Opinion
20-CV-4633 (PGG) (JLC)
05-17-2022
ALPHONSO SYVILLE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et ano., Defendants.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
JAMES L. COTT, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Alphonso Syville, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action against the City of New York and Paul Hargrow, an employee of the New York City Department of Homeless Services, alleging discrimination and retaliation in the provision of shelter services. The City of New York has moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues that Syville's claims in this lawsuit are barred by a general release that he signed pursuant to a settlement agreement in another lawsuit. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the motion to dismiss be converted to one for summary judgment and granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
1. Syville's Allegations
The following facts are taken from the Complaint dated June 16, 2020 and its attachments (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 2, and the Supplemental Pleading (“Supp. Pl.”) filed July 16, 2020, Dkt. No. 3, which the Court consolidated and treats together as the operative complaint. Dkt. No. 6. See Coleman v. State Supreme Ct., 697 F.Supp.2d 493, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (where plaintiff is proceeding pro se, court assessing legal sufficiency of claims may consider any document attached to complaint or incorporated therein by reference). The facts are accepted as true for purposes of the pending motion. See, e.g., Smolen v. Wesley, No. 16-CV-2417 (KMK), 2019 WL 4727311, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2019) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
Syville has been in the New York City shelter system since 2010, Compl. at 10, Exh. B; Supp. Pl. at 5, and he has lived at Help Meyer's Mica Shelter (“Mica Shelter”) since March 6, 2020. Supp. Pl. at 3. He suffers from permanent lower back damage for which he requires an epidural shot every six months, as well as mental illnesses including post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and major depression. Supp. Pl. at 2. Syville contends that his rights have been violated throughout his stay at Mica Shelter, and in particular since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 when staff forced him out of the shelter against his will, falsified statements, refused him medications, treated him unfairly, kept him in dangerous and unsanitary living conditions, refused and denied him services, held his mail, refused him food, and retaliated against him because of his advocacy for his rights. Compl. at 5.
All references to page numbers of the Complaint and the Supplemental Pleading cited in this Report are as reflected in this District's Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) System.
According to Syville, he began advocating for COVID-19 safety precautions at the beginning of the pandemic. Id. at 7. He complained about the treatment at the shelter, including that staff would “kick[ ] all the clients out [of their] room[s] to a small dayroom,” which was crowded, and did not supply the clients with masks or hand sanitizer. Id. Syville contends that he sent emails alerting government officials to the fact that people inside the shelters had not been able to prepare for, or obtain supplies in case of exposure to, the coronavirus. See, e.g., Compl. at 9, Exh. A; Compl. at 12, Exh. D.
Syville alleges that since May 2020, New York City Department of Homeless Services (“DHS”) and Mica Shelter staff selected clients to stay inside single hotel rooms to fight the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Supp. Pl. at 1. At first, all single adult clients were to be included in this program, but the Mayor “stop[ped]” this plan and staff selected only certain clients instead. Id. He alleges that the only individuals left inside the shelters were people “with wheelchairs, severe drug users,” “illegal immigrants, [and] the very dirty.” Id. at 2. Syville contends that he requested transfers from his shelter bed for safety concerns related to his roommate and given what he describes as the lack of safety protocols such as masks and hand sanitizer. See, e.g., Compl. at 32; Supp. Pl. at 2-3. According to Syville, staff refused to move him to a single hotel room “deliberately,” in retaliation for his advocacy, and in the hopes that he would “cont[r]act[ ] the COVID-19 virus and die.” Supp. Pl. at 3-4.
Syville also alleges that his rights were violated on several distinct occasions. He argues that in one instance, his rights were violated after he went to the hospital to seek treatment for food poisoning while he was living at Project Renewal Fort Washington shelter in upper Manhattan on March 5, 2020. Compl. at 11, Exh. C. Syville contends that when he returned to the shelter, he was denied access to his bed, kept on a chair, denied medication, and was “illegal[ly] transfer[red]” to the Mica Shelter. Compl. at 10, Exh. B, 11, Exh. C. In another example, Syville alleges that staff member Ms. Robinson harassed him in mid-March 2020 when he tried to eat in his room to avoid being near others. Compl. at 14. He notes that she had clients sit right next to each other while eating despite the six-foot social distancing rule, and when he did not wish to comply because of the COVID-19 virus, she “followed and [harassed]” him for 20 minutes. Compl. at 14. Syville also describes another incident in which he alleges that he was transported to a hospital for COVID-19 tests, which he contends were unnecessary as he had already tested negative, and he was handcuffed so tightly he cried. Compl. at 17.
