Opinion
2022 CA 1129
06-02-2023
MARK Q.TAYLOR II v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
Mark Q. Taylor II Angie, Louisiana Plaintiff/Appellant In Proper Person, Mark Q. Taylor II Jonathan Vining Debra A. Rutledge Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
Appealed from the 19th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Docket No. 715707, Section 21 The Honorable Ronald R. Johnson, Judge Presiding
Mark Q. Taylor II Angie, Louisiana Plaintiff/Appellant In Proper Person, Mark Q. Taylor II
Jonathan Vining Debra A. Rutledge Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., WOLFE, AND MILLER, JJ.
MILLER, J.
This matter is before us on appeal by petitioner, Mark Q. Taylor II, from a judgment of the district court granting his petition for judicial review and reversing a decision of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPSC"). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 18, 2021, Taylor, an inmate housed at Rayburn Correctional Center in the custody of the DPSC, filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure ("ARP"), No. RCC-2021-649, contending that the DPSC incorrectly calculated his years of experience and classified him as a Legal Worker 2, Offender Counsel Substitute. Taylor disputed the DPSC's calculation of his prior service. Taylor contended that he met the DPSC Regulation AM-C-1(B)(12) criteria for designation as a Legal Worker 3, Offender Counsel Substitute by possessing a paralegal certificate and/or degree and well over three years of service as an offender counsel. As such, he contended he should be designated as a Legal Worker 3, Offender Counsel Substitute paid at the rate of .80 per hour, and that he should be awarded back pay from October 12, 2020.
The Legal Worker 3 designation requires that the offender "[m]ust have attained paralegal certificate or paralegal degree and have a minimum of three years legal work experience OR have ten years legal work experience and no paralegal certificate or paralegal degree." LAC22:1.331(E)(2)(k).
On December 2, 2021, the DPSC issued a First Step Response addressing Taylor's complaints regarding his time computation and advising him that the time that he served as an Offender Counsel Substitute in 2011 would not count toward advancing his current level as an Offender Counsel Substitute due to his removal from that position for charging other offenders for legal services. DPSC explained that although he was assigned as a Level 3, Offender Counsel Substitute, on January 26, 2021, on May 3, 2021, DPSC discovered that he was not qualified for that position, so he was reclassified as a Level 2, Offender Counsel Substitute. The DPSC further determined that Taylor's pay rate should have been $0.50 per hour from the date he was assigned as a Level 2, Offender Counsel Substitute, and that he should receive back pay from the date he was assigned until his pay was corrected in September.
Not satisfied with the DPSC's response, Taylor sought administrative review contending that there was no policy or regulation that directs the forfeiture of service time. Taylor further contended that other previous service time should also be counted towards his three years of service.
On February 1, 2022, the Secretary issued a Second Step Response Form denying Taylor's request for relief maintaining that he had not met the minimum three years legal work experience requirement where the training records he offered did not support "legal work experience."
In accordance with the Louisiana Corrections Administrative Procedure Act, La. R.S. 15:1171, et seq., on February 7, 2022, Taylor filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the DPSC's decision in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court seeking designation as a Legal Worker 3, Offender Counsel Substitute in accordance with DPSC Regulation AM-C-1(B)(12); court costs and legal fees; compensation and back pay for a Legal Worker 3 position in accordance with DPSC Regulation AM-C-1(B)(12) starting October 12, 2020 when he began his on-the-job-training; and that no retaliation be levied against him.
A Commissioner for the district court reviewed the petition and on August 9, 2022, issued a report and recommendation. The Commissioner determined that DPSC regulations No. AM-C-1 and No. PS-F-4 did not provide for the forfeiture of prior service time as a counsel substitute. The Commissioner thus found that the DPSC erred in failing to count all of Taylor's prior service time towards his years of experience and recommended that the DPSC's decision be reversed as manifestly erroneous. Additionally, the Commissioner recommended that Taylor be credited with an additional eight months and three days towards his years of service, which would allow him to reach his minimum three-year service requirement on or about February 9, 2023. The Commissioner found that Taylor's start date was October 12, 2020, and accordingly, recommended that he be credited with additional back pay as a Legal Worker 2 between October 12, 2020, and January 26, 2021. The Commissioner further recommended that the DPSC be assessed with costs and that the various motions filed by Taylor pertaining to issues outside of the administrative record be dismissed as they are beyond the scope of his ARP.
The offices of Commissioner of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court were created by La. R.S. 13:711 to hear and recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state prisoners. La. R.S. 13:713(A). The Commissioner's written findings and recommendations are submitted to a district court judge, who may accept, reject, or modify them in whole or in part. La. R.S. 13:713(C)(5); see Covington v. Vannov. 2019-1518 (La.App. 1st Cir. 8/3/20), 310 So.3d 206, 208 n.2.
After filing his petition for judicial review of his ARP in the district court, Taylor had filed a motion for leave and amendment of complaint pointing out errors in the Second Step Response, a motion and order compelling discovery of his DPSC job history dating back to August 2, 2004, a motion for preliminary injunction, and a second motion for leave and amendment of complaint, which is the subject of the instant appeal.
Taylor filed a traversal of the Commissioner's report contending that the Commissioner failed to acknowledge or address a "Motion for Leave and Amendment of Complaint" filed by Taylor on July 14, 2022. In his motion, Taylor sought to amend his complaint, relying on Jenkins v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2021-1129 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/13/22), 2022 WL 1515388 (unpublished), an opinion handed down by this court after Taylor had filed his petition for judicial review of his ARP. Relying on Jenkins. Taylor argued that he was entitled to back pay and a pay increase commensurate with "the skill, industry, and nature" of the work he performed pursuant to La. R.S. 15:873. Taylor contended in his motion to amend that, although assigned as a Legal Worker 2, he had performed the duties of a Legal Worker 3 since the date of his designation as an Offender Counsel Substitute on October 12, 2020, and that he should have been paid accordingly.
