Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:17-cv-46
10-13-2017
MICHAEL SHANNON TALLEY, Plaintiff, v. GLYNN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER; et al., Defendants.
ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently housed at the Georgia Diagnostic & Classification State Prison in Jackson, Georgia, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain events which allegedly occurred in Brunswick, Georgia. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion. For these same reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint based on his failure to state a claim, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and CLOSE this case, and DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff maintains Defendant Mark Gordon with the Probation Division of the Georgia Department of Corrections submitted a petition for modification or revocation of his parole accusing Plaintiff of committing felonies. Plaintiff states Defendants Roger Lane and Anthony Harrison, both of whom are Glynn County Superior Court judges, signed the petition based on felony charges Plaintiff claims he did not commit. (Doc. 1-1, p.1.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts an unknown Assistant District Attorney knowingly used perjured testimony at some unspecified time, presumably from a Brunswick Police Department officer. (Id. at pp. 2, 3.) Plaintiff alleges unknown officers with the Glynn County Police Department arrested him without a warrant or probable cause. Plaintiff contends Sheriff Jump and Undersheriff Corbett illegally detained him at the Glynn County Detention Center.
Further, Plaintiff asserts Defendants Gunderson and Kidder failed to give him several medications, including medications he needs for his mental health condition. Additionally, Plaintiff avers Defendant Hall told him he would not receive "benzo's [sic]", even though he was warned he should never stop taking these medications because he could have seizures or other medical problems. (Id. at pp. 3-4.) Plaintiff also asserts Defendants Lowe and Heath allowed these violations to occur because these two Defendants did nothing to help Plaintiff after he filed grievances. (Id. at p. 2.) Plaintiff states "medical staff" at Glynn County Detention Center and Defendant Frazier placed him in isolation, in violation of policy. (Id. at p. 4.) Plaintiff further states Defendant Brooks began floating his medications because she said Plaintiff had been caught hoarding them.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks to: have all charges against him dismissed; have his record expunged; be released on his own recognizance; be compensated for the time he was falsely imprisoned and for being denied medications; receive money for the care of his daughter; change the law; have the parties who broke the law punished; and have probation abolished. (Id. at p. 5.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets, shows an inability to pay the filing fee, and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Court looks to the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without arguable merit either in law or fact.'" Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys[.]") (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").
DISCUSSION
I. Claims Against Sheriff Jump and Undersheriff Corbett
In order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him "of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was committed by "a person acting under color of state law." Id. Further, Section 1983 liability must be based on something more than a defendant's supervisory position or a theory of respondeat superior. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009); Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Emp't Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the alleged violations. Id. at 802. "To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege (1) the supervisor's personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the existence of a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed to prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct." Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App'x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011).
The principle that respondeat superior is not a cognizable theory of liability under Section 1983 holds true regardless of whether the entity sued is a state, municipality, or private corporation. Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Jump and Corbett liable solely based on their supervisory positions as Sheriff and Undersheriff of Glynn County, Georgia. However, Plaintiff fails to present any facts indicating there is a causal connection between any actions of Defendants Jump and Corbett and the alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. He does not allege that Defendants Jump and Corbett were personally involved in the conditions that he complains of or that the conditions resulted from some custom or policy Defendants Jump or Corbett promulgated or maintained. Plaintiff also fails to plausibly allege that Defendants Jump and Corbett directed the allegedly unlawful conditions or ignored a widespread history of abuse in this regard. In fact, Plaintiff fails to make even conclusory allegations that Defendants Jump and Corbett were aware of or were personally responsible for the alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Jump and Corbett.
II. Judicial Immunity
Judicial immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Lane and Harrison. Congress did not abrogate the doctrine of judicial immunity when it enacted Section 1983. Judicial immunity is an absolute immunity, and it applies even when a judge acts maliciously. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction."); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (holding judicial immunity doctrine applies in Section 1983 actions). Absolute immunity not only protects against liability but also against a case going to trial at all. Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 914 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). To determine whether a judge is entitled to absolute immunity from money damages under Section 1983, a two-part test was established in Stump: 1) whether the judge dealt with the plaintiff in a judicial capacity; and 2) whether the judge acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 357). The second prong of this test is "only satisfied if a judge completely lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 916.
