Opinion
Nos. CV 06-4015726 S, CV 04-4022612 S, CV 04-4002058 S
October 6, 2009
Introduction
These three cases and their related claims stemmed from a bitter dispute in which all of the litigants are related by either blood or marriage. The cases arose out of an intrafamily disagreement over the use and occupancy and ownership of the family homestead located in the town of Monroe, Connecticut. The three cases were consolidated for purposes of a single jury trial, which was held before the undersigned in the Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport. At that consolidated trial, all parties were represented by capable counsel, and these counsel fairly presented all of the issues for the jury's consideration. On June 5, 2008, the jury returned its verdicts in each of the three above captioned cases, and awarded certain monetary damages.
Following the court's rulings on several post-verdict motions, an appeal thereafter followed, which was filed with the Appellate Court on September 11, 2008. The cases were returned to the Superior Court by the Appellate Court on a party's motions for rectification, because it was not clear from the record presented on appeal whether or not the trial court had formally rendered judgments on the jury's verdicts. The cases on appeal have been marked over by the Appellate Court pending disposition of these motions for rectification. The trial court thereafter scheduled a hearing with counsel for the various parties to address an issue which seemed both straightforward and clear cut, and capable of a swift resolution that would allow the appeals to proceed.
On June 9, 2009, the eve of that scheduled hearing, counsel for the plaintiff/counterclaim defendant Stephen Szekeres filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court (Entry #134) in docket number CV04 4002058 (discussed herein as case number three). The motion sought the dismissal of a counterclaim that had been asserted against Steven Szekeres in one of the three consolidated cases on which the jury had rendered a verdict against him. The jury had awarded monetary damages on that counterclaim in favor of his mother, Joyce Szekeres. The motion to dismiss alleged a lack of jurisdiction, in that Joyce Szekeres was never named a party in the particular case in which she had lodged the counterclaim. Coming as it did only after the case had been returned to the trial court by the Appellate Court, this motion to dismiss marked the first time that such a jurisdictional claim had ever been articulated or advanced at any stage in these proceedings.
After allowing additional time for briefing on this newly filed motion to dismiss, the court heard oral argument in a hearing on July 31, 2009. It now issues this memorandum of decision. This decision encompasses both the motions for rectification lodged with the Appellate Court, as well as the motion to dismiss the judgment as to Joyce Szekeres on the counterclaim later filed with the trial court by Steven Szekeres. The trial court and the Fairfield JD clerk's office have also researched and reviewed the procedural history of these three cases, tracking the pleadings both before and after their consolidation for trial. A detailed exposition of that history is necessary to a complete understanding, not only as to what transpired here, but also as to the grounds for this court's decision based on that history.
Because of that history, the court has chosen to issue this decision as a single document containing all three cases names and their respective docket numbers.
The Three Consolidated Cases Case No. 1: CV06 4015726 — Steven Szekeres et al. v. Joyce Szekeres et al.
Although this case bears a 2006 docket number, it is actually the earliest of the three cases in the chronology of these related lawsuits, as this particular litigation began as a housing court matter under a different docket number some six years earlier. On March 7, 2000, the plaintiffs, Steven Szekeres and his wife Denise Miller, filed a complaint in Housing Court in Bridgeport. The three named defendants in that action were Joyce Szekeres, who is the mother of Steven Szekeres, his sister Stephanie (Szekeres) Dridi, and Stephanie Dridi's husband, Chaker Dridi. The original complaint sounded in three counts. Count one alleged forcible entry and detainer, as well as illegal lockout. Count two alleged assault and battery. Count three alleged a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiffs later withdrew the assault and battery count, and filed an amended complaint alleging forcible entry and detainer, illegal lockout, and a CUTPA violation. The defendants filed an answer and special defenses alleging (1) abandoned premises; (2) expired lease; (3) nuisance; and (4) fraud. The defendants also filed a counterclaim alleging willful and malicious destruction in count one, and statutory theft in count two. The plaintiffs filed a reply to the special defenses, as well as an answer to the counterclaim.
