Opinion
No. 105,457.
2012-09-7
Daniel L. STUECKEMANN and Cathy S. Stueckemann, Trustees Of The Stueckemann Living Trust Dated May 13, 2004 and Any Amendments Thereto, and Cedar Lake Association, a Kansas Not–For–Profit Corporation, Appellants, v. The CITY OF BASEHOR, Kansas, a Kansas Municipal Corporation, Appellee.
Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; David J. King, Judge. James R. Orr, of Westwood, for appellants. Patrick G. Reavey, of Reavey Law LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellee.
Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; David J. King, Judge.
James R. Orr, of Westwood, for appellants. Patrick G. Reavey, of Reavey Law LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellee.
Before GREENE, C.J., BUSER, J., and BUKATY, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
This is an action under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–538 challenging a municipality's unilateral annexation of land. The lawsuit was brought by Daniel and Cathy Stueckemann, Trustees of the Stueckemann Living Trust, and the Cedar Lake Association (Plaintiffs), against the City of Basehor (City). The district court denied the Plaintiff's challenge to invalidate the annexation and affirmed the City's decision to annex the land. We affirm the district court.
Factual and Procedural History
The land in question, known as Cedar Lake Estates (Estates), is a platted residential subdivision of about 115 acres adjoining the City's boundary. The land is served by the City's sewage treatment plant and accessed in part by the City's streets. In December 2008, the City adopted a resolution initiating the annexation process, and it gave notice of a February 9, 2009, public hearing to discuss the matter.
This was the City's second effort at annexation. The City had initiated the process earlier in 2008 but failures of notice and other irregularities prompted the City to start again. This time, the public hearing was held as scheduled, and the sign-in sheet shows more than 50 attendees.
The minutes of the hearing show the city administrator and city engineer gave presentations and answered questions from the attendees. Additionally, the attendees were allowed to address the City Council, and about 20 individuals expressed their views, including counsel for the Plaintiffs. Another 15 individuals submitted written comments.
When a council member moved to adjourn the hearing, Cathy Stueckemann, one of the Plaintiffs, objected that the hearing should be continued rather than adjourned. In response, the City Attorney acknowledged the hearing could be continued but stated, “[I]f all the public comments had been received there was no requirement that the public hearing be continued.” The City Attorney further “stated ... his opinion that the public hearing could be adjourned and a vote taken on the annexation ordinance at the February 17, 2009 meeting.” After suggesting Stueckemann “confer with her legal counsel Mr. Orr, who was still in the audience, about the issue,” the City Attorney asked Plaintiffs' counsel directly “what his opinion was.” According to the minutes, Plaintiffs' counsel “did not respond.” The City Council then adjourned the meeting until February 17, 2009.
On February 17, 2009, the City Council met again and held a “work session” of about 1 hour for “[d]iscussion of agenda items.” Next, the council went into public session and, after preliminary business, opened the floor to the public for comment “about any matter relating to City business that is listed on this Agenda.” Stueckemann and another person spoke out against the annexation. The City Council then voted to approve the annexation.
Plaintiffs filed the present action and eventually moved for summary judgment. The City responded that “summary judgment is not the appropriate mechanism for the Court's review of the annexation.” Instead, the City contended the district court should issue a “legal ruling on whether—based on the evidence available to the City Council at the time it made the annexation decision—Plaintiffs have shown, by a preponderance of the evidence,” that the City failed to meet the standards of K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–538.
When ruling, the district court did not cite or otherwise refer to the summary judgment statute, K.S.A. 60–256. Rather, it applied a “standard of review,” specifically “whether the party with the authority in annexation matters ... in exercising their responsibilities did so in accordance with the law within their authority and did so in a reasonable manner.” The district court observed that while it could not “act as a rubber stamp,” it was also “not free to substitute its own judgment for that of the elected representatives of the City.” Concluding that the City had “acted with authority,” had “acted with reasonableness,” had provided “an adequate plan for the extension of municipal services,” and that “the proceedings were regular,” the district court ruled in the City's favor and affirmed the City's decision to annex the land. The Plaintiffs appeal.
