Opinion
1:23-CV-260-SPB-RAL
04-11-2024
CHARLES TALBERT, Plaintiff v. PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN, et al, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS [ECF NOS. 60, 63, 65, 71] AND PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION/TRO [ECF NOS. 10, 18, 47, 49, 69] MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Joe Biden, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of Treasury, United States [ECF No. 60, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [ECF No. 63], the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association and John Eckenrode [ECF No. 65], and Wellpath [ECF No. 72] each be granted. It is further recommended that Plaintiff Charles Talbert's Motions for Preliminary Injunction/TRO [ECF Nos. 10, 18, 47, 49, 69] be denied. Finally, it is recommended that Plaintiff be provided an opportunity to file an amended complaint.
II. Report
A. Background
The following factual averments must be accepted as true at this stage in the proceedings. Plaintiff Charles Talbert, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), initiated this action by fding a pro se complaint and paying the fding fee. ECF Nos. 6-7. In his pleading, Talbert alleges that he is heterosexual, a practicing Muslim, and suffers from a gastrointestinal (GI) tract disability and various mental health disorders. ECF No. 7 ¶¶ 58. He generally avers that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections has failed to provide necessary surgery and dietary accommodations for injuries that he sustained to his intestines after being shot in the abdomen. Id. ¶ 61. Asa result, he experiences frequent diarrhea and suffers from nutritional deficiencies. Id. ¶ 61-62.
On January 13, 2020, after striking another inmate, unidentified individuals ordered Talbert to be placed into solitary confinement for 45 days. Id. ¶ 68. Due to the conditions that he has experienced in solitary confinement, his mental health has deteriorated to the point where he has become impulsive and aggressive, resulting in his continued placement in disciplinary segregation. Id. ¶ 69.
Between January 2020 and September 2023, several “gay and/or bisexual” corrections officers “made numerous sexual requests, threats, and statements towards Plaintiff, resulting in him filing a [Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA)] complaint each time.” Id. ¶ 70. The officers also made him strip naked before leaving his cell “for the sole reason of sexual pleasure.” Id. ¶¶ 72-731. Talbert also witnessed other inmates beiig groped or attacked. Id. ¶ 74. He maintains that, instead of enacting protective measures in response to his PREA complaint, he experienced retaliation in the form of destroyed property, restricted food and shower privileges, and “disrespect[] because of him not being gay or bi-sexual.” Id. ¶ 71. Talbert does not identify any of the officials or officers responsible for this alleged misconduct.
Finally, Talbert complains that “the state and DOC denied [him] Halal meat and Halal animal by-products during mealtime, forcing him to violate his religious dietary requirement.” Id. ¶ 77. Talbert specifically avers that a non-Defendant, Uli Klemm, denied him a religious accommodation for his dietary restrictions and refused to allow him to participate in religious feasts. Id.¶¶ 78-79.
Rather than identify and sue any of the individuals directly responsible for the alleged misconduct, Talbert instead elected to sue a host of state and federal agencies and officials. Invoking the Spending Clause of the United States Constitution, Talbert alleges that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Josh Shapiro, the Office of Administration, Office of Planning and Policy, Office of the State Inspector General, Office of Homeland Security, Office of the Budget, Department of Human Services, Department of Health, and Department of Corrections (collectively, the “Commonwealth Defendants”) “received federal financial assistance for their program and activities, to which they have failed to carry out, to which caused, and still causes, the Plaintiff detriment to his health, safety, and general well-being.” ECF No. 7 at 24. He raises similar claims against two private corporations, Centurion and Wellpath (collectively, the “Corporate Defendants”), each of whom contracted with the DOC to provide health care to inmates at SCI-Forest. Id. at 25. Finally, he seeks mandamus relief pursuant to “28 U.S.C. Section 1331, the Accardi doctrine, and 5 U.S.C. Section 7J2” against United States President Joe Biden, the Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of Treasury, and the United States (collectively, the “Federal Defendants”) for failing to “comply with their own rules, statutes, and policies.” Id
Talbert has also sued the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association and its president, John Eckenrode, as well as the United Nations. He has not cited a basis for jurisdiction or alleged any misconduct on the part of any of these entities. Each should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
By way of relief, Talbert seeks an order compelling the Federal Defendants “to comply with their own rules, statutes, and policies, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, the Accardi doctrine, and 5 U.S.C. Section 702.” Id. ¶ 113. He seeks monetary damages against the Commonwealth Defendants and Wellpath based on alleged violations of the “Spending Clause.” Id. ¶ 108.
Each group of Defendants has filed a motion to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 60, 63, 65, 71. Talbert has filed a response to each motion. See ECF Nos. 77-78. These matters are ripe for disposition.
The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
B. Standards of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally consider[s] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig, 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957)).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way, in assessing a motion to dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations contained in the pleading at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969). Despite this leniency, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996)).
To the extent that any defendant has not yet moved to dismiss, the Court recommends dismissal of the claims against those defendants for the same reasons set forth herein based on the screening authority provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2).
C. Analysis
1. Spending clause claims
As the basis for his claims against the Commonwealth and Corporate Defendant groups, Talbert cites the Spending Clause of the United State Constitution. That clause invests Congress with the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States . ..”. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. When Congress enacts legislation pursuant to its spending power, “it may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds and essentially create a contract between the federal government and the State recipient.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2012). Those statutes may, as a condition of the funding, “subject the grant recipient to liability in a private cause of action.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Examples include 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and Title VII. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (“Congress has passed a number of statutes prohibiting recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating based on certain protected characteristics. We have held that these statutes may be enforced through implied rights of action, and that private plaintiffs may secure injunctive or monetary relief in such suits.”). However, the Court cannot locate any authority -and Talbert has not cited any - to support the proposition that the Spending Clause gives rise to a private enforcement action on its own. To the contrary, it is well-established that “the spending power cannot be used to subject individual defendants, such as state employees, to individual liability in a private cause of action.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271-75 (11thCir. 2007)). Rather, “[i]n legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
Because Talbert has not invoked any statutory source for his “Spending Clause” claims, those claims are subject to dismissal. However, Talbert should be granted leave to amend his complaint to reassert his claims, if warranted, under an appropriate statute.
