Opinion
Docket No. 013481-2011 Docket No. 013495-2011
03-30-2015
Re: T. Zander & Sons, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Township of Fairfield
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
Howard D. Melnicove, Esq.
39 Franklin Street
Bridgeton, New Jersey 08302
Douglas E. Burry, Esq.
Law Offices of Saponaro & Sitzler
The Newbold House
27 Cedar Street
Mount Holly, New Jersey 08060
Dear Counsel:
This letter constitutes the court's opinion after trial in the above-referenced matters. Plaintiff challenges the assessments on four parcels of vacant land for tax year 2011. For the reasons explained more fully below, the assessments are reduced.
I. Findings of Fact and Procedural History
This letter opinion sets forth the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law after trial. R. 1:7-4.
Plaintiff T. Zander & Sons, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan is the owner of four parcels of vacant land in defendant Fairfield Township, Cumberland County. The first parcel is designated in the records of the township as Block 55, Lot 25 and has no official street address. The property is 543.12 acres, part of which is adjacent to Seabreeze Road. For tax year 2011, the parcel was assessed as follows:
| Land | $543,100 |
| Improvements | $ 00 |
| Total | $543,100 |
The second parcel is designated in the records of the municipality as Block 55, Lot 51. This parcel also does not have an official street address. It constitutes 884.26 acres along the Cohansey River. For tax year 2011, the parcel was assessed as follows:
| Land | $884,300 |
| Improvements | $ 00 |
| Total | $884,300 |
The third parcel is designated in the records of the municipality as Block 55, Lot 51.01. This parcel of 26.84 acres does not have an official street address. It is known as Gum Point. For tax year 2011, the parcel was assessed as follows:
| Land | $ 26,800 |
| Improvements | $ 00 |
| Total | $ 26,800 |
The fourth parcel is designated in the records of the municipality as Block 55, Lot 55. Like the other lots, this 53.9-acre parcel does not have an official street address. It is also known as Gum Point. For tax year 2011, the parcel was assessed as follows:
| Land | $ 53,900 |
| Improvements | $ 00 |
| Total | $ 53,900 |
Three of the parcels are contiguous. The remaining parcel is in close proximity to the others. For purposes of this opinion, the four parcels will be referred to collectively as "the property" and "the subject property."
Because Fairfield Township implemented a municipality-wide revaluation for tax year 2011, the ratio for the township is 100%. The assessments, therefore, reflect the tax assessor's opinion of the true market value of the parcels as of October 1, 2010.
The parcels are vast areas of remote tidal marshes along the Delaware Bay in the southern reaches of the State. There are no improvements on the property. Twice a day at high tide the property fills with brackish water from the Bay, flooding the salt-water vegetation that covers the land. At high tide, the water is twelve to fifteen feet deep throughout the property, requiring navigation by boat. At low tide, also twice a day, the water recedes, but not entirely. Although the vegetation that covers the property is revealed, it is still necessary at low tide to wear hip boots to walk the property. There are no freshwater wetlands on the property. Given the parcels' proximity to the Delaware Bay, the water that floods the property is influenced by salt water. Photographs admitted into evidence depict with clarity the property's natural, undisturbed beauty.
At one point, a narrow gravel road extends approximately 2,000 feet into the property from an adjoining roadway, allowing for limited access by vehicle. The road is at or slightly above water level. The marshlands are immediately adjacent to the roadway. Nearly all of the property cannot be accessed by vehicle. The parcels have no access to utilities.
The property is in the Fairfield Township flood plain district. Permitted uses are pasture, grazing land, agriculture, recreational uses not requiring closed structures or storage facilities, game farms, fish hatcheries, hunting or fishing preserves, woodland preserves, wildlife sanctuaries, and arboretums. No evidence was introduced at trial that any of the permitted uses offer the reasonable prospect of an economically productive exploitation of the property. The parties agree that development of the property is not feasible and that it will in all probability remain in its natural state.
