Opinion
No. 1:03-cv-337
March 4, 2004
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum opinion filed herewith, the motion by plaintiff David W. Taylor for summary judgment [Court File No. 17] is DENIED. The defendants' motion pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint [Court File No. 13] is GRANTED. The plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all defendants. This is a FINAL JUDGMENT. The Clerk of Court shall close the record in this case.
SO ORDERED.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff David W. Taylor ("Taylor") brings this action against defendants Aramark Services Corporation, Ginny Perterni, Jeff Deal, Jerry Miller, and James Pruett. There are two motions before the Court. First, Taylor moves for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 56. [Court File No. 17]. After reviewing the record, the Court concludes the motion is frivolous and it will be DENIED. Taylor has not presented any proof under Rule 56 to support his summaryjudgment motion.
Second, defendants move pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Court File No. 17]. The defendants' motion is well taken and it will be GRANTED.
I. Standard of Review
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to permit a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true. Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tennessee, 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the complaint which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 1997); Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 637-38 (6th Cir. 1993).
To preclude dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations which comprise all of the essential, material elements necessary to sustain a claim for relief under some viable legal theory. Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc., 135 F.3d 3 89, 406 (6th Cir. 1998); Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 110 9; Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993); Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court is required to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and to accept all well-pleaded allegations of fact as being true. Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 1109; Mayer, 988 F.2d at 638; Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1989). When a factual allegation is capable of more than one reasonable inference, it must be construed in the plaintiff's favor. Saglioccolo, 112 F.3d at 228; Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 1109. The Court may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss simply because the Court does not believe the allegations of fact in the complaint. In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997); Saglioccolo, 112 F.3d at 228-29; Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 1109; Allard, 991 F.2d at 1240. The Court does not, however, have to accept as true mere legal conclusions and unwarranted inferences of fact. Lewis, 135 F.3d at 405; Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998); Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 1109; Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987).
II. Facts
The pro se complaint is confusing and difficult to decipher. As the Court reads and understands the complaint, Taylor makes the following allegations. Taylor was employed by Aratex Services from 1984 — September 5, 1991. His employment with Aratex Services was terminated on September 5, 1991. It is alleged that Aratex breached a contract of employment it had with Taylor, however, Taylor has not submitted a copy of any such written contract of employment to this Court. It appears that Taylor does not currently have any written contracts in his possession to support his complaint since Taylor asks the Court to order the defendants to produce to him copies of various documents including all employment contracts.
Taylor contends that defendant Aramark Services is the successor-in-interest to his former employer, Aratex Services. It is clear from the face of the complaint that Taylor was never employed by defendant Aramark Services.
At some unspecified point in time, probably 1991, Taylor took medical leave from his job at Aratex Servives. It is alleged some unidentified person at Aratex told Taylor that he "had to sign agreements for the district manager's position when he returned from medical leave." Taylor says he signed the agreements "under duress" and as a result of "undue influence." Taylor does not bother to explain or clarify the terms and nature of these alleged agreements. Taylor's vague, conclusory allegations do not help to illuminate the basis for his complaint. In his respoase to the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion and in his summary judgment motion [Court File No. 17], Taylor also asserts the reason for termination of his employment was that he sought treatment for a medical condition and Aratex Services wanted to avoid paying the medical expenses.
Taylor is primarily concerned about money he claims is owed to him from the Aratex employees' profit sharing and pension plan. Taylor asserts that he was employed by Aratex for eight years and worked his way up to the position of district manager which he held for three years. Taylor states that he was active in the employee benefit plan for four years. When his term of employment with Aratex was terminated on September 5, 1991, Taylor contends that he was fully (100%) vested in the profit sharing and pension plan but Aratex failed or neglected to include his full benefits for the pay period ending on September 11, 1991.
Taylor seeks to recover the last year of his profit sharing and pension plan benefits which he values as being at least $2,300. In addition, Taylor demands $1,000,000 in other compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, unlawful discharge, deliberate indifference, and loss of livelihood.
III. Analysis
The Court concludes that Taylor's complaint must be dismissed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Taylor's breach of contract claim is clearly time barred by the statute of limitations. Any cause of action for breach of an alleged employment contract accrued on September 5, 1991, when Taylor's employment with Aratex Services was terminated. Tennessee law provides that the suit for breach of contract must be commenced by Taylor within six years after the cause of action accrued. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-109((3). Taylor inexplicably delayed filing the instant suit in this Court until October 2, 2003, which is more than twelve years after the cause of action for breach of contract accrued. There is no basis for the Court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. Accordingly, the breach of contract claim shall be DISMISSED.
To the extent that Taylor's vague allegations regarding his return to employment from medical leave might be liberally construed as an attempt by Taylor to perhaps assert a claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., any such claim fails. The Family and Medical Leave Act was enacted by Congress and became effective in 1993. Taylor's allegations concern events that occurred prior to the enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Defendants cannot possibly have any liability to Taylor under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Finally, Taylor's claim for employee profit sharing and pension plan benefits is time barred by the statute of limitations. As the defendants correctly explain in their memorandum of law [Court File No. 14], Taylor's complaint may be liberally construed as possibly asserting two different types of claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Either Taylor is making a claim to recover ERISA plan benefits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), or he is claiming that the termination of his employment interfered with his rights under the ERISA plan pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1140. In either case, his claim under ERISA is time barred.
ERISA does not expressly provide a statute of limitations for civil actions brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). In the absence of a federally mandated statute of limitations, this Court applies the most analogous statute of limitations under Tennessee law. For purposes of determining the most analogous statute of limitations under Tennessee law, the Court considers a 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim as one for breach of contract. Santino v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2001);Meade v. Pension Appeals and Review Committee, 966 F.2d 190, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1992); Kilpatrick v. Intertrade Holdings, Inc., 2003 WL 21938912, *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 7, 2003); Moffitt v. Whittle Communications, L.P., 895 F. Supp. 961, 971 (E.D. Tenn. 1995); see also Syed v. Hercules, Inc., 214 F.3d 155, 159 (3rd Cir. 2000); Southern Elec. Retirement Fund v. George Arp Elec. Corp., 635 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). As discussed Supra, the statute of limitations in Tennessee for breach of contract actions is six years under TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-109(a)(3). Consequently, any claim brought by Taylor under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) seeking to recover ERISA plan benefits is time barred by TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-109(a)(3) since Taylor did not commence this lawsuit within six years after the cause of action accrued.
The most analogous state statute of limitations for an ERISA claim brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1140 is the Tennessee statute of limitatioas governing wrongful discharge or retaliatory discharge from employment claims. Leemis v. Medical Services Research Group, Inc., 2003 WE 22220527 (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 2003). Tennessee law provides that retaliatory discharge claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104; Weber v. Moses, 938 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Tenn. 1996). Any ERISA claim brought by Taylor under 29 U.S.C. § 1140 is time barred by TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 since Taylor did not commence this lawsuit within one year after the cause of action accrued.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the defendants' motion to dismiss Taylor's complaint is well taken. A separate judgment will enter DISMISSING plaintiff Taylor's complaint WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).