Summary
In Stroupes, a minor plaintiff and her parents brought a claim for sexual harassment pursuant to Tennessee's Human Rights Act. 2005 WL 5610231, at *l (E.D. Term. Mar. 16, 2005).
Summary of this case from Hernandez v. Brinker Int'l Payroll Co., L.P.Opinion
No. 1:04-cv-133.
March 16, 2005
MEMORANDUM
The Plaintiffs, Lindsey Stroupes ("Lindsey") and her parents, Steve and Brenda Stroupes ("Steve" and "Brenda") (collectively the "Plaintiffs") brought this action against The Finish Line, Inc. ("Finish Line") and Anthony Bradley ("Bradley") (collectively the "Defendants"). Against both Defendants, the Plaintiffs bring a claim for sexual harassment pursuant to the TENNESSEE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ("THRA"), T.C.A. §§ 4-21-101 to 4-21-1004, as well as claims for assault and battery and outrageous conduct under state law. [Court File No. 1]. And against Finish Line, the Plaintiffs also bring a claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-1742. [Court File Nos. 16, 18]. Currently pending before the Court are the Defendants' respective motions to dismiss and compel arbitration pursuant to the FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16. [Court File Nos. 24, 27]. Bradley also moves to dismiss the THRA claim against him as a matter of law. [Court File No. 27]. The Plaintiffs responded to the motions [Court File No. 33] and Finish Line submitted a reply [Court File No. 40]. I. Background
In the Spring of 2003 Lindsey Stroupes ("Lindsey") was sixteen years old and a sophomore at Soddy Daisy High School. [Court File No. 36, Lindsey Aff. at ¶ 3]. While Lindsey was working at the "Cookie Company," a store in Northgate Mall, Anthony Bradley ("Bradley"), the manager of Finish Line's retail store in the mall, approached Lindsey inviting her to apply for a position at Finish Line. [ Id.]. Accepting Bradley's invitation, Lindsey applied for a position as a sales associate. [ Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5]. Finish Line and Bradley hired Lindsey for this position. [ Id. at ¶ 7]. At some point, Lindsey signed an employment application ("employment contract"). [ Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10; Court File No. 26, Johnson Aff., Ex. B]. In pertinent part, the employment application required that all claims against Finish Line be submitted to binding arbitration, [Court File No. 26, Johnson Aff., Ex. B], as detailed in Finish Line's "Employee Dispute Resolution Plan," [ Id. at Ex. A].
II. Discussion A. Whether the Employment Contract is Enforceable
The FAA provides that "[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. In light of this statutory directive, there exists a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2004); Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)). And any doubts as to the parties' intentions regarding arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Stout, 228 F.3d at 714 (citing Soler, 473 U.S. at 626).
There is no doubt that the instant contract, an employment contract, evidences a transaction involving commerce. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-24 (2001). So in determining whether to compel arbitration the Court's inquiry is twofold: first, whether a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement exists; and second, whether the instant claims fall within the scope of that agreement. Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Soler, 473 U.S. at 628).
The Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement is not enforceable for three reasons. The Plaintiffs contend that, because Lindsey was a minor when she signed the employment contract, the contract is voidable and was voided when Lindsey filed the instant action. Next, the Plaintiffs contend that the employment contract is a contract of adhesion and unconscionable. Lastly, the Plaintiffs contend that the employment contract contains three unenforceable provisions, thereby rendering the entire contract void.
In determining whether there is a valid arbitration agreement "courts . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern formation of contracts." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); accord Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 284 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Kaplan).
The general law in Tennessee regarding the validity of minor's contracts is clear: "A minor's contracts, generally speaking, are voidable. The minor can repudiate such contracts or can elect to claim their advantage. The party contracting with a minor, however, is bound on such voidable contracts, if the minor elects to enforce them." Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. City of Clarksville, 315 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tenn. 1958) (quotation and citations omitted). Based on this infancy doctrine, the Plaintiffs contend that, because Lindsey was sixteen years old when she began working for Finish Line, her Finish Line employment contract was voidable, and Lindsey effectively voided the contract by filing the instant action.