Standards of Review
At the outset, we must address our standards of review which apply to this case. First, we consider the appellate standard of review. The Plaintiffs state that the district court ruled on summary judgment. The City counters: “[S]ummary judgment was not the appropriate mechanism for the district court to review the annexation decision.” The City also observes that the district court “gave no indication it was utilizing summary judgment methodology in resolving the issue.”
The district court did not resolve any disputed questions of fact, and the Plaintiffs state that the district court “apparently entered its ruling on the facts as proffered” by the Plaintiffs. As a result, the procedural posture below is less important than the fact that, for reasons discussed next, the issues before us are purely questions of law. See McDowell v. City of Topeka, 239 Kan. 263, Syl. ¶ 1, 718 P.2d 1308 (1986) (“While the determination to annex real property to a city is a legislative decision, the interpretation of the statutes authorizing annexation is a matter of law subject to construction by the courts.”). Our review on appeal is, therefore, unlimited. See Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1193, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009).
There are other standards of review which are particularly relevant to our analysis. Importantly, K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–538, “sets out the court's scope of review in considering ... a challenge” to a city's unilateral annexation. Board of Sumner County Comm'rs v. City of Mulvane, 43 Kan.App.2d 500, Syl. ¶ 8, 227 P.3d 997,rev. denied 291 Kan. 910 (2010); see Parnacott, Annexation in Kansas, 70 J.K.B.A. 28, 29 (Nov.-Dec.2001) (distinguishing unilateral annexations under K.S.A. 12–520, island annexations under K.S.A. 12–520c, and county-approved annexations under K.S.A. 12–521). Plaintiffs contend this relatively new statute “represents a sea change from earlier annexation jurisprudence.”
The Plaintiffs assert that “[u]ntil relatively recently, the courts did not inquire as to the wisdom or propriety of the annexation.” They maintain K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–538, enacted in 2005, has “overturned this line of precedents.” See L.2005, ch. 155, sec. 3. Thus, according to the Plaintiffs, “the notion that a court must defer to the legislative judgment of a city is no longer valid law.” Compare Dillon Real Estate Co. v. City of Topeka, 284 Kan. 662, Syl. ¶ 3, 163 P.3d 298 (2007) (“The power of a municipality to alter its boundaries by annexation is vested absolutely and exclusively in the legislature.”); Eudora Development Co. of Kansas v. City of Eudora, 276 Kan. 626, Syl. ¶ 2, 78 P.3d 437 (2003) (“Courts have no supervisory power over legislative functions of a municipality and cannot substitute their judgment for that of the governing body.”). In marked contrast to these precedents, Plaintiffs encourage us to exercise “plenary authority” over the reasonableness of the annexation.
The City responds that while annexation “is the final decision of a legislative body, the ... City Council,” the decision itself is “quasi-judicial.” The City suggests we should be “ ‘highly deferential’ “ to such decisions and limit our inquiry to “whether the municipality has statutory authority to act, and has acted in accordance with that authority.” The City also denies that we may review the reasonableness of the annexation de novo, arguing for a “limited and deferential inquiry into the judgment of the [C]ity [C]ouncil.”
We will consider the prior statute to determine whether existing caselaw provides any guidance. The prior statute, enacted in 1974 and now repealed but still found at K.S.A. 12–520(h), gave individual landowners standing to challenge unilateral annexations. See L.2005, ch. 186, sec. 6; L.1974, ch. 56, sec. 4; Sabatini v. Jayhawk Construction Co., 214 Kan. 408, 411–12, 520 P.2d 1230 (1974); Babcock v. City of Kansas City, 197 Kan. 610, 617, 419 P .2d 882 (1966); Parnacott, Annexation in Kansas, 70 J.K.B.A. at 36 n. 144. The statute provided:
“Any owner of land annexed by a city under the authority of this section, within 30 days next following the publication of the ordinance annexing the land, may maintain an action in the district court of the county in which the land is located challenging the authority of the city to annex the land and the regularity of the proceedings had in connection therewith.” K.S.A. 12–520(h).
