Opinion
No. 18-35086
09-18-2018
MARY STRONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, AKA Freddie Mac, as trustee for securitized trust Freddie Mac Multiclass certificates, series 2998; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 6:16-cv-01498-MC MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Mary Strong appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing her action against Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") and other defendants alleging claims related to a mortgage loan on her real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Strong's slander of title claim as barred by the statute of limitations. See Diamond v. Huffman, 667 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Or. App. 1983) (one-year statute of limitations for slander of title claims).
The district court properly dismissed Strong's quiet title claim because Strong failed to plead superior title. See Coussens v. Stevens, 113 P.3d 952 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (setting forth requirements for quiet title action, and explaining that a plaintiff must rely on the strength of her own title and not on the weakness of a defendant's title).
The district court properly dismissed Strong's "lack of standing to foreclose" and declaratory relief claims because Strong did not allege that any defendants had sought to foreclose on the property.
AFFIRMED.