Opinion
C/A No. 6:18-2437-MGL-KFM
10-09-2018
Cale Marcus Strickland, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Chuck Wright, Officer Ledbetter, and Officer Cooper, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e)(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants, and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
By order filed on September 10, 2018, the plaintiff was informed that his case was not in proper form for service, and was provided with instructions for bringing the case into proper form (doc. 8). The court directed the plaintiff to complete, sign, and return the Court's Special Interrogatories (Id.). The order warned the plaintiff that his failure to comply with the order within the time permitted may subject his case to dismissal for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with an order of the court under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Id.). The time to respond to the court's proper form order has passed and the plaintiff has failed to respond.
BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a non prisoner and former pre-trial detainee, filed this action on September 4, 2018 naming the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office ("SCSO"), Sheriff Chuck Wright, Officer Ledbetter, and Officer Cooper as defendants. The plaintiff indicates that Sheriff Wright and Ofc. Cooper are employed by the SCSO, and Ofc. Ledbetter is employed by the South Carolina Highway Patrol. He asserts claims arising out of his arrest for trespassing on January 1, 2017, and his detention in the Spartanburg County Detention Center ("SCDC") for 110 days, including his "30 day jail sentence" (doc. 1 at 7). The plaintiff sues the defendants in their official capacities (Id. at 2-3). As to Ofc. Ledbetter, he appears to allege a claim for malicious prosecution arising out of his arrest. As to Ofc. Cooper, he asserts that his constitutional rights were violated, as well as South Carolina Code of Laws Sections 24-5-80 and 24-9-30, when he was allegedly placed naked in a cell for 24 hours. As to Sheriff Wright and the SCSO, he asserts his constitutional rights were violated, as well as federal and state statutes, arising out of the conditions of his confinement. Specifically, he alleges he was not provided with proper hygiene and bedding, and was subjected to forced showers during his stay in the SCDC (Id. at 10). The plaintiff contends he sustained psychological injuries, injuries to his teeth from being unable to brush them, and injuries to his legs and knees from his sleeping arrangements (Id. at 10). The plaintiff also claims he never recovered his car that was towed the night of his arrest (Id.). The plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1501(2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Failure to Comply with an Order of the Court
As addressed above, the plaintiff failed to comply with the court's proper form order entered on September 10, 2018, by failing to submit the necessary information to accomplish review and possible service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. It is well established that a district court has authority to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). In addition to its inherent authority, this court may also sua sponte dismiss a case for lack of prosecution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (Id. at 630). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that, in deciding whether to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b), a court should "ascertain (1) the degree of personal responsibility of the plaintiff, (2) the amount of prejudice caused the defendant, (3) the existence of a drawn out history of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion, and (4) the existence of a sanction less drastic than dismissal." Chandler Leasing Corp. v. Lopez, 669 F.2d 919, 920 (4th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and is thus solely responsible for his failure to comply with the court's orders. The court warned the plaintiff that failure to comply with its September 10, 2018 order could subject his case to dismissal. Rather than comply with the court's instructions to bring his case into proper form, the plaintiff failed to respond. Because the plaintiff failed to comply with an order of this court after being warned, this case may be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding the magistrate judge's explicit warning that a recommendation of dismissal would result from the plaintiff's failure to obey his order gave the district court little alternative to dismissal). As such, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ballard, 882 F.2d at 95 (finding that dismissal of a suit did not constitute abuse of discretion where the plaintiff "failed to respond to a specific directive from the court"). As it stands, the complaint alone is subject to dismissal as addressed below.
Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office
The SCSO cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a person. It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, so a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." However, sheriff's departments and similar groups of people or offices are not persons subject to suit under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a detention center, as a building, is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not "person" under the statute); Green v. Murdaugh, C/A No. 5:12-1086-RMG-KDW, 2012 WL 1987764, *2 (D.S.C. May 07, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 1987259 (D.S.C. June 04, 2012) (dismissing because police department was not subject to suit under § 1983). Therefore, the SCSO is not subject to suit under § 1983.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
With respect to the plaintiff's allegations against Sheriff Wright and Ofc. Cooper in their official capacities, they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity "extends to 'arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity," Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself," Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
"[U]nder South Carolina law, the sheriff and sheriff's deputies are State, not county employees." Edwards v. Lexington Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 386 S.C. 285, n. 1 (2010). As such, the plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Wright and and Ofc. Cooper in their official capacities are subject to summary dismissal because they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Sheriff Wright and Ofc. Cooper in their Individual Capacities
Even if the plaintiff intended to make claims against Sheriff Wright and Ofc. Cooper in their individual capacities, his allegations are insufficient to state a claim and are subject to summary dismissal. First, as to the allegations against Sheriff Wright, the plaintiff appears to allege a supervisory liability claim against him solely because he is the official in charge of the SCDC. This claim fails because the plaintiff makes no allegations that Sheriff Wright personally denied him hygiene, denied him bedding, or forced him to take showers. To successfully allege a conditions of confinement claim against Sheriff Wright, the plaintiff must show that he was aware of the plaintiff's purported mistreatment and was deliberately indifferent thereto, causing the plaintiff's injuries. No such allegations are presented here.
Next, the plaintiff fails to state a conditions of confinement claim against Ofc. Cooper in his individual capacity. The plaintiff states that Ofc. Cooper violated his Eighth Amendment rights by leaving him in his cell with no clothes for twenty-four hours. Because at all relevant times the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, his claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). In any event, "[the] due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Here, the plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation as he has failed to set forth any serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the alleged conditions and has further failed to show that the defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Thompson v. Brown, C.A. No. 3:11-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov.8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed "his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days"), adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec.2, 2011). As such, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Ofc. Cooper.
Malicious Prosecution
To the extent the plaintiff is alleging a malicious prosecution/improper seizure claim in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against Ofc. Ledbetter for arresting and jailing him, such claim is barred because the plaintiff has not shown that his conviction (for which he received a "30 day jail sentence") has been invalidated. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that:
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.512 U.S. at 487. In so holding, the Heck court found that § 1983 actions for unlawful conviction or confinement necessarily require a finding that the plaintiff's underlying criminal proceeding terminated in his favor. Id. at 484-86. Here, the plaintiff has not shown that he received a favorable termination of his conviction for trespassing. As such, the plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted with respect to his Fourth Amendment claim.
Federal and State Statutes
The plaintiff also alleges violations of Titles 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. However, while these are federal statutes dealing with civil rights violations, they are part of the criminal code of the United States, and cannot be used as a vehicle for civil prosecution. As for the alleged violations of S.C. Code of Laws Sections 24-5-80 and 24-9-30, the court should abstain from considering these state law claims. Such claims can be considered by this Court through the exercise of "supplemental jurisdiction," which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal claims. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387(1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, federal courts are permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Here, the Complaint fails to state a claim for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir.1999) ("[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.").
RECOMMENDATION
As the plaintiff has failed to comply with this court's September 10, 2018 order and the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it is recommended that the district court dismiss this case without prejudice. The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge October 9, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a),(d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).