A portion of the property is wooded and qualifies for farmland assessment under an approved forestry management program. The assessment on the farmland is not before the court.
The parties concur that the highest and best use of the property is for passive recreational use, such as hunting, for conservation purposes, or for purchase to dedicate as open space to mitigate the disturbance of wetlands elsewhere. The parties also agree that the market for tidal marshlands is not active, requiring an examination of sales over an extended period. The property's history corroborates the parties' agreement on this point.
Plaintiff is the profit sharing plan of T. Zander & Sons, Inc., a company which collects wild animal furs throughout the United States and Canada for export overseas. Prior to the purchase of the parcels, the two principals of T. Zander & Sons, Inc. acted as caretakers of the property, which was then held in trust by a different owner. During the caretaker period, the property was used for recreational muskrat hunting. The property has never been used for the commercial purposes of T. Zander & Sons, Inc. or its principals. Ultimately, the principals obtained title to the property in the name of T. Zander & Sons, Inc. The company thereafter transferred title to the property to its profit sharing plan for nominal consideration. The property has been put to limited use during plaintiff's ownership.
In 2001, plaintiff sold land which was once part of the property the Francis Corporation, an agent of PSE&G, to be dedicated as open space to mitigate the power company's disturbance of wildlife as a result of its operation of a nuclear power plant elsewhere in the State. This sale was part of a limited period of significant activity in the land conservation market resulting from PSE&G's need to acquire land to avoid constructing a new cooling tower to mitigate the power plant's impact on wildlife.
After the sale to PSE&G's agent, plaintiff attempted to sell the remainder of the property. The property was advertised for sale in Ducks Unlimited, a magazine for duck hunting enthusiasts, Field and Stream magazine, The Lancaster Farm News, and on Craigslist. Plaintiff's efforts to secure the services of a real estate broker to market the property were unsuccessful.
In addition, credible evidence at trial established that government agencies and organizations dedicated to land conservation periodically purchase large tracks of marshland for conservation purposes. These sales generally are financed by government bonds and, to a smaller extent, private donations. In the years leading up to the relevant valuation date, land preservation has not been a priority in the State's financial affairs. The relative absence of government funding, along with the general negative impact on real estate transactions of all type occasioned by poor economic conditions beginning in late 2008, depressed the market for land conservation sales in New Jersey.
In the years since plaintiff sold land to PSE&G's agent, the parcels were marketed to various organizations, including the State's Green Acres program, The Natural Land Trust, and The Nature Conservancy, for conservation. Plaintiff's marketing efforts were unsuccessful.
In 2011, plaintiff filed Petitions of Appeal with the Cumberland County Board of Taxation challenging the assessments set on the property during the municipality-wide revaluation for tax year 2011.
On June 24, 2011, after a hearing, the Cumberland County Board of Taxation issued Judgments affirming the assessments.
On August 1, 2011, plaintiff filed two Complaints in this court challenging the county board's Judgments. The municipality did not file counterclaims. At the request of the parties, the two Complaints were consolidated for purposes of trial and this opinion.
Plaintiff filed two Complaints because, as noted above, one parcel, although in common ownership with the other three parcels, is not contiguous with those lots. See R. 8:3-5(a)(2) (allowing parcels contiguous and in common ownership to be included as separate counts in a single Complaint).
Each party presented expert testimony of a certified real estate appraiser. The experts agreed that the most credible method of determining the true market value of the subject property is through use of the comparable sales approach.
Plaintiff's appraiser relied on forty-three sales of vacant land in Cumberland and Salem County which he deemed credible evidence of the value of the subject property. The expert restricted his search for comparable sales to sales of tidal marshes, excluding properties with freshwater wetlands. He was of the view that property with freshwater wetlands sells for a higher per acre value than does property with tidal marshes, even though both of these environmental conditions restrict or eliminate the development potential of land. He did not offer market evidence to support this assertion. In addition, the expert did not consider sales in neighboring Cape May County. He offered the opinion that Cape May County is economically superior to Cumberland County. According to the expert, the difference in economic conditions is reflected in land values, even for land with no development potential. He did not offer market evidence to support this opinion.
