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noting that "all factual allegations of the complaint other than those pertaining to the amount of damages are to be taken as true" once a court determines that a defendant is in default
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-1125
September 3, 2003
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Barbara Tancredi filed the instant suit against Defendants Yusef Cooper, Louis Watson, and the City of Philadelphia on March 4, 2002. Defendant Watson did not file an answer to the complaint. Accordingly, on July 30, 2002, a default was entered by the Clerk of Court against Defendant Watson for failure to appear, plead, or otherwise defend.
The Court conducted a hearing to determine Plaintiff's entitlement to damages on March 27, 2003. Defendant Watson appeared at the hearing. On that date, the Court granted Defendant Watson 20 days to file a motion to open default or take any other action in the case. Defendant failed to respond to the complaint within the time frame provided by the Court. As a result, the Court held a second hearing on damages on May 30, 2003. Defendant failed to appear at the hearing. Subsequent to the hearing, Plaintiff filed a Damages Hearing Memorandum (Docket No. 21). Upon consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint, the testimony of Plaintiff at the hearing, the evidence received at the hearing, and Plaintiff's filings in this case, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Background
1. On March 4, 2002, Plaintiff Barbara Tancredi filed the instant complaint alleging five counts against Defendants City of Philadelphia, Philadelphia Police Officer Yusef Cooper, and Louis Watson. The complaint contains the following counts: (1) civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Count I"); (2) assault and battery ("Count II"); (3) false arrest and imprisonment ("Count III"); (4) malicious prosecution ("Count IV"); and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("Count V").
2. On June 21, 2002, service of Summons and Complaint was executed upon Defendant Louis Watson by leaving copies at Mr. Watson's dwelling house with his sister, a person of suitable age and discretion. See Return of Service, Docket No. 5.
3. Defendant Watson failed to respond to the complaint. As a result, on July 30, 2002, the Clerk of Court entered a default on the record as to Defendant Watson.
4. On March 11, 2003, Plaintiff settled her claims against Defendants City of Philadelphia and Officer Cooper. See March 11, 2003 Order, Docket No. 15. In the Order dismissing the action as to these Defendants, Judge Lowell A. Reed, Jr., reiterated that the default remained in full force and effect as to Defendant Watson. Id.
5. Default having been entered against Defendant Watson, the Court held a hearing on damages on March 27, 2003. For the first time, Defendant Watson appeared at the hearing. As a result, the Court entered an Order (Docket No. 17) granting Defendant Watson 20 days to file a motion to open default or take other action in the case.
6. Defendant failed to take any action in this case during the 20-day period provided by the Court. Due to Defendant's failure to respond, the Court held a second damages hearing on May 30, 2003. Defendant Watson failed to appear at this hearing.
7. Default having been entered, the Court finds that Defendant Louis Watson is liable to Plaintiff for assault under Count II of the complaint, as discussed below.B. Plaintiff's Claims
1. Plaintiff is a resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Compl. at 2.
2. Defendant Watson is also a resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id.
3. In October of 1999, Plaintiff's husband passed away after a long illness. See May 30, 2003 Damages Hr'g Tr. at 5, line 19 ("Tr."). Shortly before Plaintiff's husband became ill, the Tancredis purchased two condominium apartments across the hall from their home at 241 So. 6th Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at p. 4, line 22 to p. 5, line 10.
4. Sometime before her husband's death, the Tancredis permitted Leighanne Tancredi, Plaintiff's step-daughter, to reside in the apartments across the hall from their home. Id. at p. 5, line 12-16. After her husband's death, Plaintiff decided to remodel the two apartments and sell them. At the time of the incident at issue in this case, Plaintiff owned all three apartments. Id.
5. At some point prior to March 7, 2000, Plaintiff removed Leighanne Tancredi's belongings from the apartment that she was occupying and placed those items in storage. Id. at p. 3, line 23 to p. 4, line 8. Construction on the vacant apartments began on or about March 1, 2000. See Pl's Pre-Trial Mem. at 2.