As all the cases that were originally filed with the court list the plaintiff as "Steven Szekeres," the court refers to him as such throughout this decision. However, it should be noted that during the pendency of this litigation, Steven Szekeres changed his name to Steven Miller, adopting his wife Denise's maiden name as his own last name.
While this matter was still pending in Housing Court, Steven Szekeres filed the other two civil actions that are the subject of this appeal. The housing matter was transferred to the regular civil docket in the Fairfield JD on March 29, 2006, at which time it assumed its present docket number. The parties also entered into a stipulation which was signed by counsel for all parties on August 16, 2007. That stipulation bears two docket numbers: CV 06 4015726 and CV 04 4002058, and it provides for the consolidation of these two cases. The stipulation was adopted as an order of the court by Judge Hiller on August 16, 2007 (Entry #103). The third case (discussed infra), was filed by Steven Szekeres in the Ansonia/Milford Judicial District. That matter was also ordered transferred to the Fairfield JD by Judge Hiller on October 17, 2007 (Entry #113).
At the conclusion of trial, the jury submitted verdict forms and interrogatories to the court on June 5, 2008. As to the allegations in this case, the jury held in favor of the defendants on count one (forcible entry and detainer/illegal lockout), count two (conversion), and count three (CUTPA). As to the counterclaims, the jury found in favor of Joyce Szekeres on count one (willful and malicious destruction of property) and awarded her damages of $35,000. The jury found in favor of Steven Miller (Szekeres) and Denise Miller on count two (statutory theft). In this particular case, there is no dispute that Joyce Szekeres was a named party, and the motion to dismiss is not directed at the damage award on this counterclaim.
As to the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim in count three, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants.
Case No. 2: CV 04 4022612 — Steven Szekeres et al. v. Joyce Szekeres et al.
On April 15, 2004, the plaintiffs Steven Szekeres and Denise Miller filed a three-count complaint in the Ansonia/Milford Judicial District. The two defendants who are named in this complaint are Joyce Szekeres and Stephanie Dridi. The complaint sounds in three counts: slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On January 26, 2007, the defendants filed an answer and special defenses (Entry #104), alleging: (1) statute of limitations; (2) statements were truthful; (3) superseding or intervening cause of third parties; and (4) any damages were proximately and directly caused by the plaintiff as a result of his illegal acts or conduct. The plaintiffs filed an answer to the special defenses on January 30, 2007 (Entry #105). The case assumed its present docket number when the matter was transferred by Judge Huller (Entry #113) from the Ansonia/Milford JD to the Fairfield JD courthouse in Bridgeport, where the other cases were already pending. At the conclusion of trial, the jury submitted verdict forms and interrogatories to the court on June 5, 2008. As to the allegations in this case, the jury found in favor of the defendants on all counts of the complaint.
The complaint is not actually divided into three counts. However three separate causes of action are alleged, and subsequent pleadings, when referring to the complaint, address it as a three-count complaint.
Count three, intentional infliction of emotional distress, holds in favor of the defendants as directed by the court.
Case No. 3: Steven Szekeres et al. v. Chaker Dridi et al. CV 04 4002058
On September 13, 2004, the plaintiffs, Steven Szekeres (now Steven Miller) and Denise Miller, filed a five-count complaint in the Fairfield JD against two defendants, Chaker Dridi and his wife Stephanie Dridi (the Dridis). Joyce Szekeres was not a defendant in this action. Count one sounds in theft, count two in trespass, count three in malicious prosecution, count four in intentional infliction of emotional distress, and count five in negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants filed an answer as to all five counts (Entry #106), as well as the counterclaim that is now the focus of the motion to dismiss, on April 20, 2007. The date is significant, because the answer and counterclaim were filed several months before the August 16, 2007 stipulation of the parties, and the consolidation order of Judge Hiller on that same date. The answer also included twelve special defenses: (1) statute of limitations; (2) prior pending action doctrine; (3) abandonment and vacating of premises, abandoned and discarded possessions; (4) the plaintiffs' lease expired 2/01/2000; (5) nuisance; (6) fraud; (7) vexatious lawsuit; (8) failure to state a claim; (9) estoppel; (10) collateral estoppel; (11) res judicata; and (12) breach of fiduciary duty.