The sales on which plaintiff's expert relied cover the period 1995 to 2010. The expert grouped the sales in two categories: (1) sales to government entities and private organizations for land conservation purposes; and (2) sales between private parties. He credibly testified that sales to government entities and land conservancy organizations were reliable because, although those sales may not have been exposed to the market, the purchasers are sophisticated market participants who routinely obtain real estate appraisals before purchasing land. He corroborated this observation with testimony recounting his experience being retained to provide appraisal reports for land conservation purchases by government entities and organizations.
With respect to the private sales, the expert testified that such transactions often are not exposed to the marketplace, given the limited utility of tidal marshland. He testified that private transactions involving this type of property generally are initiated by an interested purchaser - an hunting enthusiast or a corporation interested in obtaining land to mitigate its disturbance of wetlands elsewhere - approaching a property owner with an expression of interest and an offer. The expert provided vague testimony with respect to whether he verified the private sales on which he relied as arms' length transactions and did not satisfactorily explain why he considered the sales to be credible evidence of value.
The expert made no adjustments to the sales prices of his comparable sales. He determined an average per acre sales price and a median per acre sales price for each category of sales. For land conservation sales, he calculated an average sales price of $490 per acre and a median sales price of $470 per acre. For private sales, he calculated an average sales prices of $329 per acre and a median sales prices of $302 per acre.
The expert testified at trial that he gave greater weight to the comparable sales between private parties when reaching an opinion of value because of the slowdown in land conservation sales after 2004. The expert's written report, however, states that he reached an opinion of value after "[g]iving equal emphasis to the sales between private entities and to the sales to land conservancies and considering the property's size and the possibility that land conservancies would be seriously interested in its acquisition . . ." This apparent discrepancy was not explored at length during trial.
The expert concluded that the subject property would sell for no less than $350 per acre and no more than $450 per acre. He ultimately opined a true market value of $375 per acre as of October 1, 2010. Applying this opinion to the stipulated acreage of the subject parcels, the expert concluded the following true market values:
| Lot 55, Block 25 | $204,000 | (543.12 x $375 = $203,670) |
| Lot 55, Block 51 | (884.26 x $375 = $331,598) | |
| Lot 55, Block 51.01 | $ 10,000 | ( 26.84 x $375 = $ 10,065) |
| Lot 55, Block 55 | $ 20,000 | ( 53.90 x $375 = $ 20,213) |
This amount is based on the acreage stipulated by the parties on the eve of trial and differs from the opinion stated in the written report of plaintiff's expert.
Defendant's appraisal expert, on the other hand, searched for comparable sales of vacant land in Cumberland, Gloucester, Cape May, and Atlantic Counties. Unlike plaintiff's expert, defendant's expert did not limit his search to sales of tidal marshlands. He included in his search sales of any type of soil that is frequently flooded and which had no or limited utility apart from passive recreation and conservation. His search, therefore, included parcels with freshwater wetlands. In addition, the expert relied only on sales which he opined were exposed to the market. This included private sales of property advertised publically for sale, and purchases by a government entity or land conservancy organization for conservation purposes, even if the property was not publically offered for sales. The expert considered the latter category of sales to be credible evidence of value because government entities and conservation organization are sophisticated buyers who likely would have obtained appraisals to support each purchase.
The expert's search resulted in seven comparable sales he considered to be credible evidence of the true market value of the subject property. One sale was to a government agency and one sale was to a private organization for conservancy purposes. The remaining five sales were private transactions. The sales took place in the period 2007 through 2013 and had unadjusted sales prices ranging from $414 per acre to $1,840 per acre.
