Opinion
C/A No. 3:16-3823-JFA-PJG
07-20-2018
Bridgett Taylor, Plaintiff, v. Leon Lott; Ricky Ezzell; and David Linfert, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Bridgett Taylor, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by the named defendants—the sheriff of Richland County and two of his deputies—arising out of law enforcement officers' forced entry into her home to execute a search warrant. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 31.) Taylor filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 39), and the defendants replied (ECF No. 58). Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendants' motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
The facts discussed herein are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record.
On December 19, 2013, deputies from the Richland County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant at the plaintiff's residence—a known source of drug activity in Columbia, South Carolina—in the early morning, detonating an explosive device to open the front door. Officers thought the plaintiff's son, who was suspected in a homicide investigation as well as of the drug activity at the location, was in the house; however, the plaintiff and her daughter turned out to be the only ones in the home at the time. The plaintiff was injured by shrapnel from the door. She sues Richland County Sheriff Leon Lott and two of his deputies who were members of the Special Response Team (sometimes referred to as a "SWAT team") that assisted with executing the search warrant.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Claims
1. Alleged Violation of Fourth Amendment—Knock-and-Announce Requirement
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Generally, to be reasonable, a search of a person's residence must be preceded by law enforcement officers' knocking on the door and announcing their identity and purpose. See, e.g., Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (recognizing that an element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry is whether police complied with the common law "knock and announce" requirement). This general rule, however, is subject to exception when exigent circumstances exist. Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 419-20. The test for whether an exception to the knock-and-announce requirement is justified is whether police have a "reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Id. at 420 (emphasis added) (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997)). As the Supreme Court has instructed, "[I]t is the duty of the court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement." Id. (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 387). The reasonable suspicion for foregoing the requirement must be justified by a particularized basis, not generalizations or categorical exceptions. Id.; see also Richards, 520 U.S. at 393-94 (adopting a fact-based, case-specific inquiry rather than a categorical exception for drug investigations); Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 420 (rejecting the generalized theory that a suspected child pornographer would resort to violence against police to avoid the embarrassment of arrest and prosecution as a basis for a reasonable suspicion of an officer safety threat).
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 provides: "The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant."
Such a particularized basis for dispensing with knocking on the plaintiff's front door existed here. While the defendants' memorandum in support of summary judgment exhaustively discusses the myriad of facts known to law enforcement about the drug activity at the plaintiff's residence and the dangerousness of the plaintiff's son Terrence Taylor and others who either lived at or frequented the residence, much less comprehensive information would have provided the officers with reasonable suspicion that occupants in the residence would present a danger to law enforcement or inhibit the investigation. (See generally Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 1-9, ECF No. 31-1 at 1-9.) As both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have recognized, reasonable suspicion is not a stringent standard. U.S. v. Grogins, 163 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 394-95). Suffice it to say here that police had been called to the residence fifty times in the ten months preceding execution of the warrant based on reports of illegal drug activity, and prior search warrants executed at the residence had yielded drugs. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. I, ECF No. 33-9; Linfert Dep. 28, 43, ECF No. 33-39 at 20, 27.) Narcotics agents had advised that all of the family were involved in the drug activity at the residence. (SRT Bomb Squad After Action Report, ECF No. 33-4 at 3; Linfert Dep. 50:3-10, ECF No 33-39 at 31.) The plaintiff's son Terrence Taylor was known to currently reside there, and he was a suspect in a murder that had occurred approximately the week before. (SRT After Action Report, ECF No. 33-4 at 3.) The other murder suspect, Christopher Jones, was also known to frequent the residence. (Id.) Both Terrence Taylor and Jones were known affiliates of the Bloods street gang. (SRT Group After Action Report, ECF No. 33-8 at 2.) A Chevy Impala—registered to the plaintiff—that was associated with the murder and drug activity had been observed by law enforcement at the subject residence when they conducted surveillance there. (Search Warrant, ECF No. 33-3 at 4; Linfert Dep. 39:3-7, ECF No. 33-39 at 23; DMV Registration, ECF No. 33-7 at 2.) Significantly, Terrence Taylor was known to officers to drive the Chevy Impala registered to the plaintiff. (Linfert Dep. 39:3-7, ECF No. 33-39 at 23.)
Additionally, the City of Columbia police department, which shared jurisdiction over the subject residence with the Richland County Sheriff's Office, furnished intelligence to Defendant Ezzell detailing numerous issues of officer safety associated with the residence. (Ezzell Dep. 22:21-23:6, ECF No. 33-38 at 12-13.) Notably, the Columbia police department SWAT team commander suggested to Ezzell that the plaintiff herself presented an officer safety threat and risk of obstruction of the investigation and that occupants of the residence had been combative with police officers when they were executing search warrants or conducting interviews. (Id. at 47, 68, ECF No. 33-38 at 30, 39.) Previous search warrants executed at the residence had yielded weapons, and the occupants kept a vicious pit bull there. (SRT Group After Action Report, ECF No. 33-8 at 2-5.)
