindsay. Taylor alleged that Judge Lindsay was not randomly assigned to his second case. He also complained that his second case was wrongly dismissed. According to plaintiff, as a result, organized crime infiltrated the area and sold vast quantities of drugs. Judge Kendall dismissed the suit as frivolous. Taylor v. Clerk of the Court for the N Dist. of Tex., et al., Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1375-X (Kendall, J.).
Taylor filed a fourth lawsuit seeking relief against Magistrate Judges Stickney and Kaplan. He asserted that the rulings they had made in his prior cases established a criminal conspiracy and violated his constitutional rights. Taylor alleged that the rulings were intended to prevent him from proving organized criminal activity, drug sales, and conspiracy to commit capital murder. Judge Sanders dismissed the case as frivolous. Taylor v. Magistrate Judge Paul Stickney, et al., Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1406-H (Sanders, J.).
Taylor followed that dismissal with a fifth lawsuit, this time suing Magistrate Judge Boyle. He accused the trial judge in his discrimination case of purposely ignoring various criminal acts committed by his former employer during the course of the litigation. Taylor also challenged rulings made by other judges in subsequent legal proceedings. He alleged that Judge Boyle had obstructed justice by failing to appoint him counsel in Taylor v. Magistrate Judge Paul Stickney, et al., Judge Lindsay dismissed the case as frivolous. Taylor v. Magistrate Judge Jane Boyle, Civil Action No. 3 :01-CV-1498-L (Lindsay, J.). Judge Lindsay also ordered Taylor to obtain leave of court before filing any further suits in forma pauperis.
In his sixth suit, Taylor sued Judge Lindsay for dismissing Taylor v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., et al. He also accused the clerk of this court of sending him mail with fraudulent dates. Judge Lynn dismissed the case as frivolous. Taylor v. Judge Sam A. Lindsay, Civil Action No. 3 :01-CV-1510-M (Lynn, J.). Judge Lynn also barred Taylor from filing any more suits in this court without prepaying the $150 filing fee.
Taylor then filed his seventh suit, this time suing Magistrate Judge Kaplan. He alleged that the illegibility of Judge Kaplan's signature in prior rulings violated Texas law. He also accused Judge Kaplan of slander in previous characterizations of his cases. Judge Buchmeyer dismissed the case as frivolous. Taylor v. Magistrate Judge Jeff Kaplan, Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1628-R (Buchmeyer, J.). Judge Buchmeyer ordered Taylor to obtain leave of court before filing any additional suits in forma pauperis.
Taylor then filed his eighth suit, this time against Judge Kendall and Magistrate Judge Stickney. He complained that his prior cases were labeled frivolous and dismissed in retaliation for filing suit against various judges. According to Taylor, the court clearly acted as a criminal organization run by drug dealers in black robes. Judge Lindsay dismissed this case when Taylor failed to pay the statutory filing fee. Taylor v. United StatesDistrict Judge Joe Kendall et al., Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1694-L (Lindsay, J.).
Taylor then filed suit in Texas district court in Dallas County. In Cause No. 01-10561-B, he sued Judge Solis, Dallas Division of the FBI, Dallas Police Substation, Euless City Manager, PTS attorney Smith, Maple Avenue, and its attorneys. Taylor alleged that they had conspired to violate his civil rights through the course of his prior litigation. Following removal to this court, Judge Sanders dismissed the suit based on prior orders that prohibited Taylor from filing an action informa pauperis in this court without leave of court. Taylor v. Solis, et al., Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0042-H (Sanders, J.).
Taylor then filed the same complaint in another Texas district court in Dallas County, docketed as Cause No. 02-01184-E. Following removal to this court, Judge Sanders ordered Taylor to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing an action in forma pauperis in this court without obtaining leave of court. Following a hearing, Judge Sanders found Taylor in contempt and prohibited him from filing any suit in any court, including a state court, asserting similar claims without prior written consent from Magistrate Judge Sanderson. Taylor v. Soils, et al., Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0398-H, order at 1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2002) (Sanders, J.). Judge Sanders subsequently dismissed the case, based both on the court's prior orders prohibiting filing of the suit and as duplicative of a prior Taylor lawsuit. He also ordered Taylor to pay attorney's fees and costs totaling $3,041.61.