The expert made several adjustments to the comparable sales prices. He adjusted the sales prices to account for market conditions. He offered the opinion that while this type of property will act differently from the rest of the market, it will act in conjunction with the market. Thus, when the overall real estate market is in decline, the overall lack of investment capital and available financing will have an impact on the value of vacant, limited-utility, recreation/conservation property. Because the time period covered by the expert's comparable sales reflects a generally declining market, the expert applied a downward adjustment to the comparable sales prices of 6% a year from early 2008 to January 2011, when the market stabilized.
The expert made adjustments to account for small portions of the comparable sales which were uplands not frequently flooded, opining that "dry ground" of this type has some inherent value superior to land that is subject to tidal flooding, even if the uplands cannot be developed. The expert testified that the dry portions of the parcels could be used for camping during hunting excursions or, if adjacent to water, for docking a boat by dragging it up onto the land. The expert also made adjustments to the comparable sales prices to account for the size of the comparable sales. These adjustments were made based on the expert's opinion that smaller parcels tend to sell for a higher per-acre value than do larger parcels. The expert also made adjustments for non-contiguous properties, which he considered to have less value than contiguous land.
No adjustment was made for location in light of the expert's opinion that the proximity of this category of vacant land to economic activity or population density does not have an impact on value. Because the land cannot be developed, its value does not increase when it is proximate to commercial interests or accessible to potential consumers.
The expert's adjusted comparable sales prices ranged from $288 per acre to $1,288 per acre. Relying most heavily on the sale the characterized as comparable sale number 5, which had an adjusted sales price of $981, the expert opined a true market value of $900 per acre for the subject property. This resulted in the following opinions of value:
| Lot 55, Block 25 | $490,000 | (543.12 x $900 = $488,808) |
| Lot 55, Block 51 | (884.26 x $900 = $795,834) | |
| Lot 55, Block 51.01 | $ 25,000 | ( 26.84 x $900 = $ 24,156) |
| Lot 55, Block 55 | $ 50,000 | ( 53.90 x $900 = $ 48,510) |
This amount is based on the acreage stipulated by the parties on the eve of trial and differs from the opinion stated in the written report of defendant's expert.
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Because the tax year 2011 assessments reflect 100% of true market value, the opinion of the municipality's expert, if adopted by the court, would result in a reduction in the assessments (although not as large a reduction as would be the case if the court were to adopt the opinion of plaintiff's expert).
II. Conclusions of Law
The court's analysis begins with the well-established principle that "[o]riginal assessments and judgments of county boards of taxation are entitled to a presumption of validity." MSGW Real Estate Fund, LLC v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, 18 N.J. Tax 364, 373 (Tax 1998). As Judge Kuskin explained, our Supreme Court has defined the parameters of the presumption as follows:
The presumption attaches to the quantum of the tax assessment. Based on this presumption the appealing taxpayer has the burden of proving that the assessment is erroneous. The presumption in favor of the taxing authority can be rebutted only by cogent evidence, a proposition that has long been settled. The strength of the presumption is exemplified by the nature of the evidence that is required to overcome it. That evidence must be "definite, positive and certain in quality and quantity to overcome the presumption."Ibid. (quoting Pantasote Co. v. City of Passaic, 100 N.J. 408, 413 (1985)(citations omitted)).
The presumption of correctness arises from the view "that in tax matters it is to be presumed that governmental authority has been exercised correctly and in accordance with law." Pantasote, supra, 100 N.J. at 413 (citing Powder Mill, I Assocs. v. Township of Hamilton, 3 N.J. Tax 439 (Tax 1981)); see also Byram Twp. v. Western World, Inc., 111 N.J. 222 (1988). The presumption remains "in place even if the municipality utilized a flawed valuation methodology, so long as the quantum of the assessment is not so far removed from the true value of the property or the method of assessment itself is so patently defective as to justify removal of the presumption of validity." Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Township of Bernards, 111 N.J. 507, 517 (1988)(citation omitted).
