Opinion
Case No. 2:19-cv-307-JMC-MGB
04-10-2020
Jeremy Shay Sweat, #326997, Plaintiff, v. Brian Stirling and Michael McCall, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jeremy Sweat, a pro se state prisoner, has filed a prison-conditions lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 21.) The defendants have moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 46.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the motion and submit a recommendation to the District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends granting the defendants' motion and dismissing this case with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Sweat is an inmate at Evans Correctional Institution in South Carolina. (See Dkt. No. 27.) In his second amended complaint, he challenges two conditions he faced when he was previously housed at Perry Correctional Institution and Lieber Correctional Institution. First, he alleges that he is Wiccan and has been denied access to a Wiccan bible and other religious materials. (Dkt. No. 21 at 4-6.) Second, he alleges he was not provided food with the amount of protein his body needs. (Id. at 4-5.)
Defendant Brian Stirling is the Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. (Dkt. No. 46-1 at 1.) When Sweat filed this action, Defendant Michael McCall was the Department's Deputy Director of Operations. (See id.) McCall has since retired. (Id.) Sweat is suing these two defendants for violating the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of religious exercise and the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 4.) Sweat wants $5,000 in damages from each defendant, as well as an injunction requiring the defendants to allow Sweat access to Wiccan materials and to give him food with adequate protein. (Id. at 6.)
The defendants have moved for summary judgment, and Sweat has filed two responses. (Dkt. Nos. 49 & 52.) The motion is therefore ripe for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Facts are 'material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." News & Observer Pub'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When a court considers the motion, "'the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'" Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
Because Sweat is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing Sweat's filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
The defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment for several reasons: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars Sweat's lawsuit; (2) they are not "persons" who can be sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) Sweat has not shown they were personally involved in any of the alleged harm at issue in this case; and (4) Sweat has not shown that prospective injunctive relief would be appropriate against either defendant. (See generally Dkt. No. 46-1.) The undersigned addresses these arguments in turn.
I. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Sweat wrote his second amended complaint on a court-approved form for prisoner civil rights actions. The portion of the form where the plaintiff identifies defendants includes two boxes where the plaintiff can place check marks indicating whether he is suing a defendant in his individual capacity, his official capacity, or both. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 2-3.) For both Stirling and McCall, Sweat checked only the box for official capacity. (Id.) Seizing on those check marks, the defendants argue they are immune from Sweat's lawsuit. (Dkt. 46-1 at 2.)
The Eleventh Amendment prevents a state from being sued in federal court by its own citizens. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment's immunity covers the state itself, its agencies, divisions, and departments, and state officials sued in their official capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). When Sweat filed this lawsuit, both defendants were officials in the Department of Corrections; McCall has since retired, but Stirling is still the Department's director. The Department is a state agency, and the defendants are (or, at the relevant times, were) state officials. See McFadden v. Stirling, No. 2:15-cv-4144-JMC-MGB, 2016 WL 11220472, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 4875575 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2017). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment protects the defendants. Sweat has offered no argument or evidence to the contrary.
The defendants appear to contend the Eleventh Amendment completely bars Sweat's lawsuit. (See Dkt. No. 46-1 at 2-3.) "However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions for prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities." Manion v. N.C. Med. Bd., 693 F. App'x 178, 180 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). The undersigned concludes the Eleventh Amendment bars Sweat's lawsuit only insofar as he seeks money damages against the defendants.
While sovereign immunity does not bar suit where a state has given consent to be sued, or where Congress abrogates the sovereign immunity of a state, neither exception applies here. Congress did not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity through § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court, see S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
II. Whether the Defendants Are Persons Under § 1983
Sweat is suing under § 1983. (Dkt. No. 21 at 4.) By its terms, that statute allows suits only against a "person." See Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983 a "person" includes individuals and "bodies politic and corporate"). A state official acting in his official capacity is not a "person" for the purposes of § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. The defendants argue that because Sweat has sued them only in their official capacities, his § 1983 claims against them fail because they are not persons in those capacities. (Dkt. No 46-1 at 2.)
The undersigned agrees. As the defendants recognize, however, this conclusion only prevents Sweat from pursuing damages claims against them. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10 (noting that "a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, [is] a person under § 1983" (citations omitted)). It does not categorically bar his pursuit of injunctive relief. See id.