In opposition, the Defendants contend that the general law governing the validity of minor's contracts is inapplicable in the instant case. Essentially, the Defendants urge this Court to hold that the infancy doctrine does not apply to minor's employment contracts, despite the lack of any Tennessee court to hold similarly. Recognizing the void in Tennessee case law on this issue, the Defendants first direct the Court to Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1992), which recognized a narrow exception to the infancy doctrine. To support the proposition that minor's cannot void employment contracts, the Defendants point the Court to Sheller v. Frank's Nursery Crafts, Inc., 957 F.Supp. 150 (N.D. Ill. 1997). The Court finds the Defendants' argument unpersuasive.
Turning first to Dodson, the Tennessee Supreme Court's last case to consider the infancy doctrine, the court considered whether a minor could void a contract for the purchase of a truck, and recoup the full purchase price, after possessing the truck for nine months. 824 S.W.2d at 546. The court held that
where the minor has not been overreached in any way, and there has been no undue influence, and the contract is a fair and reasonable one, and the minor has actually paid money on the purchase price, and taken and used the article purchased, that he ought not to be permitted to recover the amount actually paid, without allowing the vender of the goods reasonable compensation for the use of, depreciation, and willful or negligent damage to the article purchased, while in his hands.Id. at 549. In so holding, the court emphasized the following public policy:
[I]t does not appear consistent with practice of proper moral influence upon young people, tend to encourage honesty and integrity, or lead them to a good and useful business future, if they are taught that they can make purchases with their own money, for their own benefit, and after paying for them, and using them until they are worn out and destroyed, go back and compel the vendor to return to them what they have paid upon the purchase price. Such a doctrine can only lead to the corruption of principles and encourage young people in habits of trickery and dishonesty.Id. at 550. The Defendants rely on this public policy and Dodson's limited retreat from the general rule regarding minor's contracts as a basis for urging this Court to hold the infancy doctrine inapplicable to Lindsey's employment contract with Finish Line.
However, neither Dodson's holding nor its public policy supports the Defendants' argument. Importantly, Dodson applies to minor's contracts for the purchase of goods. Further, and fundamentally, Dodson sought and achieved an equitable result, maintaining, and even affirming, a minor's right to disaffirm contracts, while ensuring that the merchant can recover for the use of, depreciation, and damage to the goods. Dodson, however, does not apply to minor's employment contracts, nor does its holding even translate to such a context. Here, the only issue is whether Lindsey's employment contract is voidable by Lindsey. And on this issue, Dodson permits the minor to void the contract, affirming the infancy doctrine.
In Sheller the district court considered whether minors pursuing sexual harassment claims against their employer must submit their claims to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in their employment contract. 957 F.Supp. at 152. The minors argued that their employment contracts, including the arbitration agreement, were voidable under Illinois' infancy doctrine. Id. at 153. Recognizing there was no Illinois case law on point, the district court rejected the minors' argument, finding that the employment contracts were not voidable under the infancy doctrine. Id. As a basis for its holding, the court relied on three public policy rationales.
Because Sheller is an opinion of the Northern District of Illinois involving Illinois law, it is of limited precedential value here. Further, the Court disagrees with the reasoning in that case. As its first support, Sheller relies on the policy rationale that the infancy doctrine "'is to be used as a shield and not as a sword.'" Id. (quoting Shepherd v. Shepherd, 97 N.E.2d 273, 282 (Ill. 1951)). Tennessee recognizes the same limitation to the infancy doctrine. See Dodson, 824 S.W.2d at 547 (citing Tuck v. Payne, 17 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tenn. 1929)). However, this limitation is inapplicable to the instant situation. Lindsey is not using her minority as a sword to injure the Defendants. Indeed, the only issue affected by Lindsey's use of the infancy doctrine is the appropriate forum to adjudicate her claims.