2. Mandamus claim
Talbert next seeks mandamus relief against the Federal Defendants in the form of an order directing them to “comply with their own rules, statutes, and policies.” Mandamus relief is only available “in extraordinary circumstances.” In re Baldwin, 700 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 2012). To qualify for mandamus, “a litigant must satisfy three requirements that courts have characterized as jurisdictional: (1) a clear and indisputable right to relief, (2) that the government agency or official is violating a clear duty to act, and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy exists.” Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Sec'y United States Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 2 F.4th 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing source omitted). Even if these requirements are met, the issuance of the writ is still merely discretionary with the court. Id.
Talbert's request fails on several levels. Initially, he has failed to identify any “clear nondiscretionary duty” owed to him by any of the Federal Defendants. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984). His conclusory allegation that he complained to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and that the DOJ “failed to investigate his claims” is insufficient to satisfy this standard. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has repeatedly noted, “[i]nitiation of a criminal investigation is a discretionary act and thus not the proper subject of a mandamus request.” In re D'Amario, 570 Fed.Appx. Ill. 111 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2014); Bullard v. Bureau of Unemployment and Allowances, 516 Fed.Appx. Ill. 113 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Department of Justice's decision to prosecute is purely discretionary, so mandamus relief was not available to compel the investigation or prosecution that [plaintiff] requested.”). In the absence of a clearly nondiscretionary duty, mandamus is inappropriate. See, e.g., In re Powell, 802 Fed.Appx. 731, 732 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[I]t does not appear that mandamus relief would be warranted, as Powell has not shown that the Government ‘owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.'” (quoting Heckler, 466 U.S. at 616)).
Nor can Talbert establish that no adequate alternative remedy exists. His allegations of cruel and unusual punishment, inadequate medical care, and religious discrimination can be litigated and remedied through an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and statutes such as the RLUIPA and ADA. The availability of those remedies precludes Talbert from seeking the same relief through a mandamus action. Brown v. Ebbert, 2013 WL 2245142, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2013) (holding that, because plaintiff could obtain relief for his cruel and unusual punishment claims by fding a civil rights action, “a writ of mandamus is not appropriate”); Lam v. Hufford, 2012 WL 760595, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2012) (noting that “federal courts have rarely found that a writ of mandamus is the proper legal prescription for dictating to prison officials the manner in which they should provide services or care to inmates”).
For each of these reasons, Talbert's mandamus claim against the Federal Defendants should be dismissed. Those defendants should be dismissed from this action, with prejudice.
3. Injunctive relief
In conjunction with his pleading, Talbert has filed five separate (but largely duplicative) motions for preliminary injunctive relief. See ECF Nos. 10, 18, 47, 49 and 69. To obtain the “extraordinary remedy” of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that [he] will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). An injunction should only issue if the movant produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing source omitted). Thus, the plaintiffs failure to demonstrate either a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm precludes injunctive relief. Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989).
As noted above, Talbert's claims, as originally pled, fail to state a viable claim for relief. Because he cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits on an of his claims, each of his motions for injunctive relief should be denied.
4. Leave to amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). This instruction is equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
In this case, Talbert recently submitted a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and a proposed amended pleading. ECF No. 82. A review of that document indicates that Talbert has failed to correct the deficiencies identified in this Report. Nevertheless, because it is not clear that amendment would be futile, it is recommended that Talbert be granted leave to file another amended complaint as to certain of his claims within a specified time following dismissal. Talbert is advised to pay careful attention to the legal determinations set forth in this Report and is reminded that an amended complaint “must be complete in all respects. It is a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed.” Williams v. Ferdarko, 2018 WL 3653272, at *1 n. 1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1992)).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that each of Defendants' motions be granted. Specifically:
1) The motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Joe Biden, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of Treasury, and the United States [ECF No. 60] should be GRANTED. Because Talbert's mandamus claim is legally frivolous, leave to amend should be denied as to these Defendants. Defendants Joe Biden, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of Treasury, and the United States should be dismissed from this action, with prejudice.
2) The motion to dismiss filed by John Eckenrode and the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association [ECF No. 65] should be GRANTED. These Defendants should be dismissed from this action, with prejudice.
3) The motion to dismiss filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [ECF No. 63] should be GRANTED. Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity would bar any claims against the Commonwealth and its agencies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Talbert's proposed amendment [ECF No. 82] suggests that he may wish to pursue a claim pursuant to other statutes such as the RLUIPA, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act. Because it is unclear at this stage whether such claims would be legally frivolous, leave to amend should be granted as to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
4) The motion to dismiss filed by Wellpath [ECF No. 71] should be GRANTED. However, Talbert should be granted leave to amend his claims for inadequate medical care against Wellpath and Centurion.
5) For the foregoing reasons, Talbert's Complaint [ECF No. 7] should be DISMISSED. Talbert should be granted leave to file an amended complaint within a reasonable time following adoption of this Report.
6) Talbert's motions for preliminary injunctive relief [ECF Nos. 10, 18, 47, 49 and 69] should be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).