Opinion
No. 3-833 / 02-1764.
Filed December 24, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joel E. Swanson, Judge.
Julie Stricker appeals from a district court ruling granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. AFFIRMED.
Aaron R. Murphy and Paul N. Gager of McKinley, Folkers, Walk Murphy, P.L.C., Osage, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Julie Burger and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ., but decided by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ. Eisenhauer, J., takes no part.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Julie Stricker was employed by New Horizons a/k/a RMG Resort Marketing Group (hereinafter referred to as RMG) from June 30, 2000, until her resignation on October 12, 2000. RMG entered into a twenty-year Inmate Work Agreement with the Iowa Department of Corrections (hereinafter referred to as IDC) that provided RMG would lease an area at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility (hereinafter referred to as FDCF) for one dollar annually in order to conduct a telemarketing business. RMG agreed to employ a minimum number of inmates who were considered employees of RMG. Stricker's job entailed supervising and aiding the inmates in their job duties. The lease agreement clearly stated that RMG was an independent contractor operating a telemarketing business at FDCF. However, employees of RMG were subject to advance approval by the State, were required to attend orientation as directed by the State, and were required to follow the rules and regulations of the FDCF.
Shortly after beginning her employment, Stricker encountered some behavior from William Bailey, President of RMG, and Phil Colwell, Vice-President of RMG, which she perceived was sexual harassment. Eventually, Stricker filed a complaint with Ernie Owens, Treatment Manger at FDCF. Owens forwarded the information to RMG. Subsequently, Bailey contacted Stricker and complained about being "knifed in the back." Stricker resigned and filed suit against FDCF, IDC, Iowa Prison Industries (IPI) (hereinafter referred to as State defendants), and RMG under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code chapter 216. The State defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Stricker was an employee of RMG, and not of the State, for purposes of Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the motion and stated in part:
The current action against RMG has been automatically stayed by the federal bankruptcy court.
The undisputed facts clearly established that Julie Stricker was employed by RMG. She was hired by them, she was paid by them, benefits emanated from RMG. Her employment duties were designed and controlled by RMG. When she resigned, she submitted her resignation to RMG. Clearly, Julie Stricker was never employed by the Defendants Fort Dodge Correctional Facility, Iowa Department of Corrections, or the Iowa Prison Industries. She received no compensation from them, she was not subject to withholding by them, she received no IPERS or any benefits from them. The extent of Julie Stricker's involvement with the Defendants was that she worked in a facility owned by them, but leased by RMG. She was subject to security regulations as the employees of RMG partially consisted of inmates sentenced to the custody of the Iowa Department of Corrections. In analyzing the totality of circumstances surrounding the working relationship of Julie Stricker, the Court finds no evidence from which a finder of fact could conclude that the FDCF, IDC, or IPI controlled the means or the manner in which Julie Stricker performed her day-to-day work. Accordingly, the Court finds that Julie Stricker cannot proceed on her claim of employment discrimination against the Defendants, Fort Dodge Correctional Facility, Iowa Department of Corrections, and the Iowa Prison Industries.
Stricker appeals.
Standard of Review.
We review a summary judgment ruling for corrections of errors of law. Howell v. Merritt Co., 585 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Iowa 1998). Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981, summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shriver v. City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1997).
Title VII/Iowa Civil Rights Act.
Stricker argues the district court erred when it concluded that she was not an employee of the State defendants for purposes of Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibits various forms of discrimination in employment. Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1999). It was passed in 1965 in an effort to establish parity in the workplace and market opportunity for all. Id. The Iowa Civil Rights Act was modeled after Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act. Id. Iowa courts therefore traditionally turn to federal law for guidance in evaluating the Iowa Civil Rights Act. King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 334 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1983). Federal law, however, is not controlling. Vivian, 601 N.W.2d at 873. We look simply to the analytical framework utilized by the federal courts in assessing federal law and not to a substitution of the language of the federal statutes for the clear words of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989).
The law is well established that Title VII protects employees, not independent contractors, from discriminatory employment practices. See Hunt v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 297 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The critical factor in determining whether Stricker may be considered an employee is the defendants' right to control the "means or manner" of her performance. Moland v. Bil-Mar Foods, 994 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (N.D. Iowa 1998). Other factors the court will consider are: (1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether the "employer" or the individual in question furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the length of time during which the individual has worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or both parties, with or without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the "employer"; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the "employer" pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. Moland, 994 F. Supp. at 1070.
Applying the factors set forth above to the present case, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Stricker was an independent contractor and not an employee of the State defendants. Stricker was a supervisor and support person for RMG. RMG specified her job duties and the State defendants could not control her job duties or assign her additional responsibilities. Stricker was paid by RMG. She received no benefits from any of the State defendants. RMG furnished all of the equipment for the inmates. In addition, the intent of the parties' agreement was that RMG and its employees were not employees of the State defendants. Instead, they were independent contractors.
Stricker argues the control the State defendants had over the manner and means of her performance shows that she was their employee. In support of her argument, she points out that she worked in a building inside the FDCF and was subject to their security measures. Stricker also notes that the State defendants had the right to approve her working at the prison and provided training for her. After a thorough review of the record, we find the State defendants had minimal control over Stricker's employment and that control was limited to security measures. We note a prison by its very nature must exert some control over its workers to ensure the safety of individuals on the prison grounds. Control over security measures alone is not enough to prove that Stricker was an employee of the State. For these reasons, we find Stricker was an employee of RMG and not of the State defendants.
Stricker, in her alternative argument, alleges she was a joint employee of RMG and the State defendants. The State points out and we agree that Stricker failed to raise this argument at the district court level. We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). It is not a sensible exercise of appellate review to analyze facts of an issue without the benefit of a full record or lower court determination. Id. Therefore, we need not address this issue, and we affirm the decision of the district court.