Opinion
21-CV-06248 EAW
2022-06-06
Nicholas Bates STUMPF, Plaintiff, v. Linda MAYWALT, Mary Ellen Degrave, Jeffrey Cooley, Katherine Resch, Olivia Christman, Vince Arcesi, Wonisha-Ann Greenlee, Debra Indivino, Honorable James A. Vazzana, Defendants.
Nicholas Bates Stumpf, Hamlin, NY, Pro Se.
Nicholas Bates Stumpf, Hamlin, NY, Pro Se.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge
INTRODUCTION
Pro se plaintiff Nicholas Bates Stumpf ("Plaintiff") commenced the instant action on March 17, 2021, alleging violations of his civil rights by Defendants. (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. 2). On March 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint , which contains substantially the same allegations but names the Honorable James A. Vazzana as an additional defendant and amends the name of defendant "Vincent Arcarese" to "Vince Arcesi." (Dkt. 3 at 1). Plaintiff's amended complaint is accompanied by another in forma pauperis application. (Dkt. 4).
On May 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (Dkt. 5), which contains many of the same allegations as are contained in his previously-filed complaints. Plaintiff has already filed one amended complaint in this action (see Dkt. 3), and the Court did not previously grant him leave to file a second amended complaint. As further explained below, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to further amend his claims consistent with this Decision and Order, and therefore it will not consider the second amended complaint filed at Docket 5.
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's motions for in forma pauperis status, and they are granted. The Court has also reviewed Plaintiff's amended complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and finds that his claims stemming from the New York child custody proceedings must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, given Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will grant Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his claims.
In April 2022, the Court received an email with an attached letter from Plaintiff, containing further allegations relating to his claims. Plaintiff is hereby advised that an emailed letter is not the appropriate vehicle for supplementing his claims. Rather, as further explained below, Plaintiff may only supplement his claims by filing an amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's amended complaint. (Dkt. 3). As is required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff's allegations as true.
Plaintiff's claims stem from Defendants’ involvement in and handling of the state court custody proceedings involving his son and daughter. He alleges that Judge Vazzana violated his First Amendment rights by placing his children in a foster care family that attended religious practices against Plaintiff's beliefs, and also that he has been denied his right to a trial by jury when the court canceled two trial dates. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff alleges that defendant Waywalt, a child protection worker, removed his children based on speculation, that she has not addressed his objections to religious practices in his children's foster home, she attempted to end his weekend visitation, and she forced him to close his tobacco business as a condition of visitation. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff alleges that defendant Degrave, who is the girlfriend of his children's paternal great grandfather, filed an untrue petition in Monroe County Family Court, containing "profanity and libel about [his] character," and that Degrave's attorney, defendant Indivino, also defamed him in emails and before the court. (Id. at 7). He alleges that defendant Indivino also participated in "coercing agreements that were ... illegal to make between the court and myself," and that defendant Degrave has no custodial rights over his children. (Id. at 8). As against defendant Cooley, Plaintiff alleges that he entered his home without permission after an allegation concerning his children's mother, he coerced Plaintiff into a safety plan, had his children taken from him, and did not seek other options to keep the children home with Plaintiff. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges that defendant Christman assisted defendant Cooley in the decisions made the day his children were removed from his care, and that she took statements from his children against his wishes. (Id. at 8-9). He also alleges that she displayed a "Black Lives Matter" sticker on her vehicle, which he alleges is "an organization that terroristicly promotes against all race besides their own," and therefore she is not impartial. (Id. at 9). As to defendant Arcesi, Plaintiff alleges that he is the Monroe County Attorney for Child Protective Services (CPS), and he lied in a May 2020 petition, including because he stated that Plaintiff has a history of cocaine use and is on probation for larceny, as he does not have a history of drug use and has received only traffic violations. (Id. ). Plaintiff alleges that defendant Resch removed his children and coerced him into a safety plan by threatening that she would place the children into foster care and separate them. (Id. at 11). He also alleges that she had a conflict of interest, and that her reasons for removing the children—that the children saw their mother and they were present at his store—were unconstitutional. (Id. ). As to defendant Greenlee, Plaintiff alleges that she is a Monroe County Department of Social Services case worker, and she removed his children in May 2020 without a warrant and violated his right to due process by breaking up his family. (Id. at 11-12).
