Opinion
1:24-CV-00122-RAL
07-02-2024
CHARLES TALBERT, Plaintiff v. RANDY IRVIN, et al, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MOTION FOR HEARING
ECF NOS. 5, 8, 9, 17, 18 AND 19
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs Motions for Temporary Restraining Order [ECF Nos. 5, 8, 9, 17, and 18] and Motion for Hearing [ECF No. 19] each be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Background
In his underlying complaint, Charles Talbert, an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI Forest), generally alleges that officials SCI Forest have violated his constitutional rights by depriving him of adequate health care and ventilation and failing to protect him from abuse. See, generally, ECF No. 1-2. Specifically, Talbert maintains that, while incarcerated in the Restricted Housing Unit, Defendants refused to provide treatment for his mental and physical ailments and allowed a guard, D' Angelo, to sexually harass him. Id. He also complains that his cell is too cold in the winter and that the ventilation ducts have not been cleaned. Id.
B. Standard
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed under the same standard. The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court should issue the injunction only if the movant produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians, 920 F.2d at 192 (citing ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances." American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). The facts clearly must support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a "clear showing of irreparable injury." Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent a showing of immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny preliminary injunctive relief.
Moreover, because the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to prevent irreparable injury pending the resolution of the underlying claims on their merits, “the injury claimed in the motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct alleged and permanent relief sought in the plaintiffs complaint.” James v. Varano, 2017 WL 895569, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017). In other words, “there must be a connection between the underlying complaint and the relief requested in the motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id. (citing Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010)). A district court "should not issue an injunction when the injunction in question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.” Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41,43 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)).
Finally, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate 'in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiffs confinement simply because they are “in court” . . Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
C. Analysis
In the instant case, Plaintiff has filed five separate motions for temporary injunctive relief, none of which relate to the underlying claims in his complaint. In his first motion [ECF No. 5], he avers that Defendants have retaliated against him in numerous ways for filing the instant lawsuit including interfering with his mail, spraying him with pepper spray, depriving him of a meal, and verbally threatening him. In his second motion [ECF No. 8], he simply asks the Court to grant him injunctive relief in this lawsuit without specifying the relief that he is seeking. His third motion [ECF No. 9] requests a “writ of mandamus” compelling Defendants “to stop engaging in and/or promoting violence against people of color with the use of Federal dollars.” Finally, his fourth and fifth motions [ECF Nos. 17 and 18] assert further claims of retaliation based on the instant lawsuit, including mail tampering, urine-soaked meals, and a refusal to monitor his safety during a “hunger strike.”
Critically, none of the factual allegations in Plaintiffs motions for injunctive relief bear any relationship to his underlying claims. Because the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to prevent irreparable injury pending the resolution of the underlying claims on their merits, "the injury claimed in the motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct alleged and permanent relief sought in the plaintiffs complaint.” James, 2017 WL 895569, at *3. In other words, “there must be a connection between the underlying complaint and the relief requested in the motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id. (citing Ball, 396 Fed.Appx. at 837). This is not an arbitrary distinction or a technicality; rather, the Court completely “lacks jurisdiction over claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief' that are “unrelated to the underlying complaint.” Stewart v. Verano, 2015 WL 1636124, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2015) (citing Raupp v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2006 WL 3332089, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2006)).
Because the injunctive relief requested in Plaintiffs motions is wholly disconnected from the underlying claims in the complaint, injunctive relief is plainly inappropriate. Ball, 396 Fed.Appx. at 837; Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of injunction where plaintiffs' alleged harm was "insufficiently related to the complaint and [did] not deserve the benefits of protective measures that a preliminary injunction afford”); Stewart, 2015 WL 1636124, at *2 (“In sum, a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief where those matters are wholly unrelated to the underlying complaint.”). If Plaintiff wishes to pursue claims based on these unrelated matters, he must do so by filing a separate civil action against the appropriate defendants.
III. Conclusion
For each of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs requests for a temporary restraining order [ECF Nos. 5, 8, 9, 17 and 18] be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).