"In the absence of a R. 4:37-2(b) motion . . . the presumption of validity remains in the case through the close of all proofs." MSGW Real Estate Fund, LLC, supra, 18 N.J. Tax at 377. In making the determination of whether the presumption has been overcome, the court should weigh and analyze the evidence "as if a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence had been made pursuant to R 4:40-1 (whether or not the defendant or plaintiff actually so moves), employing the evidentiary standard applicable to such a motion." Ibid. The court must accept as true the proofs of the party challenging the assessment and accord that party all legitimate favorable inferences from that evidence. Id. at 376 (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 535 (1995)). In order to overcome the presumption, the evidence "must be 'sufficient to determine the value of the property under appeal, thereby establishing the existence of a debatable question as to the correctness of the assessment.'" West Colonial Enters, LLC v. City of East Orange, 20 N.J. Tax 576, 579 (Tax 2003)(quoting Lenal Props., Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 18 N.J. Tax 405, 408 (Tax 1999), aff'd, 18 N.J. Tax 658 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 488 (2000)).
Only after the presumption is overcome with sufficient evidence at the close of trial must the court "appraise the testimony, make a determination of true value and fix the assessment." Rodwood Gardens, Inc. v. City of Summit, 188 N.J. Super. 34, 38-39 (App. Div. 1982)(citations omitted). If the court determines that sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption has not been produced, the assessment shall be affirmed and the court need not proceed to making an independent determination of value. Ford Motor Co. v. Township of Edison, 127 N.J. 290, 312 (1992); Global Terminal & Container Serv. v. City of Jersey City, 15 N.J. Tax 698, 703-704 (App. Div. 1996).
The municipality moved for judgment in its favor at the conclusion of plaintiff's case-in-chief. The court issued a bench opinion denying defendant's motion. It is not necessary to restate the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to defendant's motion. It will suffice to say that the court concluded that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of validity attached to the assessments and county board Judgments.
The decision made at trial, however, does not end the court's inquiry. Having found that the presumption of correctness was overcome, it is the court's obligation to determine the true market value of the subject property on October 1, 2010.
The comparable sales approach is generally accepted as an appropriate method of estimating value of vacant land. See e.g. Pepperidge Tree Realty Corp. v. Borough of Kinnelon, 21 N.J. Tax 57 (Tax 2003); Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 140 (13th ed 2008)("Usually the most reliable way to estimate land value is by sales comparison."). This method of valuation has been defined as "[a] set of procedures in which a value indication is derived by comparing the property being appraised to similar properties that have been sold recently, applying appropriate units of comparison, and making adjustments to the sales prices of the comparables based on the elements of comparison." Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 417 (12th ed 2001). The court adopts the opinions of both appraisal experts that this approach is the best method for determining the true market value of the subject property. In addition, the court agrees with the experts that the highest and best use of the subject property is for passive recreation, such as duck hunting, for conservation purposes, or to be held for eventual sale as mitigation of environmental disturbances at some other location.
The experts offered significantly different opinions with respect to the true market value of the subject property on the relevant valuation date.
The weight to be given to an expert's opinion depends especially upon the facts and reasoning which are offered as the foundation of his [or her] opinion. Ocean County v. Landolfo, 132 N.J. Super. 523, 528, 334 A.2d 360 (App. Div. 1975). The weight and value of expert testimony are for the trier of fact. Robbins v. Thies, 117 N.J.L. 389, 398, 189 A. 67 (E & A 1937). An expert's opinion may be adopted in whole or in part or completely rejected. Middlesex County v. Clearwater Village, Inc., 163 N.J. Super. 166,
174, 394 A.2d 390 (App. Div. 1978), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 483, 401 A.2d 239 (1979).
[Marina District Dev. Co., LLC v. City of Atlantic City, 27 N.J. Tax 469, 524 (Tax 2013), appeal pending, (quoting City of Atlantic City v. Ginnetti, 17 N.J. Tax 354, 362 (Tax 1998), aff'd, 18 N.J. Tax 672 (App. Div. 2000)).]