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of this conduct, he has sustained injuries to his reputation as a father and as a business owner, as well as post-traumatic stress disorder and an increase in his anxiety levels, and that both of his children show signs of trauma and separation anxiety. (Id. a 13). Based on these allegations, Plaintiff requests that the Court declare the New York State custody case to be unconstitutional and to dismiss it. (Id. ). He also requests monetary damages against each of the individual defendants. (Id. (requesting $500,00 against Judge Vazzana; $100,00 against defendant Maywalt; $100,00 against defendant Degrave; $25,000 against defendant Indivino; $25,000 against defendant Greenlee; $50,000 against Arcesi; $100,000 against defendant Cooley; $50,000 against defendant Christman; and $50,000 against defendant Resch)).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's Motion for In Forma Pauperis Status is Granted
Plaintiff's affirmation of poverty has been reviewed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements for in forma pauperis status and permission to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The Court now turns to its obligation to screen Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
II. Legal Standards
A. Screening Order
" Section 1915 requires the Court to conduct an initial screening of complaints filed by civil litigants proceeding in forma pauperis , to ensure that the case goes forward only if it meets certain requirements." Guess v. Jahromi , No. 6:17-CV-06121(MAT), 2017 WL 1063474, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017), reconsideration denied , No. 6:17-CV-06121(MAT), 2017 WL 1489142 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2017). In evaluating the complaint, a court must accept as true all of the plaintiff's factual allegations and must draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g. , Larkin v. Savage , 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003). Upon conducting this initial screening, a court must dismiss the case pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) "if the [c]ourt determines that the action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assocs. , 364 F. Supp. 2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). "In addition, if the Court ‘determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the action.’ " West v. Sanchez , No. 17-CV-2482 (MKB), 2017 WL 1628887, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ); see also English v. Sellers , No. 07-CV-6611L, 2008 WL 189645, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2008) ("[E]ven pleadings submitted pro se must fit within the subject matter jurisdiction of an Article III court....").
B. Section 1983 Claims
"To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Whalen v. Cnty. of Fulton , 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido , 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994) ). " Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James , 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ).
III. Analysis
A. Plaintiff's Claims Against Judge Vazzana
Plaintiff's claims against Judge Vazzana must be dismissed on the basis of judicial immunity. "Judicial immunity protects conduct taken as part of all judicial acts except those performed in the clear absence of jurisdiction." Walker v. Family Ct. Judge Catherine Cholakis , No. 1:19-CV-1288 (LEK/CFH), 2020 WL 3503158, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) (quotations and citations omitted). All of Plaintiff's claims against Judge Vazzana stem from alleged actions taken in connection with the child custody proceedings, including orders relating to foster care and continuing his trial. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Judge Vazzana are dismissed on this basis. See id. at *7 (explaining that judge had "absolute judicial immunity for all judicial actions that occurred within her judicial capacity" of determining the proper custody for the plaintiff's children, and noting that immunity applies "even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly" (citation omitted)).
B. Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the State Court Custody Proceedings
The Court next concludes that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, his claims relating to the state court custody proceedings are barred by the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). " Younger abstention is required when three conditions are met: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is implicated in that proceeding; and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of the federal constitutional claims." Morpurgo v. Incorp. Vill. of Sag Harbor , 327 F. App'x 284, 285 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). As to the first condition, " Younger applies if the federal action involves ongoing: (1) ‘state criminal prosecutions’; (2) ‘civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions’; or (3) civil proceedings that ‘implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.’ " Torres v. Gaines , 130 F. Supp. 3d 630, 636-37 (D. Conn. 2015) (quoting Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs , 571 U.S. 69, 72, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013) ). "Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have observed that a ‘state-initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents’ falls within the second category." Id. (citing Davis v. Baldwin , 594 F. App'x 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2015) ). "If the federal action falls into one of these three categories, a Court may then consider the additional factors ... [of] whether the state interest is vital and whether the state proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims." Id.