2. General Release
In support of its motion to dismiss, Defendant City of New York (“City”) submitted a General Release signed by Syville, notarized, and dated June 17, 2020.
Declaration of Stephen Kitzinger in Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated October 29, 2021 (“Kitzinger Decl.”), Exhibit 1 (“General Release”), Dkt. No. 49-1. According to this document, as part of a settlement agreement in another lawsuit (Syville v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-9988 (VEC) (DF)) and in exchange for payment of $10,000, Syville agreed to release the City and its employees from liability for violations of his civil rights. Id. The General Release states in relevant part that Syville agreed to:
release and discharge defendant City of New York; its successors or assigns; and all past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents of the City of New York or any entity represented by the Office of Corporation Counsel . . . from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of my civil rights and any and all related state law claims, from the beginning of the world to the date of this General Release.
Id. It further states the release may not be changed orally, and that the undersigned - Syville - read the release and fully understood it. Id.
B. Procedural History
Syville initiated this action against the City, Ms. Johnson, Ms. Robinson, A. Brown, Pernal, Paul Hargrow, and Smila Kodali, on June 16, 2020. Compl, Dkt. No. 2. He filed a supplemental pleading on July 16, 2020, which was consolidated with the Complaint on August 17, 2020. Supp. Pl., Dkt. No. 3; Dkt. No. 6.
Defendant Smila Kodali never appeared in this case.
Following an application from Syville, the Court terminated defendant Ms. Robinson on October 16, 2020. Dkt. No. 11. Upon joint submission from the parties, the Court granted leave for Syville to amend his Complaint by December 23, 2020, and subsequently extended the deadline twice - first to April 30, 2021, and then to August 3, 2021. Dkt. Nos. 19, 27, 35. Syville did not file an amended complaint. On September 5, 2021, as a result of a joint stipulation, the case was dismissed against Defendants Johnson, Brown, and Pernal pursuant to a settlement agreement. Dkt. No. 42.
Syville wrote to the Court on September 30, 2021, asking for additional time, until November 6, 2021, to file an Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 47. However, he did not do so.
According to the Joint Stipulation, the full names of these Defendants are Anne Marie Johnson, Andre Brown, and Pernell Odom.
After further extensions, Dkt. Nos. 43, 45, the City moved to dismiss the complaint on October 29, 2021 pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Notice of Motion (“Def. Notice”), Dkt. No. 48; Kitzinger Decl., Dkt. 49; Memorandum of Law in Support (“Def. Mem.”), Dkt. No. 50. Syville was served with the notice of motion, memorandum of law, and the Kitzinger Declaration on October 29, 2021. Dkt. No. 52. A day after prompting by the undersigned, Dkt. No. 53, Syville filed his opposition. Letter from A. Syville dated December 13, 2021 (“Pl. Opp.”), Dkt. No. 54 (filed on December 15, 2021). The City did not file a reply. The motion was referred to me for a report and recommendation on November 3, 2021. Dkt. No. 51.
Paul Hargrow is the only individual defendant remaining in this lawsuit. According to Syville, Hargrow is a city employee who worked for DHS. Compl. at 3. He is represented by the Office of Corporation Counsel. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 36, 38 (notice of appearance). Although the City of New York filed the motion to dismiss without specific reference to Hargrow in its motion papers, the relief sought is for Syville's claims to “be dismissed in their entirety with prejudice.” Def. Mem. at 6. The General Release on which the motion to dismiss is based releases “all past and present . . . employees . . . of the City of New York or any entity represented by the Office of Corporation Counsel.” Thus, the motion is properly considered to seek dismissal of both the City and Hargrow. See, e.g., Roberts v. Doe 1, No. 14-CV-9174 (AJP), 2015 WL 670180, at *5, *5 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (defendants' motion granted when identical language in release explicitly “includes the claims in this action asserted against [all] defendants . . . [including] employees of the City of New York” even though defense counsel only put in appearance for one of many city employee defendants).
