Opinion
2011-12-13
In the Matter of James TAYLOR, et al., appellants, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, et al., respondents.
Dell, Little, Trovato & Vecere, LLP, Bohemia, N.Y. (Keri A. Wehrheim of counsel), for appellants. Christine Malafi, County Attorney, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Marcia J. Lynn of counsel), for respondents.
Dell, Little, Trovato & Vecere, LLP, Bohemia, N.Y. (Keri A. Wehrheim of counsel), for appellants. Christine Malafi, County Attorney, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Marcia J. Lynn of counsel), for respondents.
In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50–e(5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the petitioners appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Molia, J.), dated June 15, 2010, which denied the petition.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim. The petitioners failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their one-year delay in filing the petition. The petitioners' alleged ignorance of the law is not a reasonable excuse for their failure to serve a timely notice of claim ( see Matter of Bush v. City of New York, 76 A.D.3d 628, 906 N.Y.S.2d 597; Matter of Dancy v. Poughkeepsie Hous. Auth., 220 A.D.2d 413, 631 N.Y.S.2d 879), and the injured petitioner failed to submit any medical evidence to support his claim that he was incapacitated to such an extent that he could not comply with the statutory requirement to serve a timely notice of claim ( see Matter of Wright v. City of New York, 66 A.D.3d 1037, 1038, 888 N.Y.S.2d 125; Matter of Portnov v. City of Glen Cove, 50 A.D.3d 1041, 856 N.Y.S.2d 655; Matter of Papayannakos v. Levittown Mem. Special Educ. Ctr., 38 A.D.3d 902, 834 N.Y.S.2d 214).
The petitioners contend that the respondents acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the accident or a reasonable time thereafter by virtue of a police accident report made by the responding police officer. However, for a report to provide actual knowledge of the essential facts, one must be able to readily infer from that report that a potentially actionable wrong had been committed by the public corporation ( see Matter of Devivo v. Town of Carmel, 68 A.D.3d 991, 992, 891 N.Y.S.2d 154; Matter of Wright v. City of New York, 66 A.D.3d at 1038, 888 N.Y.S.2d 125). Here, the police accident report did not provide the respondents with actual notice of the petitioners' claim of negligence in the happening of this accident or of the injured petitioner's claim that he was injured as a result of the respondents' negligence ( see Matter of Wright v. City of New York, 66 A.D.3d at 1038, 888 N.Y.S.2d 125; Matter of National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Town of Eastchester, 48 A.D.3d 467, 468, 851 N.Y.S.2d 632). Furthermore, the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the delay did not substantially prejudice the respondents in maintaining their defense on the merits ( see Matter of Liebman v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 69 A.D.3d 633, 893 N.Y.S.2d 141; Matter of Smith v. Baldwin Union Free School Dist., 63 A.D.3d 1078, 881 N.Y.S.2d 488; Matter of Felice v. Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 A.D.3d 138, 152–153, 851 N.Y.S.2d 218).