Opinion
2012-04-17
In the Matter of ALAYSHA E. (Anonymous).Suffolk County Department of Social Services, respondent;John R.E. (Anonymous), appellant.
Joseph R. Faraguna, Sag Harbor, N.Y., for appellant. Dennis M. Cohen, County Attorney, Central Islip, N.Y. (James G. Bernet of counsel), for respondent.
Joseph R. Faraguna, Sag Harbor, N.Y., for appellant. Dennis M. Cohen, County Attorney, Central Islip, N.Y. (James G. Bernet of counsel), for respondent. Mary C. Pelaez, Central Islip, N.Y., attorney for the child.RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SHERI S. ROMAN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In a child protective proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the father appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Hoffmann, J.), dated July 5, 2011, which, after a fact-finding and dispositional hearing, found that he had abused and neglected the subject child, and placed him under the supervision of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services pursuant to enumerated terms and conditions.
ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
“At a fact-finding hearing in a child protective proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the petitioner has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject child has been abused or neglected” ( Matter of Kassandra V. [ Sylvia L.], 90 A.D.3d 940, 941, 935 N.Y.S.2d 607; see Family Ct. Act § 1046[b][i]; Matter of Ndeye D. [ Benjamin D.], 85 A.D.3d 1026, 1027, 926 N.Y.S.2d 119).
Contrary to the father's contention, the Family Court's determination that he sexually abused the subject child is supported by a preponderance of the evidence ( see Family Ct. Act §§ 1012[e][iii], 1046 [b][i]; Penal Law § 130.65[3]; Matter of Lindsay B. [ Carlton B.], 80 A.D.3d 763, 764, 916 N.Y.S.2d 778). The Family Court has considerable discretion in deciding whether a child's out-of-court statements describing incidents of abuse have been reliably corroborated and whether the record as a whole supports such a finding ( see Matter of Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d 532, 536, 549 N.Y.S.2d 643, 548 N.E.2d 1294; Matter of Alexander M. [ Benjamin M.], 88 A.D.3d 794, 795, 930 N.Y.S.2d 893). Here, the child's sworn in-court testimony sufficiently corroborated her consistent out-of-court description of the abuse ( see Matter of Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d at 536–537, 549 N.Y.S.2d 643, 548 N.E.2d 1294; Matter of Bianca M., 282 A.D.2d 536, 536, 722 N.Y.S.2d 766).
Further, the Family Court's determination that the father neglected the subject child also was supported by a preponderance of the evidence ( see Family Ct. Act § 1046[b][i] ). The evidence established that the father was highly intoxicated in the child's presence, the child was not appropriately dressed for the cold weather, and that the father exposed the child to conditions which created an imminent danger of impairing her physical, emotional, or mental condition ( see Family Ct. Act § 1012[f][i][B]; Matter of Samara M., 19 A.D.3d 214, 214, 797 N.Y.S.2d 58; Matter of Jessica DiB., 6 A.D.3d 533, 534, 775 N.Y.S.2d 69).