III. Religious Materials Claim
Sweat alleges that in Perry and Lieber, he was denied access to a Wiccan bible and other Wiccan material. (Dkt. No. 21 at 6.) He contends this violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom. (See id. at 4.)
The defendants argue this claim fails because Sweat has not shown that they were personally involved in any instances of Sweat being denied access to his legal materials. The undersigned agrees.
To recover under § 1983, one thing a plaintiff must show is that the defendants were personally involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant, as well as an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct). That is because § 1983 does not create vicarious liability for supervisors based on their subordinates' conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
As the defendants point out, Sweat has not presented any evidence that either of them had any involvement in the instances where he could not access his religious materials. Indeed, when Sweat was at Perry and Lieber, the defendants were high-level Department officials. Nothing in the record indicates either of them even were aware of the issue, let alone that they condoned it. Cf. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining a § 1983 plaintiff can establish a supervisor's personal involvement by showing "(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
As the defendants point out, the Department recognizes Wicca as a religion, and Department policy allows prisoners to possess one primary source book for their religion. (Dkt. No. 46-1 at 6.) Sweat's contention is that some Department employees are not following that policy for Wiccans. (Dkt. No. 52 at 1.) Going forward, it may be prudent for Stirling to investigate whether his employees are violating a policy aimed at protecting prisoners' religious freedoms.
In addition, the undersigned agrees with the defendants that, even if Sweat had proven his claim, an injunction against McCall would be inappropriate. Because McCall is retired from the Department of Corrections, he no longer has any official capacity .
If the Court were to find a genuine issue of fact existed on the merits of either of Sweat's injunctive-relief claims against McCall, the undersigned would recommend substituting in the successor to McCall's former position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (allowing courts to order substitution of a public official's successor in his or her official capacity); Haggwood v. Magill, No. 5:15-cv-3271-RMG, 2016 WL 4149986, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2016) (substituting in new warden in prisoner's lawsuit seeking injunction after warden that prisoner originally sued retired).
In sum, the defendants appear to be entitled to summary judgment on Sweat's First Amendment claim.
IV. Nutrition Claim
Sweat's other claim is that he was not provided food containing all the protein his body needs at Lieber or at Perry. (Dkt. No. 21 at 4, 5.) He contends this was cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 4.)
The defendants again argue Sweat has not shown they were personally involved in this issue. The undersigned again agrees.
In addition, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sweat was actually malnourished. "[T]o demonstrate cruel and unusual punishment, a plaintiff must establish a serious deprivation of a basic human need and that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to prison conditions." Peterson v. Barksdale, No. 7:16-cv-217, 2017 WL 2963519, at *6 (W.D. Va. July 11, 2017) (Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate nutrition in prison food). To establish that first requirement, the plaintiff "must show that he suffered some serious physical or emotional injury as a result" of the denial of adequate nutrition. Id. The defendants have provided copies of Sweat's prison medical records from 2018 and 2019, a period covering the alleged denial of adequate food. (See Dkt. No. 46-3.) In one visit, a doctor noted Sweat was "well nourished" at 189 pounds. (Id. at 10-11.) Other treatments notes show Sweat maintaining that approximate weight. (Id. at 2, 5.) Even when viewed in the light most favoring Sweat, the records do not suggest that Sweat was lacking protein in his diet or he was suffering any effects from such a lack of protein. Sweat has not come forward with any evidence that creates a reasonable inference to the contrary.
Acknowledging those records, Sweat responds he has maintained his weight because his family gives him money to buy extra food from the prison canteen. (Dkt. No. 49 at 1; Dkt. No. 52 at 1.) By saying that, he effectively concedes that any lack of protein in prison meals has not caused him any harm because he has gotten his protein another way. Moreover, Sweat's response tends to undermine the central premise of his claim. As the district court explained in Peterson, the failure to meet an inmate's basic nutritional needs is cruel and unusual punishment because the inmate relies on prison officials to provide food; if the official fails to do so, the inmate's basic nutritional needs will not be met." 2017 WL 2963519, at *6 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Here, Sweat is relying—at least in part—on his family for his nutritional needs.
Finally, as discussed above, even if Sweat could prove this claim, an injunction against McCall would be inappropriate because McCall has retired.
In sum, the defendants appear to be entitled to summary judgment on Sweat's Eighth Amendment claim.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends the Court grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismiss this case with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. April 10, 2020
Charleston, South Carolina
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).