In Jenkins. Jenkins sought adjustment of his .04 per hour incentive pay to an amount commensurate with his work as an academic tutor. He also requested adjusted back pay for a period he worked as a registered tutor. The DPSC denied his ARP at both stages contending that he was paid the correct rate where he did not possess an associate degree or higher as required to earn .75 per hour as a certified tutor. The Commissioner concluded that the lowest pay rate commensurate with Jenkins's job assignment was .50 per hour and that he was entitled to .46 back pay for each hour worked as a registered tutor. The district court adopted the Commissioners report as its reasons. On review, this Court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the DPSC's regulations did not contain a job title or pay range for registered tutors, as they did for other positions. Thus, in the absence of a specific pay range, considering La. R.S. 15:873, which provides that inmate pay rates should be according to "the skill, industry, and nature" of the work performed, the district court determined that Jenkins should be paid, not at the rate of a certified tutor where he lacked the requisite degree, but at the same rate as other categories of non-certified tutors performing the same job duties that Jenkins performed as a registered tutor. Jenkins. 2022 WL 1515388 at *2-3.
On August 24, 2022, the district court signed a judgment granting Taylor's petition for judicial review, reversing the DPSC's decision in ARP No. RCC 021-649, ordering the DPSC to pay Taylor additional back pay commensurate with his education and legal work experience as a Legal Worker 2 between October 12, 2020 and January 26, 2021, and ordering that Taylor's records be amended to show that he will meet the three-year minimum 0065perience date on or about February 9, 2023. The judgment further ordered that any motion or petition filed after the petition for judicial review was dismissed. Taylor now appeals the judgment of the district court.
Rule to Show Cause
At the outset, we note that on examination of the record following the lodging of this appeal, this court, expropio motu, discovered a defect in the August 24, 2022 judgment of the district court in that it awarded plaintiff "additional back pay" but failed to specify an amount for that award. This court thus issued a rule to show cause order, ordering the parties to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed where the precise relief awarded was not determinable from the judgment alone.
After receiving responses from the parties, this court issued an interim order for the limited purpose of requesting that the district court, in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1951, issue an amended judgment correcting the deficiencies in the judgment in compliance with La. C.C.P. art. 1918. The order further instructed the Clerk of Court of East Baton Rouge Parish to supplement the record with the amended judgment by February 2, 2023. On March 7, 2023, the district court signed an amended judgment, which specified that the award of additional back pay to Taylor was $661.30. The clerk supplemented the record in this court with the amended judgment on March 20, 2023. The parties have not submitted any filings with this Court in response to the district court's amended judgment. In light of the supplementation of the amended judgment herein, we maintain the appeal.
DISCUSSION
In its judicial review of the prison authorities' final decision, the district court functions as an appellate court. Therefore, on appeal of the district court's judgment, the appellate court reviews the administrative record de novo under the criteria of La. R.S. 15:1177(A)(9), owing no deference to the factual findings or legal conclusions of the district court. Marchand v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. 2020-0747 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/24/21), 322 So.3d 269, 273, writ denied. 2021-00457 (La. 9/27/21), 324 So.3d 104. Judicial review of the DPSC's administrative decision, however, shall be limited to the issues presented in the petition for review and the administrative remedy request filed at the agency level. La. R.S. 15:1177(A)(5). Thus, under the statutory framework of the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure Act, the opportunity for the parties to present evidence occurs at the administrative level, not at the trial court level, and review by the trial court is limited to the record established at the administrative level, absent alleged irregularities in the procedure. Lee v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2017-0740 (La.App. 1stCir. 12/21/17), 240 So.3d 244,247.
The district court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or order that additional evidence be taken. La. R.S. 15:1177(A)(8). The court may reverse or modify the administrative decision only if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative decisions or findings are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion; or (6) manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. La. R.S. 15:1177(A)(9).
On appeal, Taylor contends that the district court erred in failing to consider the arguments set forth in his Motion for Leave and Amendment of Complaint, i.e., that his pay rate be set according to the skill, industry, and nature of the work he performed, pursuant to Jenkins. Jenkins was decided after the administrative proceedings had concluded and Taylor's petition for judicial review was filed with the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Thus, the arguments urged by Taylor therein and on appeal were not raised, presented, or considered in his ARP or in his petition for judicial review. Judicial review of the DPSC's administrative decision is limited to the issues presented in the petition for review and confined to the record established at the administrative level. La. R.S. 15:1177(A)(5); Poullard v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2017-1743 (La.App. 1stCir. 6/4/18), 2018 WL 2676675, *2 (unpublished). Accordingly, because the arguments urged by Taylor in his motion and on appeal were not raised or considered in the administrative proceedings and are not contained in the administrative record, we find no error in the district court's dismissal of Taylor's motion for leave to amend his complaint.
Cf. McCoy v. Stalder. 1999-1747 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/22/00), 770 So.2d 447, 453-454. (In the judgment rendered by the district court, it explicitly stated that it considered the traversal filed by appellant in rendering its decision. Under the clear import of La. R.S. 13:713(C)(4), the district court is not required to conduct a hearing, or de novo review, of the findings objected to in the traversal.)
Considering our findings herein, we nonetheless note that unlike Jenkins, in the instant case, DPSC regulations provide a specific pay range for offenders who are assigned to work as counsel substitutes. The pertinent regulations provide that counsel substitutes shall be paid in accordance with their education and years of legal experience and sets forth the specific criteria and incentive pay range for Legal Workers 1, 2, and 3. See LAC 22:1.331(E)(2)(k).
Thus, on review, we find no merit to Taylor's assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the March 7, 2023 amended judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.