The answer states that all twelve special defenses apply to all twelve counts, however this appears to be an error, as there are only five counts in the complaint, which the defendants acknowledge in their answer to the complaint.
The answer also includes a counterclaim by the defendants alleging a vexatious lawsuit under General Statutes § 52-568, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This counterclaim was appended to the end of the defendants' answer on page 9. While this section is separately captioned as a counterclaim inside the answer itself, the face sheet of the document is captioned simply "Answer." This may be why the pleading was entered into the judicial docketing system simply as an answer. The counterclaim is purportedly asserted on behalf of all the defendants. However the counterclaim only specifically mentions one person, Joyce Szekeres by name. Paragraph 5 of the counterclaim states, "The plaintiffs' [sic] intentionally and unreasonably subjected the defendants to emotional harm. The plaintiffs know that the defendant, Joyce Szekeres was in poor health and suffered from chronic ailments and that their described conduct would likely cause the defendant's health to be affected by their illegal and wanton acts."
The crux of the matter is that Joyce Szekeres is not and never was a proper party to this particular action. The only two defendants named in the complaint were Joyce Szekeres' daughter and her son in law, Stephanie and Chaker Dridi. The plaintiffs filed their answer to the counterclaim (Entry #107, 107.50) on April 24, 2007. However, that answer failed to address the fact that Joyce Szekeres was not a proper party to the action at issue, and therefore was unable to assert a counterclaim. Hence, the issue was not raised at that time, and Joyce Szekeres' lack of party status in CV 04 4002058 went unnoticed, unmentioned and unchallenged by all concerned. This state of affairs continued until the motion to dismiss was filed on June 8, 2009, a full year after the jury had rendered its verdicts.
On June 1, 2008, counsel for the defendants filed "Defendant's Proposed Interrogatories to Jury on Counterclaim." This document included all 3 docket numbers, and specifically mentions Joyce Szekeres by name as a counterclaim plaintiff on the counterclaims for vexatious litigation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants filed a trial memorandum, addressing the permissibility of the defendants' vexatious litigation counterclaim on June 3, 2008. The jury submitted verdict forms and interrogatories to the court on June 5, 2008. These hold in favor of the Dridis on counts one through five. As to count one of the counterclaim, vexatious lawsuit, the jury awarded Joyce Szekeres $85,000, and the Dridis $17,500 each, but no double or treble damages. On count two of the counterclaim, intentional infliction of emotional distress, the jury awarded Joyce Szekeres $100,000, but no damages to the Dridis. Judgments on the verdicts in all three of the consolidated cases were entered on August 5, 2008, pursuant to Practice Book § 17-2.
The header on this pleading includes all three docket numbers, as those three cases were tried together.
Count four (malicious prosecution) and count five (intentional infliction of emotional distress) hold in favor of the defendants, as directed by the court.
Practice Book § 17-2 states in relevant part: "If no motions under Sections 16-35 or 16-36 are filed, upon the expiration of the time provided for the filing of such motions, judgment on the verdict shall be rendered in accordance with the verdict, and the date of the judgment shall be the date the verdict was accepted. If motions are filed pursuant to Sections 16-35 or 16-36, judgment shall be rendered at the time of and in accordance with the decision on such motions. Whenever a judgment is rendered in a civil jury case, the clerk shall send notice of such judgment to all attorneys and pro se parties of record. (See General Statutes § 52-225 and annotations.)"
In the present case, the plaintiffs' motion for JNOV and the plaintiffs' amended motion to set aside the verdict were denied by the court, Blawie J., on August 5, 2008. Accordingly, judgment entered on August 5, 2008.
