Opinion
Civil Action 4:23-cv-01899
01-19-2024
HENRY CHRISTOPHER STUBBS, III, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
BRANN, C.J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This civil action commenced on November 15, 2023, when the plaintiff, Henry Christopher Stubbs, III, filed a fee-paid pro se complaint for declaratory and prospective injunctive relief. Doc. 1. At the time of filing, Stubbs was incarcerated at SCI Huntingdon, a state prison located in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania.
I. Background
Stubbs is a convicted state prisoner, serving two consecutive life sentences for first-degree murder. The instant complaint arises out of his prior efforts to litigate challenges to his state convictions and sentences. The pro se complaint alleges, in vague and conclusory terms, a widespread conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional right to access the courts. The alleged conspiracy involves the United States government, various federal and state court judges, and various state and municipal officials. Altogether, Stubbs has named 28 defendants in his pro se complaint.
These include: (1) the United States of America; (2) Hon. Yvette Kane, a federal district judge who presided over a prior, in forma pauperis lawsuit, Stubbs v. Skrepenak, No. 22-cv-00940 (M.D. Pa. filed June 14, 2022); (3) Hon. C. Darnell Jones, II, a federal district judge who presided over that same case in its initial stages before it was transferred to this judicial district, Stubbs v. Skrepenak, No. 22-CV-0889 (E.D. Pa. filed Mar. 7, 2022); (4) Hon. Susan F. Schwab, a federal magistrate judge co-assigned to the Skrepenak case with Judge Kane; (5) Patricia S. Dodszuweit, clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, who signed an order dismissing an appeal from Judge Jones's partial dismissal of the Skrepenak claims against various federal judicial defendants, Stubbs v. Skrepenak, No. 22-2277 (3d Cir. filed July 13, 2022); (6, 7, 8) Gregory A. Skrepenak, Todd Vonderheid, and Stephan A. Urban, former Luzerne County commissioners; (9) the Luzerne County Office of the Clerk of Courts; (10 and 11) Robert F. Reilly and James L. Haddock, former Luzerne County clerks of court; (12) the Office of the District Attorney for Luzerne County; (13, 14, 15) David W. Lupas, Jacqueline M. Carroll, Stefanie J. Salavantis, former Luzerne County district attorneys; (16, 17, 18, and 19) Timothy M. Doherty, Frank P. Barletta, Anthony Ross, and James L. McMonagle, Jr., current or former Luzerne County assistant district attorneys; (20) Stephen A. Menn, the plaintiff's court-appointed PCRA counsel; (21) Hon. Peter Paul Olszewski, Jr., a state common pleas judge who presided over the plaintiff's first PCRA petition proceedings; (22) Hon. Fred A. Pierantoni, III, a state common pleas judge who presided over the plaintiff's third PCRA petition proceedings; (23, 24, 25) Hon. Jack A. Panella, Hon. Jacqueline O. Shogan, and Hon. John T.J. Kelly, state superior court judges who presided over the plaintiff's appeal from denial of his first PCRA petition; and (26, 27, 28) Hon. Judith Ference Olsen, Hon. Alice B. Dubow, and Hon. Eugene B. Strassburger, state superior court judges who presided over the plaintiff's appeal from dismissal of his third PCRA petition. The complaint itself identifies only the first five defendants by name, but it references “previously named defendants” as well, and it includes an attached exhibit, labeled “Exhibit AA-1” (Doc. 1-4) identifying the 23 “previously named defendants.”
II. Legal Standards
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Dismissal Standard
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction when challenged under Rule 12(b)(1). See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Shawe v. Pincus, 265 F.Supp.3d 480, 484 (D. Del. 2017) (“A motion to dismiss pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”). A defendant may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in one of two fashions: it may attack the complaint on its face or it may attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, relying on evidence beyond the pleadings. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Where a defendant attacks a complaint as deficient on its face, “the court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court may only consider the allegations contained in the complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint; matters of public record such as court records, letter decisions of government agencies and published reports of administrative bodies; and ‘undisputably authentic' documents which the plaintiff has identified as a basis of his claims and which the defendant has attached as exhibits to his motion to dismiss.” Medici v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-2344, 2010 WL 1006917, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010). However, when a motion to dismiss attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations,” and “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. This case falls into the former category.
B. Section 1915A Dismissal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court is obligated to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The court must dismiss the complaint if it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). In deciding the motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Although the court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Nor is it required to credit factual allegations contradicted by indisputably authentic documents on which the complaint relies or matters of public record of which we may take judicial notice. In re Washington Mut. Inc., 741 Fed. App'x 88, 91 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018); Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 246 F.Supp.3d 1058, 1075 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
III. Discussion
A. Claims Against the United States
It is beyond cavil that, “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “Whether the United States has waived its sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional question.” Gillette v. Warden Golden Grove Adult Corr. Facility, 75 F.4th 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2023). It is the plaintiff who bears the burden of establishing an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity by the federal government. St. Tammany Parishex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556 F.3d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2009); Wright v. New Jersey, 115 F.Supp.3d 490, 496 (D.N.J. 2015).
The complaint expressly alleges jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702. While § 702 waives sovereign immunity to allow claims for nonmonetary, injunctive relief against the United States based on acts or omissions by a federal agency or an officer or employee thereof, the definition of “agency” in this waiver expressly excludes the federal courts. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B). The plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief against the United States arises solely out of alleged acts or omissions by officers or employees of the federal courts. Thus, the APA may not serve as the source of requisite waiver of sovereign immunity.
The pro se complaint fails to allege any other basis for a waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity. Thus, we recommend that the plaintiff's claims against the United States be dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] claim of sovereign immunity advances a jurisdictional bar which a party may raise at any time, even on appeal, and which the court may raise sua sponte.”).