As a second basis for its holding, Sheller notes that the infancy "doctrine is to protect the inexperienced minor in their dealings with others." 957 F.Supp. at 153. Applying this policy to the facts, Sheller reasoned that the plaintiffs status as "minors was irrelevant to their signing of the employment application agreeing to arbitrate all claims against the company. Indeed, Defendant required all of its employees, including adults, to sign the same agreement." Id. Based in part on this reasoning, Sheller prohibited the minors from using the infancy doctrine to disaffirm their employment contracts.
If Sheller's reasoning in this regard were extended, it would eviscerate the infancy doctrine altogether. For example, under Sheller, any employment contract in which minors and adults alike must sign is not voidable by minors, because adults are bound by the same agreement. To extend the example to the consumer context, any contract for the purchase of an automobile signed by minors and adults alike is not voidable by minors, because adults are bound by the same agreement. If such were true, the infancy doctrine, permitting minors to disaffirm their contracts, would cease to exist.
As its final point, Sheller notes that "the minor is not entitled to retain an advantage from a transaction which he repudiates." 957 F.Supp. at 153 (quotation and citation omitted). Applying this policy to prohibit minors from disaffirming their employment contracts with the infancy doctrine, Sheller reasoned as follows:
The fundamental reason Plaintiffs are able to bring this lawsuit is because they were employed by Defendant. Had they not been employed by Defendant, they would not be eligible to maintain the instant Title VII suit, obviously. Had they not signed the employment application which contained the arbitration clause, they would not have been hired by Defendant. Thus, if the Court were to allow the minor Plaintiffs to disaffirm the contract, Plaintiffs would be retaining the advantage of employment — which entitled them to bring the instant Title VII suit — while repudiating their entire basis of employment — the employment application.957 F.Supp. at 153-54.
Here Sheller seems to be saying, as did the Tennessee Supreme Court in Dodson, that a minor cannot both disaffirm a contract and sue on the contract. See, e.g., 7 Joseph M. Perillo, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 27.4 (Rev. Ed. 2002). That is not what is happening here. A minor suing an employer for sexual harassment is not suing on the contract. As Sheller recognizes, a minor suing an employer for sexual harassment could not maintain the suit but for the employment, which requires signing the employment contract. However, this fact does not morph a suit for sexual harassment against an employer into a suit on the employment contract.
There are other cases which reach a different conclusion from that reached in Sheller. Most recently, in considering whether a minor must arbitrate his claims pursuant to an arbitration provision in the purchase contract, the Alabama Supreme Court recognized that "infancy is a valid defense to the enforcement of a properly supported motion to compel arbitration." HS Homes, L.L.C. v. McDonald, 823 So.2d 627, 630 (Ala. 2001). Facing a similar issue, a federal district court in North Carolina refused "to require arbitration on the ground that plaintiff, as a minor, is not bound by the arbitration provision." Wilkie v. Hoke, 609 F.Supp. 241, (W.D.N.C. 1985).
The Court concludes that, under Tennessee law, a minor's employment contracts, including arbitration agreements, are voidable by the minor. This proposition has, in effect, been recognized by the Tennessee Legislature in the TENNESSEE PROTECTION OF MINOR PERFORMERS ACT, T.C.A. §§ 50-5-201 to 50-5-222. Section 50-5-207 provides that, "[i]f a contract is approved by the appropriate court pursuant to the provisions of this part, then such minor may not, either during minority or after reaching majority, disaffirm such contract on the ground of minority." By enacting a statute prohibiting minors from disaffirming a court-approved contract employing the minor "to perform artistic or creative services," T.C.A. § 50-5-206, the legislature implicitly recognized that minor's maintain the right to disaffirm employment contracts. In short, the legislature acknowledged that a minor's employment contracts are voidable by the minor.
Having concluded that a minor's employment contracts, including arbitration agreements, are voidable by the minor, the Court turns to apply this doctrine to the facts of this case. In so doing, the Court finds that Lindsey's employment contract with Finish Line was voidable by Lindsey, and was voided by filing this action. At the time she signed the employment contract with Finish Line, Lindsey was undisputably a minor, sixteen years old. Further, by bringing her claims in this Court, Lindsey indicated her desire not to be bound by the arbitration agreement in the employment contract. Filing suit in this Court effectively repudiated Lindsey's employment contract with Finish Line.