Since the motion to dismiss implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, it can be filed at any time (Practice Book §§ 10-31, 10-32 and 10-33). Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294 (1987). Although it is hard to conceive of a later stage in a case at which a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction might be adjudicated by a trial court, the court finds that it is has been validly filed and is not untimely. Moreover, once the court's subject matter jurisdiction is called into question, ". . . [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding with the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn. 546, 552 (1997).
Jurisdictional Analysis Regarding the Counterclaim
As a threshold matter, the court must first decide what type of jurisdiction is implicated by the defective counterclaim on behalf of Joyce Szekeres that the plaintiff/counterclaim defendant Stephen Szekeres now seeks to attack. Does it raise the issue of personal jurisdiction, which may be waived by the conduct of the parties? "Unlike subject matter jurisdiction . . . personal jurisdiction may be created through consent or waiver." United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 39, 495 A.2d 1034 (1985); Pedro v. Miller, 281 Conn. 112, 120, 914 A.2d 524 (2007). "Because a lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived by the defendant, the rules of practice require the defendant to challenge that jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Golodner v. Women's Center of Southeastern Connecticut, Inc., 281 Conn. 819, 825, 917 A.2d 959 (2007).
If the jurisdictional flaw in this case was personal, as Joyce Szekeres contends, there are ample grounds to find such a valid waiver by the plaintiff/counterclaim defendant here. As the court stated at the outset, all sides were represented at trial here by capable counsel who fairly presented their respective cases to the jury. The court also found that the verdicts, including the now disputed counterclaim, were supported by the evidence. There can be no argument that the counterclaim defendant did not have adequate notice of the allegations, or a sufficient opportunity to defend himself against that counterclaim. In short, many of the safeguards built into our legal system and usually invoked as grounds for dismissal do not seem to be implicated here. The waiver of personal jurisdiction argument rests on the fact that while Joyce Szekeres was never made a party to the case in which she asserted a counterclaim for vexatious litigation, the parties conducted themselves as if she were properly joined, thereby waiving any claim of failure of personal jurisdiction. It is also true that a common nucleus of operative facts involving these three cases might have readily supported such a counterclaim in one or the other cases where she was in fact named as a party. However, such a circumstance cannot create subject matter jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist, and it cannot exist for a non-party.
"Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 386, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009). "[A] claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case cannot be waived by the parties to an action and may be raised at any time." MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Boata, 283 Conn. 381, 390, 926 A.2d 1035 (2007). "In undertaking this review, we are mindful of the well established notion that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). In one sense, therefore, while it may be said that the court does indeed have subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims alleging vexatious litigation, that is not dispositive.
"The jurisdiction of the trial court is limited to those parties expressly named in the action coming before it . . . Until one is given notice of the actions or proceedings against him and is thereby given opportunity to appear and be heard, the court has no jurisdiction to proceed to judgment either for or against him even though it may have jurisdiction of the subject matter . . . A court has no jurisdiction over persons who have not been made parties to the action before it." Rocque v. DeMilo Co., 85 Conn.App. 512, 524, 857 A.2d 976 (2004). "[I]t is axiomatic that a party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut State Medical Society v. Oxford Health Plans (CT), Inc., 272 Conn. 469, 476, 863 A.2d 645 (2005). "Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest . . . in the subject matter of the controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chila v. Stuart, 81 Conn.App. 458, 464, 840 A.2d 1176, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 917, 847 A.2d 311 (2004); Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 501, 467 A.2d 674 (1983).
"In any action for legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff . . . provided that each such counterclaim . . . arises out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint . . . Practice Book § 10-10. To have standing to bring a valid counterclaim, a defendant must have sufficient interest that is affected. See Southbury v. American Builders, Inc., 162 Conn. 633, 634, 295 A.2d 566 (1972) (remanding to dismiss counterclaim because defendants have failed to allege "any interest which would be affected so as to give them standing to prosecute their counterclaim").
