Opinion
24A-CR-1042
08-30-2024
James A. Sturgel, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Dearborn Superior Court The Honorable Jonathan N. Cleary, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 15D01-0805-FA-2
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BRADFORD, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] James Sturgel was on probation for a child-molesting conviction when he violated the terms of his probation. After Sturgel admitted to the violations, the trial court revoked ten years of his previously-suspended sentence. Sturgel claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve ten years of his previously-suspended sentence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In 2008, Sturgel pled guilty to Class A felony child molesting and received a sentence of thirty years of incarceration, with fifteen years suspended to probation. Ten years later, the State released Sturgel to probation. Just over one year after being released to probation, Sturgel admitted to having violated the terms of his probation by committing Level 6 felony failure to register for the sexual-offender registry, having contact with three minor children, and committing perjury. The trial court revoked four years of Sturgel's fifteen-year suspended sentence.
[¶3] In December of 2022, the State again released Sturgel to probation. Upon his release, Sturgel sought assistance from a recovery-support specialist and, within six months, had a vehicle and housing. Sturgel gained full-time employment, regularly checked in with the probation department, and attended sex-offender maintenance and monitoring classes as required by the terms of his probation.
[¶4] By the fall of 2023, Sturgel had purchased a camper and was living on a friend's property in Switzerland County. Around this time, Sturgel lost his job after having what he described as a mental breakdown. On November 16, 2023, probation officers conducted a home visit at 12:30 a.m., and Sturgel was not present at his residence. One of the conditions of Sturgel's probation is that he must be in his residence from 11:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.
[¶5] The State alleged a second probation violation, and a warrant was issued for Sturgel's arrest. Police officers attempted to serve the warrant for three consecutive days; however, Sturgel, aware of the warrant, did not answer his door on one occasion and did not report to his probation appointment because he knew that he would be arrested. The State charged Sturgel with Level 5 felony failure to register in Switzerland County. Police arrested Sturgel after he had been discovered by a security officer at Belterra Casino. In February of 2024, Sturgel pled guilty to the Level 5 felony charge and was sentenced to four years, all suspended to probation.
[¶6] In April of 2024, the trial court conducted a sentencing and probationrevocation hearing in this case. At the hearing, Sturgel testified regarding his attempts at rehabilitation, his first probation violation, his two child-molesting convictions, and his attempts to evade service of the warrant. The trial court noted that "the culpability of Mr. Sturgel is extremely high, the severity of the crime is high, and the damage to others has been high." Tr. Vol. II p. 44. The trial court further noted that this was Sturgel's second probation violation, both based on new convictions for failure to register, and he has two felony child- molesting convictions. Moreover, the trial court acknowledged Sturgel's attempts to evade the warrant; noncompliance with the conditions of his sexoffender probation, including failing to attend certain classes to avoid being arrested; and the trial court's prior patience with him. Consequently, the trial court ordered that Sturgel serve ten years of his previously-suspended sentence and extended his probation by one year.
Discussion and Decision
[¶7] Probation is a matter of grace left to the trial court's discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if a defendant violates any of the conditions. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3. "Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed." Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). "Accordingly, a trial court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard." Id. "An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances." Id.
[¶8] Probation revocation is a two-step process: First, the trial court must determine whether a probation violation actually occurred, and second, whether the violation warrants revocation. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). On review, we will "not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses and will look only to the evidence which supports the judgment and any reasonable inferences flowing therefrom." Richardson v. State, 890 N.E.2d 766, 768 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). Importantly, a trial court may revoke the defendant's probation upon proof of a single violation. Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), trans. denied.
[¶9] Sturgel argues that, while he did violate the terms of his probation, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve ten years of his previously-suspended sentence because he has made "a substantial effort to be a law abiding citizen" and "his progress and effort far outweigh[] his mistake[.]" Appellant's Br. p. 8. We disagree. Because Sturgel admitted to having violated the terms of his probation, we proceed to step two of the analysis and consider whether his violations warrant revocation. See Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582.
[¶10] As noted, Sturgel has committed multiple probation violations and admits that they were "more than a mere technical violation of the rules." Appellant's Br. p. 8. First, Sturgel was absent from his residence past curfew when probation officers conducted a home visit, despite knowing that he was required to be in his home between 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. Second, Sturgel admitted to Level 5 felony failure to register after evading service of an arrest warrant for over seventy-two hours.
[¶11] Notably, the commission of a new felony alone, even if a defendant is not convicted of it, can be sufficient grounds for a trial court to revoke a defendant's placement in probation. Dokes v. State, 971 N.E.2d 178, 180-81 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012). Moreover, even a single violation can support the revocation of a defendant's probation. See Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582. The trial court noted Sturgel's attempts to evade the arrest warrant; noncompliance with the conditions of his sex-offender probation, including failing to attend certain classes to avoid being arrested; his previous efforts to comply with the terms of his probation; and its prior patience with him. Based on Sturgel's multiple violations, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that revocation was warranted and ordering him to serve ten years of his previously-suspended sentence.
[¶12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.