Syville also filed a letter dated May 2, 2022, providing what he called an “update” to his case. Dkt. No. 56.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
1. Conversion of a Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment
In adjudicating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), district courts “generally” confine themselves to “the four corners of the complaint and look only to the allegations contained therein.” Drew v. City of New York, 18-CV-10714 (ER), 2019 WL 3714932, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019) (citing Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007)). However, “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). “All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id.; see also Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 2009) (“a district court acts properly in converting a motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment when the motion presents matters outside the pleadings . . . [but the Court must] give sufficient notice to an opposing party and an opportunity for that party to respond”) (internal citations omitted).
“[F]ormal notice is not required where a party should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment and was neither taken by surprise nor deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings.” Cuffee v. City of New York, 15-CV-8916 (PGG) (DF), 2018 WL 1136923, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2018) (cleaned up). While “pro se parties must have unequivocal notice of the meaning and consequences of conversion to summary judgment[,] . . . a District Court need not advise a pro se litigant as to the nature of summary judgment where an opposing party has already provided the litigant with the requisite notice ....” Id. (cleaned up) (citing, among other cases, McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 282 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A]bsent a clear indication that the pro se litigant understands the nature and consequences of Rule 56 . . . he or she must be so informed by the movant in the notice of motion or, failing that, by the district court.”)).
2. Summary Judgment Standard
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must “show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In its adjudication, the Court must view all facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Pennington v. D'Ippolito, 855 Fed.Appx. 779, 781 (2d Cir. 2021).
If the movant meets its burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). “[A] party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment ....” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d
159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Rather, to survive a summary judgment motion, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of material fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009).
3. Pro Se Litigants
Because Syville is proceeding pro se, his submissions are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Nevertheless, the “duty to liberally construe a plaintiff's complaint [is not] the equivalent of a duty to re-write it.” Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 663 F.Supp.2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (cleaned up). Although submissions by pro se litigants are “construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest[,]” pro se litigants “must still meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Bolling v. City of New York, 18-CV-5406 (PGG) (RWL), 2021 WL 961758, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2021) (cleaned up); see also Cuffee, 2018 WL 1136923, at *5.
B. Discussion
1. The Motion Should Be Converted to One for Summary Judgment
The City seeks to dismiss Syville's claims based on his execution of a General Release dated June 17, 2020. See Def. Mem. at 2-6. In support of its motion, it submitted the General Release. General Release, Dkt. No. 49-1. The General Release is a matter “outside the pleadings” because it is not 1) discussed or referred to in the Complaint or Supplemental Pleading; 2) attached as an exhibit to the pleadings; 3) relied on by the pleadings so as to be considered integral to its allegations; or 4) a matter on which judicial notice may be taken. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); see Cuffee, 2018 WL 1136923, at *5 (citing Johnson v. Cty. of Nassau, 411 F.Supp.2d 171, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Roberts, 2015 WL 670180, at *2). Thus, the motion to dismiss may be converted to a motion for summary judgment if Syville had 1) “unequivocal notice of the meaning and consequences of conversion,” and 2) “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Cuffee, 2018 WL 1136923, at *5 (citations omitted). Here, both requirements are met.
First, Syville had unequivocal notice of the possibility of conversion. The City served Syville with a formal, written “Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Rule 12 Motion” on October 29, 2021, which stated: “[y]ou are warned that the Court may treat this motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Def. Notice at 3. The notice described the “nature and consequences of summary judgment,” Hernandez, 582 F.3d at 308 (citing McPherson, 174 F.3d at 282), including that Syville's claims may be dismissed without a trial if he did not respond to the motion on time by “filing sworn affidavits as required by Rule 56(c) and/or other documents.” Def. Notice at 3. It explained that he may not oppose the motion “simply by relying upon the allegations in [his] complaint” but rather “must submit evidence . . . countering the facts asserted by the defendant and raising specific facts that support [his] claim[,]” otherwise “the Court may accept defendant's facts as true.” Id. The City also attached the text of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to its notice. Id. at 4-6. As in Cuffee, such notice is considered “unequivocal” as courts in this Circuit “regularly hold” the type of notice given here to be “sufficient notice to convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Cuffee, 2018 WL 1136923, at *5 (collecting cases).