In the present case, Joyce Szekeres was not made a party to the action at hand (Docket No. CV 04 4002058). Moreover, the plaintiffs' complaint under this docket number, dated September 1, 2004, and filed by the plaintiffs on September 13, 2004, fails to allege any claim against Joyce Szekeres. In fact, the complaint does not even reference Joyce Szekeres at all, and solely directs its counts to the Dridis. Accordingly, while the Dridis may have properly filed such a counterclaim, the court finds that Joyce Szekeres was not aggrieved by the complaint in Docket No. CV 04 4002058, and, therefore, lacked standing to assert any defense or bring any claim, counterclaim or otherwise. As lack of standing affects the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, it may be raised at any time, and is never waived.
The court dislikes the prospect of exalting form over substance on the facts as presented here, because that runs the risk of being unfair to the counterclaim "plaintiff" Joyce Szekeres. But neither should this court, nor any court, feel itself obligated to rescue a fatally defective pleading for the benefit of one of the parties; or more properly, someone not a party to this particular lawsuit. That is not the court's function, and such a practice runs an equal if not greater risk of yielding an unfair result to the counterclaim "defendant," Steven Szekeres.
The court presided over this trial and observed all the witnesses. In addition to the three cases now on appeal, the jury heard evidence that this family feud also spawned two other unsuccessful lawsuits in federal court, suits brought by Steven Szekeres. A jury could have readily found, as they did here, that this litigation was indeed vexatious. The suits took their corrosive toll in the form of financial expenses, property damage, police interventions and poisoned relations between apparently once-happy family members. There is no reason to suspect that any party would have tried this case any differently had this counterclaim been properly pursued, meaning filed instead where it belonged in one of the other two cases now on appeal. Both the evidence adduced at the 2008 trial and the outcome would have been the same.
That is what makes the court's current decision now over a year later so difficult. The court is loath to overturn a jury's verdict and its award of damages supported by the evidence, so the equities seem to favor Joyce Szekeres here. Equity also supports the inference that the mother's confusion was an understandable consequence of the plethora of lawsuits filed here, a circumstance attributable to her estranged and litigious son Stephen Szekeres. But on questions of law as fundamental as subject matter jurisdiction, the answers must be provided by the law, not equity. The law requires that the motion to dismiss be granted. As Professor Biackstone noted, law without equity may be hard and disagreeable at times, but it is much more desirable for the public good than the confusion that would result from a system of equity without law. See W. Blackstone, Commentaries, bk. 1, 62.
Just as a court cannot even hear argument by a person not properly a party before it, this counterclaim was void ab initio, filed as it was by a non-party to this case. The spurious counterclaim was also filed months before the consolidation of the files had been ordered by Judge Hiller, so that the counterclaim plaintiffs cannot even avail themselves of any defense that some sort of "merger" of the three separate cases had been effected by the consolidation. There was no other docket number on that counterclaim than the one case it was filed in. Indeed, there could not have been any other docket numbers, because the cases had not yet been consolidated. The simple fact is that the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the allegations presented in that 2007 counterclaim in CV 04 4002058 never existed as to the non-party Joyce Szekeres. This is true despite the reality that this fact lay undiscovered for so long.
ORDER
The motion to dismiss the counterclaim in CV 04 4002058 as to Joyce Szekeres for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED. The court vacates its earlier ruling that the verdict on this counterclaim as to Joyce Szekeres be accepted and recorded. There is no issue of valid jurisdiction as to the counterclaim in this same docket number as to the named parties Stephanie and Chaker Dridi. Therefore, that verdict and the jury's award of damages to the Dridis on that counterclaim are unaffected by this ruling.
As the court previously noted, judgment on the verdicts entered on August 5, 2008 pursuant to the Practice Book. Except as to the above "counterclaim" as to Joyce Szekeres, and to the extent that the court's previous findings and orders left any doubt in the record, the court hereby affirms that it rendered judgments on the jury's remaining verdicts in each of the three above referenced cases.
SO ORDERED,