The court concludes that the opinion of plaintiff's expert is lacking in sufficient indicia of credibility to be accepted as the true market value of the subject property. Plaintiff's expert relied on forty-three comparable sales, which took place over a fifteen-year period. He offered no credible testimony that he examined the comparable sales closely to determine whether the properties involved were, in fact, sufficiently similar to the subject property to render the sales prices credible evidence of value. The sheer number of comparable sales alone raises concerns about the precision of the expert's inquiry. The list of comparable sales is more accurately described as a survey of all sales of tidal marshlands in Cumberland and Salem Counties over a fifteen-year period, rather than a list of sales of property the expert determined to be comparable to the subject property on or around the relevant valuation date.
In addition, the expert's testimony with respect to his verification of the private party sales as arms' length transaction was vague. The witness testified about what "would have" been done by him or his staff upon receiving information about a particular sale to verify that it was an arms' length transaction. It was not clear if he was referring to the steps he took to formulate his report and opinion in this matter or if he was referring to office practice over the period of many years in which the data with respect to the sales was collected. He offered no precise testimony with respect to any conversation he had with a buyer, a seller or a broker connected to any of the comparable sales. He did not testify with respect to having examined tax records to determine if the sales had been considered by the tax assessor to be usable for the annual sales- price/assessment ratio study of the Director, Division of Taxation. See N.J.A.C. 18:12-1.1(a). Nor was he aware of the precise terms of the sales, the parties' interactions leading up to the sales, or the motivations of the buyer and seller.
The lack of any adjustments to the comparable sales prices also undermined the credibility of the opinion of plaintiff's expert. Of particular concern is the absence of a time adjustment for changes in the marketplace and, when considering sales more than a decade old, for inflation. The expert testified that time adjustments were not necessary because the market for tidal marshlands was stable. Yet, the private sales on which he relied had sales prices of $141 per acre in 1999, $723 per acre in 2004, and $86 per acre in 2010. This is hardly a model of stability. Even if these sales are dismissed as outliers, the remaining sales range from $150 per acre in 2010 to $619 per acre in 2001. Surely, an adjustment for market conditions is necessary.
The expert made no other adjustments, suggesting an absence of a careful analysis of the comparable sales and the subject property. It is difficult to believe that all forty-three comparable sales were sufficiently similar to the subject property that no adjustments of any type were necessary.
Finally, the expert's use of averaging of the comparable sales prices as a key element of his analysis is suspect. See Pansini Custom Design Assocs., LLC v. City of Ocean City, 407 N.J. Super. 137, 144 (App. Div. 2009)(holding that averaging of the sales prices of comparable sales is not a credible method of determining the true market value of real property). While plaintiff's expert also used the median of the comparable sales prices in his analysis, this too is "a simple mathematical formula" that is an "unacceptable" methodology for determining value. Ibid.
Defendant's expert presented a more credible analysis. After gathering evidence of comparable sales from several counties, the expert selected several sales of vacant, limited-utility, frequently flooded land that he determined to have been exposed to the market. He credibly testified that the private sales on which he relied were of property offered publically for sale. In addition, the court accepts the expert's opinion, which was shared by plaintiff's expert, that sales to government entities and conservation organizations are credible evidence of value, given the sophisticated nature of the parties and the likelihood that they obtained real estate appraisals. For each comparable sale he identified, the expert verified the terms of the transaction and inspected the property. He made a careful determination, informed by the information he uncovered in his investigation, that the sale were arms' length transactions. The expert's techniques enhanced the credibility of the comparable sales prices on which he relied as evidence of market value.
Defendant's expert also made several adjustments to the comparable sales prices. He adjusted the sales prices to account for changes in market conditions over the period covered by the comparable sales. In addition, he made adjustments for lot size, small areas of uplands, and for non-contiguous lands. The court accepts these adjustments as credible.