B. Claims Against the Federal Judicial Defendants
Stubbs has brought this federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To establish a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a civil rights complaint must state the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible for the alleged civil rights violations. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).
The pro se complaint asserts a claim for injunctive relief under § 1983 with respect to four federal judicial defendants: federal district judges Kane and Jones, federal magistrate judge Schwab, and clerk of court Dodszuweit. The complaint expressly states that the plaintiff's § 1983 claims for injunctive relief are brought against each of these defendants in his or her official capacity. Claims against federal officials or employees in their official capacity constitute claims against the United States. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Bell v. Rossotti, 227 F.Supp.2d 315, 320 (M.D. Pa. 2002). As our sister court has previously instructed this plaintiff, “[i]t is well-settled that the United States is not a ‘person' subject to § 1983 liability.” Stubbs v. Skrepenak, No. 22-CV-0889, 2022 WL 2134170, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 2022) (citing Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 2011), and Accardi v. United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1241 (3d Cir. 1970)), appeal dismissed, No. 22-2277 (3d Cir. Sept. 26, 2022). The plaintiff's unsupported allegations that these federal officials conspired with state actors does not subject them to § 1983 liability either. See id. (citing Hindes v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 137 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 1998)).
Judge Jones dismissed claims against 16 other federal judges, none of whom are expressly named as defendants in this action. See Stubbs v. Skrepenak, No. 22-CV-0889, 2022 WL 2134170, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 2022). In light of the plaintiff's specific identification of the 23 “previously named defendants” in an exhibit to his complaint, we decline to construe the pro se complaint to also include these 16 other federal judges, none of whom are mentioned by name in the instant complaint. See generally Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing a court's obligation to liberally construe pro se pleadings and other submissions, particularly when dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants). Even if we were to so construe the complaint to include claims against these 16 other federal judges, the plaintiff's claims against them would be subject to dismissal for the very same reasons as the claims against the five federal judicial defendants expressly named in the instant complaint.
For the reasons outlined in the margins of Judge Jones's opinion, we decline to construe the pro se complaint as raising either official- or personal-capacity Bivens claims against these five federal judicial defendants. See Skrepenak, 2022 WL 2134170, at *3 n.4 (noting that official-capacity Bivens claims would be barred by sovereign immunity and personal-capacity Bivens claims would be barred by absolute judicial immunity); see also Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2d 391, 392 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (holding that judicial or quasi-judicial immunity applied to clerk of courts); Davis v. Philadelphia Cnty., 195 F.Supp.2d 686, 688 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“[J]udicial or quasi-judicial immunity applies to court staff who are acting in their official capacities.”). See generally Mala, 704 F.3d at 244-46.
Accordingly, we recommend that the plaintiff's claims against the federal judicial defendants-Kane, Jones, Schwab, and Dodszuweit-be dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
C. Claims Against Previously Named Defendants
In the instant pro se complaint, the plaintiff appears to reassert previously dismissed federal civil rights claims against 23 “previously named defendants”-state and local officials individually identified in the margin above. See supra note 1. All of those claims were previously considered by this court and dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Stubbs v. Skrepenak, No. 22-cv-00940 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2022) (report and recommendation), ECF No. 23, adopted by No. 22-cv-00940 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2022) (dismissal order), ECF No. 30. While the prior dismissal of these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) may have a res judicata effect on subsequent in forma pauperis litigation, such dismissals do not bar future litigation of a fee-paid complaint such as this. See Cieszkowska v. Gray Lines N.Y., 295 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2002); Kaetz v. United States, No. 23-cv03482, 2023 WL 5979824, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2023) (Saporito, J.), R&R adopted by 2023 WL 6387300 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2023) (Brann, J.), appeal filed, No. 23-2802 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2023); Gibson v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, No. 15-cv-00855, 2015 WL 3952777, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2015); Woodard v. Upland Mortg., No. Civ. A.03-4382, 2003 WL 22597645, at *1 n.7 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2003); cf. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992) (holding that a sua sponte dismissal under the statutory predecessor to § 1915(e)(2) “does not prejudice the filing of a paid complaint making the same allegations”). Nevertheless, other than the payment of the filing fee to commence this action, we find no distinction whatsoever between the claims asserted by Stubbs against these 23 state and municipal defendants in this action and in his prior in forma pauperis action, Stubbs v. Skrepenak, No. 22-cv-00940 (M.D. Pa. filed June 14, 2022)..
A copy of Judge Schwab's report and recommendation in the Skrepenak case has also been filed in this case as an attachment to the plaintiff's complaint, labeled “Exhibit AA-6” (Doc. 1-9).
A copy of Judge Kane's dismissal order in the Skrepenak case has also been filed in this case as an attachment to the plaintiff's complaint, labeled “Exhibit AA-0” (Doc. 1-3).
Accordingly, for the very same reasons stated in Judge Schwab's report and recommendation and Judge Kane's dismissal order, we recommend dismissal of these claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
D. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). In this case, based on the facts alleged in the pro se complaint and the plaintiff's history of meritless serial litigation, it is clear that any further amendment would be futile. See Jones v. SCO Family of Servs., 202 F.Supp.3d 345, 350 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (considering evidence outside of the pleadings for limited purpose of whether to grant leave to amend); Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“A court may consider factual allegations outside the complaint in determining whether to grant leave to amend.”); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. United Limousine Serv., Inc., 303 F.Supp.2d 432, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Therefore, we recommend that the plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants be dismissed without leave to amend.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that:
1. The plaintiff's claims against the United States be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
2. The plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); and
3. The clerk be directed to mark this case as CLOSED.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated January 19, 2024. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.