Second, Syville had a reasonable opportunity to present relevant material because he filed an opposition to the City's motion. See Pl. Opp, Dkt. No. 54. In his opposition, Syville stated that he was “answering the motion set forth by [the City's counsel]” and he himself attached the General Release on which Defendant relies. Id. at 1, 5. Notably, he did not oppose conversion of the motion to one for summary judgment. Moreover, it is clear he was familiar with the General Release submitted by the City because he submitted it as part of his opposition as well. See Timperio v. Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center, 384 F.Supp.3d 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2019) (motion to dismiss converted to motion for summary judgment when plaintiff did not oppose conversion and supplemented record with affidavit which made clear he was familiar with documents submitted by defendant).
Because Syville had notice of the possibility for conversion and a reasonable opportunity to present pertinent material to the Court, the motion to dismiss should be converted to one for summary judgment.
2. The General Release Bars Syville's Claims
The General Release releases the City and its employees from liability for the civil rights claims which give rise to this case. “It is well established that settlement agreements are contracts and must therefore be construed according to general principles of contract law.” Murphy v. Institute of Int'l Educ., No. 20-CV-3632, 2022 WL 1217180, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2022) (quoting Collins v. Harrison-Bode, 303 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 2002) (cleaned up)); see also Mateo v. Carinho, 799 Fed.Appx. 51, 53 (2d Cir. 2020). Moreover, “[a] release is a species of contract and is governed by the principles of contract law.” Mandal v. City of New York, No. 02-CV-1234 (WHP) (FM), 2008 WL 754666, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.17, 2008) (cleaned up). “Under New York law, a release that is clear and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily entered into will be enforced.” Compunnel Software Group, Inc. v. Gupta, 859 Fed.Appx. 596, 598 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1998)).
In this case, the General Release in question a) is unambiguous, and b) was entered into knowingly and voluntarily.
a. The language of the General Release is unambiguous
“Where the language of [a] release is clear, effect must be given to the intent of the parties as indicated by the language employed.” Mateo, 799 Fed.Appx. at 53 (cleaned up). If “general language is used in the releasing document, the release is to be construed most strongly against the releasor.” Tromp v. City of New York, 465 Fed.Appx. 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2012). As noted above, on June 17, 2020, Syville agreed to:
release and discharge defendant City of New York; its successors or assigns; and all past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents of the City of New York or any entity represented by the Office of Corporation Counsel . . . from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of my civil rights and any and all related state law claims, from the beginning of the world to the date of this General Release.
This language unambiguously bars Syville from bringing civil rights claims that arose before June 17, 2020 against the City or its employees. See, e.g., Lloyd v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-8539 (RJS), 2017 WL 2266876, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) (identical language “unambiguously” precluded plaintiff from bringing civil rights claims); Roberts, 2015 WL 670180, at *5 (identical language “not reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation”). “[C]ourts in the Circuit have consistently concluded that similarly phrased releases between federal civil rights claimants and the City of New York bar suit against the City and its employees for alleged conduct predating the release.” Lloyd, 2017 WL 2266876, at *3 (internal citations omitted) (collecting cases); see also Rodriguez v. City of New York, 18-CV-4805 (NRB), 2021 WL 5360120, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021) (“numerous courts have considered [identical] language in the Release and found it unambiguous”). Moreover, “courts have found parties' intent to be clear where they entered into an agreement that explicitly included the term ‘general release,' even where one party was pro se and later asserted confusion as to the meaning and effect of the term.” Pullman v. Alpha Media Pub., Inc., No. 12-CV-01924 (PAC) (SN), 2014 WL 5043319, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014) (collecting cases), adopted as modified by 2014 WL 5042250 (Sept. 10, 2014).