The court is not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that an adjustment is necessary to account for the fact that defendant's expert included comparable sales of land with freshwater wetlands, as opposed to the subject which is flooded with saltwater. While the court recognizes the difference between tidal marshlands and freshwater wetlands, it concludes that this distinction is not material here. The subject property, like all of the comparable sales on which defendant's expert relied, cannot be developed because of the presence of water on the property. Nothing in the record suggests that the value of limited-utility property of this type depends on whether the water affecting the development potential of the property is freshwater or saltwater.
The court reaches the same conclusion with respect to plaintiff's argument that an adjustment should be made to defendant's comparable sales to account for the fact that the comparable sales are frequently flooded, but not flooded on a twice-daily basis, as is the subject property. Again, the court acknowledges that defendant's comparable sales are of land on which water is frequently, but not always or regularly, present. These lands likely have water present periodically after rains or other weather events. The subject is flooded completely twice a day, every day, with the high tides. This distinction might be meaningful if the comparable sales had potential uses other than passive recreation and conservation. The frequency of the presence of water of the comparable parcels, however, do not make them more useful than the subject in any meaningful way.
The trial record establishes two categories of sales relevant to the market value of the subject property. Sales to private parties for recreation and sales to government entities and private organizations from conservation. The evidence tends to show that sales for conservation purposes are at a higher per-acre price. The court will rely primarily on the private sales, as the record demonstrates that as of the relevant valuation date government financing for conservation purchases, which fuel both government entity and private organization sales, had contracted significantly. The court concludes that as of October 1, 2010, the most likely purchaser of the subject property would have been a private party intending to use the property for passive recreation. The court also concludes, however, that the purchase price of the subject property would be influenced by the prospect of government funding once again becoming available for land conservation purchases, as well as the potential that the property would be purchased in the future by an entity that needs to dedicate vacant land for conservation to mitigate environmental disturbance elsewhere. The court concludes that these potential uses of the property would tend to increase the true market value of the subject property.
Of defendant's private sales, the court will rely most heavily on comparable sales Nos. 2, and 3. These have adjusted sales prices per acre of $288 and $336. The court gives comparable sale No. 1, with an adjusted sales price of $1,024, little weight, given the property's small size, adjacency to a highway, its location in an area of light industrial uses, and its upland area abutting the highway, which would allow for the launching of a boat and easy access to the property. Comparable sale No. 5, which took place in 2012 and has an adjusted sales price of $981 per acre, is given little weight, in light of the fact that it took place well after the valuation date and because the parcel abuts the Garden State Parkway. Comparable sale No. 7, which took place in October 2011 and has an adjusted sales price of $1,288, also is given little weight in light of the fact that it took place a year after the valuation date.
The court will also give some weight to defendant's comparable sale No. 4, which was a purchase of land for conservation. The sale, with an adjusted sales price of $801 per acre, will assist the court in determining the influence on value of the potential sale of the property at a future date when financing becomes available for land conservation purchases or for mitigation purposes. Comparable sale No. 6 took place in 2013, long after the relevant valuation date. The court, therefore gives no weight to its adjusted sales price of $981 per acre.
After weighing the evidence, the court determines that the subject property had a true market value of $550 per acre as of October 1, 2010. This conclusion results in the following findings of true market value:
| Lot 55, Block 25 | $299,000 | (543.12 x $550 = $298,716) |
| Lot 55, Block 51 | $486,000 | (884.26 x $550 = $486,343) |
| Lot 55, Block 51.01 | $ 15,000 | ( 26.84 x $550 = $ 14,762) |
| Lot 55, Block 55 | $ 30,000 | ( 53.90 x $550 = $ 29,645) |
Chapter 123 does not apply when evaluating an assessment made as the result of a municipal-wide revaluation. N.J.S.A. 54:51A-6d. The assessments, therefore, will be set at 100% of true market value. Judgments will be entered accordingly.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Hon. Patrick DeAlmeida, P.J.T.C.