The 1974 amendments were construed in Clarke v. City of Wichita, 218 Kan. 334, 543 P.2d 973 (1975). Our Supreme Court first noted its long-standing position that the legislature may “grant municipalities the authority to extend their boundaries provided the grant be accompanied by adequate standards or guideposts for its exercise.” 218 Kan, at 342; see City of Emporia v. Smith, 42 Kan. 433, 435–36, 22 P. 616 (1889). The 1974 amendments, which also required notice to landowners and a public hearing on the proposed annexation, were designed to allow “the affected landowner” to “attempt to persuade the City that annexation would not be in the best interest of either party.” 218 Kan. at 349–50.
Where a municipality nevertheless imposes annexation against the wishes of one or more landowners, the prior caselaw limited the courts to asking whether the municipality had acted with statutory authority and followed proper procedures. 218 Kan. at 349. Similar to the Plaintiffs here, the appellants in Clarke argued that the 1974 amendments went further and required the courts to consider “ ‘the reasonableness, wisdom, necessity or advisability of annexing.’ “ 218 Kan. at 349. Our Supreme Court conceded that a court could consider reasonableness if by that were meant whether the municipality had exceeded statutory authorization or violated constitutional guarantees. 218 Kan. at 349. However, the Supreme Court repeated that courts should “not examine the wisdom, necessity or advisability of the annexation.” 218 Kan. at 350. Such “matters discretionary in nature involving economic and political considerations entrusted to the governing body of the City [are] outside judicial cognizance.” 218 Kan. at 350.
Plaintiffs insist Clarke is no longer good law, relying in part on a conference committee report brief prepared by the Legislative Research Department. By its own terms, however, the conference committee report brief does “not express legislative intent,” a caveat our Supreme Court has noted before. See McCracken v. Kohl, 286 Kan. 1114, 1121–22, 191 P.3d 313 (2008) (identifying reliance on such material as a “problem with McCracken's argument”). As a result, we take little guidance from the conference committee report brief and instead focus on the statutory language and caselaw precedent.
The new statute, K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–538, provides in relevant part:
“Any owner of land annexed by a city under the authority of K.S .A. 12–520(a)(1) through (6), and amendments thereto, and any city whose nearest boundary line is located within 1/2 mile of the land being so annexed, within 30 days next following the publication of the ordinance annexing the land, may maintain an action in district court of the county in which the land is located challenging the authority of the city to annex the land, whether the annexation was reasonable, whether the service plan was adequate and the regularity of the proceeding had in connection with the annexation procedures.”
This statute, like the prior version at K.S.A. 12–520(h), does not provide standing to assert individual property rights so much as standing to attack a municipality's authority for annexation. See Dillon Real Estate Co., 284 Kan. 662, Syl. ¶ 3 (“the failure of a city to comply with requirements of the legislative enactment which gave it power and authority to annex territory nullifies the attempted annexation ordinance”); Babcock, 197 Kan. 610, Syl. ¶ 1 (“The extension of the corporate limits of a city to include new territory, under statutory authority, is, in effect, a reorganization of the city, and an action attacking the legality of such reorganization attacks the corporate integrity of the city in the same manner as if the city's original organization were attacked .”). Stated another way, the “setting of boundaries is a political decision of the state legislature, delegated to local governments, and is not a deprivation of any property right without due process.” Parnacott, Annexation in Kansas, 70 J.K.B.A. at 36 n .159 (citing State, ex rel. v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, 527 P.2d 1340 [1974] ).
