Opinion
FA164068976
07-27-2016
Anthony Sulpasso v. Marie Sulpasso
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO REARGUE
Kenneth L. Shluger, J.
The question presented is whether a restraining order pursuant to Gen. statutes section 46b-15 can issue on the basis of a court finding that the respondent had engaged in stalking as the term is commonly understood, even though he had not engaged in stalking in violation of Connecticut Gen. statutes section 53a-181d.
A review of the record reveals that the parties are engaged in a high conflict and contentions dissolution of marriage action. The applicant sought a restraining order, pursuant to Gen. Statutes Section 46b-15 against his wife claiming, inter alia, that " she put a tracking device on my vehicle and would routinely drive by the house to check on me. On a regular basis, she would call repeatedly to express her frustration with me in the proceedings. On five occasions, the contacts got to such an extreme that I had to call the East Haven Police Department to try to get the contacts to stop." The court, Goodrow, J., issued an ex parte restraining order on June 15, 2016, and the matter returned to court on June 29, 2016 wherein the applicant requested that the restraining order be extended for an additional one-year period. The parties appeared and were represented by counsel.
The court considered all of the evidence and concluded that in fact, the respondent engaged in stalking behavior, extending the restraining an additional one year.
Now comes the respondent and claims in her motion to reargue dated July 15, 2016 that since the respondent did not engage in stalking in violation of Connecticut Gen. Statutes Section 53a-181d the court is powerless to grant a restraining order based on stalking behavior as it is commonly understood.
The court disagrees.
Connecticut Gen. Statutes Section 53a-181d states that:
For the purposes of this section, " course of conduct" means two or more acts, including, but not limited to, acts in which a person directly, indirectly or through a third party, by any action, method, device or means, (1) follows, lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates with or sends unwanted gifts to, a person, or (2) interferes with a person's property.
Thus, it appears that for purposes of violating the Penal Code as it pertains to stalking, one must engage in a " course of conduct" meaning two or more acts. Nonetheless, for purposes of sustaining the imposition of a Civil restraining order, a lower standard applies.
The court in Princess Q.H. v. Robert H., 150 Conn.App. 105, 89 A.3d 896, 902 (2014) addressed a similar factual circumstance wherein the respondent claimed that since he only perpetrated a single act, he had not committed " stalking" as defined in the Penal Code and that a restraining order could not issue against him. The court held otherwise and observed:
The legislature did not provide a definition of " stalking" as that word is used in § 46b-15(a). Although it could have done so, it did not incorporate by reference the definitions of " stalking" that are contained in the Penal Code, specifically, § 53a-181d and General Statutes § 53a-181e. Accordingly, we look to the commonly approved usage of the word stalking. See O'Dell v. Kozee, 307 Conn. 231, 243-44, 53 A.3d 178 (2012) (declining to rely on Penal Code definition but relying on commonly approved usage); In re Rachel J., 97 Conn.App. 748, 759-60, 905 A.2d 1271 (same), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 941, 912 A.2d 476 (2006).
" Stalking" is defined as " [t]he act or an instance of following another by stealth . . . The offense of following or loitering near another, often surreptitiously, to annoy or harass that person or to commit a further crime such as assault or battery." Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009). To " loiter" means " to remain in an area for no obvious reason." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2011). We interpret the statute in accordance with these commonly accepted definitions, satisfied that the plain meaning of the statute does not yield an unworkable or absurd result. We reject the defendant's reliance on the narrower definitions of stalking codified in our Penal Code. In so doing, we are mindful that our legislature reasonably may have chosen to rely on a narrower definition of stalking in delineating criminal liability, while deciding that a broader definition of stalking was appropriate in the dissimilar context of affording immediate relief to victims under § 46b-15. See Putman v. Kennedy, 104 Conn.App. 20, 25-26, 932 A.2d 439 (2007) (" [t]he legislature promulgated § 46b-15 to provide an expeditious means of relief for abuse victims")." Id., 441-43.
Thus, one need not engage in behaviors which would lead to criminal prosecution under General Statutes § 53a-181 before a court can issue a civil restraining order (emphasis provided).
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to reargue is denied.