Opinion
Civil Action No. 2: 18-cv-1685
04-10-2019
QUINTEZ TALLEY, Plaintiff, v. PA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, et al, Defendants.
United States District Judge Nora Barry Fischer
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
Upon review of the Complaint, and pursuant to the screening requirements for litigants proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court recommends sua sponte dismissal of the Complaint before service as such claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is further recommended that leave to amend be denied as it would be futile for Plaintiff to amend his claims.
II. Report
A. Background
The factual scenario that forms the basis of the instant case arises from Defendants filing of Plaintiff's "confidential medical records" in Talley v. Gilmore, Civil Action No. 16-cv-1318 (the "Previous Case"). In the Previous Case, which is scheduled for trial on November 18, 2019, Plaintiff challenges Defendants' decision to have his mental health stability code changed from a "D-Code," meaning seriously mentally ill, to a "C-Code," meaning receiving treatment for mental health but not seriously mentally ill. Defendants' position is that Talley's mental health stability code was changed based on the clinical judgment of practitioners that he does not suffer from a serious mental illness. In support of their motions for summary judgment, Defendants relied upon, and filed with the Court, Talley's medical records, including his mental health treatment records.
In the Previous Case, the allegations of the Amended Complaint included conspiracy, and violations of the Eighth Amendment (deliberate indifference), First Amendment (retaliation) and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. As a result of the Court's ruling on Defendants' motions for summary judgment, all claims except his retaliation claim were dismissed.
In the instant lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
All of the herein named defendants have worked in concert to first rob / extort Plaintiff for property (confidential communication created in the course of psychotherapy) converted for their own use, while simultaneously making it available for public consumption (through PACER and purchase from any United States District Court in the NATION!), of which Plaintiff will receive no financial benefit! - nor have these defendants given Plaintiff ANY just compensation, either[.]Complaint at ¶ 56. He brings his federal claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a number of claims under state tort common laws. He seeks as relief the following: (1) "an injunction striking the excessively filed confidential communications between Plaintiff and licensed psychiatrist, psychologist, and clinical social workers filed in [the Previous Case]; in a way that it will cease being "public"; (2) compensatory damages of $1,000,000.00 against all the defendants; (3) punitive damages in the amount of $7,000.00 against each defendant for each state tort claim; and "Nine (9xs) of whatever the compensatory damage award is after trial as to Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims; (4) treble damages in connection with his RICO claim; (5) all costs and fines; and (6) any additional relief the Court or jury deems just, equitable, or proper."
Named in the complaint are nineteen defendants: The Department of Corrections ("DOC") and nine officers or employees of the DOC (collectively referred to as the "Commonwealth Defendants"); The Attorney General's Office, Bruce R. Beemer, the former the Attorney General; Timothy Mazzocca, Deputy Attorney General; Keli M. Neary, Chief Deputy Attorney General, the law firm of Matis, Baum, O'Connor, P.C., and attorney Cassidy L. Neal of that firm, Nurse Practitioner Amy Ankrom (who is represented by Attorney Neal in the Previous Case), and Dr. Lucas Malischak, the DOC Acting Director of Psychology. Service of process has not yet been made on defendants.
On March 4, 2019, the undersigned administratively closed the instant case finding that many of the claims are duplicative of (and/or touch upon) claims he is asserting in the Previous Case, which is ready for trial. The Court noted that Plaintiff named as defendants in this case the attorneys who are representing the defendants in the Previous Case. Given the substantial overlap of the claims and facts in the two cases, the undersigned determined that it would be in the best interests of the Court and parties to stay the instant case until after the trial in the Previous Case. (ECF No. 3).
On March 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the disposition of his retaliation claim in the Previous Case would have no bearing upon the claims in the instant case. (ECF No. 4). The Court granted Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 5), reopened the case, granted Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 6), and the Complaint thereafter was filed. (ECF No. 7). It is now the Court's statutory responsibility to review the Complaint before service to determine if it states a valid claim for relief.
B. Applicable Legal Principles
This Court has a statutory responsibility to review complaints filed by prisoners and by those who have been granted in forma pauperis to determine if the complaint states a valid claim for relief. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
Moreover, not only is a court permitted to sua sponte dismiss a complaint which fails to state a claim, but it is required to do so by the mandatory language of "the court shall dismiss" utilized by § 1915(e)(2). In performing a court's mandated function of sua sponte reviewing complaints under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A to determine if they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal district court applies the same standard as applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Powell v. Hoover, 956 F. Supp. 565, 568 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to claim dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
In reviewing complaints as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A and, consequently, utilizing the standards for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded, material allegations of fact in the complaint must be taken as true. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Because Plaintiff is pro se, the court will accord him an even more liberal reading of the complaint, employing less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
The question to be resolved is: whether, taking the factual allegations of the complaint, which are not contradicted by exhibits and matters of which judicial notice may be had, and taking all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those contradicted factual allegations of the complaint, are the "factual allegations . . . enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact[.]" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Or put another way, a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. Dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6), and hence, under the PLRA screening provisions, where the court determines that the contradicted facts alleged, taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, fail to state a claim as a matter of law. See., e.g., Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
C. Discussion
Plaintiff's claims in this lawsuit are based on the disclosure of his private medical information in the Previous Case. However, it is clear that Plaintiff waived his right to confidentiality in his medical records when he filed the Previous Case in which he challenges Defendants' decision to change his mental health stability code. See Caldwell v. Beard, 324 Fed. App'x 186, 188 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that an inmate waived his right to confidentiality in his medical records when he filed a grievance alleging that he had been injured). Disclosure of Plaintiff's medical records to the attorneys defending the Previous Case was a direct byproduct of Plaintiff's lawsuit.
E. Claims Arising Under State Law
Plaintiff states he also is bringing a number of state tort claims, i.e., conspiracy, legal malpractice, invasion of privacy, and intrinsic fraud / extrinsic fraud.
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized, "where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so." Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)) (emphasis in original). Here, it is recommended that all of Plaintiff's federal claims - that is, all claims over which the district court had original jurisdiction be dismissed. Considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness do not provide an affirmative justification for maintaining Talley's state law claims. Shaffer v. Bd. of Sch. Dir. of Albert Gallatin Area S.D., 730 F.2d 910, 912-13 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that "time already invested in litigating the state cause of action is an insufficient reason to sustain the exercise of pendent jurisdiction" and that "decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law"). As such, the Court recommends that Talley's state law claims be dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction. See Burnsworth v. PC Lab., 364 F. App'x 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming a district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims had been dismissed); Alexander v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 160 F. App'x 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (same).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to the screening provisions of the 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. It is further recommended that Plaintiff not be permitted to amend his complaint. The factual scenario upon which Plaintiff bases his claims does not provide any conceivable avenue of legal recourse.
Plaintiff is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections to this Report and Recommendation by April 29, 2019. Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe "will waive the right to appeal." Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
Chief United States Magistrate Judge Dated: April 10, 2019 cc: QUINTEZ TALLEY
KT 5091
SCI Fayette
48 Overlook Drive
LaBelle, PA 15450-0999