Syville filed this lawsuit on June 16, 2020, the day before he signed the General Release. The events underlying the action thus “necessarily” occurred prior to the date of the General Release. Additionally, after a review of the Complaint and Supplemental Pleading, it is clear to the Court that the violations alleged by Syville are civil rights violations, as they pertain to discrimination on the basis of disability and retaliation for advocacy. Thus, Syville's Complaint is barred by the language releasing the City and its employees “from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of [Syville's] civil rights and any and all related state law claims” that pre-date June 17, 2020. General Release; see Roberts, 2015 WL 670180, at *5 (“Courts in this Circuit repeatedly hold that [general] releases [for violations of civil rights] . . . bar suit against the city and its employees for conduct that pre-dates the release.”) (collecting cases).
Syville himself identifies the following as the federal laws at issue in this case: the Americans with Disabilities Act, Human Rights Act, Rehabilitation Act, Retaliation, HIPAA, Discrimination, and Harassment. Compl. at 4. HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, is inapposite here as it does not provide for a private right of action. See, e.g., Warren Pearl Const. Corp. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 639 F.Supp.2d 371, 377 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 22, 2009) (collecting cases).
Moreover, Syville and the City of New York explicitly exempted another pending lawsuit from the General Release, Syville v. City of New York, et al., No. 20-CV-571 (LTS) (SDA), but did not exempt this lawsuit. Had the parties desired to explicitly exempt the current action as well, they could have done so. See Tromp, 465 Fed.Appx. at 53 (“If the parties had desired to enter into a limited release, barring only claims arising out of the specific events alleged in [the case that settled], they could have expressly done so, but they did not.”) (cleaned up); see Bolling v. City of New York, 18-CV-5406 (PGG) (RWL), 2020 WL 8671940, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2020) (incident giving rise to lawsuit not exempted from release when another incident was listed as exception but not the one in question), adopted by 2021 WL 961758 (Mar. 15, 2021). Thus, because no exception was made for any other civil rights claims or cases that pre-dated the release, the current action is not exempted from the release.
As the City points out in its memorandum, while Syville was aware of the claims being asserted in this action when he signed the release, as they were filed one day prior to his executing it, and he was certainly aware of the mechanism by which to exclude claims from an otherwise general release (as he did so in the case filed at 20-CV-571), Defendants were not aware - and had no way of being aware - of the existence of this action when the other lawsuit was settled as they had not yet been served. Def. Mem. at 6.
b. Syville signed the General Release knowingly and voluntarily
A reasonable jury would find that Syville signed the General Release “knowingly and voluntarily” because he does not dispute the authenticity of the General Release or the conditions under which he signed it. Pampillonia, 138 F.3d at 463; see Drew, 2019 WL 3714932, at *3 (“because [Plaintiff] did not challenge the authenticity of the release, his signature on the release, or conditions under which he signed the release, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that [Plaintiff] did not sign the release discharging the City from any liability”). “[A] release is binding on the parties absent a showing of fraud, duress, undue influence, or some other valid legal defense.” Davis & Assocs., Inc. v. Health Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 168 F.Supp.2d 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Duran v. J.C. Refinishing Contracting Corp., 421 Fed.Appx. 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2011) (courts in New York can vacate a settlement in cases of fraud, collusion, mistake, or duress).
Here, Syville presents no such arguments. Despite the opportunity to do so in his opposition, Syville does not assert that he entered into the General Release under any fraud or mistake, nor does he challenge the authenticity or validity of the release. Id. Additionally, Syville's status as a pro se litigant does not change the analysis, as courts in this district have “consistently enforced similar general releases in civil rights actions brought by pro se litigants against the City and its agents.” Bolling, 2020 WL 8671940, at *5 (collecting cases). Thus, Syville has not established a genuine dispute with respect to whether he entered into the release “knowingly and voluntarily.” Pampillonia, 138 F.3d at 463.
In sum, the General Release should be enforced, and summary judgment granted for defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City's motion to dismiss the Complaint should be converted into one for summary judgment and granted.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Opinion to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections, and any responses to such objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Paul G. Gardephe, United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Gardephe.
FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Garwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).