Summary
In Stringer—an age discrimination suit—this Court ruled that the following sentence "articulated a clear theory of defense": "Under the traditional summary judgment motion... Plaintiff must produce evidence that would at least create an issue of triable fact that GBC's stated reason [for terminating Stringer] is pretextual, and that GBC actually fired Plaintiff due to his age."
Summary of this case from Galvez v. Tornado Bus Co.Opinion
No. 05-04-00822-CV
Opinion Filed April 20, 2005.
On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District Court, Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03-1060.
Affirmed.
Before Justices BRIDGES, O'NEILL, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this age discrimination case, appellant Terry P. Stringer appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Grayson Business Computers, Inc., d/b/a SignWarehouse.com (GBC). We affirm the trial court's judgment.
GBC hired Stringer as warehouse manager in November 2001, when Stringer was fifty-two years old. Stringer's responsibilities included managing both the warehouse and shipping activities of the company. His resume indicates that he had substantial experience in shipping prior to coming to GBC, though his warehouse management experience appears to have been entirely with GBC. Stringer also has some experience as a purchasing agent but not as a manager. In addition to his work experience, Stringer attended junior college for one year but did not earn a degree. His qualifications for the warehouse manager position are not questioned.
In February 2002, GBC hired Larry Adams to be operations manager and Stringer's direct supervisor. In September 2002, Adams hired his friend of twenty years, Mike McCollum, to be purchasing manager, a rank equivalent to Stringer's and also reporting directly to Adams. At that time, McCollum was just shy of his forty-fifth birthday. The record indicates that McCollum had substantial warehouse management experience.
On October 29, 2002, Adams informed the owners of GBC that he wanted to terminate Stringer and a few other employees as part of a reorganization. That reorganization would collapse the warehouse, shipping, and purchasing manager positions into one "logistics" manager position, reducing overall management costs. Adams intended to place McCollum in the new position. The owners agreed to the plan, and on December 2, 2002, Adams informed Stringer that he was being terminated.
Stringer then filed an age discrimination claim with the EEOC. GBC responded to the complaint in writing, stating that Stringer's position had been eliminated and his duties as warehouse manager combined with the purchasing and inventory management jobs into a new position. Additional notes attached to the response included the statement, "Due to revenue reduction we were forced to undergo a company/management reorganization eliminating 4 positions." GBC was not, in fact, experiencing a reduction in revenues; however, the company has otherwise consistently referred to the reason for Stringer's termination as "management downsizing," and the collapsing of three management positions into one. GBC makes several references in the record to an organizational structure that includes twelve managers in a company of just 80 employees. The record includes uncontradicted evidence that McCollum did take on managerial responsibility for the warehouse, purchasing, and inventory with no increase in salary. Stringer states that McCollum was given additional help in his new role, but there is no indication any new managers were added in the areas of McCollum's responsibilities.
Stringer next filed this action in district court, claiming age discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). He has not asserted any federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After both sides had engaged in some discovery, GBC filed a hybrid traditional summary judgment motion/no-evidence summary judgment motion on Stringer's discrimination claim. GBC's summary judgment motion was granted by the trial court, and Stringer timely appealed.
In six points of error, Stringer generally contends the trial court erred in granting GBC's motion for summary judgment because GBC's summary judgment motion was inadequate, Stringer had presented sufficient fact evidence to preclude summary judgment, and the trial court applied the wrong law to the case.
In Stringer's first issue, he complains that GBC's motion for summary judgment is inadequate as a matter of law. Specifically, he states that "[a]ppellee's motion was procedurally defective because it did not clearly delineate and separate its arguments or its authorities pursuant to Waldmiller [ v. Continental Express, Inc., 74 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.)]." He also complains that GBC's traditional summary judgment motion was vague and ambiguous and GBC failed to render any argument or cite any authority to support its no evidence motion. We disagree.
The standards for reviewing summary judgment are well established. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), 166a(i); Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt., Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). Under a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that no material fact issue exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); S.W. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002); M.D. Anderson Hosp. Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam). After the movant produces evidence sufficient to show it is entitled to summary judgment, the nonmovant must then present evidence raising a fact issue. See Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996); Muckelroy v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 884 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied). When a defendant moves for summary judgment under rule 166a(i), asserting that no evidence exists as to one or more elements of a plaintiff's claim, the burden is on the plaintiff to present evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Gen. Mills Rest., Inc. v. Tex. Wings, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). The trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds relied on for its ruling. "When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories advanced are meritorious." Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).