Taylor then filed the instant case in state court, and Dallas Division of the FBI removed it to this court. He maintains that defendants engaged in improprieties during the course of his prior litigation. Taylor alleges that they have either manufactured drugs, suppressed evidence of the manufacture, or committed perjury to defeat his litigation efforts, in violation of his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. Dallas Division FBI, Euless City Manager, Maple Avenue, Anterra, and Dallas Police Substation separately move to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Taylor has not responded to the motions, and they are now ripe for determination.
Subsequent to Judge Sanders' contempt ruling, Taylor has filed two additional suits in Texas state court, both of which were removed to this court and are currently pending. See Taylor V. Judge Jerry Buchmeyer, et al., Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0674-G (Fish, C.J.); Taylor v. Britten, et al., Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-1219-D (N.D. Tex.) (Fitzwater, J.).
II A
"[T]he motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 598 (1969)). "[D]ismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones pleadings is a "precarious disposition with a high mortality rate."' id (quoting Barber v. Motor Vessel "Blue Cat," 372 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1967)). "The court may dismiss a claim when it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990)). "In analyzing the complaint, [the court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (citing Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5th Cir. 1996)). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim." Id (citing Doe, 81 F.3d at 1401). "Thus, the court should not dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint." id (citing Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is ordinarily determined by whether the facts alleged in the complaint give rise to a cause of action, a claim may also be dismissed if a successful affirmative defense appears clearly on the face of the pleadings. Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986). "[W]hen a successful affirmative defense appears on the face of the pleadings, dismissal under Rule 12 (b)(6) may be appropriate." Kansa Reinsurance Co. v. Congressional Mtg. Corp. of Tex., 20 F.3d 1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Clark, 794 F.2d at 970).
B
Each defendant contends that Taylor's claims are barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars litigation of any issue connected with a cause of action or defense that, in the use of diligence, a party might have tried or actually did try. See Ellis v. Amex Life Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 935, 938 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2000). Res judicata has four elements: (1) the parties must be the same in both cases; (2) the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there must be a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same cause of action must be involved in both cases. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp., 37 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 701 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc)).
The first three requirements are clearly met here. This is the third lawsuit that Taylor has filed against each defendant. All prior cases were dismissed on the merits by final judgments rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction. Thus the only remaining issue is whether the prior suits involved the same claims or causes of action as alleged in the instant proceeding.
In determining whether this component is satisfied, the court utilizes the transactional approach of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Ellis, 211 F.3d at 938; In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d 382, 386 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2000). The transactional approach provides:
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar . . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction", and what groupings constitute a "series," are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). The critical issue is not the relief requested or the theory asserted. The question is instead
whether [the] plaintiff bases the two actions on the same nucleus of operative facts. The rule is that res judicata "bars all claims that were or could have been advanced in support of the cause of action on the occasion of its former adjudication, . . . not merely those that were adjudicated."
In re Howe, 913 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Nilsen, 701 F.2d at 560). "If the factual scenario of the two actions parallel, the same cause of action is involved in both. The substantive theories advanced, forms of relief requested, types of rights asserted, and variations in evidence needed do not inform this inquiry." Agrielectric Power Partners, Ltd v. Gen. Elec. Co., 20 F.3d 663, 665 (5th Cir. 1994).
This element of the test is satisfied in this case. In his pro se state court petition, Taylor alleges that "[a]ll of Plaintiff's current claim against the Defendants emanate from Plaintiff's civil case #3-00CV1277-P[.]" Pet. at 1. He accuses Maple Avenue and Anterra of evicting him in a "mock staged trial." Id Taylor asserts that Dallas Division FBI deliberately suppressed evidence of drug manufacture by Maple Avenue and Euless City Manager. Id. Likewise, he avers that the Dallas Police have taken no action against various criminals. As Taylor concedes, the claims he alleges are based on "the same nucleus of operative facts" as those asserted in his first federal lawsuit and the succeeding lawsuits against these defendants. Consequently, he is barred from relitigating the claims. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) ("Res judicata prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.").