Under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–538, one method a landowner may attack the annexation is to challenge whether the annexation was “reasonable.” We agree with the district court's refusal to interpret this issue as de novo review of the City's action, as if the court were stepping into the shoes of the City Council. Importantly, a court is not a legislative body with the power to decide political boundaries. See Board of Riley County Comm' rs v. City of Junction City, 233 Kan. 947, Syl. ¶ 1, 667 P.2d 868 (1983) (“A court does not have the power to place the boundary line in a position other than that described by the city in its ordinance, for the fixing of city boundary lines is a legislative act.”). Whatever constitutional issues would be raised if the legislature were to attempt such a delegation to the courts, we do not believe it did so in the current statutory scheme.
This is shown by the standard the legislature set for a municipality when deciding whether to annex—not reasonableness but “advisability.” K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–520a(e). If the legislature had intended to overturn Clarke (and much of our Supreme Court's precedent), it presumably would have required a reviewing court to consider the advisability of an annexation, the test which is to be applied by the municipality. As already indicated, that would raise constitutional problems. See Shultz, Kansas Annexation Law: The Role of Service Plans, 40 U. Kan. L.Rev. 207, 236–37 (1991).
So, what standard of reasonableness is applicable in the present case? We note that Clarke features a cognate of “reasonable,” the term the legislature used in K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–538:
“A careful study of our cases illustrates that the court does recognize the ‘reasonableness' of action taken by a city in connection with annexation as a viable issue, where the action taken by the city is found to violate constitutional guarantees. The same could be said if the action taken by a city in connection with annexation is found to exceed statutory authorization.” 218 Kan. at 349.
We find a similar use in Banzer v. City of Wichita, 237 Kan. 798, 801, 703 P.2d 812 (1985), where in a unilateral annexation case our Supreme Court stated: “Substantial compliance requires compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective of the statute.” Since a municipality's power to annex is “completely controlled by statute,” Dillon Real Estate Co., 284 Kan. 662, Syl. ¶ 3, and since statutes are to be interpreted reasonably as a general matter, Ft. Hays St. Univ. v. University Ch., Am. Ass'n of Univ. Profs, 290 Kan. 446, 464–65, 228 P.3d 403 (2010), this usage is not surprising.
We conclude the legislature intended to codify the existing standard of review rather than overturn it. For courts the question of reasonableness in unilateral annexation matters remains whether the annexation violated constitutional protections or statutory authority. Courts do not pass on the wisdom, necessity, or advisability of legislative acts delegated to municipalities.
Jurisdiction
The Plaintiffs first claim the annexation is void because the City lacked jurisdiction to render its decision. In this regard, the Plaintiffs highlight several claimed infirmities with the City's annexation process that we consider in the next section entitled, Adequacy of the City's Plan. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which this court exercises unlimited review. Max Rieke & Brothers, Inc. v. Van Deurzen & Assocs., 34 Kan.App.2d 340, 343, 118 P.3d 704 (2005).
We decline Plaintiffs' suggestions that the City's “jurisdiction” is at issue. Generally, subject matter jurisdiction is the power to decide a matter, not the exercise of that power. See Miller v. Glacier Development Co., 293 Kan. 665, Syl. ¶ 1, 270 P.3d 1065 (2011). Although the Plaintiffs assert the City lost jurisdiction due to its failure to strictly comply with the annexation statutes, they do not indicate why or how the City lost its power. The City undoubtedly had the power to annex Plaintiffs' land; the critical question is whether it exercised that power according to Kansas statutes. That is the question which Plaintiff also raises and which is considered below.
Adequacy of the City's Plan
The Plaintiffs assert the City's annexation plan was inadequate for a variety of reasons. We will address these concerns individually.
Public Hearing
Plaintiffs contend the City “adjourned, rather than continued or recessed, the Public Hearing on February 9, 2009.” Plaintiffs base their argument on a technical construction of the statutory requirement that the City “determine the advisability of annexation” at a public hearing “or at any continuation of such hearing.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–520a(e). The district court held the City's procedure substantially complied with the statute, and we agree. As the district court noted, “whether it was an adjournment or a continuance, there's nothing to indicate that magic words have to be used or somehow this invalidates the annexation.”