Turning to the additional conditions for application of the Younger abstention doctrine, it is well-settled that "a custody dispute ... raises important state interests." Amato v. McGinty , No. 1:17-CV-593 (MAD/ATB), 2017 WL 9487185, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2017) (citation and quotations omitted), adopted , 2017 WL 4083575 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017) ; Reinhardt v. Commonwealth of Mass. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 715 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (explaining that "there can be no doubt that a custody dispute that involves allegations of sexual abuse raises important state interests," and noting that "[q]uestions of family relations, especially when issues of custody and abuse are involved, are traditionally an area of state concern"). Put simply, Plaintiff asks the Court to declare unconstitutional and to dismiss the state custody proceedings, based on his allegations relating to Defendants’ procedure for removing his children, alleged coercion they used during that process, and making untrue statements during the state custody proceedings. These allegations are based solely on the state custody proceedings and "similarly involve the state's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children," and Plaintiff may raise these claims in the state proceedings. Torres , 130 F. Supp. 3d at 636. Plaintiff does not allege that he cannot vindicate his claims in state court. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed without prejudice on this basis. See, e.g. , Curcio v. Grossman , No. 22 CV 1648 (VB), 2022 WL 767167, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022) ("to the extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to intervene in [her pending state-court child-custody] ... proceeding, the Court also dismisses those claims under the Younger abstention doctrine"); Walker , 2020 WL 3503158, at *4 (where the plaintiff challenged a temporary order in an ongoing child custody dispute, alleging that the temporary custody order was gained under "lies and false pretenses and therefore should be considered invalid," finding application of Younger abstention barred the plaintiff's federal claims for injunctive relief); Herbert v. Cattaraugus Cnty. , No. 17-CV-248S, 2017 WL 5300009, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2017) (applying Younger abstention to the plaintiff's claims arising from ongoing Family Court proceedings, and noting that "[s]everal courts in this Circuit have held that Younger abstention applies in similar circumstances").
"The Supreme Court ... has not addressed whether Younger [abstention] applies to claims for monetary relief, ruling only that a stay rather than a dismissal of those claims would be appropriate," and "[t]he Second Circuit has reiterated that a stay may be appropriate but has not explicitly articulated whether a stay is made pursuant to Younger or some other equitable principle." Torres , 130 F. Supp. 3d at 636 ; see also Bukowski v. Spinner , 709 F. App'x 87, 88 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding Younger abstention applied only to Plaintiff's claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief). At least one court has applied the Younger abstention doctrine to a claim for money damages in an ongoing child custody proceeding, in which it stayed claims for monetary relief and administratively closed the action, with leave to reopen at the conclusion of the underlying state proceedings. See Torres , 130 F. Supp. 3d at 637 ("The application of Younger is appropriate here because the resolution of the claims for monetary damages still places the Court in the awkward position of having to question the validity of the underlying state proceedings, the sum and substance of Plaintiff[’s] claims.").
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief are also foreclosed by the domestic relations exception, it need not reach this issue. See Walker , 2020 WL 3503158, at *4 ("Although Younger does not bar Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief ... all of Plaintiff's claims seeking monetary relief are dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the domestic relations exception.").
To the extent Plaintiff's claims are "aimed at changing the results of domestic proceedings, including orders of child custody," they are barred by the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction, which "divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees." Rabinowitz v. New York , 329 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citation omitted); see also McArthur v. Bell , 788 F. Supp. 706, 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (where the plaintiff alleged violations of his constitutional rights and property damage, which were directly related to the child support determination, finding that domestic relations exception applied, because "to decide the instant case, this Court would be forced to re-examine and re-interpret all the evidence brought before the state court in the domestic relations proceedings," which "is the role of the Appellate Division ... not the role of this Court"). As presently alleged, the majority of Plaintiff's allegations are aimed at changing the results of the state custody proceedings. Accordingly, his claims for relief are also dismissed without prejudice on this basis.
