Opinion
24A-CR-889
10-18-2024
Rushawn S. Tanksley, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
APPELLANT PRO SE Rushawn S. Tanksley Michigan City, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable Steven O. Godfrey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 02D04-0001-CF-45.
APPELLANT PRO SE Rushawn S. Tanksley Michigan City, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Crone and Tavitas, Judges concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] In 2000, in this cause number, Rushawn Tanksley was sentenced to ten years of incarceration following his conviction for aggravated battery, a sentence that was to be served consecutively to a sentence for murder in another cause number. In 2023, Tanksley completed a substance-abuse program in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") and sought to receive additional credit time, a request that was denied. Tanksley appealed the DOC's decision to the post-conviction court, which denied his request for additional credit time. Tanksley contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition for additional credit time. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On October 9, 2000, Tanksley was sentenced to ten years of incarceration following his guilty plea to a charge of aggravated battery, a sentence that was ordered to run consecutively to a sentence for a murder conviction in Cause Number 02D04-0002-CF-126, and is currently incarcerated. On May 3, 2023, Tanksley completed an "Addiction Recovery" program while in the DOC. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 66. Tanksley was denied the credit time he sought and, on September 28, 2023, filed a State Form 9260, a document titled "CLASSIFICATION APPEAL" to ask for credit time, to which he received a response on October 24, 2023, stating "Not appealable-please contact Release Specialist[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 62.
[¶3] On or about January 3, 2024, Tanksley petitioned for additional credit time in the post-conviction court, alleging that he had successfully completed the recovery-while-incarcerated program while in the DOC but had not received credit time for it. On January 9, 2024, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On February 12, 2024, Tanksley moved to correct error, on which motion the post-conviction court did not rule.
Discussion and Decision
[¶4] Tanksley contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition for additional credit time. The State argues that Tanksley failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for obtaining additional credit time. Trial courts make initial determinations as to the credit time a defendant should receive at sentencing, and afterwards the DOC is responsible for modifications to credit time, including for educational credit. Ellis v. State, 58 N.E.3d 938, 941 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied; see also Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3 (providing educational credit time for successful completion of substance-abuse treatment). When educational credit time is denied, a petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies within the DOC before appealing to a post-conviction court because these decisions are the DOC's initial responsibility. Ellis, 58 N.E.3d at 941. A petition for additional credit time is to be treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. Clear v. State, 232 N.E.3d 1186, 1188 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024) (citing Wilson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1152, 1153 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003)), trans. denied. A petitioner bears the burden to show what the relevant DOC procedures are and that he has exhausted them. Ellis, 58 N.E.3d at 941.
The State also argues that Tanksley has failed to establish that completion of the addiction-recovery program in 2023 entitled him to additional credit time. Because we find the State's first argument to be dispositive, we need not address its second.
[¶5] Tanksley has shown neither the relevant procedures for a credit-time appeal nor that he has exhausted them. Tanksley claims that he "attempted to exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with IDOC policy and Administrative Procedure No. 01-04-101." Appellant's Br. p. 5. Administrative Procedure No. 01-04-101, however, addresses "Adult Offender Classification[,]" and the policy itself makes it clear that "[t]he awarding of credit time awards, application of jail time credit and any other statutory-driven actions are not appealable under this policy and administrative procedure." DOC Policy 01-04-101 IV. J.4. (located at https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/policy-and-procedure/policies/01-04-101/4-Function-and-Process-2-1-2024.pdf, last visited Sept. 30, 2024). Because Tanksley has failed to identify the proper remedies for appealing a credit-time decision, much less that he has exhausted them, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
[¶6] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.