Based on the information provided to him and gathered in the homicide and narcotics investigation, Defendant Ezzell conducted a threat assessment on a point-based scale which resulted in the highest total points ever compiled by the sheriff's department's Special Response Team. Significantly, officers decided to conduct a forced entry only if the Impala was in the driveway at the residence at the time they executed the warrant, since the presence of the Impala would indicate to them that Terrence Taylor was inside the house. (Ezzell Dep. at 29-30, ECF No. 33-38 at 17-18.)
The assessment resulted in a total of over 35 points, indicating a high threat, based on the following: suspects in a homicide investigation (35 points); suspects with a criminal history relating to firearms (15 points); suspects with a criminal history relating to resisting arrest or combativeness with police (10 points); existence of handguns at the location (15 points); additional persons believed to be at the location (5 points); vicious dog at the location (10 points); drug or alcohol use among occupants (5 points). (Warrant Service Risk Assessment, ECF No. 33-12 at 2-3.)
Taylor's opposition to summary judgment largely rests on the argument that the potential threats stemmed from Terrence Taylor and his cohorts and that an issue of material fact exists about whether the officers' belief that Terrence Taylor was in the house at the time of the execution of the warrant was reasonable. This contention misses the mark. First, it ignores the totality of the circumstances, which precedent repeatedly has emphasized must be considered in any Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (reasonable suspicion determinations); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (probable cause); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2001) (consent to search); see also Grogins, 163 F.3d at 798 ("We also take exception to Grogins' contention that the legality of the search hinged entirely on the likelihood of [the suspected drug dealer's] presence at the precise moment the officers executed the search warrant."). Second, it seeks to apply a more rigid standard on the officers than the law requires. Grogins,163 F.3d at 797 (noting that the Supreme Court in Richards expressly rejected a probable cause standard in determining whether exigent circumstances justify a no-knock entry); see also Richards, 520 U.S. at 394-95; Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-31 (1990) (discussing the differences between the standards of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and a preponderance of the evidence); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (holding that probable cause is a "flexible, common-sense standard" that "does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false"). Finally, it utterly ignores the evidence of record that officers had reason to suspect that the plaintiff herself posed a risk to the effectiveness of the investigation. (Ezzell Dep. 47, 68, ECF No. 33-38 at 30, 39; Linfert Dep. 42-43, ECF No. 33-39 at 26-27.)
For example, the plaintiff relies heavily on her expert witness's testimony that officers should have conducted a longer period of surveillance to know exactly who was in the house before executing the warrant. Such a standard would require near certainty—even more than probable cause—that the dangerous suspects were present. But the law is clear that certainty is not demanded of law enforcement, only reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Price, 150 F. App'x 243, 246 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that the "rule requires only that officers possess a 'reasonable suspicion' that knocking before entry would be dangerous. Officers need not possess the knowledge to an absolute certainty or even by a preponderance of the evidence.") (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). Further illustrating the plaintiff's use of an improperly high standard is her repeated use of words like "know" and "believe" when describing the officers' perceptions. (Compare Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n at 23, ECF No. 39 at 23) (arguing that Defendants "could not have reasonably believed" the occupants then inside would use violence; that Defendants "should have known" that only the plaintiff and her daughter were present; that "Defendants could not have known" drugs were inside the residence; and "they did not even know who was in the house at the time") (emphasis added) with Grogins, 163 F.3d at 797 (suggesting that the district judge's use of the words "reasonable belief," while not dispositive, indicated he incorrectly applied the more rigorous standard of probable cause rather than the lower standard of reasonable suspicion) and Price, 150 F. App'x at 246 n.1.
Of more concern is the plaintiff's point that officers knew of the exigent circumstances upon which they now rely to excuse the knock-and-announce requirement at the time they applied for the search warrant, but failed to request no-knock authorization from the magistrate. This one fact, however, is not determinative of the reasonableness of the no-knock entry. Case law indicates that officers may under certain circumstances dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement at the time they are executing the warrant even if a magistrate denied authority for a no-knock entrance. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 395-96. Obtaining express authority from the magistrate based on the information regarding exigencies that they had at the time may have been the better practice, and Fourth Circuit precedent suggests that the officers' choice not to do so may be a factor entering into the analysis. However, it also indicates that express judicial preapproval for a no-knock entry is not constitutionally mandated. Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 421 (stating that "[o]f course, the absence of a no-knock warrant 'should not be interpreted to remove the officers' authority to exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being executed' " but observing a "strong preference" for specific authority in the warrant when there was no barrier to seeking no-knock authorization at the time they obtained the warrant) (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 396 n.7 and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984)). Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, the court cannot say that the failure to seek no-knock authority when they applied for the warrant renders the no-knock entry unreasonable.