Finding that Lindsey effectively disaffirmed her employment contract with Finish Line, the Court will DENY the Defendants' respective motions to dismiss and compel arbitration. [Court File Nos. 24, 27]. Because the Court finds that the employment contract was voidable due to Lindsey's minority, and was voided by filing this action, the Court does not consider the Plaintiffs' remaining arguments regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreement nor whether the Plaintiffs' claims are covered by the agreement.
B. Bradley's Motion to Dismiss As a Matter of Law
The Plaintiffs bring three claims against Bradley: sexual harassment pursuant to the THRA; assault and battery under state law; and outrageous conduct under state law. In his motion to dismiss and compel arbitration [Court File No. 27] Bradley moves the Court to dismiss the THRA claim against him pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), contending that the THRA does not permit such a claim against an individual supervisor.
Under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the complaint which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Arrow v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 358 F.3d 392, 393 (6th Cir. 2004); Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 1997); Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The Court is required to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and to accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact. Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; Arrow, 358 F.3d at 393; Columbia Natural Res., 58 F.3d at 1109. When a factual allegation is capable of more than one reasonable inference, the Court must construe it in the plaintiff's favor. Saglioccolo, 112 F.3d at 228; Columbia Natural Res., 58 F.3d at 1109. The Court may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss simply because the Court does not believe the allegations of fact in the complaint. Saglioccolo, 112 F.3d at 228-29; Columbia Natural Res., 58 F.3d at 1109. The Court does not, however, have to accept as true mere legal conclusions and unwarranted inferences of fact. Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998); Columbia Natural Res., 58 F.3d at 1109.
Turning to the issue Bradley raises, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the extent of an individual's liability under the THRA in Carr v. United Parcel Serv., 955 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by Parker v. Warren County Utility Dist., 2 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 1999)). Importantly, Carr held that the THRA does not impose individual liability unless the individual "aids, abets, incites, compels, or commands an employer to engage in employment-related discrimination." Id. at 835-36.
In applying this holding to sexual harassment claims, the court differentiated between two types of supervisor harassment: quid pro quo harassment, where a supervisor conditions employment benefits on sexual favors, id. at 837; and supervisor-created hostile work environment, where the supervisor does not use authority to obtain sexual favors, id. at 838. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs sole allegation against Bradley is that he "harassed the minor plaintiff sexually, by requesting intimacies, by pursuing, and touching, and attempting to touch her body; by kissing her and embracing her, by telephoning her at home, and by stating that he desired to take her away our-oftown, and do other things to her." [Court File No. 1 at ¶ 7]. This allegation does not indicate that Bradley used his authority to seek sexual favors from Lindsey. Consequently, the Plaintiffs raise a claim for supervisor-created hostile work environment, not quid pro quo harassment.
In the context of a supervisor-related hostile work environment claim, Carr held that a supervisor could only be held individually liable "for encouraging or preventing the employer from taking corrective action" to alleviate the hostile work environment. 955 S.W.2d at 838. The Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege that Bradley encouraged or prevented Finish Line from taking corrective action. Absent such allegations, the Plaintiffs cannot maintain a THRA claim against Bradley. See id. Accordingly, Bradley's motion to dismiss the THRA claim against him will be GRANTED.
A separate order will enter.
ORDER
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum, the Court DENIES the Defendants' respective motions to dismiss and compel arbitration. [Court File Nos. 24, 27]. Further, the Court GRANTS Anthony Bradley's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' sexual harassment claim under the TENNESSEE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ("THRA"), T.C.A. §§ 4-21-101 to 4-21-1004. [Court File No. 27]. The Plaintiffs' THRA sexual harassment claim against Anthony Bradley is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Currently pending before the Court are all of the Plaintiffs' claims against Anthony Bradley except the THRA sexual harassment claim, and all of the Plaintiffs' claims against The Finish Line, Inc.
SO ORDERED.