In their brief, the Plaintiffs substitute a nonstatutory term, “decide,” for the statutory term, “determine,” suggesting the City was required to hear from the public and vote on annexation at the same meeting. But the statute required the City to determine the advisability of annexation by holding a public hearing, which it did. The fact that the City Council voted later did not change its means of determining advisability. Moreover, the vote occurred at a meeting after the City Council had again heard from the public, including one of the Plaintiffs, regarding the annexation.
Plaintiffs also complain about changes which were made between the public hearing on February 9, 2009, and the annexation decision on February 17, 2009. Plaintiffs assert the City Council received “information after-the-fact and without public disclosure and debate,” but it appears the City was simply responding to feedback it had received at the earlier public hearing. Once again, we agree with the district court's analysis:
“There's no indication that the legislature intended to set a trap that required that the annexation ordinance be passed at the public hearing. What occurred here did not prejudice anyone's rights. The decision was made after public input. It was not done in secrecy. There's no indication that anyone was mislead and ... in fact, the procedure that was followed reflects a deliberative and reflective process by the governing body rather than being forced to vote on something contemporaneous with hearing public comment about it.”
We find substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion that the City substantially complied with the public hearing requirement as set forth in K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–520a(e).
Depictions of the Annexed Land
Next, the Plaintiffs contest the depictions of the annexed land. Although the Plaintiffs do not argue they were misled by any discrepancies, they maintain the annexation was nevertheless void. The statutory provisions relevant to this complaint are K.S.A. 12–520b(a)(1), which required the City Council to prepare a report including “[a] sketch clearly delineating the land proposed to be annexed,” and K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–520a(a)(2), which required the City Council to adopt a resolution which described “the boundaries of the land proposed to be annexed.” Plaintiffs cite other provisions, but they are derivative of these two statutes.
The parties are familiar with the depictions at issue: a sketch that omitted about 2 acres of a dam's spillway which was properly included in a legal description, and a legal description that included about 11 acres of unplatted land which was properly excluded from the sketch. The City Council changed the legal description to exclude the unplatted land after the mistake was discovered.
The Plaintiffs claim numerous legal errors, but we agree with the district court that “there's no indication ... the legislature intended that kind of strict compliance.” The depictions, including the sketch, were sufficient to accomplish the reasonable objective of the statute—to give notice to the affected landowners.
Although the Plaintiffs cite Board of Riley County Comm'rs, in support of their argument, the present case is very different from the facts in that case. In Board of Riley County Comm'rs, a legal description mistakenly included “about 1,000 acres” of land owned by various individuals. 233 Kan. at 948. The mistake also occurred in the ordinance which purported to annex the land. Our Supreme Court held the error was not so “trivial ... that it should be treated as mere surplusage, and the balance of the ordinance held valid.” 233 Kan. at 952. In the present case, however, the discrepancy in the sketch was minimal, and it does not appear that owners of the acreage in question complained or that anyone was misled or prejudiced.
We conclude there was substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's ruling that the City substantially complied with the requirements of depicting the annexed land as set forth in K.S.A. 12–520b(a)(1) and K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–520a(a)(2).
Provision of Services
The Plaintiffs raise numerous complaints regarding the City's plan for extension of services. See K.S.A. 12–520a(e) (requiring the city to present such a plan at the public meeting). As the district court summarized it, Plaintiffs argued “the City's plan for the delivery of services is in effect a hoax and ... this annexation is nothing more than a grab for tax revenues.” The district court concluded, however, “[t]here is nothing in Kansas law ... that supports a requirement of a degree of specificity and scrutiny as is suggested by [P]laintiff[s].” We agree.