The court's conclusion that the defendants had reasonable suspicion justifying a no-knock entry is further supported by a review of precedent examining this question in various factual scenarios. To begin with, the cases upon which the plaintiff relies addressed vastly different facts than the ones confronting the defendants in this case. For example, in Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit found no reasonable suspicion for a no-knock entry into the residence of an armed robbery suspect's father when the armed robbery suspect was already in custody and the officers' articulated basis for such entry essentially imputed—without any basis—the son's violent behavior to his father, assuming that he might use a firearm against police simply because his son likely would have. This is a far cry from the facts presented here, where officers had particular reason to suspect Terrence Taylor (and possibly co-conspirators) were in the house and that his mother might interfere with law enforcement's efforts to conduct the search.
Moreover, as the plaintiff had herself been arrested for possession of drugs at her residence approximately three months prior, the officers executing the warrant could have reasonably suspected her to be connected to her son's drug activity. Cf. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997) (indicating that an exception to the knock-and-announce rule may not be justified when the search is "conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evidence").
In United States v. Singleton, 441 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2006), upon which the plaintiff also relies, the Fourth Circuit suppressed evidence from a no-knock entry because, although the investigation concerned drugs, there was no particularized basis for suspecting danger or destruction of evidence. Similarly, in United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1584 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1993), the court also rejected the general speculation that every narcotics search carries the risk that evidence will be destroyed, finding no particularized basis for such conjecture when the police had no reason to suspect anyone inside the house would destroy evidence and, in fact, no evidence indicated drugs would even be found in the house at all.
Notably, the Lalor Court did excuse the knock-and-announce requirement based on the risk to officer safety. The Court upheld the district court's finding that exigent circumstances existed based on the fact that a handgun had been discovered in connection with a prior arrest of Lalor and that in another encounter Lalor had been belligerent and made derogatory comments about the police. Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1584-85. This was the case even though the Court had already determined that the police did not know who was in the house; thus, Lalor's actual presence in the house—or even a reasonable suspicion that Lalor was in the house at the time—was not crucial to a finding of exigent circumstances based on officer safety.
By contrast, the instant case is much more factually similar to other cases finding no-knock entries to be justified. First, in U.S. v. Grogins, 163 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit found that police properly dispensed with the knock-and-announce requirement late at night before entering a known stash house used by a violent drug dealer who was expected, based on a tip from a reliable informant, to be present at the stash house sometime that evening. Id. at 798 ("Based on facts known to the officer at the time of the search, a mere suspicion of danger—if reasonable—will excuse the police from knocking and announcing their presence. Here, the police had more than adequate basis to forego knocking."). In Grogins, the Fourth Circuit addressed a situation where the police had reliable information that the dwelling to be searched was a site of unlawful drug activity which continuously served as a drug distribution center, and the suspect daily frequented the house. Similarly, in the instant case, police had been called to the residence fifty times in ten months—often for drug activity—and had recovered drugs in past searches, and the suspect frequented the residence. In Grogins, the suspect had a history of gun-related violence. Here, the officers knew weapons had also been recovered from the house in the past; Terrence Taylor was suspected of a fatal shooting in addition to his drug activity; Terrence Taylor and Christopher Jones had recently posed with firearms—apparently on the subject property—in photographs posted on social media; and Columbia police officers had met with interference from occupants of the house in the past. (See ECF Nos. 33-4 & 33-8.) In Grogins, the Court was not persuaded by Grogins's argument that foregoing the knock-and-announce requirement was unreasonable because the dangerous suspect was actually not present at the time the officers entered, because the officers reasonably suspected that he was. Id. at 798-99. Here as well, officers had reason to suspect that Taylor was present, since they had information that Terrence Taylor drove the Impala and that the presence of the Impala would indicate he was at the subject property. (Ezzell Dep. 31, ECF No. 33-38 at 19; Linfert Dep. 39:3-7, ECF No. 33-39 at 23.)
Although the plaintiff argues that nothing in the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant at issue indicated that Terrence Taylor was suspected of a homicide, she does not dispute that the Richland County Sheriff's Office knew that information when they executed the warrant.
An unpublished decision relied on by the defendants also aptly distinguishes Lalor and Singleton from the case at bar. In a factually similar situation to that presented here, the Fourth Circuit in Johnson v. City of Aiken, 217 F.3d 839 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision), distinguished Lalor. In both cases, the police lacked information about who was in the residence to be searched. In Johnson, however, unlike Lalor, the police had been told that the suspect was a heavily armed drug dealer with readily accessible firearms in the room into which the front door opened. The Johnson Court found this information particularized the danger of entering the house, warranting a no-knock entry.
