Opinion
No. 87424-COA
06-06-2024
Tiffany R. SULLIVAN, Appellant, v. James D. SULLIVAN, Respondent.
Tiffany R. Sullivan appeals from a district court order modifying child custody, as well as a post-trial order denying a motion for new trial and amending the findings. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Dawn Throne, Judge.
With respect to the post-trial orders, we note that an order denying a motion to amend findings of fact and conclusions of law is not appealable pursuant to NRAP 3A. See Casino Operations, Inc. v. Graham, 86 Nev. 764, 765, 476 P.2d 953, 954 (1970) (concluding that an order denying a motion to amend findings is not appealable under former NRCP 72(b)). That being said, a final order that is altered or amended may be appealable if those amendments substantively alter the final order. See NRAP 4(a)(5). Here, the district court granted Tiffany's motion in part and amended two of its findings, but neither of those amendments substantively altered its final custody determination. Furthermore, Tiffany identifies this issue on appeal only summarily and makes no argument. We therefore need not consider the post-trial amendments. See Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) (providing that arguments not raised on appeal are deemed waived). Nevertheless, we address the amended findings in our discussion of the best interest factors in this order. As to the motion for new trial, Powell also applies, and Tiffany does not make a cogent argument, so this court need not consider the order denying the new trial on appeal. See Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (explaining that this court need not consider an appellant’s argument that is not cogently argued or lacks the support of relevant authority). We address these post-trial orders only to the extent necessary to contextualize the proceedings below.
AFFIRMED.