"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars ‘federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’ " Walker , 2020 WL 3503158, at *3 (quoting Sykes v. Mel S. Harris and Assoc. LLC , 780 F.3d 70, 94 (2d Cir. 2015) ). "[T]he Rooker Feldman doctrine has four requirements: (1) the plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the loss must have occurred before the district court proceedings commenced; (3) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment; and (4) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment." Id. (citing Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections , 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) ). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to overturn final custody orders that have already been issued by the court, any such claims would also be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
C. Plaintiff's Remaining Claims
Construed broadly, the amended complaint contains allegations that are not specifically aimed at changing the results of the state custody proceedings, but rather seek compensation for injuries Plaintiff alleges he sustained due to unconstitutional actions taken by Defendants during the removal of his children. Indeed, "[f]ederal courts do have jurisdiction to decide tort, contract or civil rights questions in cases arising out of a domestic relations context when the underlying domestic relations issues are not in dispute." McArthur , 788 F. Supp. at 708. For example, Plaintiff makes allegations relating to an unlawful entry into his home in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as allegations of libel and defamation against certain defendants. (See, e.g. , Dkt. 3 at 8, 10-11 (alleging that defendant Cooley entered his home without permission, and that defendant Greenlee removed his children without a warrant); id. at 7, 9 (alleging that defendant Degrave filed a petition containing false information, defendant Indivino published libel in emails and on the record before the court, and defendant Arcesi lied about Plaintiff's criminal history in a May 2020 petition)).
Turning first to Plaintiff's unlawful entry claims, the Fourth Amendment requires that a state actor obtain a warrant, based on probable cause, before entering a residence and conducting a search. "Warrantless searches inside a home are presumptively unreasonable. However, police officers may enter a dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance." Tierney v. Davidson , 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations, quotations, and alteration omitted). Although Plaintiff states, in conclusory fashion, that certain defendants entered his home without a warrant, he provides no facts supporting his allegations, such as when the alleged entry occurred or the circumstances surrounding the entry. Further, it is not clear from the amended complaint whether the state actors in this case searched or seized anything (other than his children) from Plaintiff's home.
"To state a claim for libel under New York law, a complaint must allege ‘(1) a false statement that is (2) published to a third party (3) without privilege or authorization, and that (4) causes harm,’ unless the statement is defamatory per se , in which case harm is presumed." Goldman v. Reddington , 417 F. Supp. 3d 163, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citation omitted). "[U]nder New York law ... absolute immunity from liability for defamation exists for oral or written statements made ... in connection with a proceeding before a court." Brown v. Maxwell , 929 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotations and citations omitted). All the statements Plaintiff claims are libelous were made in connection with the child custody proceedings. Accordingly, as currently pleaded, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim for libel.
Plaintiff has also raised due process claims relating to the removal of his children. See, e.g., Southerland v. City of New York , 680 F.3d 127, 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (describing procedural due process claim, explaining that "[a]s a general rule ... before parents may be deprived of the care, custody, or management of their children without their consent, due process—ordinarily a court proceeding resulting in an order permitting removal—must be accorded to them" (quotations and citations omitted)); see also id. at 152 ("We have long recognized that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody and management of their children, and that the deprivation of this interest is actionable on a substantive due process theory." (quotations and citations omitted)). However, "because the law contemplates a careful balancing of interests, a parent's substantive constitutional rights are not infringed if a caseworker, in effecting a removal of a child from the parent's home, has a reasonable basis for thinking that a child is abused or neglected." Id.
Here, it is not entirely clear what process Plaintiff claims he was deprived. He has also failed to articulate why Defendants did not have a reasonable basis for removing his children from his home, but only that he believes the removal was improper. In other words, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants’ conduct was "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience," which is required to state a substantive due process claim. Id. at 151-52.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to bring the above-mentioned claims, given Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will grant him leave to file an amended complaint so that he may have the opportunity to better articulate them. Plaintiff must file his amended complaint within 45 days of the date of this Decision and Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within that time, the Clerk of Court is directed to dismiss this case without further Order of the Court.
Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint is intended to completely replace the prior complaint in the action, and thus it "renders [any prior complaint] of no legal effect." Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco , 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977) ; see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc. , 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). Therefore, any amended complaint must include all allegations against each Defendant so that the amended complaint stands alone as the only complaint that Defendants must answer in this action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 2; Dkt. 4) is granted. Plaintiff's amended complaint has been screened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claims relating to the state court child custody proceedings, and therefore they are dismissed without prejudice. Further, Plaintiff's claims against Judge Vazzana are dismissed based on judicial immunity. Given Plaintiff's pro se status, and as described above, the Court will grant him leave to file an amended complaint within 45 days of the date of this Decision and Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint by that date, the Clerk of Court is directed to dismiss this case without further Order of the Court.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Decision and Order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v. United States , 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962). Any request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal should be directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SO ORDERED.