Further, with regard to the presence of the dangerous suspect, the Johnson Court, distinguishing Gould, observed:
We believe Gould is distinguishable from the present case. While it is true that the officers did not have specific information that Bryant would be home at the time of execution of the search warrant, they did know that he lived at the house to be searched. Therefore, although the lack of information that Bryant would be home lessened the expectation that the officers would encounter violent resistance if they knocked and announced, we decline to hold that exigent circumstances did not exist without such information. Rather, we believe the officers were entitled to consider that there was a significant probability that Bryant would be home at 5:30 on that Sunday afternoon, especially considering that two vehicles were parked in front of the residence when the raid occurred.Id., 2000 WL 263823, at *11.
Because the plaintiff cannot show that the defendants' failure to knock on her door before entering her home to execute the search warrant rendered the search unreasonable, the defendants should be granted summary judgment on this claim.
2. Alleged Violation of Fourth Amendment: Excessive Force/Use of Detonator
The plaintiff also contends that the defendants' use of a detonator on the front door constituted an excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A claim that a law enforcement officer has used excessive force during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a person is properly analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). The Fourth Amendment test is an objective one; however, it is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. Id. at 396-97. It requires the court to determine "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Id. at 397. The court must balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Id. at 396.
Courts must examine the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the force used was objectively reasonable. Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877, 885 (4th Cir. 2016). In Graham, the Supreme Court recognized that proper application of this standard "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003). "But these factors are not 'exclusive,' and we may identify other 'objective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force.' " E.W. by & through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015)). "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Many of the plaintiff's arguments with respect to her excessive force claim hinge on her contention that no exigent circumstances existed at the time officers executed the warrant. Because the court concludes that officers reasonably suspected exigent circumstances existed, these arguments fail for the reasons addressed above. A few other arguments specific to this claim, however, remain to be addressed.
Specifically, her argument that officers waited only approximately three seconds after yelling "get away from the door" before detonating the explosive device fails. Because the officers were not required to announce their presence at all, this fact, even if true, is not constitutionally significant.
With specific regard to the plaintiff's argument that use of the detonator itself constituted excessive force, the facts and circumstances of this case belie this contention. The court first considers the factors suggested in Graham to the extent they apply. First, the severity of the crime at issue was serious—law enforcement had regularly been called to the residence based on illegal drug activity. Second, the suspect—Terrence Taylor, and arguably everyone else in the residence based on information that all of the household were involved in drug activity—were assessed to pose a threat to law enforcement officers. According to Ezzell, all of the occupants had been identified by his counterpart at the Columbia police department as combative. Weapons had previously been recovered in the home. Moreover, Terrence Taylor, whom the police reasonably but erroneously suspected to be inside, was a murder suspect and known to carry weapons. The third factor—whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee—has no application to the facts presented, as the detonator was deployed while the door was still locked prior to law enforcement's entry. Moreover, Defendants Ezzell and Linfert consulted beforehand and decided to use a smaller (six-inch) charge rather than the usual fifteen-inch more explosive charge, indicating use of a lower level of force for the circumstances presented. Based on all of this, and considering the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable jury could find that using the detonator to unlock the door was unconstitutionally excessive.
The defendants point to evidence indicating that after the officers gained entry, the plaintiff disobeyed instructions to get down on the floor and an officer had to subdue her. The plaintiff disputes this, and the court accepts her version of events for purposes of this motion. In any event, such a confrontation, if it occurred, was causally unrelated to the detonation device which allegedly resulted in her injuries.
As to the plaintiff's assertion that she had opened the door and was looking directly at the officer's face when he detonated the device, however, the court agrees with the defendant that this testimony is so completely defied by all other evidence, including post-denotation photographs of the door and the plaintiff's own expert's testimony, that it need not be accepted as true for summary judgment purposes. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."); (Defs.' Reply at 12-14, ECF No. 58 at 12-14).
3. Alleged Violation of Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments
The plaintiff's Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims rest on her contention that she was in the defendant's custody at the time of her injuries and that they were deliberately indifferent to her safety. These claims fail for the simple reason that no facts in this record permit a reasonable inference that the plaintiff was in custody, either as a detainee or a convicted prisoner, at the time of her injuries. (See generally Defs.' Reply at 14-17, ECF No. 58 at 14-17.)
Notably, "the less protective Eighth Amendment standard applies 'only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.' " Graham, 490 U.S. 386, 398-99 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671, n.40 (1977)).
RECOMMENDATION
Because the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional deprivation based on the record, the defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 31) should be granted.
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE July 20, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' " Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).