Plaintiff clearly complains about the actions or omissions of Defendants Lane and Harrison in their capacities as judicial officials in cases that were pending before them in which Plaintiff was a named party. Nevertheless, he fails to make a plausible claim that these Defendants acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants Lane and Harrison based on judicial immunity principles.
III. Claims Against Glynn County Detention Center
In order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him "of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was committed by "a person acting under color of state law." Id. While local governments qualify as "persons" under Section 1983, local police departments and penal institutions are generally not considered legal entities subject to suit. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Sheriff's departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit[.]") (citations omitted); Williams v. Chatham Cty. Sherriff's Complex, Case No. 4:07-cv-68, 2007 WL 2345243 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2007) ("The county jail, however, has no independent legal identity and therefore is not an entity that is subject to suit under Section 1983."); Shelby v. Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing the Atlanta Police Department for not being a proper Section 1983 defendant). Consequently, the Glynn County Detention Center is not a viable Defendant in Plaintiff's Section 1983 action. Therefore, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Glynn County Detention Center because it is not a proper party Defendant in a Section 1983 action.
IV. Denial of Grievances
"An allegation that prison officials denied grievances does not 'support a finding of constitutional violations on the part of' those defendants." Gresham v. Lewis, No. 6:15-CV-86, 2016 WL 164317, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2016) (citing Bennett v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., No. 4:12CV32-MP/CAS, 2012 WL 4760856, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:12-CV-00032-MP-CAS, 2012 WL 4760797 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2012) (quoting Raske v. Dugger, 819 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 (M.D. Fla. 1993)); see also Ludy v. Nelson, No. 5:14-CV-73-MTT-CHW, 2014 WL 2003017, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:14-CV-73 MTT, 2014 WL 2003096 (M.D. Ga. May 15, 2014) ("However, the mere fact that a prison official denies a grievance is insufficient to impose liability under § 1983.") (citing Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009), and Baker v. Rexroad, 159 F. App'x 61, 62 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Lowe and Heath denied or failed to provide any assistance to him after he filed grievances regarding the conditions of his confinement. As stated above, the denial of grievances is an insufficient basis for liability under Section 1983. Thus, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Lowe and Heath. V. Dismissal Pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint center around his criminal proceedings in Glynn County, Georgia. It appears from the docket of this case that Plaintiff has been convicted of the charges levied against him; however, Plaintiff makes no indication whether that conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, or otherwise overturned. (Doc. 1.) Consequently, this Court is precluded from reviewing his claims by the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, a state prisoner filed a Section 1983 damages action against the prosecutors and investigator in his criminal case for their actions which resulted in his conviction. The United States Supreme Court analogized the plaintiff's claim to a common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution, which requires as an element of the claim that the prior criminal proceeding was terminated in favor of the accused. 512 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court reasoned:
We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it had always applied to actions for malicious prosecution (footnote omitted).Id. at 486-87 (emphasis added).
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, (footnote omitted), a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Under Heck, a plaintiff who is attempting "to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," must make a showing that his conviction, sentence, or other criminal judgment was reversed, expunged, declared invalid by an appropriate state tribunal, or called into question in a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. If a plaintiff fails to make this showing, then he cannot bring an action under Section 1983. Id. at 489. Furthermore, to the extent a plaintiff contends that a favorable ruling on his claims would not invalidate his conviction, sentence, confinement, or other criminal judgment, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove this contention in order for his claims to proceed. Id. at 487. Although Heck involved a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages, Heck's holding has been extended to claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief as well as money damages. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005); Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) ("[W]e hold today that when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.").
As relief, Plaintiff seeks to: have all charges against him dismissed; have his record expunged; be released on his own recognizance; be compensated for the time he was falsely imprisoned and for being denied medications; receive money for the care of his daughter; change the law; have the parties who broke the law punished; and have probation abolished. (Doc. 1, p. 5.)