The district court first noted: “This area is already served by municipal waste water treatment.” While not determinative, we believe this fact distinguishes the present case from many others. The City's prior provision of such a substantial service to the Estates makes it less likely the plan was “a hoax ... designed only to accomplish the annexation of territory.” Clarke, 218 Kan. at 346.
Turning now to the Plaintiffs' arguments, they conflate the statutory requirements for the plan with 16 items municipalities must “consider” “[a]s a guide in determining the advisability of such annexation.” K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–520a(e). The purpose of a plan is to make a good faith showing that “owners of land in the newly annexed territory are entitled within a reasonable time to share in the municipal services and benefits accorded to owners of land in other portions of the municipal territory upon a footing of substantial equality. [Citation omitted.]” Clarke, 218 Kan. at 346. This is a different purpose than the advisability of the annexation itself, although the City addressed all 16 items in the plan.
The statutory requirements for plans are set out in another statute, K.S.A. 12–520b(a)(2), primarily through language added in 1987. See L.1987, ch. 66, sec. 4; Parnacott, Annexation in Kansas, 70 J.K.B.A. at 37. We will, therefore, disregard Plaintiffs' arguments under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12–520a(e).
The Plaintiffs, however, also raise arguments under K.S.A. 12–520b(a)(2). In particular, they assert the plan “failed to describe [the City's] intentions regarding law enforcement.” The record facts indicate otherwise. The plan considered the existing law enforcement coverage of the Estates by one county sheriffs deputy responsible for 72 square miles and another roving deputy. The plan provided that the City would include the Estates in an existing district of 2.5 square miles served by one city police officer. In this way, the City concluded it could provide more protection for a minimal increase in cost.
Under the statute, the City was required to set forth “a plan of sufficient detail to provide a reasonable person with a full and complete understanding of the intentions of the city for extending to the area to be annexed each major municipal service provided to persons and property located within the city.” K.S.A. 12–520b(a)(2). With regard to law enforcement protection, Plaintiffs argue the plan was “silent about scheduling new patrols, staffing, or any other law enforcement impact that would result from annexation.” A reasonable person, however, would understand the City intended to add the Estates to an existing patrol district. We do not read the statute to require a detailed description of how that might be done, and adding some 115 acres to an existing 2.5 square mile patrol area was not so significant as to otherwise trigger a need for further explanation.
The Plaintiffs also contend the plan “contradicts itself” because it first “said there would be no additional cost for law enforcement” and “[l]ater” said “police services would cost $22,200.” The Plaintiffs misread the plan. The City did not claim “there would be no additional cost for law enforcement,” but that the increase in cost would be “minimal.” The reference to $22,200 was also not “later” in the plan but in the next paragraph on the same page of the plan, which also gave the 2008 police budget as $741,101. A reasonable person would understand that the City considered an increase of $22,200 in a police budget of $741,101 to be a minimal additional expense.
The City further stated that the increased amount would “be paid for by the general fund,” which at least with respect to the police budget was “primarily funded through property taxes.” As a result, the plan provided “the estimated cost impact of providing such services” and “the method by which the city plans to finance the extension of such services.” K.S.A. 12–520b(a)(2). This was sufficient substantial compliance.
Next, the Plaintiffs attack the City's calculations, arguing for example that the City could not determine the cost of policing based on the area served because “over 25% of [the Estates] is under water or is green space.” For its part, the district court suggested “[a]nother way to look at this ... based on population,” is the “idea being that land standing alone without any humans on it is not going to have a need for police protection.” The district court then provided an alternative calculation to show the annexation provided “value” to the Plaintiffs.
While we understand the district court's discussion (which was prompted by the arguments of Plaintiffs' counsel) the critical inquiry is whether the plan conforms to the statute. Plans are not necessarily sophisticated statistical appraisals of the sort requiring expert testimony at trial. The statute states that plans must “provide a reasonable person with a full and complete understanding of the intentions of the city.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 12–520b(a)(2). Certainly plans must state “estimated” costs and the “method” or “means” by which services would be extended, but the statute does not impose a standard of reliability on these statements other than reasonableness. K.S.A. 12–520b(a)(2).