6. On March 7, 2000, Plaintiff, who is an attorney in Philadelphia, returned home from work to find Leighanne Tancredi, Louis Watson, and Philadelphia Police Officer Yusef Cooper waiting in her apartment building. See Tr. at p. 6 lines 9-13. Mr. Watson, who was Leighanne Tancredi's boyfriend, identified himself as an employee of the Office of the City Solicitor and displayed his identification badge. Id. at p. 8, line 22 to p. 9, line 1. Defendant Watson stated that Plaintiff had stolen Leighanne Tancredi's belongings from her apartment. Id. at p. 7, lines 5-7. A dispute between the parties ensued, resulting in Plaintiff's arrest. Id. at p. 9, line 9.
7. Plaintiff was handcuffed and removed from the building. Id. at p. 16, lines 4-8. She was taken to a Philadelphia Police holding facility and questioned. Id. at p. 16, lines 11-16. During her interview, she informed the interrogating officer that she was taking medication for depression and anxiety. Id. Subsequent to this interview, Plaintiff was transported to the Round House, a Philadelphia Police Department facility, for holding. Id. p. 17, lines 1-2. During her transportation to the Round House, Plaintiff was held in a police van for approximately 15 minutes. Id. at p. 17, lines 19-23. At this point, she suffered from an anxiety attack due to a lack of medication. Id. In total, Plaintiff was held for approximately 36 hours before being released. Id. at p. 18, line 25.C. Damages
1. Plaintiff incurred legal fees and costs of $7,500 for representation during a hearing at which the charges against Plaintiff were dropped. Id. at p. 19, lines 1-12.
2. Plaintiff paid $2,500 for an expungement of her criminal record. Id. at p. 20, lines 21-25.
3. As a result of the trauma suffered by Plaintiff, she was forced to increase the dosage of her anxiety and depression medication. Id. at p. 22, line 20 to p. 23, line 25. This resulted in additional costs of approximately $25 per month to Plaintiff for a period of 4 months. Id. Thus, Plaintiff paid an additional $100 for her medication over this period. Id.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Jurisdiction and Applicable Law1. The Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the remainder of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
2. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
3. The entry of default and default judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. Rule 55 provides, in pertinent part:
Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default.
Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1)By the Clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for that amount and costs against the defendant, if the defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2)By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. . . .
4. Upon determination by the Court that Defendant is in default, all factual allegations of the complaint other than those pertaining to the amount of damages are to be taken as true. Comdvne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.3d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990). Default, however, does not constitute an admission of liability or establish conclusions of law. Degen v. Bunce, No. Civ. A. 93-5674, 1995 WL 120483, at *2 (E.D. Pa. March 13, 1995). Accordingly, "even after default it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action.'" Id. (quoting 10 Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688).B. Liability of Defendant
1. Section 1983 is not, by its own terms, a source of substantive rights. Rather, it provides a remedy for deprivations of rights that are established elsewhere in the Constitution or the federal statutes. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694 n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a valid claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must plead that Defendant Watson, while acting under color of state law, deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995).
2. In Count I of the complaint, Plaintiff pleads that all Defendants acted or conspired under color of state law to deprive her of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. See Compl. at 5. Taking the facts in the complaint as proven, the Court finds, however, that Plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to state a claim that Defendant Watson acted under color of state law.
3. Defendant Watson, as a private citizen, is not an agent of the state. In certain circumstances, however, a private citizen, acting in conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a right, may be deemed a state actor for purposes of § 1983. See, e.g., Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998). Under § 1983, persons act under color of state law if: (1) they are state actors or (2) they exert "power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law.'" Id. at 146 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)). Thus, a defendant may be found to be a state actor when: (1) the defendant acts as a state official; (2) the defendant acts together with or receives significant aid from state officials; or (3) the defendant's conduct is chargeable to the state. Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999).