A motion for summary judgment is sufficient if it clearly sets forth its grounds and otherwise meets the requirements of Rule 166a, T.R.C.P. Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. 2004). While the use of headings to clearly delineate the basis for summary judgment under subsection (a) or (b) from the part that relies on subsection (i) of Rule 166a would be helpful, the rule does not require it. Id.
GBC's hybrid summary judgment motion states in relevant part, "Under the traditional summary judgment motion . . . Plaintiff must produce evidence that would at least create an issue of triable fact that GBC's stated reason [for terminating Stringer] is pretextual, and that GBC actually fired Plaintiff due to his age." A movant is not required to specifically describe how evidence in support of the motion justifies a summary judgment; merely identifying a theory of liability or defense will suffice. Gehan Homes, Ltd. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 146 S.W.3d 833, 845 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed). We conclude that GBC has articulated a clear theory of defense in its summary judgment motion. We resolve the first issue against Stringer. Stringer's second and fourth issues are closely related. His second issue in this case is the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because appellant established a prima facie case of age discrimination. His fourth issue is the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Stringer presented fact questions on pretext sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
In Texas, an employer may not discriminate against its employees because of age. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.051(1) (Vernon 1996). In discrimination cases that have not been fully tried on the merits, we apply the McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) burden shifting scheme. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003). Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To meet this burden, a plaintiff must show (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was discharged; (3) he was qualified for the position from which she was discharged; and (4) he was either replaced by someone outside the protected class, replaced by someone younger, or was otherwise discharged because of his age. Russo v. Smith Intern., Inc., 93 S.W.3d 428, 435 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.], 2002), pet. denied) (citing Baker v. Gregg County, 33 S.W.3d 72, 80 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. dism'd)).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for any alleged unequal treatment. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Tex. 2001). The offer of a legitimate reason eliminates the presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff's prima facie case. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show the employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. Quantum Chem., 47 S.W.3d at 477. A plaintiff can raise a fact issue as to pretext if the evidence, taken as a whole, shows the employer's stated reason was not what actually motivated the employer and creates a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the complained of actions. Elgaghil v. Tarrant County Junior Coll., 45 S.W.3d 133, 140 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). Plaintiff's burden with respect to pretext is the same in a traditional and a no-evidence summary judgment, so long as the defendant has produced some evidence that it had a legitimate reason to terminate the plaintiff to support its traditional summary judgment motion. The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to prove by a preponderance of the evidence he was discriminated against because of his age. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
GBC concedes that Stringer has met the elements of a prima facie case; however, the analysis does not stop there. Under the burden shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas, GBC then had the burden of offering a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Stringer. We conclude GBC met that burden by producing evidence that Stringer was terminated as a part of a management reorganization and downsizing due to a top-heavy management structure, efficiency considerations in warehouse related functions, and revenue reductions. The burden then shifted back to Stringer to produce evidence that each reason given by GBC to terminate Stringer was pretextual. Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. System, 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001); Jaso v. Travis County Juvenile Bd., 6 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). Stringer did not produce evidence that a management reorganization due to a top-heavy company structure or an attempt to more efficiently manage the warehouse, shipping, and purchasing functions were pretextual reasons for his termination. As further evidence of GBC's discriminatory intent, Stringer complains that he was better qualified for the new logistics manager position; however, merely disputing GBC's assessment of his qualifications will not create an issue of fact. See Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir. 2002). Federal and state laws protecting employees against age discrimination were not intended to be vehicles for judicial second-guessing of employment decisions, nor intended to transform courts into personnel managers. See Jaso, 6 S.W.3d at 332. Because Stringer has not produced evidence to establish a fact issue with respect to the pretextual nature of each of GBC's reasons for terminating Stringer, he has not met his burden under McDonnell Douglas. We resolve the second and fourth issues against Stringer.
Because we conclude that Stringer has not met his burden under McDonnell Douglas, we need not reach his remaining complaints.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.