Dallas Division FBI also seeks dismissal of this action on the ground that a civil rights action cannot be maintained against a federal governmental agency. Euless City Manager alternatively seeks dismissal on the basis that it is not a jural entity amenable to suit. Dallas Police Substation also seeks dismissal on that ground, as well as on the basis that Taylor's claims are vague and unintelligible. In light of the court's conclusion that plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata, the court need not consider these grounds.
Accordingly, the court grants defendants' motions to dismiss and dismisses this action with prejudice as to them.
III
Normally, the court in a pro se case is required to grant a plaintiff at least one more opportunity to plead his best case. See, e.g., Barber v. G. H Rodgers, Civil Action No. CA3-84-1750-D (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 1988) (Fitzwater, J.). Here, however, it is clear that Taylor's action is barred by res judicata, and he is engaging in vexatious litigation that should be brought to a prompt conclusion. Allowing him to replead would be futile and simply prolong the case and unjustiflably burden these defendants. The court therefore declines to permit Taylor to replead.
IV
Maple Avenue and Anterra also request sanctions against Taylor pursuant to Rule 11 or the court's inherent authority, and they also seek a finding of contempt and entry of injunctive relief in view of Taylor's repeated practice of filing frivolous lawsuits.
This court has an obligation to protect the orderly administration of justice, and it can issue injunctive relief to discharge that duty. See Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("Suffice it to say that, in dealing with such a litigant, the court `has an obligation to protect and preserve the sound and orderly administration of justice. . . .'" (quoting In Re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984)); see Farguson v. MBank Houston, NA., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding thatpro se plaintiff has "no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets"); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). "Abusers of the judicial process are not entitled to sue and appeal without paying the normal filing fees — indeed, are not entitled to sue and appeal, period. Abuses of process are not merely not to be subsidized; they are to be sanctioned." Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989).
As noted, this is the fourth lawsuit that Taylor has filed against Maple Avenue and Anterra. He has filed six other suits against a host of defendants, including nearly every judge in the Dallas Division of this court. Each case has been dismissed as frivolous or as violative of the court's order prohibiting him from filing additional actions without obtaining leave of court. Moreover, Judge Sanders has found Taylor in contempt of court for violating that order. Taylor continues to harass defendants and others by filing frivolous lawsuits that require parties to incur legal fees and that place burdens on the valuable and limited resources of the judicial system.
Although the court recognizes that sanctions and contempt are available remedies, it is apparent that Taylor is impecunious and that civil contempt has not been effective. The court will therefore enjoin Taylor from filing any lawsuit in any court against any party unless he first seeks and obtains leave to do so from this court by filing a motion for leave under this civil action number and attaching a copy of his proposed state court petition or federal court complaint. This injunction does not apply retroactively to cases already pending as of the date of this memorandum opinion and order. See, e.g., supra note 2. Additionally, the court admonishes Taylor that, if he persists in disregarding this court's orders and the injunction entered today, the court will refer this matter to the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas to consider prosecuting him for criminal contempt of court.
This enlarges on Judge Sanders' ruling in Taylor v. Solis, et a!., Civil Action No. 3 :02-CV-0398-H, order at 1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2002) (Sanders, J.), which prohibited Taylor from filing any suit in any court, including a state court, asserting similar claims without prior written consent from Magistrate Judge Sanderson. Today's injunction applies to all claims, of any party.
The court expresses no view on whether these cases are subject to other orders and restrictions on filing imposed by a judge of this court or whether the cases have merit. It merely concludes that this injunction should not apply to a case filed before the effective date of the Injunction.
* * *
Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted. Plaintiff's claims against Dallas Division FBI, Euless City Manager, Maple Avenue, Anterra, and Dallas Police Substation are dismissed with prejudice by Rule 54(b) judgment filed today. An injunction in accordance with the foregoing opinion will be included in the court's judgment. The clerk of court is directed to transmit to each district and full-time magistrate judge of this court a copy of this memorandum opinion and order.
Because there are other defendants who apparently have not been served and so did not file motions to dismiss, the court will make the judgment of dismissal final by filing it under Rule 54(b).