4. In the complaint, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant Watson identified himself as an employee of the Office of the City Solicitor. See Compl. at 2. Plaintiff also pleads that Defendant Watson "urged" Office Cooper on, resulting in Officer Cooper becoming verbally abusive with Plaintiff and arresting her for burglary and related offenses. See id. at 3. The Court finds that these facts are insufficient to support a finding of state action on the part of Defendant Watson. In Abbott, the Court found sufficient facts to support a claim of state action when the plaintiff was arrested "at the insistence and request of [the private citizen defendant]." 164 F.3d at 148. In contrast, in this case there are no facts supporting a conclusion that Defendant Watson insisted or requested that Plaintiff be arrested. Rather, the complaint shows that the arrest was a result of a confrontation between Officer Cooper and Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant Watson is liable to Plaintiff under § 1983.
5. Under Pennsylvania law, an assault occurs when "an actor intends to cause an imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive bodily contact." Sides v. Cleland, 648 A.2d 793, 796 (Pa.Super. 1994) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 21). In the complaint, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant Watson acted to put Plaintiff in fear of imminent physical contact by telling the police that she stole Leighanne Tancredi's belongings. Taking the facts in the complaint as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to state a claim for assault. Accordingly, Defendant Watson is liable to Plaintiff on Count II of the complaint.
6. Under Pennsylvania law, a claim for false arrest requires that the process used for arrest be facially void or that the issuing tribunal lack jurisdiction. Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 984-85 (Pa.Super. 1997). An allegation that the charges were unjustified is insufficient to support a claim of false arrest. Id. In Count III of the complaint, Plaintiff avers that "Watson and Cooper conspired to arrest and imprison [Plaintiff] without probable cause or other legal justification." Compl. at 7. Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege a defect in the process or lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court cannot find that Defendant Watson is liable to Plaintiff for false arrest under Count III of the complaint.
7. Under Pennsylvania law, to establish a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must plead "that the defendant 'instituted proceedings without probable cause, with malice, and that the proceedings were terminated in favor of the plaintiff.'" Strickland, 700 A.2d at 984 (quoting Cosmas v. Bloomingdales Bros., Inc., 660 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa.Super. 1995)). Taking the facts in the complaint as proven, the Court finds nothing in the complaint sufficient to state a claim that Defendant Watson acted to "institute proceedings" against Plaintiff. At most, the complaint reveals that Defendant Watson told Officer Cooper that Plaintiff stole Leighanne Tancredi's belongings. The decision to charge Plaintiff is too far removed from Defendant Watson's actions to state a valid claim for malicious prosecution. Accordingly, the Court cannot find Defend Watson liable for malicious prosecution as pled in Count IV of the complaint.
8. Under Pennsylvania law, a tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress lies where a person, whose acts constitute extreme or outrageous conduct, intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress on another person. Hunger v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173, 583 (Pa.Super. 1996) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46). Conduct is considered "extreme or outrageous" where the conduct "'goes beyond all bounds of decency, and [is] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Id. at 584 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 comment (d)).
9. Taking the facts in the complaint as proven, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Watson. Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff plead any facts indicating that Defendant Watson's conduct was extreme or outrageous as defined in the Restatement. Accordingly, the Court cannot find Defendant Watson liable under Count V of the complaint.C. Damages
1. The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $10,100 for: (1) costs incurred in defending herself from the charges brought against her and (2) increasing her medication as a result of the assault by Defendant Watson. See supra. Part I.C.
III. CONCLUSION
By entry of default, all factual allegations contained in the complaint, other than allegations related to damages, are taken as true. At a hearing to determine damages, Plaintiff introduced evidence regarding her claims. Because Plaintiff pled facts sufficient to state a claim for assault, Defendant Watson defaulted on this claim and is liable to Plaintiff for her damages resulting from this conduct.This Court's Final Judgment follows.
FINAL JUDGMENT
AND NOW, this 3rd day of September, 2003, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Default Damages Memorandum (Docket No. 21) and the testimony and evidence received at the Hearing on Damages on Default held on May 30, 2003, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Plaintiff Barbara Tancredi and against Defendant Louis Watson; AND
Plaintiff Barbara Tancredi is awarded damages in the amount of $10,100.00.