Plaintiffs also challenge the plan's discussion of streets and infrastructure, maintaining again that insufficient detail was provided. These arguments are similar to those already discussed, and we do not believe further analysis is necessary to explain the result. We conclude the district court adequately considered the plan's approach to street maintenance, and the City substantially complied with the statute.
In summary, although a plan may not be a mere “hoax,” Clarke, 218 Kan. at 346, where the plan reasonably states a municipality's intentions, estimates the costs, and describes the methods or means of fulfilling those intentions, any remaining deficiencies are for the political process. In this context, our Supreme Court made observations in Clarke which we believe still apply:
“[A]ll municipal services and facilities are subject to economic, political and other practical contingencies and vicissitudes, too numerous to mention, over which a municipality has no absolute and complete control. Limitations and restrictions are imposed by other statutory and regulatory provisions, both state and federal, which mandate changes and modifications in the plans and timetables of municipalities. A municipality cannot know what fortune or misfortune time will bring. For these reasons the ‘plan’ and ‘timetable’ of a municipality cannot be a ‘guarantee’ to the owner of land in the proposed area of annexation. Our rule has always been that substantial compliance with an annexations statute is all that can be required.” 218 Kan. at 346–47.
Having carefully considered the record, we are convinced the City substantially complied with the statutory requirements for an adequate annexation plan. It presented the plan in a public forum with City officials to explain it and answer questions. The record shows the public took full advantage of the opportunity and challenged the City on many points. This is what the legislature intended, and the City's decision to proceed despite some opposition from landowners was not in violation of the statute but within the City's discretion. See McDowell, 239 Kan. 263, Syl. ¶ 3 (“The power of a municipality to alter its boundaries by annexation is controlled by statute, and while the city has the discretion to exercise that power, it must be done within the confines of the statutes.”).
Reasonableness
Finally, the plaintiffs contend the annexation was unreasonable. They raise new and reprise old arguments, but their main contention is that they “gained nothing but a whopping tax bill.” We have already set out the legal standard on the question of reasonableness. To reiterate, our Supreme Court has essentially defined the meaning of reasonableness in the context of judicial review of annexations:
“A careful study of our cases illustrates that the court does recognize the ‘reasonableness' of action taken by a city in connection with annexation as a viable issue, where the action taken by the city is found to violate constitutional guarantees. The same could be said if the action taken by a city in connection with annexation is found to exceed statutory authorization.” 218 Kan. at 349.
By way of contrast, the legislature has delegated to boards of county commissioners the task of determining whether a county-approved annexation “causes manifest injury to the owners of any land proposed to be annexed.” K.S.A. 12–521(c). Our Supreme Court has defined manifest injury to mean “material or substantial burdens upon the landowners without accompanying material or substantial compensating benefits.” In re Appeal of City of Lenexa, 232 Kan. 568, 584, 657 P.2d 47 (1983). This is the essence of the Plaintiffs' argument in this unilateral annexation case. But unlike boards of county commissioners, the legislature has not purported to confer such power on the courts over unilateral annexations. See Ruland v. City of Augusta, 120 Kan. 42, 52, 242 P. 456 (1926) (“manifest injury” is “included in the question whether the proposed action is advisable,” which is a “purely legislative question” that cannot be conferred on the courts).
The plaintiffs do not allege that the City violated constitutional guarantees, and no such violations are apparent. Moreover, we have thoroughly considered and rejected Plaintiffs' claims that the annexation exceeded statutory authorization. Following the guidance of Clarke and its progeny, we conclude the City's action of annexation was reasonable. 218 Kan. at 349. We do not pass judgment on the balance of Plaintiffs' arguments which go to the wisdom, necessity, or advisability of the annexation. 218 Kan. at 350. Having considered the record, the appellate briefs, and the district court's opinion, we do not find reversible error.
Affirmed.