"Under this standard, it is not unusual for a § 1983 claim to be dismissed for failure to satisfy Heck's favorable termination requirement." Desravines v. Fla. Dep't of Fin. Servs., No. 6:11-CV-235-ORL-22, 2011 WL 2292180, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2011), report and recommendation adopted by No. 6:11-CV-235-ORL-22, 2011 WL 2222170 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2011) (citing Gray v. Kinsey, No. 3:09-cv-324/LC/MD, 2009 WL 2634205, at *9 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2009) (finding plaintiff's claims barred by Heck's favorable termination requirement where plaintiff sought invalidation of his traffic conviction but failed to appeal the conviction in state court)); Domotor v. Wennet, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2009) ("allowing the plaintiff to circumvent applicable state procedures and collaterally attack her convictions in federal court is the precise situation that Heck seeks to preclude" because the plaintiff entered into a plea agreement with knowledge of substantially all of the allegations that now form the basis of a Section 1983 action for damages); St. Germain v. Isenhower, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding plaintiff's convictions for the lesser-included offenses of false imprisonment and misdemeanor battery did not constitute a favorable termination and thus plaintiff's § 1983 action was precluded by Heck ); see also Cooper v. Georgia, No. CV413-091, 2013 WL 2253214, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 22, 2013), report and recommendation adopted by No. CV413-091, 2013 WL 2660046 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2013); Brown v. Renfroe, No. CV210-003, 2011 WL 902197, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2011), report and recommendation adopted by No. CV210-003, 2011 WL 892359 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2011), aff'd sub nom., Brown v. Coleman, 439 F. App'x 794 (11th Cir. 2011).
In this case, Plaintiff has not shown that his underlying conviction or his sentence has been favorably terminated. Instead, Plaintiff seeks his release from confinement and monetary compensation. Accordingly, the Heck decision unquestionably precludes Plaintiff's claims.
Even if Plaintiff is not challenging a conviction, he is at least challenging his post-arrest confinement. However, Heck is not only limited to claims challenging the validity of criminal convictions. It also applies to detentions absent convictions. See Cohen v. Clemens, 321 F. App'x 739, 741 (10th Cir. 2009) (In the immigration context, "Heck bar[red the plaintiff's] claims for damages because success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] detention."); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U .S. 641 (1997) (applying Heck to a Section 1983 claim challenging procedures used to deprive a prison inmate of good time credits); Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to a Section 1983 claim challenging civil commitment under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Heck to a Section 1983 claim challenging the coercive nature of a pretrial detainee's confinement prior to giving a statement regarding pending charges).
Additional grounds support dismissal of Plaintiff's putative Section 1983 claims. Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court is without jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, which essentially seek review of state-court criminal proceedings decided against him. "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and provides that, as a general matter, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision." McCorvey v. Weaver, 620 F. App'x 881, 882 (11th Cir. 2015). Nor under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may a federal court "decide federal issues that are raised in state proceedings and 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court's judgment." See Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 253 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1988)). "Rooker-Feldman applies because, among the federal courts, Congress authorized only the Supreme Court to reverse or modify a state court decision." Helton v. Ramsay, 566 F. App'x 876, 877 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Because Plaintiff, through this Section 1983 action, essentially asks this Court to invalidate the conviction on which he was paroled and the criminal charges against him in Glynn County, Georgia, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims.
For these reasons, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's non-conditions of confinement claims in their entirety.
VI. Plaintiff's Unrelated Claims
In addition to his contentions regarding his criminal proceedings, Plaintiff levies claims relating to the conditions of his confinement at the Glynn County Detention Center, particularly allegations concerning his medical needs. (Doc. 1.) However, the allegations Plaintiff sets forth in his Complaint are not related to each other. A plaintiff may not join claims and various defendants in one action unless the claims "arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). Accordingly, because Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are not related to his contentions regarding his criminal proceedings, the Court should DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims. VII. Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in the Court's order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal is not taken in good faith "before or after the notice of appeal is filed").
A certificate of appealability is not required in this Section 1983 action.
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is "without arguable merit either in law or fact." Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff's action, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2.) I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS in part Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim and DISMISS without prejudice his conditions of confinement claims. I also RECOMMEND the Court DIRECT the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and CLOSE this case and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 13th day of October, 2017.
/s/_________
R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA