Opinion
Case No. 00-CV-72742-DT
May 31, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Richard Taranto, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Mound Road Correctional Facility in Detroit, Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Now before the court is Respondent Kenny Robinson's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with the Statute of Limitations. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the motion to dismiss.
I. Background
Following a jury trial in the 30th Judicial Circuit Court for the County of Ingham, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and felony firearm. On February 6, 1985, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and two years imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals. On November 5, 1987, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. People v. Taranto, No. 84197 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov. 5, 1987). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Taranto, No. 82151 (Mich. Mar. 30, 1988)
On April 24, 1997, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The trial court issued an opinion and order denying the motion for relief from judgment on March 29, 1997. People v. Taranto, No. 84-53148-FC (Ingham County Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1997). Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration and for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 436 (1973), which were also denied. People v. Taranto, No. 84-53148-FC (Ingham County Cir. Ct. June 20, 1997)
Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Taranto, No. 209272 (Mich.Ct.App. Sept. 29, 1998)
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. On June 29, 1999, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Taranto, No. 113540 (Mich. June 29, 1999)
Petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus on June 19, 2000. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the statute of limitations. On April 30, 2001, Petitioner filed a response to Respondent's motion to dismiss. On May 2, 2001, Petitioner filed a corrected response to Respondent's motion to dismiss.
II. Analysis
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the pending habeas corpus petition is untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA" or "the Act"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief was filed after April 24, 1996. Therefore, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the limitations period for filing an application for habeas corpus relief, apply to Petitioner's application. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 337 (1997)
Among other amendments, the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to include a one-year limitations period within which habeas petitions challenging state court judgments must be filed. In most cases, a prisoner is required to file a federal habeas corpus petition within one year of completing direct review of the habeas claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A). Where a prisoner s conviction became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the prisoner is permitted one year from the AEDPA's effective date to file a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court. Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1999). However, the time during which a prisoner seeks collateral review of a conviction does not count toward the limitations period. Section 2244(d) (2) provides:
The time during which a properly filed application for post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2).
In the pending case, Petitioner's conviction became final before the AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. Therefore, absent state collateral review, Petitioner was required to file his application for habeas corpus by April 24, 1997, to comply with the one-year limitations period. Petitioner sought state collateral review of his conviction by filing a motion for relief from judgment in state court on April 24, 1997 and applications for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. The one-year limitations period was tolled on April 24, 1997, with one day remaining. It resumed running again on June 29, 1999, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal. Petitioner did not file his habeas corpus petition until June 19, 2000.
In his response to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner concedes that, even tolling the limitations period for the time during which his applications for state collateral review were pending, his petition was not filed within one-year from the AEDPA's effective date. He argues, however, that the one-year limitations period should not have started to run until August 5, 1999, the date the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Brown v. O'Dea, 187 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 120 S.Ct. 2715 (2000), holding that prisoners whose conviction became final prior to the AEDPA's effective date were permitted one year from the effective date to file a habeas corpus petition. Petitioner claims that, prior to that time, he did not know whether and how the AEDPA's limitations period would apply to his claims.
This court disagrees. The AEDPA clearly established a one-year limitations period applicable to habeas corpus petitions. The one-year grace period was recognized to ensure that prisoners convicted prior to the AEDPA were afforded a reasonable period of time to receive notice of the new limitations period and to comply with it. Id.. at 576. Petitioner was provided with that one-year grace period. The Sixth Circuit's decision in Brown does not support an enlargement of that limitations period.
In addition, an essential component of the doctrine of equitable tolling is a petitioner's diligent pursuit of federal habeas relief. Dunlap v. United States, ___ F.3d ___, 2001, WL 473063 (6th Cir. May 7, 2001); see also Morgan v. Money, 2000 WL 178421 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000) (holding that a petitioner must show that he exercised due diligence in pursuing § 2254 relief to support equitable tolling). Petitioner claims that he was not on notice that the one-year limitations period applied to his habeas corpus petition until August 5, 1999, when the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Brown v. O'Dea, 187 F.3d 572. However, he waited until June 19, 2000 to file the pending habeas corpus petition. Petitioner fails to allege any justification for this ten-month delay in pursuing his habeas corpus petition. Thus, he has not shown that he exercised due diligence in pursuing habeas corpus relief.
Petitioner also claims that his petition should not be barred by the one-year limitations period because a state-created impediment prevented him from filing a habeas corpus petition. Petitioner argues that, since the date of trial, he has repeatedly requested that the state release exculpatory evidence to him. He claims that such evidence was necessary for him to establish how the state's failure to disclose this evidence prejudiced his case. He argues that because the state, to date, still has not disclosed this exculpatory evidence, the one-year limitations period has not yet begun to run. Given that Petitioner has filed a habeas corpus petition despite not having received the requested evidence from the state, it is apparent that the absence of that evidence did not prevent him from filing a timely petition. Petitioner clearly was able to articulate the bases for his claims without those documents. Moreover, Rule 6, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, permits a party to a habeas corpus proceeding to seek leave of court to conduct discovery. Thus, at the time of filing a habeas corpus petition, a petitioner need not file all of the documents which support his claims. Because Petitioner has failed to show that the state withheld documents which were essential to his ability to file a meaningful petition, the court holds that no state-created impediment existed which prevented Petitioner from filing a timely petition.
III. Conclusion
The court concludes that Petitioner failed to file his application for a writ of habeas corpus within the one-year limitations period established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d). The court further concludes that Petitioner failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances which would warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.